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Abstract 
 
Since the first pillars of the discipline of archaeology were laid in the nineteenth century, archaeologists 
have been aware of the potential employment of their research for political purposes. Despite the 
recognition of the role of archaeology in politics, and specifically in the instigation and promotion of 
different brands of nationalism, there have been few studies that focused on Iran. To fill this lacuna, this 
thesis aims to examine the close relationship between the rise of nationalism and its impact on the birth 
and development of Iranian archaeology. It is argued that during different political periods, in particular 
during the Qajar, Pahlavi and post-Revolutionary Administrations, various aspects of Iranian history and 
identity were selected to assist the construction of new State-sponsored narratives. The utilisation of 
archaeological sites to support the competing brands of nationalism promoted by each of these 
Administrations is analysed in this thesis through the selection of three case studies that represent the 
Prehistoric (Sialk), pre-Islamic (Persepolis), and Islamic (Friday Mosque of Isfahan) archaeological 
periods. Following an interpretive analysis of the internalist and externalist dimensions that fostered the 
foundation and development of Iranian archaeology, it is concluded that the discipline was born out of 
nationalistic traditions, and remains exploited as a potential instrument of legitimisation. It is further 
argued that during certain periods of modern Iranian history, the employment of archaeology to 
authenticate particular aspects of Iranian identity resulted in the institutionalisation of the discipline. In 
contrast, during periods when authenticity was sought in ‘charismatic leadership’ or ‘populism’, 
archaeology was cast aside as a pseudoscience to legitimise the ‘tyranny’ of Iranian dynasties or, 
alternatively, employed for populist projects to assert a particular impression of Iran as the protectorate of 
Shi’a Muslims across the globe. This thesis aims to demonstrate that it is only through such analyses of 
the fluid nature of Iranian archaeology and the review of the history of attempts at its politicisation that 
Iranian archaeologists can begin to address the potential challenges to their discipline and raise caution 
against the instrumental application of archaeology as a political tool in service of different political 
administrations and their nationalistic policies and resume a focus on the outstanding research questions 
and preservation challenges.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
“Twenty-five centuries after Cyrus the Great history is repeating itself through another great King, 
Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose nation has given him the title of “Aryamehr” (Light of the Aryans) 
for his gallantry and far-sighted efforts to revive the splendour of Persia, and to uphold a tradition of 
humanitarianism established by the founder of the Persian Empire.”  
(The Times 1971: V) 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The Pahlavis’ declaration of power that manifested itself in the celebration of Achaemenid archaeological 
remains is engraved in the collective memory of Iranians as the exemplar of the State’s exploitation of the 
past. The enigmatic ruins of Persepolis and the tomb of Cyrus (r. 559-530 BC) had evoked the 
imaginative speculations of Iranians and foreigners alike for centuries. Nevertheless, it was during the 
Pahlavi period, with the construction of Iran as a modern nation-state in the mid twentieth century, that 
archaeology was brought to the forefront as a potential political instrument to realise the prevalent 
ideologies endorsed by the State. This politicisation of archaeology, which in various manifestations 
continued into the post-Revolutionary period, is not unique to the case of Iran and, as Kohl and Fawcett 
argued (1995a:4), is a universal phenomenon.  
 
Since the first pillars of the discipline of archaeology were laid in the nineteenth century, archaeologists 
have been aware of the potential uses of their findings for political purposes. As a general process, the 
involvement of archaeology in politics commence once a country’s administrators aspire to create or re-
construct a new identity for their nation. In Europe, the exploitation of archaeology and the physical 
remains of the past was simultaneous with the Industrial Revolution and after the hegemony of 
Napoleonic France with the pursuit to generate distinct modern nation-states, which differed significantly 
from their neighbouring countries (Trigger 2006:217). In the Middle East, the main event initiating the 
creation of nation-states was World War I (1914-1918 AD), leading to the fragmentation of the Ottoman 
Empire and the establishment of new borders for Iran (Owen 1992:3). Accompanying Western 
2 
 
expansionism, the modern definition of concepts such as nation-state, nationalism, and the discipline of 
archaeology were transmitted to these newly formed nations in the Middle East. One of the prominent 
resources available to these young nations was the wealth of historic and archaeological monuments upon 
which new national identities could be instigated. In these countries, governments employed the 
abundance of historical parables and narratives to re-construct and re-present already existing identities in 
ways that justified the formation of new states. The embracing of certain aspects of existing national 
identities in expense to others was often administered through the use of specific historical periods or 
archaeological sites to legitimise the particular political ambitions of the empowered authorities.  
 
The potential dangers of the instrumental use of archaeology for political purposes became apparent with 
the calamities of two World Wars and the actions of Nazis and Fascists. Despite this realisation, the initial 
interest in the history of archaeology which began in the 1950s (Daniel 1950; Piggott 1985; Kendrick 
1950) aimed to provide a historical record of existing data and archaeological trends (Trigger 1994:114). 
This early emphasis on the history of archaeology eventually grew into its current state where numerous 
publications focus on the interpretive features of archaeology as a discipline and developments in 
archaeological theories began to reflect developments in the humanities and social sciences more 
generally (Meskell 1998:7). Therefore, whilst initially the analysis of the history of archaeology was 
predominated by Internalist approaches that centred on the methodological development and 
transformation of theory and technique (Willey & Sabloff 1993), more recent studies adhered to the 
Externalist perspective and focused on the influence of socio-cultural context on the practice of 
archaeology (Trigger 1994:118). The prevalence of the Externalist approach became apparent in the 
beginning of the 1990s as literature in archaeology devoted considerable attention to the instrumental rule 
of archaeology in validating particular forms of authority in different parts of the globe. This interest was 
built on the foundation of earlier work by authors such as Trigger (1984; 1985) and Hodder (1983; 1984; 
1985; 2002), who demonstrated a universal link between archaeology and the socio-political context 
within which it developed. Trigger (1994) argued that these concerns were to challenge the ideologically-
free Processual traditions of archeology that had emerged as a respond to the misuses of archaeology in 
legitimising Nazism and Fascism. This reactionary response combined with the philosophical movements 
derived from the ideals of Existentialism and Deconstructionism to emphasise the interpretive nature of 
archaeology as a discipline. The work of critical theorists such as Michel Foucault and his discourse 
analysis, interest in the history of knowledge, as well as the consideration of the role of the “author” in 
“proliferation of meaning” (Foucault et al. 2003:244, 252) were prevalent concepts prior to the 
consideration of archaeology as an interpretive science. 
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At the core of the new Externalist studies were the articulation of the complex relationship between 
nationalism and archaeology (Silberman 1989; Shanks & Tilley 1987, 1996; Meskell 1998; Diaz-Andreu 
2007). In particular, the political use of archaeology as an instrument to strengthen a sense of unity, 
identity, and territory was investigated. In this regards, Anthony Smith (1995a:15-17) maintained that the 
task performed by nationalists is very much similar to that of the archaeologists in that they both engage 
in the “re-interpretation” of the past for the mobilisation of the present. He further argued that 
archaeology provides authenticity for the national project of nationalists by creating a sense of 
community, rediscovery of symbols, confirmation of national territories, and the provision of a “golden 
age” (Smith 2001). The future of the ethnic community especially relies on the “golden age” when men 
were “heroes” (Smith 1999:65). The myth within which these heroes flourished is considered by nations 
as the great age of liberation from the foreign yoke (ibid.). The ‘re-invention’ of myth of common descent 
was also considered by Max Weber (1968:395; Bendix 1998:297) as an apparatus to legitimate the system 
of domination or the ruling administration. Smith (1999:66) further contended that historians and 
archaeologists assisted the process of “reconstruction” of myth in the “golden ages” for their communities 
by recovering artefacts and sites that were assimilated to the mainstream vision of a particular nation. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the selection of particular mythical characters as the archetype of 
national “hero” during different periods of Iranian history is reflective of the “golden age” each political 
community aimed to promote. The embodiment of Iranian heroes were sought in the mythical characters 
of the Shahnameh (the Book of Kings, completed in 1010 C.E) during the reign of Reza Shah (r. 1925- 
1941 AD); Cyrus the Great during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941- 1979 AD); and Imam Ali 
and Mahdi following the Islamic Revolution (r. 1979 AD-the present). 
This theoretical discussion of nationalism and archaeology initially emerged as a concern in Bruce 
Trigger’s examination of the various forms of archaeological traditions (Trigger 1984). In his publication, 
he initially identified three different types of archaeological traditions: Nationalist; Colonialist; and 
Imperialist (ibid.). While considering the prevalent tradition of archaeology in each nation as a reflection 
of the social context within which it is practiced, Trigger argued that the Nationalist tradition of 
archaeology is the most natural form of archaeological tradition (ibid.:356). Building on these notions, 
Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996:3) contended that the appearance of nationalism stimulated the very 
creation of archaeology as a scientific discipline. They further argued that this was due to archaeology’s 
predisposed features that make it vulnerable to manipulations by nationalism. These features are 
articulated as the versatility of archaeological evidence, which allows alternative interpretations of the 
past; the age of the archaeological evidence, which supports the claims of cultural continuity; and the 
physicality of archaeological evidence, which offers various means of exploitation through museums, 
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indoor and outdoor, and adaptation of national symbols (ibid.:20). Thus archaeological resources that 
articulate a distant past can be utilised to legitimise a particular national identity and, as Smith (2004:3) 
argued, conflicts over the meaning of the past become more than conflicts over the interpretation of 
different values. They become embroiled in the legitimacy of political and cultural claims that 
contemporary governments make on the basis of what is considered as “authentic” past (ibid.). In Iran 
where this “authentic” past is disputed, the interpretation of the past frequently alternates between the pre-
Islamic and Islamic Iranian identity as a suitable policy of legitimisation. 
As the above arguments imply, although most archaeologies are Nationalist, there are considerable 
variations in the archaeological traditions of each nation or within different historical periods in a single 
nation, depending on the particular frameworks that are recognised as “authentic” national traditions. The 
recognition of these “regional traditions” (Trigger 1984:355) require the comprehensive investigation of 
the orientation of particular tendencies that lead to the rise of regional states, nationalist trends and 
archaeological traditions. It is argued here that although the history of archaeology, and its susceptibility 
to the socio-political mediums, has been a subject of interest in the past decades, there has been an 
inadequate amount of research centering on the contributing factors that shaped the formation and 
orientation of the discipline in Iran. This thesis intends to map out the Iranian archaeological tradition by 
presenting the prevalent trends in Iranian archaeology and analysing the impact of competing 
interpretations of nationalism on the foundation and development of archaeology. By providing three case 
studies that cover Iran’s Prehistoric (Sialk), pre-Islamic (Persepolis), and Islamic (Friday Mosque of 
Isfahan) periods in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, this thesis will present the influence of nationalism in re-
constructing “authentic” pasts that assisted the adoption of contemporary political objectives of different 
Governments in Iran. In order to satisfy a complete understanding of the process of development of 
archaeology in Iran, the provision of a historical background and an analysis of the socio-political 
frameworks that shaped this discipline is first required. In Chapter 2, this aim is achieved through the 
interdisciplinary analysis of the various Internalist and Externalist dimensions that have contributed to the 
development of Iranian archaeology from its instigation during the Qajar period, to its nationalisation and 
institutionalisation during the Pahlavi period and, finally, the setbacks and restorations that contributed to 
shaping the discipline into its contemporary form in the post-Revolution period. It is only through these 
emphases on the fluid nature of archaeology that archaeologists may address the potential drawbacks of 
their discipline and raise cautious against the instrumental application of archaeology as a tool in the 
service of State political intentions and nationalism.  
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1.2. Background to a History of Political Archaeology    
 
As noted above, the history of archaeology follows the socio-political transformations and intellectual 
trends that emerged at the end of eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century. The most 
significant of these modifications involved the transformation of world empires into nation-states and the 
consequent rise of nationalism in Europe (Diaz-Andreu 2007:131). The involvement of archaeology in 
politics commences once the new nation-states aspired to legitimise their authority through creating a new 
identity for their young nation. These identities were often artificial narratives erected on the 
misconceptions or mistreatment of data gathered by archaeologists. Mythical symbols and lost glories 
became national banners that legitimised the existence of the new nations. Subsequent to these new 
conversions, the world witnessed a simultaneous eruption of interest in archaeology in quest for a 
comprehensible past (Kohl 1998:226). As Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996:3) argued, it was during this 
period that archaeology emerged as an institutionalised discipline. 
 
It is true that the obscured interaction of politics and archaeology is a recent discourse within the 
scientific debates, nevertheless, the affiliation of these two fields and the politicisation of ancient 
monuments go back to the fifteenth century and the emergence of the Renaissance. Indeed, it is possible 
to stress that the Renaissance was inspired by the rediscovery of sculptures, architectures, and literature 
work from ancient Greece and Rome (Corrain 2008:8). The Medici family as the patrons of the 
Renaissance art consolidated their power by fabricating an image of themselves through visual and 
literary art that connected the past with the present and enhanced their status as a prominent dynasty 
(Cheney 2002:107). According to Vasari, the great Michelangelo began his career as the forger of 
Ancient Roman sculpture at a time when interest in ancient artefacts provided a market for fake antiquity 
(Briefel 2004:27). Interest in the remains of past civilisations continued into the eighteenth century and 
was utilised by the Popes in an attempt to identify with Classical values and enhance the religious prestige 
of the clergies in Europe (Dyson 2006:12-15). These attempts were to counter the serious criticisms that 
were posed to the Church with the emergence of secular ideals of the Enlightenment. Thus, it became the 
cultural policy of Popes, such as Clement XIV (r. 1769-1774 AD) and Pius VI (r. 1775-1799 AD) to hire 
antiquarians to excavate Classical sites and enhance the treasures displayed in the Vatican (ibid.:12). This 
trend continued on to the period of the French Revolution (1789-1799 AD), when Napoleon aspired to 
legitimise the hegemony of France through establishing historical and cultural ties with the values of 
Classical civilisations. His attempt to present himself as Mars, the God of War, with the placement of his 
Augustus like statue between the Arch of Titus and that of Septimius Severus in Rome is one such 
example (Huet 1999:59). These attempts played a role in the formation of the French nation by creating 
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an image of progress that linked France to the ancient civilisations (Diaz-Andreu 2007:61). The French 
Revolution and its focus on Classical antiquity is recognised as the initial incentive for the 
institutionalisation of archaeology within a context where archaeology was under the direct influence of 
politics (ibid.:69). The politicisation of archaeology was perpetuated with the expansion of the world 
empires and colonialism that followed the Industrial Revolution. During this period, countries like Greece 
employed archaeology as a tool to expand their territories, while imperial powers such as France and Italy 
implemented an Evolutionary approach that entitled them to re-claim the ancient cities of Asia Minor, 
Middle East and North Africa that possessed Biblical and Classical monuments (Dyson 2006:182). As 
will be argued in Chapter 2, this provided the main incentive for the British and French interest in the 
archaeological remains in Iran.  
The discipline of archaeology was further influenced by the explosion of urban industrialism that coerced 
the rising of new classes, ethnic migrations, and racist xenophobia against lower classes and foreigners, 
especially the Jews (Hobsbawm 1994:109-11). As this form of nationalism reached its apogee in the mid 
twentieth century with Fascism and Nazism, the foundations of the Culture-Historical approach were laid. 
The underlying assumption of this approach traced material culture of Prehistoric civilisations to known 
peoples on the basis of pottery and grave types (Trigger 2007:235). The emphasis of the Culture-
Historical approach on the Prehistory of specific peoples provided a model for national archaeologies 
around the world where specific archaeological cultures were seen as ancestral to contemporary ethnic or 
national groups (Trigger 1996:26; Kohl 1998:231). This was an instrumental tool in bolstering the pride 
and morale of nations or ethnic groups, especially those that were threatened or deprived of their 
collective rights by more powerful nations (Trigger 1996:26). The period immediately following the 
aftermath of World War II was dominated by an intellectual climate that was optimistic about the 
potential of science and technology (Hodder 1991:152). From the 1960s onwards, the intellectual current 
of theoretical archaeology adopted the positivist “New Archaeology”, later known as Processual 
archaeology, with an attempt to liberate their discipline from the political connotations that had provided 
for verifying the promotion of German nationalism and Fascism during World War II (Kristiansen & 
Rowlands 1998:32). From the mid 1970s onwards, as social theories of Post-Modernism emerged and in 
reaction to the scientific methods of Processual archaeology, a series of alternative viewpoints known as 
Post-Processualism developed (Hodder 1991:134). Hodder described Post-Processualism as an approach 
that emphasised the opening up of theoretical debates to a wider range of socio-cultural issues, including 
Marxism and Post-Positivism (ibid.:16).  
In the 1980s, interest was directed towards a discourse that focused on the evident interactions between 
archaeology and social, political and economical themes (Kohl & Fawcett 1995a:15). The resulting 
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research demonstrated the susceptibility of archaeological evidence to the interpretations made by 
archaeologists (Trigger 1989; Hodder 1999; Kane 2003). The indignations regarding the misuses of 
archaeology were so extensive that concerns were raised against the nature of archaeology as a 
“scientific” discipline (Trigger 1989; Kane 2003). While initially the associated relations concerning 
archaeology and politics focused on condemning  the exploitation of archaeological data for the 
promotion of Nazi or Marxist ideologies (Arnold & Hassmann 1995; Chernykh 1995), by the mid 1990s 
scholars such as Trigger, Kohl, Fawcett, and those who followed their lead, aspired to convey the 
relationship between the elevated nationalistic sentiment in the Balkans and the anticipated problems 
arising from the newly built nation-states after the break-up of the Soviet Union (Kohl & Fawcett 1995b; 
Dolukhanov 1996; Mirsky 1997). This incident re-oriented an originally prevalent Eurocentric discourse 
on the relations between archaeology and politics to encompass the Near Eastern and Middle Eastern 
geographical regions that had been previously neglected. The central concern of this discourse was the 
intricate influence of nationalism on the interpretation of archaeological data (Diaz-Andreu & Champion 
1995:11). As these themes were extended to include wider regional variations, emphasis on the 
implementation of the role of religion (Seely 2007) and imperialism (Diaz-Andreu 2007) on archaeology 
began to surface.  
As Kohl (1998:226) argued, the emphasis on the political character of nation-formation is essential since 
it can be applied to the treatment of archaeology and its relations to nationalism. Therefore, in order to 
assert an articulate role to the influence of socio-political context in Middle East on the discipline of 
archaeology, it is essential to address the existing discrepancies between the ‘West’ and the ‘East’ with 
regards to vital phases of socio-political developments such as the formation of nation-state, rise of 
nationalism, and promotion of national identity and their interaction with the development of 
archaeology. As discussed previously, in Europe, with the existence of few exceptions, the exploitation of 
archaeology and the physical remains of the past co-occurred with the Industrial Revolution and the 
aspiration to generate unique nation-states (Trigger 2006:217). This was a nationalist movement 
generated by the intellectuals who searched for a social place in a world dominated by the institutes of 
Monarchy and Church (Diaz-Andreu & Champion 1996:4). Conversely, in the Middle East, the main 
event evoking the creation of nation-states was World War I as noted above (Owen 1992:3). The events 
of the War not only established new countries carved out of the old Empires, but also introduced the 
Western concepts of ‘nation-states’ and ‘nationalism’ to Middle East. The incipient processes and the 
circumstances, under which these concepts developed, however, conspicuously differed from Europe and 
culminated in the formation of nation-states unique to the Middle East (ibid.). The main differences in the 
formation of ‘nation-states’ in the latter were twofold, existing ideologies and Western imperialism.  
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In majority of the Middle Eastern countries, where a lack of finance, power, and state bureaucracy 
prevailed, central administrations often used ideology as a means to claim sovereignty and authority 
(ibid.: 4). While in the West the creation of nation-states accompanied the elimination of religious power 
and its substitution with the concept of nationalism (Diaz-Andreu & Champion 1996:4), in the Middle 
East the inclusion of religious ideologies in the formation of nation-states was a more conventional 
inclination. In addition, the political interference of external imperial powers and their exploitation of 
resources was one of the main incentives for the rise of indigenous nationalism and the quest for the 
construction of independent nation-states. In these countries, given the absence of modern notions of 
nationalism, religion was often brought to the forefront to resist Western expansionism. As it will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, Iran was never an official colony but rather what was termed by Lenin as a “semi-
colony” (Lenin & Riddell 1984:258). In semi-colonies, although the external imperial powers did not 
officially control the administrative infrastructure, they extensively manipulated domestic affairs towards 
their own political ends. As Kamrava (1992:26-28) argued, the surrender of concessions to foreign power 
and the reception of large loans by the Qajars subjugated Iran to foreign hegemony and initiated the early 
sparks of nationalism and the desire for Independence. In Iran, similar to a number of other Middle 
Eastern countries, Islam, and in particular Shi’a identity, performed an emancipating role against the 
expansionist policies of the West during the Qajar and later the Pahlavi period (Keddie 2003:206). These 
socio-political dimensions against which Iranian archaeology was developed are discussed in more detail 
in Chapter 2.  
The different processes of creating nation-states in the Middle East in comparison with Europe meant that 
they followed different approaches in employing archaeology. Although the coercive use of nationalistic 
archaeology was an instigating phase in both Europe and Middle East, due to the cultural history, social 
composition and the political agendas that prevailed in the Middle East this initial phase became 
indefinite and archaeology is still utilised as a potential apparatus to meet political aims. This is 
particularly due to the feeling of insecurity that threatens the sovereignty of these nations (see Trigger 
1984:360). Despite acute differences in the official adaptation of archaeology in the Middle East, it is 
argued that the existing literature on the uses and abuses of archaeology in Europe can provide a 
remarkable platform against which the Middle Eastern experience can be evaluated. In this thesis, these 
objectives are achieved through the examination of Iran as a case study for the wider region as a whole. 
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1.3. Nationalism and Archaeology in Iran     
 
The persistent focus of archaeologists on the interaction of archaeology and politics in Europe has thus far 
been justified by the fact that, as Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1995:12) argued, archaeology and the 
concepts of nationalism and nation-states were initially experienced in Europe before spreading to other 
regions. In recent years, however, as scholarly studies on Europe continue, there has been a shift of 
interest to include the often neglected countries in the Middle East and to examine the extent of adoption 
of archaeology as a political instrument by politicians. These include attempts to produce a historiography 
of the process of archaeological development in India (Chakarbarti 2003), Iraq (Bernhardsson 2005; 
2007), Turkey (Shaw 2007), and other parts of the Middle East (Meskell 1998; Kohl et.al 2007). The only 
exception is Silberman’s (1989) Between Past and Present which looked into the interactions between 
nationalism, ideology and archaeology in Middle East and particularly in Israel and Egypt as early as 
1989. It is the intention of this thesis to complement this trend in the region by providing an analytic 
study of the development of archaeology in Iran.  
In contrast with the frequent analysis of historical incidents in Iran and the provision of sophisticated 
insights into the different aspects of Iranian nationalism, modest attention has been given to politicisation 
of archaeology as an instrument to fulfill particular nationalistic aims. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
this lack of interest in interpretive archaeology can be traced back to the socio-political dimensions that 
influenced Iranian archaeology following the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In particular, the aversions 
against the discipline of archaeology as a political tool to legitimise the institution of monarchy raised 
awareness amongst Iranian archaeologists against the potential dangers of politicising archaeology. In 
their efforts to counter the austere resistance to their discipline, Iranian archaeologists became 
increasingly absorbed in the adoption of ‘objectivit’ approaches in archaeology. This indifference towards 
interpretive archaeology may also reflect the belief that archaeology should be shaped by scientific 
analysis rather than socio-political dimensions. Although there are no signs that Iranian archaeologists are 
beginning to accept the limitations of what Feyerabend terms the “tyranny of science” (see Krieger 
2006:93), there are indications that they are becoming increasingly concerned with the Internalist and 
Externalist dimensions that continue to influence Iranian archaeology. Considering the interpretive study 
of archaeology in Iran is highly politicised, these studies are scarce and constrained by political 
limitations.   
It should be noted that Iranian archaeologists became engaged in debates concerning the interpretive 
features of their discipline in response to social changes and political liberalisation that followed the 
Presidential period of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005 AD). As Holliday (2007:14) argued, this period 
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was defined by intellectual debates regarding the very nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Given this 
critical socio-political context which provided for the spreading of the culture of social debates and the 
process of self-analysis (ibid.:14-15), Iranian archaeologists took initiatives towards understanding the 
influences of the socio-political dimensions of the Iranian society on their discipline. Of particular interest 
are Abdi’s publications on the interaction of nationalism and Iranian archaeology. Abdi (2001; 2008) not 
only provided the single analysis on the influence of nationalism on Iranian archaeology, but also 
considered the international bearings of Iranian nationalism and the sensitivities of political threats 
against the perceived symbols of Iranian identity, such as the Persian Gulf. Although the issue of the 
interactions between nationalism and archaeology was not explicitly addressed in any further research, 
there are sporadic references to the influence of socio-political factors on the development of Iranian 
archaeology. For example, Niknami (2000), in his publication Methodological Aspects of Iranian 
Archaeology: Past and Present provided an introductory overview of archaeological research in Iran and 
criticised the antagonised state of Iranian archaeology which failed to keep up with contemporary global 
scientific advances. Further, Gholi Majd (2003) and Goode (2007), provided a political analysis of 
archaeological activities during the early Pahlavi period as the French Monopoly was annulled and 
American teams began their expeditions in Iran. Other isolated cases are limited to the French 
archaeological activities in Iran from 1897 to 1912 and focus on the site of Susa in particular (Chevalier 
1997; Naseri-Moghaddam 2004), or the British archaeological activities at Susa and southern Iran in the 
1800s (Sarkhosh-Curtis 2007:166-178; Simpson 2007:153-165). Naseri-Moghaddam’s (2004) analysis is 
somewhat more in-depth as he investigates the socio-political impact of Franco-Persian relations during 
the Qajar period and its broader influence on granting the French the right to engage in archaeological 
activities in Iran.  
It is important to note that most of these studies addressed certain aspects of the Externalist approach 
discussed above, such as the influence of nationalism and socio-political impacts on archaeology; 
although Niknami’s (2000) analysis also provided a brief discussion of the methodological developments 
in Iranian archaeology. One confining common denominator to all these studies was their concentration 
on the Pahlavi period with few references to the Qajar or the post-Revolutionary period. This was due to 
the conviction that the Qajars had no interest in the archaeological value of the past and the prevalence of 
socio-political constraints that limit Iranian archaeologists in the analysis of such interpretive studies in 
more contemporary periods. Therefore, while during Khatami’s Presidency certain progress were made in 
re-orienting Iranian archaeology towards a more self-critical interpretive direction, in more recent years, 
there has been a tendency to evaluate particular problems in the evolution of theoretical developments in 
Iran within the scope of the Internalist approach. An example, is Fazeli’s (2010:1) reference to the 
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prevalence of what he called the “quasi-Culture-Historical approach” where certain aspects of Culture-
Historical approach are applied without adhering to the overall conceptual framework of the model 
(Fazeli 2010:1). Despite efforts to adopt an Internalist outline, these studies often failed to consider the 
changing intellectual orientations in other fields, such as anthropology and philosophy, which contributed 
to methodological modifications within Iranian archaeology. 
 It should be considered that in most contemporary cases, the history of Iranian archaeology is discussed 
in a descriptive manner within the context of an introductory debut without the provision of theoretical 
paradigms (Malek Shahmirzadi 1996:1999; Ma’soomi 2004). As Fazeli (2010:1) pointed out, the lack of 
healthy theoretical debates can be held responsible for the deficiencies observed in Iranian Archaeology 
today. It is the aim of this thesis to address these issues and to marry Iranian archaeology to Internalist 
and Externalist dimensions of theoretical debates. In the following section, the general outline within 
which these concepts are discussed in this thesis is provided.  
 
1.4. Thesis Outline  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters with three case studies supplying the core of the arguments 
investigated within this research. Having provided an introduction to the history of research in the 
analysis of the problematic nature of nationalistic interpretation of archaeological records in this chapter, 
Chapter 2 is concerned with identifying the ideologies embedded within the Iranian society from the 
Qajar to the contemporary periods and to consider their influence on Iranian archaeology. It is argued that 
as a prevalent form of resistance, anti-imperialist ideologies that manifested in the form of authenticating 
pre-Islamic or Islamic Iranian identities influenced the birth and orientation of Iranian archaeology. From 
an Internalist approach some of these ideologies are presented as Bazgasht (return) movements that began 
as a literary pursuit during the Qajar period and re-appeared in various manifestations during the Pahlavi 
and the post-Revolution periods, albeit with different narratives about what is considered an ‘authentic’ 
past to return to during each historical period. In addition, to lay the foundation for an Externalist 
approach, the political underlying of each historical period is examined and the reforms made to provide 
an underpinning for Iranian archaeology are addressed. 
It is the intention of Chapter 3 to outline the orientation of this thesis and to present the theoretical 
concepts relevant to this research. Given the core relevance of nationalism to this thesis, this concept is 
defined in terms of Smith’s Ethno-Symbolic approach (Smith 2009:27). This is followed by the provision 
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of various competing forms of Iranian nationalism, such as ethnic, dynastic and Islamic, which are 
defined in terms of Smith’s concept of “ethnie” (ibid.). It is further argued that the discussion of the birth 
of Iranian archaeology and its development cannot be addressed without the consideration of Internalist 
and Externalist dimensions that influenced the course of the orientation of this discipline in Iran. These 
concepts and the meaning attached to them will be particularly discussed within Chapters 4, 5, and 6, 
where the development of Iranian archaeology during various historical periods is considered against a 
backdrop of the prevalent nationalistic aims within altering political policies.  
Following the presentation of the socio-political dynamics that fostered competing forms of nationalism 
during different political periods and their influence on Iranian archaeology, the thesis will enter into the 
discussion of three case studies. Each case study has been selected to reflect the impact of socio-political 
context and nationalism on a particular archaeological period. Therefore, Chapter 4: “Nationalism and the 
Treatment of Prehistoric Archaeological Sites”, aims to contextualise the orientation of advances made in 
Prehistoric archaeology through analysing the treatment of the Prehistoric site of Sialk during different 
political periods. In Chapter 5: “Nationalism and the Treatment of pre-Islamic Archaeological Sites”, 
these same investigations are applied to the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis and finally, in Chapter 6: 
“Nationalism and the Treatment of Islamic Archaeological Sites”, the Islamic site of Friday Mosque of 
Isfahan is selected to undergo similar analysis. Each of these case studies is examined under four sub-
sections. Before proceeding to the analytical section of each chapter, a background is provided to 
introduce each archaeological site. This is followed by the division of each chapter into Qajar, Pahlavi 
and post-Revolutionary sub-sections where the application of different forms of Iranian nationalisms 
promoted by each Administration on each archaeological site is investigated. This arrangement will allow 
the drawing of parallels between different political periods and to depict the influence of their perceived 
‘authentic’ identity and appropriated nationalism on the treatment of each archaeological period. In these 
chapters, the Externalist and Internalist dimensions of an interpretive approach are investigated with the 
provision of the socio-political dynamics that influenced the orientation of Iranian archaeology and the 
assessment of the evolution of theoretical perspectives from one method to another respectively.  
The thesis will conclude by bringing together the main themes of the research and the representation of 
the complex relationship between different manifestations of nationalism, national identity and Iranian 
archaeology. Through the examination of three further incentives, namely, heavy reliance on historic 
periods in archaeology, failure to adopt scientific approaches due to the contextual differences in socio-
political dimensions between Iran and other nations, and the marginalisation of Iranian archaeology 
through an Orientalist outlook, further support is provided for the concept that archaeology as a discipline  
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was born and institutionalised in response to socio-political dynamics and that the orientation of its 
development or demise reflects the nationalist image that each political entity aimed to promote.  
 
1.5. Conclusion 
 
The central aim of this thesis is to explore the nationalistic tradition of Iranian archaeology by presenting 
instances that highlight the employment of different archaeological periods to the service of nationalist 
movements and the influence of different brands of nationalism on the birth and development of the 
discipline in Iran. The objectives of this interpretive analysis are met by investigating the treatment of 
three case studies of Sialk, Persepolis, and the Friday Mosque of Isfahan, that correspond with the 
Prehistoric, pre-Islamic, and Islamic periods, during various political Administrations. The application of 
social theories and highlighting the significance of social context in the formation of archaeological 
traditions is what sets this research apart from previous studies. It is argued that the lack of interest in 
analytic studies on the one hand, and the socio-political restrictions on the other, have hindered the 
maturation of Iranian archaeology into a scientific discipline and produced a tradition that has fallen short 
of global theoretical debates. In doing so, this thesis acknowledges the breadth of nationalism at play in 
Iran, rather than adopting a simple single definition of nationalism. This emphasis on diversity, as a 
central component of an interpretive approach, further sets the objectives of this thesis apart from 
previous studies on the interactions of Iranian archaeology and nationalism. 
Having thus defined the aim, objectives and context of the thesis in this introductory chapter, the next 
chapter will focus on presenting a historical overview of the interactions between archaeology and socio-
political components of the Iranian society. In doing so, the utilisation of archaeological past to provide 
support for different brands of Iranian nationalism and their accompanying ‘authentic’ identities are 
evaluated. The provision of this historical background is necessary as it will supply the foundation based 
on which Iranian archaeology was matured and present an opportunity for the application of Internalist 
and Externalist approaches which are essential to this research.  
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                                                         Chapter 2 
                           Nationalism & Archaeology in Iran: An Overview 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The Introduction presented the main aim and objectives of this thesis by demonstrating the intertwined 
relationship between politics and archaeology. This was done by establishing that, within a global 
context, archaeological remains are constantly utilised for the promotion of different political aims. It is 
now necessary to demonstrate the ways in which the Iranian past has been employed to endorse different 
political intentions during different historical periods. The ways in which nationalism and archaeology 
interact in Iran have to be explained in terms of domestic affairs with the rise of Iranian nationalism, the 
establishment of modern nation-state, and the emergence of modern Iranian identity; as well as in terms 
of international concerns that aimed to enhance Iran’s prestige and affirm its independence by depicting it 
as a ‘civilised nation’ with pre-Islamic and Islamic roots. The consideration of these themes is necessary 
in order to outline the essential contributing factors that shaped the traditions of Iranian archaeology.  
In Chapter 1, it was argued that the critical evaluation of the development of Iranian archaeology and its 
relation to various socio-political dimensions has been scarce. In fact, as Niknami (2000:39) has argued, 
the historical orientation of Iranian archaeology has led to the domination of a descriptive tradition that 
fails to analytically relate social phenomena to the discipline. This is of particular importance since it 
implies that Iranian archaeology has fallen behind other nations in the region, such as Egypt, Israel, 
Turkey, Iraq and India, in attempts to make a thorough study on the prevalent traditions of archaeology 
and the evaluation of the political context within which the discipline develops.  
With respect to Iranian archaeology, Trigger (1984:359) briefly referred to its tradition and classified it as 
Nationalistic in his global categorisation of archaeological trends. In addition, he emphasised that the 
excessive attention to the historical periods in Iranian archaeology created ambiguity by concentrating on 
the pre-Islamic period to advocate nationalist movements at times of secular domination, while the 
Islamic periods are exploited to promote pan- Islamic (pan-Shi’a) pursuit during the administration of 
pro-Islamic Governments (ibid.). The theme of religion, as mentioned by Trigger, and its impact on 
archaeology is the focus of discussion in Kohl’s (2007) book, Selective Remembrance. In it, he made a 
brief comment regarding the significant influence of an explicitly religious State on the practice of 
archaeology after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (ibid.:12). While the associations between pre-Islamic 
history and archaeology under the Pahlavis have been recognised, the influential role of theocracy on the 
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development of Iranian archaeology is less explored. Thus, the recently recognised link between religion 
and archaeology is especially noteworthy since it creates an opportunity to explore an unknown area of 
research. As will be illustrated, based on Trigger’s  (1984:355) argument that despite regional variations 
all archaeological traditions are Nationalistic, the primarily focus of this chapter is to elaborate on the 
fluid nature of nationalism and political identity in different socio-political periods and their influence in 
shaping the practice of archaeology in Iran. In addition to providing a background to the socio-political 
dimension of Iranian society, this chapter also aims to articulate the reforms made under different 
governments. For the benefit of comparative analyses, this chapter is divided into three periods; Qajar 
period, Pahlavi period and post-Revolutionary period.  
 
2.2. Nationalism & Archaeology during the Qajar Period  
 
In this section, it is argued that although the structure of the Qajar court rested on a tradition that seldom 
required the appropriation of the past for its legitimacy, the political applications of archaeological 
remains had already been recognised during this period. This is demonstrated by taking advantage of 
archaeological remains for their monetary value as well as for enhancing the image of Iran as a ‘civilised’ 
nation. These concepts are discussed in detail in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In this section, the Qajars’ attempt 
at unifying Iran as a nation, the prevalent forms of nationalism, and the state of archaeological activities 
during this period are discussed. 
 
2.2.1. The Qajars & the Construction of a Nation: an Experiment    
 
Iranian political development and its advance towards modernity is considered as a reflection of the 
country’s indigenous culture and geographical position in the Middle East. To evaluate the birth of Iran as 
a modern nation-state, the consideration of emerging powers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and their rivalry in the Middle East over economical and political affairs is of vital importance. While 
there had been contacts between Iran and the West from the time of Shah Abbas (r. 1571-1629 AD), the 
nature of these relationships remained commercial and, at times, military. The Qajar period marked the 
beginning of new types of relationships, which threatened the sovereignty of Iran as an independent 
nation. During this period, Iran’s failure to develop into an independent and modern nation-state is a 
mirroring effect of the influence of Western powers, especially Britain and Russia, who sought to control 
Iran as a buffer zone between themselves and other rivaling powers. It is here argued that during the Qajar 
period although Iran was not a modern nation-state, it was considered a centralised nation in its own 
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unique terms. This section also aims to address the socio-political dynamics and the intellectual trends 
prevalent during this period.  
Scholars uniformly agree that Iran was never colonised by expansionist powers but its autonomy was 
subjected to the intrusive demands of the West on a regular basis (Amanat 1997:1; Kamrava 1992:8). 
Wilber (1981:31) believed that this policy was achieved through restricting Iranian’s effort to establish a 
constitutional government and to adopt beneficial Western concepts. Thus, the import of Western 
concepts such as a modern nation-state, nationalism, and certain sciences such as archaeology had to pass 
through a filter of Western approval prior to establishing any foundation in the Iranian society. This does 
not imply that Iran was not a unified nation during this period. Rather, despite the Weberian (1947:347) 
“Sultanistic” approach to governing, the Qajar period represented the emergence of the first initiations 
towards creating a modern nation-state in Iran (Kamrava 1992:2; Amanat 1997:3).  
There were many differences between the Qajars centralised Government and those of European nations 
during this period. This difference rose from the origins of the legitimacy of the State. In Iran, this 
legitimacy did not originate in the constitutional laws but in the rise of “arbitrary rulers” (Katouzian 
2006:3). These rulers established their hegemonies by monopolising State property and distributing them 
within the royal household. Therefore, contradictory to the Western experience of nationhood, Iran had 
“no state, social class, laws and politics as observed in European history” (ibid.). According to Amanat 
(1997:7-9), the political order under the Qajar was unique in that the legitimacy of the Qajar kings was 
founded on the dual institutes of monarchy and Shari’a (Islamic laws).  
The most successful attempt at building a modern nation-state emerged during the reign of Naser al-Din 
Shah (r.1848-1896 AD) and the reforms that he implemented. As will be discussed in Section 2.2.3., these 
reforms were accompanied by more intense foreign involvement in Iran and had a negative impact on the 
development of Iran as an independent nation. These involvements were mostly in the form of 
concessions and large loans. The concession for building railroads and search for minerals went to the 
British Baron de Reuter, the concession for shipping in Karun River went to another British company- the 
Lynch Brothers, the Russian Company of Cie. De La Route started paving highways, and the French 
obtained the concession for archaeology activities in Iran (Abrahimian 1979:393). The nationalist 
movement which eventually led to the Constitutional Revolution (1905-1907 AD) was in part a response 
to the many concessions given by the Qajar kings to foreign companies and, in part, due to the Anglo-
Russian Agreement of 1907 by the terms of which Iran was to be divide into two zones of influence (Abdi 
2001:55). In this context, the Constitutional Revolution was the initial step towards establishing Iran as a 
modern nation-state.  
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The absence of a modern nation-state did not imply an absence of a national identity. Indeed, Keddi 
(2003:2) provided an argument largely based on the notion that an entity called Iran or Iranshahr had 
been in continuous existence since pre-Islamic times. This implies that Iranians throughout history have 
retained a somewhat unified national identity. Further, despite providing an incoherent view of the Qajar 
society, Wilber (1975:36) agreed that the Persians had developed elaborate systems of etiquette to 
overcome the existing friction in the society and presented a unified and coherent cultural homogeneity as 
a nation. Alamdari (2007:25-26) argued that, similar to other nations, a collective Iranian national identity 
was constructed through national myth and ballads. These ballads correspond with the epic stories of the 
Shahnameh, which provide historic continuity from the time of creation to the downfall of the Sassanid 
Empire, stressing the glories of Persia and preserving the names of national heroes (Wilber 1963: 35). The 
Shahnameh was also instrumental in shaping the intellectual trends during this period through the 
Bazgasht (return) movement. Luft (2001:43) argued that the revival of Shahnameh through this literary 
movement was essential in enhancing general interest towards pre-Islamic Iranian history and identity 
(see Chapters 4 & 5). Despite interest in the Bazgasht movement, the idea of the authenticity of Iranian 
nationalism or its import by the Iranian bourgeoisie is not complete without considering the Islamic 
foundation of Iranian socio-cultural traditions. According to Boroujerdi (1996:14), Iranian “authentic” 
identity is Islamic in nature. In the following section, the impact that these national identities had on the 
formation of Iranian nationalism is further articulated. 
  
2.2.2. The Qajars & Nationalism  
 
Iranian nationalism is one of the major areas of interest studied by scholars even though some conceive 
that modern nationalism was introduced to Iran at the end of nineteenth century (Abrahamian 1979; 
Katouzian 1979, 2003; Vaziri 1993; Ansari 2001; Keddie 2003). Abrahamian (1979:403) argued that 
nationalism and national identity were not new concepts to the Iranian society, rather, unlike the West 
where they were associated with archaeological monuments and historical remains, in Iran they were 
linked to cultural values held in the epics of Shahnameh and the ethical codes of the society. Through the 
Shahnameh, indigenous Iranian nationalism was appropriated to incorporate different ethnic or religious 
groups into a collective Iranian identity. In addition, given the religious basis of the Iranian society, the 
concepts of nationalism that were imported from the West by the intellectual elite were appropriated to 
prevent contradictions with the interpretations of Islamic ideologies (Wilber 1975:29). Katouzian 
(1979:533) argued that a defining moment in the manifestation of Iranian nationalism was the period 
between 1921 and 1926 when due to the weakness of Iranian central administration, foreign powers 
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enhanced their interventions in Iranian internal affairs. This weakness was not only conceived in the 
numerous concessions granted to foreign powers but also in the Qajars’ incompetence to defend Iran’s 
frontiers and the loss of territories in the Treaties of Golestan (1813 AD) and Turkamanchai (1828 AD). 
Therefore, nationalism emerged as a narrative capable of emancipating Iran from the expansionist policies 
of Russia and Great Britain and to form a democratic government (Katouzian 1979:534; Ahmadi 
2007:57). It was immediately after the arrival of protestors who returned from Tehran after the 
establishment of the Constitution that the phrase “Long live the Nation of Iran” was heard for the first 
time (Abrahamian 1979:405). It is important to note that given the appropriation of nationalism as non-
contradictory to Islam, the Ulama (religious clergy) were in the forefront of this nationalist movement 
(Keddie 2003:175).   
In terms of intellectual trends, apart from the Bazgasht movement, the pro-Aryan doctrine of intellectuals 
such as Akhundzade (1812-1878 AD) and Kermani (1854-1896 AD) was also significant. This group of 
intellectuals advocated the ‘superiority’ of pre-Islamic Iranian identity, while blaming Islam for 
‘contaminating’ the Iranian society. This trend was fed by the pro-Aryan intellectual movements of 
Western scholars such as Gobineou (1816-1882 AD), Cumont (1868-1947 AD), and Strzgowski (1862-
1941 AD) as discussed further in Chapter 4. In this thesis, it is argued that even though the foundation of 
these movements during the Qajar period instigated an interest in the past, their social and political 
repercussions appeared during the Pahlavi period.  
 
2.2.3. The Qajars & Reforms       
       
The majority of the Qajar reform movements culminated during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah. His 
initial interest in reforms that targeted to modernise and institutionalise Iran paved the way for the 
embryonic development of the Constitutional movement. These reforms were implemented in two waves 
under two different Ministers. The initial reformist movement in Iran came under the Premiership of Amir 
Kabir (1807-1852 AD). The establishment of the first secular school, Dar al-Fonoun, is considered as one 
of the most significant reforms during this period. In 1860s Dar al-Fonoun became closely associated 
with a freemasonry society called Faramooshkhaneh (house of forgotten), whose members were often the 
instructors or students of Dar al-Fonoun (Ekhtiar 2001:156). The initial purpose advocated by the 
supporters of this society was to strengthen the Shah’s power. However, Faramooshkhaneh grew 
independent from the Court and began campaigns for “governmental reforms, the rule of law, and the 
need for constitution” (ibid.:157). The anti-Court activities executed by the members of this society were 
soon condemned by the Shah and all its activities were band. Dar al-Fonoun also lost its initial appeal for 
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the Shah as it fed the anti-Government secret society (ibid.). It was partly due to the distrust of Naser al-
Din Shah towards the graduates of Dar al-Fonoun, that the focus of the curricula taught in the school 
shifted from military and science to history, geography, foreign languages and art (ibid.:159). Further, the 
study of certain translated books such as those related to the French Revolution was prohibited 
(ibid.:158). Nevertheless, Iranian intellectuals became familiar with the works of Descartes (Discourse de 
la method translated to Persian in 1862), Auguste Comte, David Hume, John Lock, J.S. Mill, and J.J. 
Rouseau (Parsinejad 2003:27). Although the influence of the philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment 
inspired some of the Iranian elite, perhaps the most significant advance during this period was their 
acquaintance with the Western approach to Iranian history.  
The second wave of reforms was carried out by Mirza Hossein Khan Sepahsalar (1827-1881 AD) who 
was educated in France (Nashat 1982:137). Hossein Khan became the Prime Minister in 1873 and began 
undertaking various political, military and cultural reforms (ibid.:138). As a part of his attempt to 
modernise Iran, he arranged several trips for the Shah to Europe between 1873 and 1878. The aim of 
these trips was to familiarise the Shah with the European culture. Although many consider Hossein 
Khan’s modernisation attempts, such as the auctioning of concessions like Reuter to foreigners and the 
organisation of expensive European trips for the Shah, as steps towards abolishing Iran’s independence, 
Hossein Khan can be identified as one of the first Iranian nationalists who advocated the ‘restoration of 
Iran’s glorious past’ (Nashat 1982:149). In fact, while in office, he used his authority over publications to 
introduce terms such as “patriotism” and “fatherland”, as well as writing extensively on topics of “welfare 
of the state and nation” and “Iran’s greatness” (ibid.:152). The introduction of such themes had a 
tremendous influence on the attitude of some court officials as well as the newly emerging middle class, 
setting the stage for further reforms.  
From the above section, it can be argued that some Iranian intellectuals perceived the expansion of 
Western powers in Iran as a route to modernisation (Kamrava 1992:8). These intellectuals believed that 
modernisation equalled the adoption of Western social values and more intensive relations with 
Europeans. In fact, Hossein Khan deeply believed that the word “civilisation” merely applied to the 
European countries and if Iran wished to become “civilised”, the emulation of the West was inevitable 
(Nashat 1982:137). As Diaz-Andreu (2007:67) has argued, this perception rose from the widespread 
belief during the period of the French Revolution that only the most civilised states could claim 
nationhood. 
Although the escalated interactions between Iran and Europe in the nineteenth century did not lead to any 
considerable changes in the Iranian society, it enhanced knowledge of civilisations beyond the Iranian 
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borders, creating an opportunity to be acquainted with Western ideologies and ways of life. These cultural 
and ideological exchanges often came in the form of travel memoirs of Iranians who had either travelled 
or lived in Europe; or the translation of Western books into Persian (Bakhash 1978:2). One such traveller 
was Haj Sayyah who visited many European countries and wrote about their political and social states. 
During his stay in London, he wrote, “Why don’t we have progress like these people? When will we wake 
up from our negligence? I was very sorry…” (Sayyah 1998:155). He also visited libraries and museums 
around the world and became one of the first advocates for the protection of national heritage in Iran 
(Abdi 2001:53). 
 
2.2.4. An Age of Antiquarianism              
 
The previous section demonstrated that during the Qajar period, Iran failed to become a modern nation-
state. It was further articulated that the interference of external powers and their exploitation of resources 
weakened Iran’s autonomy and caused severe financial distress. It is argued that the economic 
considerations of this period and the scarcity of the most immediate necessities of life made the practice 
of archaeology a “wasteful luxury” (Trigger 1984:357). Nevertheless, the socio-political dynamics that 
led to the initial manifestations of the rise of Iranian nationalism against foreign threat provided a 
platform for interest in the past. Trigger (1984:358) argued, under such historical circumstances, 
suppressed nations often turn to archaeology and history to glorify their national past in order to resist 
foreign influence. In the case of Iran, even though the foundations for such movements were instigated 
during the Qajar period, it is argued that the Qajar social context was far from ideal for the establishment 
and institutionalisation of archaeology. It is contended that although the Qajars had recognised the  
effectivness of archaeology as a political instrument, in particular pre-Islamic monuments, most of the 
archaeological activities undertaken by Iranians during this period are more suitably classified as 
antiquarianism. In contrast, the pursuits of foreign archaeologists in Iran during this period may be 
articulated in terms of their interest in Biblical and Classical remains (see Chapter 5) or in their collection 
of Islamic antiques (see Chapter 6).  
The intention of the first part of this section was to represent a comprehensive understanding of the 
Qajars’ outlook towards archaeology. The most important factor to consider while investigating the 
history of Iranian archaeology is to take into account the nature of the ruling administration, the 
monarchy, and the importance of religious authority, as the source of legitimacy for the Qajars (Amanat 
1997:8-9). With respect to the former, the succession of each dynasty from the previous one was 
essential, as this change often declared the prevalence of one Iranian tribe over another. Considering the 
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continuous rivalry among Iranian tribes and their role in the fragmentation of the Iranian society, it is 
suggested that the new dynasties were not liable to show sympathy or reverence towards anything 
constructed by previous dynasties. Although this may have been a general pattern, there were also 
instances of the Qajars looking into past dynasties for inspiration. In Chapter 5, the Qajar fascination with 
the archaeological site of Persepolis and the imitation of the mannerism of Ancient Persian dynasties are 
discussed in more detail. There were also isolated cases of Qajar kings or influential individuals who 
funded the refurbishment of historic monuments (see Chapter 6).   
With respect to the second issue, namely the essentiality of Shi’a Islam as a pillar of Qajar legitimacy, one 
has to consider the negative outlook towards the “ignorant” past, often promoted by Islamic ideology (see 
Seely 2007:16). The unfavourable attitude of the religious leaders towards a period in history of Iran that 
proceeded the enlightened age of Islam discouraged any interest towards the pre-Islamic past. Therefore, 
the refurbishments of past monuments during this period were restricted to functional public spaces such 
as, mosques, squares, bridges, bazaars and caravanserais. This restriction was also associated with the 
Islamic system of vaqf which is discussed in Chapter 6.  
It is also important to note the influence of Europeans in raising Iranian’s interest in their own antiquities. 
This new interest drove Iranian officials who had become impressed by the amount of gold and silver 
recovered by the French excavations, to launch their own treasure-hunting expeditions and collection of 
artefacts (Naseri-Moghaddam 2004:49, 253-2660). An account by Etemad al-Saltaneh, who was a Trustee 
of Naser al-Din Shah, reveals his new hobby of collecting ancient coins (Abdi 2001:53). As will be 
discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, such privately-funded treasure-hunting expeditions by Iranian elite were 
common across the country and encapsulated all archaeological periods.  
A more active era in the history of reconstruction and protection of Iranian cultural heritage came under 
the reign of Naser al-Din Shah. Due to his intentions to modernise the country and given his travels to 
Europe, which often included visits to museums, Naser al-Din Shah had grown interest in the Western 
practice of valuing the past. Naseri-Moghaddam (2004:254) points out that during these voyages the Shah 
was accompanied by Fuevrier, his medical specialist, who met the monarch’s interest in antiquity through 
explaining the process of human evolution using bows and arrows displayed at the Museum of Natural 
History in Paris. Further, at the Golestan Palace, there exist several photography albums, collected by the 
Shah, that contain depictions of ancient sculptures and inscriptions (ibid). Naser al-Din Shah’s interest in 
the past made him the first Qajar monarch to launch official excavations, hire photographers to depict 
Iran’s monuments, and establish a museum. The establishment of the first Museum, the Homayooni 
Museum, is particularly noteworthy. The Museum was established in 1911 and was located in the 
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Golestan Palace, where a room was adorned by the Monarch’s collection of antiques from Iran and other 
countries (Nafisi 2000:9). The collection of ancient antiquities and their preservation was, however, an 
old tradition in Iran and Chardin, in his travelogue to Persia in the seventeenth century discussed the 
existence of a collection of coins from the Median period, which were discovered in Marand in 
Azerbaijan, and kept in Shah Abbas’ court (Negahban 2006:46). Nevertheless, the first collection of 
antiquities organised in a space called ‘museum’ appeared by the request of Naser al-Din Shah. Due to a 
robbery soon after its foundation, the jewelry, which was originally placed in glass displays cases in the 
Homayooni Museum, was moved to the basement, and later on to the Jewelry Museum in the Central 
Bank of Iran (Nafisi 2000:10). In terms of the discipline of archaeology around the time of the 
Constitutional Revolution, although no activities were reported (apart from lootings documented by 
Naseri-Moghaddam 2004:17), one of the achievements of the Revolution was the establishment of an 
official post for a Cultural Minister (Abdi 2001:54). This event marked the initial step in recognising the 
value of cultural heritage by Iranian authorities. 
In terms of foreign archaeological activities, the British and French were active in Iran, although their 
interest in Iranian archaeology was delayed by Iran’s lack of Biblical and Classical monuments. By the 
end of the nineteenth century, the focus in Middle Eastern archaeology was no longer restricted to 
Biblical or Classical remains and Prehistoric research prevailed within many projects in the region. This 
diverted attention was targeted towards tracing back the origins of Europeans to Mesopotamia, through 
placing particular reliance on stratigraphy and cross-dating cultural sequences (Trigger 2007:246). The 
supplement of a comprehensive cultural sequence required the acquisition of data from Prehistoric sites in 
various regions of the Middle East. Thus, subsequent to archaeological activities in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, 
and Palestine, eventually Iran gained significance. In addition, with the implementation of antiquity laws, 
cultural property in countries like Turkey (1883), Greece (1932), and Italy (1939), were claimed by the 
State, limiting the export of antiquities and thus restricting international excavations. In Iraq, between 
1921 and 1933 archaeology was primarily managed by the British, who wrote the antiquity law (1924), 
executed it, and held the final judiciary authority (Bernhardsson 2007:197). The French acquired the 
concession for Iranian archaeology in 1900 and although their concession allowed archaeological 
activities in any part of Iran, they mainly focused on the site of Susa. Similarities between Mesopotamia’s 
cultural remains and those uncovered in Susa by the French Delegation intensified foreign interest to 
explore the Iranian antiquities and to trace cultural connections between the two civilisations. This 
international interest in Iranian antiquities conspired to exert diplomatic pressures on Iran to annul the 
French Monopoly and adopt an open-door policy. 
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2.3. Nationalism & Archaeology during the Pahlavi Period 
 
In this section it is demonstrated that incorporation of certain Western concepts such as a modern nation-
state and nationalism significantly influenced the institutionalisation of archaeology during the Pahlavi 
period. This was due to the fact that with the establishment of a modern nation-state and the fading of the 
traditional form of government, new sources of legitimacy were adopted to authenticate the Pahlavi 
dynasty. With the rise of Iranian nationalism, this legitimacy was sought in the ‘golden age’ of Ancient 
Persian Empires, and particularly in the legacies of the Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties. These themes 
are further evaluated in Chapter 5 through the analysis of Persepolis as a case study. In this section, as it 
was completed in the Qajar section, the Pahlavis’ attempt at creating and maintaining a nation-state, the 
prevalent forms of nationalism, and the state of archaeological activities is discussed in detail.  
 
2.3.1. The Pahlavis & a Modern Nation-State  
 
In this thesis, it is argued that the diminishing independence of Iran as a nation under the Qajars, 
accounted for the radical attempts by the Pahlavis to cultivate national pride through presenting a 
narrative of Iran as an ancient civilisation that surpassed the achievements of Classical Western 
civilisation. The determination to establish Iran as a sovereign nation-state and the objectives of 
modernisation were generated to combat the militant threats from foreign powers during the Qajar period 
and the two World Wars. In this section, the Pahlavis’ effort in constructing a modern nation-state and the 
impact of such socio-political dynamics on the development of Iranian archaeology is discussed in detail.  
 
“For too long my countrymen have relied on others. I want to teach them their own values, so that they 
may be independent in mind and action.”  
(Reza Shah cited in Menashri 1992:98) 
 
The Pahlavi period is often recognised as the hallmark of state building and modernisation (see 
Lenczowski 1978). In this section, the legacy of the Pahlavis, in particular the efforts of Reza Shah’s 
Government in building a modern nation-state is discussed. It is argued that while under Reza Shah the 
process of unification relied on the notion of ‘Aryanism’ and the heroes of the Shahnameh, during 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign more emphasis was laid on the institution of monarchy and the 
Achaemenid kings. As will be articulated in the following sections, these same tenors are observed in the 
implementation of the brand of nationalisms promoted by each monarch.  
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At the end of World War I in 1918, Iran had become a disoriented country without the sovereignty of a 
central government. The Constitutional Revolution had failed to unite and modernise the Iranian nation 
(Abrahamian 2008:34) and the country was on the verge of fragmentation. In light of these events, a 
series of dramatic political episodes resulted in the rise of Reza Khan (1878-1944 AD) as the ultimate 
authority. Through a coup d`etat in 1921, Reza Khan worked his way up to become the Prime Minister 
and in 1925, he crowned himself Shah of Persia (Asgharzadeh 2007:87). Despite the rise of nationalism, 
Iran in the nineteenth century had to confront many inadequacies in order to transform itself from a 
divided multi-ethnic society into a united nation-state. The solution of Reza Shah’s Government was to 
adopt a rigorous regime of Westernisation to establish a modern state. Consequently, he arranged for the 
application of the one culture-one state- policy as a modernisation strategy. These policies and the top-
down implementation of nationalism to homogenise the polyglot Iranian society correspond with 
Gellner’s notion of a “young-nation-in-a-hurry” (Gellner 1997:46). According to this view, nations that 
transform into States without passing the necessary precursors and time lapses, can nonetheless achieve 
their objectives of constructing a homogenous culture and a state-unit, through the employment of 
vigorous procedures (ibid.). 
The construction of a unified nation-state was achieved through the ‘invention’ and ‘resurrection’ of a 
common national identity. As Hobsbawm (1994:76-83) has argued, the “construction” of a national 
identity is based on two particular concepts, the “invention of traditions”, and the “invention of a 
collective memory”. Further, in correspondence with the German nation-state model, these concepts 
rested on two chief pillars of “superiority” and “continuity” (Heyd 1950:164). To attest the spirit of 
homogeneity, Reza Shah’s Administration promoted the ideals of an ‘imagined community’ that glorified 
the pre-Islamic Iranian history. Particular emphasis was laid on the common ancestry of all Iranians and 
their lineage with the ‘Aryan race’. This self-afflicted superiority and chauvinism had three intentions; 
firstly, to enhance national unity in the multi-ethnic Iranian society; secondly to reiterate Iran’s 
sovereignty over previous protectorates and extend the country’s political power beyond its current 
borders; and thirdly, to place Iranian’s “racial” composition, as superior in comparison with the rest of 
Middle Eastern nations (Abrahamian 2008:87). In 1934, the Government announced that, henceforth 
Persia would be known as “Iran”, the land of Aryans (Wilber 1975:162). This name change was justified 
through associating “Persia” with the Province of Pars (Fars), whereas “Iran” was perceived to invok the 
glories and the birthplace of the ancient Aryans (Vaziri 1993:67). Some argued that this name change was 
suggested by the Iranian Legation in Berlin (Wilber 1975:163). The Government’s attempt to make 
affiliations between Iran and Aryans was strengthen with the publication of Ernst Herzfeld, the German 
archaeologist who argued that the name Iran was derived from the geographical and political name 
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Aryanama Khshathram “the Empire of the Aryans” from which a new ethnikon Erani was derived 
(Herzfeld 1934:9). Ansari (2003:65) further maintained that the name change was justified through the 
anti-imperialist policies of Reza Shah’s Government which denounced the use of “Persia” considering its 
association with the “Persian Wars” and the defeat of Persia by the Greeks. 
The sense of ‘superiority’ and ‘continuity’ of the Iranian identity was further asserted through the re-
invention of a glorious imperial past for the Monarch (ibid.:36). It has been argued that prior to selecting 
the surname “Pahlavi”, Reza Khan consulted Ernst Herzfeld, about the origins of the word (Wilber 
1975:229). Ansari argued that at the time the word Pahlavi was attributed to the best of people in the 
Sassanid period and was interpreted as “civilised” and “free” (Ansari 2003:36). He further contended that 
the connotation of the name Pahlavi with a Sassanid “tribe” allowed Reza Shah to construct a lineage 
with a pure Iranian royal tribe (ibid.), a custom practiced by many previous Iranian dynasties and their 
founding members (see Chapter 5). This was particularly important to Reza Shah given his background as 
an ordinary soldier with no connection with Qajar royalty. 
Even though Iran was recognised as a Muslim country, Reza Shah’s Government promoted a narrative of 
Iran as an ancient nation with its own distinctive history and separate from the rest of the Arab and 
Islamic world. The ‘unique’ Iranian identity was further endorsed by emphasising pre-Islamic history and 
symbols. In order to implement modernisation, the Government aimed to secularise the Iranian society 
and diminish the power of Ulama. This task was especially difficult due to the influence of Islam, and in 
particular Shi’ism, with the Iranian identity in the absence of any other distinct national historiography 
(ibid.:7). The ‘continuity’ of Iran as a nation-state was thus emphasised through the prevalence of a long 
line of royalty extending from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavi dynasty (Wilber 1975:175). To further 
illuminate this continuity, in 1925, the Government replaced the Muslim lunar calendar with a solar one, 
which started on the 21 of March, the Ancient Persian New Year and then replaced the Muslim months 
with Zoroastrian ones (Abrahamian 2008:83). 
The introduction of a ‘unique’ collective national identity prevailed under Reza Shah, through the 
selection and presentation of historical figures from different ethnic groups and their transformation into 
national heroes. The main incentive was to re-invent a ‘collective memory’ for Iranians that fed into the 
notion of Iran as a united country with a homogenous culture. Similar to the German concept of Volk 
(Ergang 1931:206), Almadari (2007:28), argued that during this period mythical narrations and ballads 
were re-enforced and appropriated to fit the social values that assisted the construction of a common 
national identity. In correspondence with the policy of adopting a collective memory, legends were told of 
the courageous Persian heroes, the great military advances of the Persian kings, and the glories of the 
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Persian Empire. Further, new editions of poetry books by Ferdowsi, Sa’di, Hafez, and Omar Khayyam, 
were printed and integrated into school curricula and new mausolea were built to convert these 
individuals into national icons (Menashri 1992:98). 
The scheme of adopting a common national identity was also fostered through the promotion of the idea 
of ‘us’ against ‘them’ policies. Thus, those Iranians who had fought against the assault of conquering 
Arabs or Turks were made national heroes. For example, Ferdowsi and Babak Khoramdin were 
emphasised as figures who had contested the Arab domination and Arash Kamangir was hailed as a 
figure who fought against the Turans (Turks). There was an exceptional focus on Ferdowsi as the 
protector of the Persian language and national Iranian identity against the conquering Arabs (Perry 
1985:245) and in 1934 the Anjoman-e-Asar-e-Melli (Society for National Heritage) (hereafter SNH) in 
collaboration with the Iranian Parliament constructed a mausoleum for Ferdowsi in Tus, which was 
unveiled by Reza Shah himself (Negahban 2006:45). Some 45 Orientalist scholars from 18 countries were 
invited as guests to participate in the inauguration of the mausoleum (Wilber 1975:161). The celebration 
was aimed to remind Iranians of the patriotism of Ferdowsi and his attempt to glorify the achievements of 
earlier Persians to inspire his modern descendants (ibid.). Abrahamian (2008:87) has also argued that the 
location of this mausoleum may have been chosen in order to create a rival pilgrimage to the nearby Imam 
Reza Shrine. The SNH, which was established in 1922 further engaged in the organisation of public 
lectures on Iranian pre-Islamic and Islamic history as well as the publication of eight booklets on related 
matters (Abdi 2001:57). Lambton (1957:23) has argued that these efforts resulted in the enhancement of 
the international position of Iran while it helped to increase ‘Iranian national consciousness’ and 
‘superiority’ towards their neighbours and equality with Europeans. The construction of a unified national 
identity persisted with recognising “Persian” as the official language of Iran. Prior to these reforms, the 
absence of a unified language was a chief contributing factor to the fostering of factional strife already 
existing in the Iranian society (Abrahamian 1974:17). Abrahamian (2008:77) has recorded that two third 
of the military conscripts who were recruited from various regions, spent their first six months of service 
learning Persian.  
During the reign of Reza Shah despite a strict regime to construct an independent modern nation-state, the 
influence of foreign powers in Iran continued. This influence was emphasised with the discovery of oil by 
William Knox-D’Arcy in 1908. Although this discovery transformed Iran into a strategic region for the 
exploitation of Britain and later the United States, it also provided Iran with an opportunity to finance its 
modernisation reforms (Ansari 2003:9). These reforms were particularly apparent after the nationalisation 
of oil by Mossadegh in 1951 (see Diba 1986). In 1941, despite Iran’s proclamation of neutrality, the 
Allies invaded Iran, forcing Reza Shah to abdicate, and installed Mohammad Reza Shah as the new king 
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(Abrahamian 2008:97). In many ways Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign was a continuation of his father’s, 
with some minor variations. He achieved Reza Shah’s dream of turning Iran into a massive State structure 
by creating the OPEC and generating income from the rise in oil revenue (ibid.:123).  
In this section, the construction of Iran as a modern nation-state was discussed. In doing so, emphasis was 
laid on Reza Shah given that the project of nation construction was initiated and pursued by his 
Government. Mohammad Reza Shah continued these policies, albeit through more emphasis on the 
institution of monarchy and its unbroken continuation since its foundation by Cyrus the Great as the main 
component of Iran’s nationhood. In 1949, he replaced the solar calendar with an imperial one which 
allocated 2500 years for the presumed length of the Iranian monarchy, plus another 35 years for Pahlavi 
reign (ibid.: 152). His Government further launched a wave of modernisation projects which are discussed 
further in later sections. It is also important to note that, in comparison to Reza Shah, Mohammad Reza 
Shah was less hostile towards religion (see Chapter 6). For the benefit of analysis, the following sections 
are divided into two subsections where the socio-political dynamics and archaeological developments are 
presented under Reza Shah (r. 1925-1941 AD) and Mohammad Reza Shah (r. 1941-1979 AD) separately.   
 
2.3.1.1. Reza Shah’s Government & Nationalism 
 
The brand of nationalism practiced during Reza Shah’s reign will be discussed in Chapter 3. In this 
section, the nationalistic trends during this period are briefly addressed. At the core of the nationalism 
endorsed by Reza Shah’s Government was the promotion of a secular and ancient society. This 
secularisation, which was seen as a precursor to modernisation, was achieved through diminishing the 
power of the Ulama (Menashri 1992:90). In order to aid the substitution of Islam with secular 
nationalism, the Government reduced the status of clerical establishments and pursued a policy that 
emphasised the ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of Iran by adopting a narrative that linked Iranians to the 
Aryan race. Therefore, although this brand of nationalism was secular, it relied significantly on the 
‘ethnic’ elements of Iranian society. Considering that the Achaemenids were proclaimed as the 
descendants of the Aryans, emphasis was also laid on pre-Islamic Iran as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian 
history. The impact of nationalist thinkers such as Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1854-1896 AD), Aref 
Qazvini (1882-1934 AD), Mohammad Taqi Bahar (1884-1951 AD), Mirzadeh Eshqi (1893-1924 AD) 
were also significant. The tendencies of Kirmani’s patriotism and his blaming of Islam and Arabs for the 
“contamination” of the “highly sophisticated” and “civilised” Persian culture, intensified during this 
period (Bayat-Philipp 1980:75). The support that the Iranian intelligentsia provided for Reza Shah is also 
apparent in the writings of the poet Aref Qazvini who claimed: 
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“The winds of the Sardar Sepah [one of the titles of Reza Khan] will receive this country from the verge of 
destruction. As long as the mullahs and the Qajars remain who knows what dishonour will befall the 
country of Cyrus? … If the crown and throne of Anushiravan and Jam had any honour, this beggar king 
[Ahmad Shah] has destroyed it … Always the people were the arbiters of the nation’s destiny; it was the 
people who made Dereydoun and Ghobad their kings.” 
 (Aref cited in Ansari 2003:32) 
 
In 1920 Eshqi composed a nationalist Opera titled Resurrection in which the great kings of the past and 
the prophet Zoroaster return, and Iran is restored to its glorious past (Shafaq 1952:427). Bahar further 
supported Reza Shah’s cause by assuming great responsibilities in the organisational faction of the 
Democratic Party, which favoured the centralisation of a unified Iran in order to maintain its autonomy as 
an independent nation (Ghods 1991:35). The intelligentsia continued to endorse Reza Shah’s nationalism 
through the employment of their Western scientific expertise to gain a place for Iran in history. Following 
these attempts, Iranian political elite members, such as Mohammad Ali Foruoghi (1877-1942 AD), 
Hassan Pirnia (1871-1935 AD), and Hassan Taqizadeh (1878-1970 AD), began a campaign to recast the 
history of Iran and especially, pre-Islamic period by deviating from the European impressions of Iran and 
providing their own accounts (Abdi 2001:57). During this period a Party called Iran-e Naw (New Iran) 
was formed by the Cabinet members. The main aims of this Party were described as promoting the 
independence of Iran under the banner of Pahlavi; assisting the progress of Iran through the power of 
Reza Shah to civilisation and modernity; resisting foreign influence; opposing all reactionary and 
subversive ideas; and promoting honesty and devotion in public administrations (Grigor 2004:22). As a 
part of their endeavors, they articulated the significance of Iran’s pre-Islamic history which further 
complemented the nationalistic propagandas that were prevalent under the reign of Reza Shah. The pre-
Islamic Iranian identity was further aided by the archaeological findings, such as Ghirshman’s 
excavations at Sialk, that provided support for the Aryan heritage of Iranians (see Chapter 4). The 
emphasis on the myth of common decent and the Aryan race provided a platform for the Government’s 
adopted narrative of ethnic nationalism. This trend was also aided by the discoveries at Persepolis and the 
focus on pre-Islamic Iran (see Chapter 5). As will be discussed in the following sections, the necessity to 
supply the ethnic and dynastic nationalism of Reza Shah’s Government with a valid historical background 
provided the pretext for the institutionalisation and progress of enterprises like archaeology.  
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2.3.1.2 Reza Shah’s Government & Reforms 
 
The major pillars of change that characterised the Pahlavi period were based on centralisation, 
modernisation, and the establishment of institutes (Banani 1961:147). To achieve these objectives, Reza 
Shah’s Government instigated extensive social and educational reforms. Further military reforms were 
introduced to complement the Government’s intentions of promoting national unity and loyalty to the 
State. The procedures to endeavor such modifications in the Iranian society were merged with the 
embracing of secularism and Westernisation, both of which were supported by the intelligentsia while 
contested by the Ulama (Atabaki 2004:6-7). These reforms led to growth in economy and the formation 
of a middle class who became the catalyst for change in the Iranian society (Sayeed 1999: xii). Due to 
these modifications, Iranian society became more familiar with Western concepts, making the time ripe 
for the progress of cultural and scientific enterprises. Therefore, disciplines such as history and 
archaeology that were thought as wasteful luxury during the Qajar period became the foundation for 
legitimising the Pahlavi dynasty. This trend was fostered by the growing acquaintance of Iranians with 
foreign languages, which began during the Qajars and continued into the reign of Reza Shah. Many 
documents regarding Ancient Persia were recovered and translated. Consequently, by the 1920s, a 
complete history of Iran that extended back to the time of Achaemenid, as opposed to the Sassanid as 
recorded by Ferdowsi, was re-discovered and re-introduced to the Iranian society (Pirnia 1928:144). 
The core of the reforms made by Reza Shah’s Government aimed to foster patterns of change that 
provided for the abrupt achievements of constructing a modern nation-state. The adoption of a collective 
national identity was enforced through the instigation of a uniform culture and a common language. 
Alterations made in the education system were especially important as they aimed at reinforcing the 
national sense of belonging to a civilised and ancient nation with a continuous cultural tradition that 
surpassed the age of Islam. In agreement with these themes, the Government also made Persian the 
official language of the State and the education system was obliged to put strict emphasis on the Persian 
language as the standard dialect used in schools (Menashri 1992:96). The ultimate intention was to 
employ education as an apparatus to make ‘Iranian’ citizens for a newly built nation-state. Therefore, the 
expansion and progress of the education system was one of the main targets of reforms during this period 
(Wilber 1975:260). In 1922, these reforms continued by establishing the Shura-ye ‘Ali-ye Amuzesh 
(Supreme Council for Education) to outline education policies and by 1928 standard textbooks were 
issued (Menashri 1992:95). The growth of budget in the expenditures of Reza Shah’s Administration 
depict that between the years of 1925-26 to 1940-41, the Education Ministry increased its expenses from 
7 million Rials to 194 million Rials (Abrahamian 2008:69).  
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With the rapid pace of modernisation, alien technical and administrative words penetrated into the Persian 
language (Perry 1985:296). Although in 1933 the Dar ol-mo Allemin-e Ali (Teaching-Training College) 
formed a society to suggest new terms in arts and sciences (ibid.:299), the State additionally sponsored 
campaigns to target the ‘purging’ of Persian language from foreign words, especially Arabic. This task 
was undertaken by the Farhangsara (Cultural Academy), founded in 1935 (Wilber 1975:163). In addition 
the Department of Public Guidance, the SNH, the Geography Commission, the Journal Iran-e Bastan 
(Ancient Iran), as well as two main Government-subsidised papers, Ettela’at (Information) and Journal 
de Tehran, were created to promote national awareness in general public and advocate a pure Persian 
language (Abrahamian 2008:86).  
In terms of social reforms that targeted the Westernisation of Iranian society, the establishment of the 
National Bank (1927), Tehran University (1935), the National Museum (1937), the National Library 
(1937), the Trans-Iranian Railway (1939), the Post and Telegraph Office (1946), two hospitals, modern 
factories, along with cinemas, roads, cafes, theaters, and other necessities to accommodate a middle-class 
style of life are noteworthy (Abrahamian 2008:90). In the following section, the institutionalisation of 
archaeology as an instrument of legitimising the Pahlavi dynasty and promoting national unity is 
discussed.  
 
2.3.1.3. An Introduction to Iranian Archaeology  
 
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it is argued that Iranian archaeology was born and institutionalised in response to 
the nationalistic trends prevalent during the Pahlavi period. Considering that the Nationalistic tradition of 
Iranian archaeology was formed during the reign of Reza Shah and under the dominance of ethnic and 
dynastic nationalism, the review of archaeological activities during this period is of vital importance. In 
this section, a brief overview of these activities is provided. For the purpose of clarity, this section is 
divided into two sections. The first section is dedicated to examining the role of Iranians in the 
development and institutionalisation of Iranian archaeology, while the following section focuses on the 
impact of foreign archaeological teams on the development of the discipline in Iran.  
As demonstrated, the doctrine of Reza Shah’s Government centred on the construction of a modern 
nation-state and the adoption of a new national identity that aimed to unite the multi-ethnic Iranian society 
based on ‘true Iranian characteristics’ of the Aryan race, while blaming Islam for all the cultural 
inadequacies. Given that the source of legitimacy of Reza Shah’s Government was in ethnic and dynastic 
nationalism, the study and appropriation of the past through archaeology became an essential component 
of the State’s discourse. Therefore, similar to the experience of other nations in the making, the process of 
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constructing and consolidating a nation-state in Iran was achieved through the employment of 
archaeology as a tool that could recover the historic past and re-introduce it to the contemporary citizens 
as a part of their eternal identity and shared past.  
Smith (1999:176-77) further illustrated the imperative role of archaeology in the formation of nations by 
arguing for the cultural platform that archaeology facilitates in promoting dignity and authority, as well as 
bolstering self-esteem. He contended that the subjectivity of the scientific study of the past facilitates the 
introduction of severe changes, as well as providing models of nobility and virtue to be emulated by the 
contemporary society (ibid.). During Reza Shah’s period, the creation of a strong nation-state, abrupt 
socio-political reforms, and the elevation of nationalist sentiments, paved the way for the introduction of 
archaeology. Archaeology in return, was employed as an apparatus to foster the Government’s account of 
national pride and to confirm the cultural ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of Iranians. Archaeology’s 
function in providing Iranians with a common historical and cultural past, not only united the multi-ethnic 
Iranian society, but also emphasised the projected grandiose of the Ancient Persian Empire which 
contributed to the bolstering of Iranian identity. 
Given the Government’s recognition of the instrumental role of archaeology in providing a sense of unity 
and superiority for the Iranian society, archaeological sites that were selected during this period as a 
portrayal of Iran’s ‘golden age’ corresponded with the Achaemenid and Sassanid periods. The outcome of 
this movement, which presented contemporary Iranians as the true heirs of the Aryans, was a reflection of 
the “Pharaonicism” movement in the nineteenth-century Egypt (Meskell 1998:156). As “Pharaonicism” 
had become an instrument to assert a certain Egyptian identity, “Aryanism” became a strong ideological 
base for the construction of the Iranian identity in the twentieth century. This often chauvinist ideology 
claimed the existence of a unique Aryan national spirit, which had persisted over many centuries and 
passed on to the contemporary Iranians from the time of Cyrus the Great. This view implied that modern 
Iranians were descended from the pure-bred stock of Aryans and possessed their qualities. Through 
appropriating the archaeological heritage of the Aryans and their vast ‘Empire’, the Government was able 
to adopt its brand of nationalism and affirm Iran’s sovereignty in the Middle East. The search for the true 
Aryan qualities was reflected in the activities of the SNH and their projects of building mausolea for 
national heroes. Through their efforts, skull measurements of these national icons were “proved” to fit the 
criterion of “true Aryans” (Abrahamian 2008:87). In Chapter 4, the impact of the Government’s ethnic 
nationalism on Iranian archaeology is evaluated with reference to the study of the Prehistoric site of Sialk. 
This escalated interest in the field of archaeology during Reza Shah’s reign led to a number of progressive 
outcomes. These were the foundation of SNH, as discussed above, which held its first annual meeting on 
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30 June 1926 (Gholi Majd 2003:65); the eradication of the French Monopoly in 1927; the ratification of 
the Antiquity Law and the re-organisation of the Antiquity Office in 1930. Iranian archaeology was 
further institutionalised by establishing a Department of Archaeology at Tehran University in 1937; an 
inauguration of the National Museum in 1937; the publication of journals on Iranian archaeology such as 
(Athar-e Iran); and the excavation of archaeological sites that will be discussed throughout this thesis 
(Negahban 2006:57-68). 
In terms of institutions, the earliest institute with interest in archaeology was the Edarey-e Atiqat or 
Antiquity Office, which was established in 1910 and was often synonymous with archaeological activities 
in Iran. However, it is here contended that the SNH provided the preliminary foundations for the 
development of archaeology. This position is assumed considering that every member of the SNH’s Board 
of Trustees was in Reza Shah’s Administrative Cabinet and therefore capable of manipulating and 
implementing policies that served Iranian cultural heritage. Grigor (2004:22) argued that the members of 
this Society were intimately linked with the Iran-e Naw Party discussed above. The preliminary aims 
implemented by this Society including the building of a museum and a library in Tehran; documentation 
and registration of national remains; and registration of antiquities in possession of government and 
national organisations (Abdi 2001:56; Negahban 2006:43). The achievement of these objectives was 
imperative to the institutionalisation of Iranian archaeology. More importantly, this thesis argues that the 
SNH was instrumental in the formation of a homogeneous national identity that Reza Shah wished to 
promote. Thus, what is often dismissed as the penetration of politicians into the sphere of national 
heritage, in the absence of trained experts, was in part an institutionalised attempt to install a certain 
archetype of Iranian identity by creating common historical pasts through the employment of 
archaeological remains and historical figures. The SNH had a significant role in ‘forging a nation’ and 
implanting an Iranian identity by hiring Herzfeld in 1925 to investigate a number of sites as Iran’s 
national heritage. At the end of August 1925, Herzfeld’s efforts matured into the SNH’s first publication 
titled A Brief Inventory of Historical Heritage and Edifices of Iran (Grigor 2004:29). It is interesting to 
note that by 1932 this Inventory had expanded to include 247 buildings, about one third of which were 
pre-Islamic (ibid.:30). The society was also made responsible for the protection and restoration of heritage 
sites. However, in 1930 and upon the ratification of the Antiquity Law, this duty was granted to the 
General Office of Archaeology. In 1944, SNH was re-organised and launched the project of One 
Thousand Year Anniversary of Avicenna (http://anjom.ir/pishineh.html). SNH continued its interpretation of 
Iranian identity through the construction of over 30 mausolea and several memorial structures.  
Another active institute in the formation of Iranian archaeology during Reza Shah’s reign was the Edarey-
e Kolle Bastanshenasi or Archaeological Service of Iran, also known as General Office of Archaeology 
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(hereafter GOA). In contrast to the SNH, the active promotion of ethnic nationalism was in steep 
contradiction to the objectives of the GOA. This Institute was established in 1910 and before 1936 it was 
known as Edarey-e Atiqat (Antiquity Office). The Institute was initially responsible for the management 
of antiquities and their export out of Iran (http://www.icar.ir/documents/ ). Following the ratification of the 
Antiquity Law, the GOA was placed under the direction of the French architect, André Godard, and 
assumed a substantial role in the enforcement of the Law (Negahban 2006:62). In 1936 after the 
completion of the Iran-e Bastan (National Museum), the GOA’s headquarters were relocated from 
Masoudie Palace to the new Museum building (Abdi 2001:59). 
Integral to the preparations that assisted the transformation of Iranian archaeology from antiquarianism 
into an institutionalised discipline was the opening of Tehran University and the establishment of an 
academic base for the field of archaeology. Tehran University was inaugurated in 1935 with a symbolic 
act of placing a Gold Foundation Plate in the cornerstone of the University in the manner of the 
Achaemenids at Persepolis (Wilber 1975:163). The University was composed of six faculties, with 
archaeology assembled as one of the programmes within the Faculty of Literature (Negahban 2003:276). 
The first graduates of this programme obtained their Bachelor Degree in 1941 (ibid.). Among them was 
Fereydoun Tavalloli, whose dissertation focused on Timurid Art (Negahban 2006:84). In its early days, 
the Archaeology Programme at Tehran University was dominated by Iranian nationalists who formed a 
society called Anjoman-e Iranvij (Society for the Land of Iran). This Society was described by Abdi 
(2001:62) as a chauvinist organisation that aimed to promote Iranian nationalism. Among the founders of 
this Society were Mohammad-Sadeq Kia, Zabih Behrooz and Mohammad Moqaddam. Ebrahim 
Pourdavoud, another member of the Society and the first Professor of Ancient Iranian Cultures and 
Languages, is said to have been more moderate in his nationalist views (ibid.). 
The onset of World War II had unprecedented consequences for Iranian archaeology. While foreign 
archaeological expeditions were abandoned and archaeologists left Iran, Iranians began to advance into 
positions previously reserved for foreign experts. During this period, the SNH and GOA went through 
further organisational modifications to enhance their efficiencies. Furthermore, the Iranian archaeologists 
who were trained in Tehran University began to emerge as professional archaeologists. This progress was 
partially a product of the improvements made to the archaeology programmes at Tehran University, 
including the establishment of the Institute of Archaeology by E.O. Negahban. In addition, in the absence 
of foreign expeditions, Iranians began to take over excavations. In Chapter 5, it is argued that the majority 
of these Iranian archaeologists began their careers by engaging in archaeological activities at the pre-
Islamic site of Persepolis.  
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The second part of this section is dedicated to providing a descriptive analysis of the participation of 
foreign archaeologists and their contributions in forming the discipline of Iranian archaeology. In the 
earliest stages of foreign presence in Iran, Iranian archaeology can be divided into before and after the 
ratification of Antiquity Law by the Iranian Parliament in 1930. In the domain of archaeological 
excavations, the French were the first to initiate significant archaeological expeditions in Iran since 1884. 
In 1895, the French obtained a monopoly to explore archaeological sites in Iran in exchange for a sum of 
500000 Francs (Chevalier 1997:77) and later in 1900 a concession was granted which offered them the 
exclusive right to excavate all over Iran (Tissot 1994). During the 33 years of French Monopoly, 
archaeological activities were largely restricted to antiquarian pursuit and occasionally the provision of 
stratigraphy for archaeological sites. Gholi Majd (2003:4) has argued that this monopoly was a safeguard 
against the exploitation of archaeological material and the ratification of the Antiquity Law, which was 
encouraged and pushed forward by foreigners, especially Germans and Americans, made Iranian 
archaeology susceptible to more intensive antiquarian activities. In confirmation of this suggestion, the 
annulment of the French Monopoly in 1929 and the adoption of an open-door policy in Iranian 
archaeology intensified international interest to expand the margins of their projects into Iranian territory.  
It is further argued that European lack of interest in Ancient Persian remains was due to the scarce amount 
of Biblical and Classical remains, which they identified as their own historical past. The Classical remains 
of Iran were restricted to the monuments of the Achaemenid Empire, whom the Classical world portrayed 
as an Oriental despot and a stepping stone to the perceived glories of ancient Greece and Rome. However, 
by the end of the nineteenth century, the focus in Middle Eastern archaeology was no longer restricted to 
the remains of these periods and Prehistoric research prevailed over much of excavating projects in the 
region. By the time international interest grew deeper in Iranian archaeology, the global status of 
archaeology as a scientific discipline had gone through dramatic structural changes in theoretical 
framework and technical capabilities to conduct field-work. With respect to theoretical developments, 
archaeologists had abandoned the Evolutionary approach that prevailed in the nineteenth century and 
replaced it with the Culture-Historical approach, which placed an increasing reliance on diffusion and 
migration theories to explain culture change (Trigger 2007:218). The foundation of this new approach 
laid in the eventual emergence of economic deficiencies following the Industrial Revolution (Kristiansen 
1978:21). These changes induced a shift in the European societies and their Darwinian belief in the 
“continous progress” as a natural aspect in the history of human evolution and instead propelled them 
towards the doctrine of nationalism (ibid.). Further, the political transformations during this period, which 
encouraged dogmatic nationalism and embraced the racial convictions that triggered the two World Wars 
no longer favoured the gradual evolutionary approach of Darwin, but embraced the migration and 
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invasion theories to justify diplomatic policies. The outcome of these assumptions directly influenced the 
practice of archaeology. As Trigger (2007:199, 217) argued, the failed states externalised economic and 
social conflicts by blaming them on their neighbours and instead promoted national unity through 
common biological heritage and race. This encouraged an interest in Prehistoric remains through the 
state-sponsorship of excavations that validated the common ancestry of citizens of each nation (ibid.). 
Gradually, the establishment of a chronological cultural distribution in Prehistoric Europe intensified 
interest in the cultural influences that could be traced back to the Middle East.  
Several other factors contributed to the relocation of archaeological interest from Europe to the Middle 
East. To start with, the colonial adventure of the world powers in the Middle East and the sudden 
favouritism towards religion, which itself was a by-product of the failed European economy, justified the 
search for ancient material remains in the Old World (ibid.:229). These political interventions continued 
after the events of World War I, providing Britain and France with a ripe opportunity for the division of 
archaeological projects between the two countries (ibid.:255). Further, the prevalence of the diffusion 
approach was inflated with the interpretations of Gustaf Oscar Montelius (1843-1921 AD) and later 
Gordon Childe (1892-1957 AD), who claimed that in Prehistoric times cultural development had occurred 
in the Middle East and transmitted through a series of diffusion and migration waves to Europe (Daniel 
1981:114; Trigger 2007:228). In the 1920s and 1930s, the publications of Gordon Childe placed Iran on 
the Prehistoric map within the global context (see Chapter 4). In terms of technological advances, this 
period was revolutionised by the innovative scientific developments such as aerial photography, pollen 
analysis and, above all, radiocarbon dating, which transformed archaeology into a more professional and 
scientific discipline (Bahn 1996:197-99).  
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it will be demonstrated that the above advances in archaeological theory and 
methodological techniques did not have a substantial impact on Iranian archaeology, given the late 
development of archaeology into an institutionalised discipline. Nevertheless, the methods associated 
with the Culture-Historical approach were eventually adopted during Reza Shah’s time, considering their 
potential to assist the confirmation of cultural and ethnic ‘continuity’ of Iranians as a ‘unique nation’ were 
recognised by the Government. In addition, the centrality of typological and chronological patterns in this 
approach, profited international expeditions with the provision of artefacts that supplied their museums 
and assisted comparative studies with Mesopotamia. These projects became especially prevalent 
following the annulment of the French Monopoly.  
Despite the annulment of the French Monopoly, the administration of Iranian archaeology remained in the 
hands of the French. In 1929, André Godard, a French architect, archaeologist and historian from École 
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des Beaux-Arts of Paris became the first Director of the Antiquity Service of Iran, a position he held until 
1953 and again from 1956 to 1960 (Gran-Aymerich & Marefat 2001). As Director, Godard played a 
fundamental role in maneuvering the involvement of non-French Organisations, as well as the division of 
finds. Apart from his role in composing the Iranian Antiquity Law, Godard’s era in Iranian archaeology is 
marked by two accomplishments: the design and construction of the Iran-e Bastan Museum and the 
inauguration of the first Iranian Journal of Archaeology (Athar-e Iran) (Abdi 2001:59). Godard’s 
background in architecture transformed him into one of the pioneers in the institutionalisation of 
architecture in Iran and provided him with the opportunity to engage in building governmental and 
cultural complexes for the Pahlavis. The Iran-e Bastan Museum, which was modeled after the Sassanid 
Palace of Ctesiphon, is considered as one of Godard’s major contributions to the institutionalisation of 
Iranian archaeology and architecturally echoed the Government’s attempt at the appropriation of past 
Iranian dynasties. In 1936 the collections were transformed from the old National Museum to the new 
building and the Museum was officially founded by Reza Shah in 1937 (Abdi 2001:59). In addition, the 
Parse Museum in Shiraz (1936) and Persepolis Museum (1937) were established as the first museum 
complexes outside Tehran. Godard’s Athar-e Iran journal of archaeology was published in French twice 
annually, from 1936 to 1949 (Gran-Aymerich & Marefat 2001).   
The major foreign archaeological activities during this period, mainly undertaken by American 
expeditions, will be discussed in further details in the following chapters. It is further argued that under 
the reign of Reza Shah, given the consideration of ‘Aryan race’ as the ‘authentic’ Iranian identity, all 
archaeological sites, including Islamic ones, were studied within the ‘ethnic’ Iranian context.  
  
2.3.2.1. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government & Nationalism  
 
In this thesis, the brand of nationalism implemented by Reza Shah’s Government is described as an 
instrument to foster the sense of superiority and pride within the Iranian society in order to address the 
crisis of inferiority experienced by Iranians during the Qajar period and during the occupation of Iran by 
the Allies. Therefore, Reza Shah’s Government adopted a brand of nationalism that focused on the ethnic 
elements of Iranian identity and the myth of common descent, Aryans, to emphasise the unity of Iran as 
an independent nation-state, and its superiority in comparison with other nations. The reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah can be considered as a continuation of Reza Shah’s policies as the official 
objectives for modernisation and Westernisation of Iran continued, albeit with less emphasis on 
secularising the society (Pahlavi 1961:165). A point of departure that differentiated the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah from that of his father is the fact that he inherited a nation-state; therefore, his 
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brand of nationalism was targeted towards the maintenance of that State. This contention was increasingly 
addressed in the legitimisation of monarchy as the most appropriate form of government for Iran (Ansari 
2003:33). Therefore, as Ansari argued, the brand of nationalism adopted by Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
Government increasingly centred on the persona of the Shah and thus corresponded to a form of political 
nationalism which he labeled “dynastic nationalism” (Ansari 2003:33; 2008:327). The endorsement of 
dynastic nationalism required the re-creation of the dynastic past, which mainly focused on the mighty 
empires of the Achaemenid and Sassanid dynasties. The ultimate expression of Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
dynastic nationalism was the celebration in 1971 for the Anniversary of 2500 years of Persian Monarchy, 
which took place at Persepolis and Pasargadae (see Chapters 5 & 7). The link with the Achaemenids was 
powerfully accentuated by Mohammad Reza Shah’s eulogy at the tomb of Cyrus the Great (Holliday 
2013:39).  
The dynastic nationalism that Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government advocated was accompanied by the 
adoption of a national identity that relied on the pre-Islamic Iranian history and the ideals of Western 
societies. The articulation of pre-Islamic Iran as the ‘authentic’ Iranian identity was resisted by a division 
of the intellectual movement that considered Islam and Shi’ism as the true Iranian identity (Ansari 
2005:328-329). The ideals of this movement, which was best represented in the writings of Jalal Al-e 
Ahmad (1923-1969 AD) and Shari’ati (1933-1977 AD), condemned the brand of nationalism advocated 
by the Shah’s Government as unauthentic, and considered a return to the Islamic political doctrine as the 
only remedy for the Iranian society (ibid.). Shari’ati, in particular, tried to make Islam compatible with the 
twentieth-century life (Kamrava 1990:67) and, therefore, an alternative Islamic Government was foreseen 
to replace the institution of monarchy. This group of intellectual elite were highly contradictory to their 
earlier counterparts- such as Ali Akbar Dehkhoda (1879-1956 AD); Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946 AD); 
and Sadiq Hedayat (1903-1951 AD), who were fiercely anti-Islamic and raised questions regarding the 
validity of Islam as a credible religion (ibid.). The advocacy of a ‘return’ to Shi’a Islam as the true Iranian 
identity had implications that will be discussed in the section on post-Revolution.  
 
2.3.2.2. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government & Reforms 
 
In the previous section it was argued that the policies of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government were to 
modernise Iran through Westernisation, therefore, the reforms that were carried out, aimed to achieve 
these objectives. More importantly the resources for the wave of reforms and institutionalisation were 
provided following the nationalisation of oil and increase in oil revenues. In 1951 the Iranian Parliament 
passed the Nationalisation Bill, paving the way for the nationalisation of the oil industry (Afkhami 
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2009:124). Arjomand (1988:72) argued that following the nationalisation of oil, Dr. Mosaddeq (1882-
1967 AD), aimed to restrict the power of the Shah into a constitutional monarch. In 1953, with the 
support of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency a coup d’etat was carried and Mosaddeq’s Government 
and his National Front Party was overthrown (ibid.). Ansari contended that following the Shah’s return to 
Iran after the coup, he began to see his Government in terms of “popular authoritarianism”, whereby the 
king was mandated by a grateful people over the head of the “reactionary” establishment (Ansari 
2012:156). Therefore, in the aftermath of the coup, Mohammad Reza Shah identified himself as a 
“democratic monarch” with reforms that reflected the modern and democratic nature of his monarchy 
(ibid.). In correspondence with these themes, in 1963 Mohammad Reza Shah launched the ‘White 
Revolution’ to further modernise the economy and social infrastructure of Iran. The White Revolution 
specifically targeted land reforms and women’s rights (Afkhami 2009:228). 
 
Following these reforms, education institutes grew threefold (Abrahamian 2008:134) and the literacy rate 
rose extensively from 20 percent to 42 percent (ibid.). The institutionalisation and advance of the 
education system was further structured to target the promotion of the objectives of the Pahlavi 
Government, which were the propagation of Westernisation, dynastic nationalism, and secularisation of 
Iran. To achieve these aims various foundations were organised and the Pahlavi court extended its 
influence into cultural forums. The Anjoman-e Qalam (the Pen Society), Bonyad-e Farhang (Iranian 
Culture Foundation), Bonyad-e Pahlavi (Pahlavi Foundation), and Bonyad-e Farabi (Farabi Foundation) 
are to name a few of these organisations (Boroujerdi 1996:45). The most significant of these, was the 
Pahlavi Foundation, founded as a court patronage for charitable social and cultural activities in 1958 
(Abrahamian 2008:127). Apart from organising cultural events, a branch of the Foundation, The Institute 
for the Translation and Publication of Books, had published more than 500 sociology, religious, historic, 
and literary works of international culture by 1977 (Pahlavi & Waugh 1980:120). The Pahlavi Foundation 
had shares in 207 companies, some of which were in the tourism industry, including casinos, cabarets, 
and hotels (Abrahamian 2008:127). Further, in 1961, the Vezarat-e Farhang va Honar (Ministry of 
Culture and Art) was established, which worked in close correspondence with the Pahlavi royal family 
(Hojjat 1995:200); in fact, Mehrdad Pahlboud, the Minister, was the brother-in-law of Mohammad Reza 
Shah. As will be discussed in the following section, the institutionalisation of culture and the appearance 
of court organisations that mediated the brand of culture that the Pahlavi aimed to promote had an impact 
on the course of Iranian archaeology. This influence was particularly noticeable as the Organisation of 
Attracting Tourism was established in 1963 and archaeological sites became recast as tourist destinations.  
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2.3.2.3. The Birth of Iranian Archaeology 
 
As demonstrated in the preceding sections, the Pahlavi Administration is considered as the first Iranian 
Government to officially politicise archaeological remains. During this period, the Western practice of 
utilising archaeology for the promotion of national unity and enhancing pride, which dawned in Europe in 
the early nineteenth century (Diaz-Andreu 2007:318), was introduced and deployed by the Pahlavis. In 
addition to the ‘invention’ of an identity that celebrated the ‘golden ages’ of the pre-Islamic Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government, increasingly relied on presenting the monarchy as an inherent 
nature of Iranian culture which had prevailed for the past 2500 years (Ansari 2003:171). In 
correspondence with the Pahlavis’ policy to portray Iran’s pre-Islamic past as the ‘golden age’ and the 
enduring nature of Iranian monarchy, a devotion to the advance of the field of archaeology was required. 
The Iranian socio-political and anti-imperialist context provided a platform for the endorsement of the 
Pahlavi’s ‘Persianising’ policies. The political policies of the Pahlavi period suggest that a surge of 
archaeological activities, mostly concentrated on the pre-Islamic period of Iranian history, was launched 
to propagate the importance of the Iranian empire and monarchy for international and domestic audiences. 
The ultimate exploitation of archaeology for this purpose was the celebration of the Anniversary of 2500 
years of Persian Monarchy at Persepolis, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. In this section, similar to 
the section on Reza Shah’s period, the archaeological activities during this period are evaluated first in 
terms of Iranian contributions and then in terms of the involvement of foreign archaeological expeditions. 
A distinctive indication of the development of Iranian archaeology into a scientific discipline was the rise 
in the number of Iranian archaeologists and their engagement in key positions in official institutes. This 
did not influence the SNH, given its inherent nationalist nature and the participation of political elites in 
the Organisation since its formation during Reza Shah’s reign, however, the SNH began a more intensive 
involvement in various cultural projects. In 1968 the Society was equipped with a permanent office 
following the purchase of an old house belonging to Amir Bahadour (http://anjom.ir/pishineh.html). In the 
same year, a specialised library was founded with holdings that focused on the history, culture, 
archaeology, geography and literature of Iran (ibid.). In addition, the Society continued to lend its 
assistance to the formation and interpretation of Iranian identity through the construction of statues and 
mausolea for Iranian national heroes. These constructed monuments were soon denoted as the most 
visited tourist attractions and pilgrimages in Iran and played a vital role in shaping the Iranian identity. 
From the year 1925 to 1979 the Society published more than 150 books which were housed among other 
publications in the library founded by the Society in 1968 (ibid.). The advent of the Islamic Revolution in 
the year 1979 concluded the activities of the Society until its re-organisation in 1986 (ibid.). 
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The involvement of Iranians was particularly apparent in the GOA, given it had been dominated by the 
French since its establishment. In 1952, Mohammad Taqi Mostowfi became the first Iranian Director of 
the GOA (Negahban 2006:64). With the foundation of the Ministry of Art and Culture in 1961, the GOA, 
the National Museum and the National Library were placed under this Ministry. With the incorporation of 
the GOA into the Ministry, the institute was renamed as the General Office of Archaeology and Folklore 
(http://www.icar.ir/documents/). However, in 1973 the Institute was divided into two separate Institutions, 
the Markaz-e Bastanshenasi (Archaeology Service), also known as the Archaeology Centre of Iran, and 
the Markaz-e Mardom Shenasi (Anthropology Service) (ibid.). By this time, the Archaeology Service had 
expanded its missions to 51 in number and had assumed substantial modifications to manage the Annual 
Symposiums of Archaeology for international and Iranian scholars alike (ibid.; Mousavi 2002:248).  
 In the section on the archaeological activities during Reza Shah’s rule, it was argued that the 
establishment of the Archaeology Programme at Tehran University was instrumental in the 
institutionalisation of archaeology. In this section, it is argued that the explosion of Iranian’s participation 
in archaeology should be accredited to the progress made by this Institute. In the year 1964, the 
Archaeology Programme at the Faculty of Literature became the Department of Archaeology with Isa 
Behnam as the first Head of the Department (Negahban 2006:85). By this time, E.O. Negahban, one of 
the most instrumental figures in the history of Iranian archaeology, had been employed at Tehran 
University and embarked on his projects of professionalising archaeology in Iran. Malek Shahmirzadi  
(http://archaeology.ut.ac.ir/moh-abad.htm) summed up Negahban’s contributions by stressing three 
substantial factors, being: the establishment of the Institute of Archaeology at Tehran University in 1959, 
directing the first joint excavation of the Institute and GOA at the Prehistoric site of Marlik in 1961, and 
the restoration of the Mohammad Abad Kharre Carvansarai and its establishment as a base camp to 
accommodate students during field seasons. Furthermore, Negahban (2003:277) contributed to the 
professionalisation of archaeology in Iran by establishing a Graduate School (Master’s Degree), 
increasing the amount and variety of field work trainings, and initiating a tradition of Prehistoric research 
in Iranian archaeology. Following these efforts, Tehran University added two modules of “scientific 
excavation” and “mapping” to its curricula and made them compulsory for all Graduate students in 1965 
(Negahban 2006:81). The Ghazvin plain was selected and preparations were made by Negahban to 
accommodate the University’s requirements for completing field research (ibid.:86).  
In 1959 Negahban, as the Director the Institute of Archaeology, invited Robert Braidwood, an American 
archaeologist from the Oriental Institute of Chicago, to begin a joint expedition in Prehistoric period with 
the Institute (http://www.icar.ir/documents/). In Chapter 4, the implications of this collaboration are 
discussed in greater detail. Even though an isolated number of archaeological excavations on Prehistoric 
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sites had been carried out during Reza Shah’s reign, the realisation of Prehistoric archaeology as a 
scientific discipline intensified during Mohammad Reza Shah’s period. Following these efforts, Iranians 
became engaged in excavation of Prehistoric sites in Marlik in 1961 and Hafte Teppeh in 1965.  
A final development worth mentioning during this period was the foundation of several local museums 
outside Tehran: Abadan Museum (1948); Chehelsotun Museum in Isfahan (1958); Naderi Garden 
Museum in Meshad (1963); Ghazvin Museum (1965); and Rasht Museum (1970) 
(http://www.caroun.com/Museums/2MuseumsIranContents.htm). More importantly the National Museum was 
detached from the GOA and became part of a new organisation called the National Organisation for the 
Conservation of the Historical Monuments in Iran (hereafter NOCHMI), which was established in 1956 
(Tilia 1978:68; Hojjat 1995:198). As will be argued in Chapter 5 and 6, in 1964 NOCHMI launched 
several extensive projects with the collaboration of Italian teams to restore historical monuments in Iran. 
This partnership terminated in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution.  
In the second part of this section, an overview of archaeological activities by foreign archaeological teams 
is presented. It has to be noted that in Chapter 4, 5 and 6, a detailed analysis of the major contribution of 
the foreign archaeological scholars in re-orienting the developmental course of Iranian archaeology is 
provided. Therefore, this section does not elaborate on this topic in detail. In terms of nationality, French 
and American teams remained prominent, albeit towards the end of the Pahlavi period many other 
international research teams were excavating in Iran. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the Americans 
had a particularly significant role in acquainting Iranian archaeology with scientific approaches through 
the introduction of methods that were associated with ‘New Archaeology’.  
The Americans were also influential in the domains of pre-Islamic archaeological projects and a notable 
example is the work of Erich F. Schmidt (1897-1964 AD), a German archaeologist who was trained at 
Columbia University under the supervision of Anthropologist, Franz Boas (Grusan-Salmann 2007:42). 
Schmidt who replaced Herzfeld as Director of Persepolis project, followed a model that emphasised the 
significance of stratigraphy (see Chapters 4 & 5). This was undoubtedly the influence of his teacher as 
Boas was one of the pioneers in advocating the stratigraphic revolution in the American field work 
(Daniel 1981:175). The Americans were also influential in the promotion of Islamic archaeology and its 
‘Persianisation’ (see Chapter 6). Therefore in terms of excavations, it may be argued that Iranian 
archaeology during this period was dominated by the methods and theories of Americans, while Italians 
contributed substantially to the development of conservation techniques in Persepolis and Islamic 
complexes in Isfahan (see Chapters 4, 5 & 6). Other archaeological expeditions were undertaken by 
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scholars from Germany, Britain, Japan and Canada. For a more detail analysis of these activities refer to 
the main three chapters in this thesis. 
 
2.4. Nationalism & Archaeology after the Revolution & the Emergence of an Islamic 
State  
In the previous section, the socio-political dynamics of the Pahlavi period and its contributions to the 
construction and maintenance of Iran as a modern nation-state were introduced. In addition, it was argued 
that the prevalent intellectual trends such as the nationalist orientation of societies like Iranvij and similar 
movements had a profound impact on the promotion of pre-Islamic Iran as the ‘authentic’ Iranian national 
identity, while the intellectual movement of those like Al-e Ahmad and Shari’ati advocated the search for 
‘true’ Iranian identity in the teachings of Shi’a Islam. In this section, it is argued that the Islamic utopia 
promoted by the latter intellectual movements greatly influenced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902-
1989 AD) who led the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It is generally held that during this period indigenous 
populist Shi’a ideology was adopted to defeat ‘Western imperialism’ by reclaiming true Iranian identity 
and culture, which was to be found in Shi’a Islam. However, the banner of anti-imperialism was not the 
sole motivation behind the Revolution. In fact, countless explanations have been offered for the 
proceedings of the Islamic Revolution. These included Khomeini’s condemnation of the institution of 
monarchy and his claims that its hereditary succession was wrong, invalid, and against Islamic values 
(Algar 1981:31); and the emergence of a wide social and economic gap between different levels of 
Iranian society. Dorraj (1990:176) argued that the Islamic Revolution was a ramification of the projection 
of ideals and dreams of people who felt oppressed by their own elites. These concepts were well 
represented in Khomeini’s speech on the New Year of 1980 when he declared that “the world today 
belongs to the oppressed, and sooner or later they will triumph” (Algar 1981:287). As will be argued in 
the following sections, this outlook towards Iran as an Islamic State, and the promotion of Islamic 
identity, eventually grew more accommodating to pre-Islamic Iranian identity, particularly following the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988 AD).  
 
2.4.1. Populism & Islamic Identity  
 
The aim of this section is to explore the means through which the Iranian nationalism and national 
identity was altered during the early years of the Islamic Revolution. It has to be noted that after the 
Revolution, these notions remained fluid and their patterns constantly changed in response to socio-
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political dynamics. This section further refers to the social and political instruments utilised by the post-
Revolutionary Regime to create an Islamic State that differed in structure from other nation-states. This is 
due to the fact that the Iranian Islamic State was founded on the pillars of anti-imperialism and 
disapproval of all Western concepts, including the notions of nation-state and nationalism. With 
Khomeini’s disapproval of nationalism (Algar 1981:302) the main supportive pillar of the Pahlavi 
Government faded from the Iranian political scene, at least temporarily. Khomeini argued that the 
nationalism endorsed by the Pahlavi was void of any accuracy since the monarchy was the “agent” of 
Western imperialism in Iran (Amuzegar 1991:142). The new Islamic movement further argued that 
people did not associate with the nationalism promoted by the monarchy, which centred on the illusions 
of the glories of Persian Empire. These mythical accounts about the “Great Civilisation” were too abstract 
and remote for the people who associated more with their recent Islamic culture (ibid.). A combination of 
these concerns provided the pretext for the type of “nationalism” that Ansari termed “Shi’a nationalism” 
(Ansari 2003:222). As will be illustrated, at the core of this nationalism was the endorsement of ‘populist’ 
policies that appealed to the masses. 
The fundamental question subsequent to the Islamic Revolution was the explanation for the survival of 
the Islamic State in the absence of familiar Western concepts such as nationalism. The debates that 
followed emphasised the replacement of nationalism by ‘Islamic ideology’. Considering that this Islamic 
ideology was founded on condemning imperialism and promoting the unification of Muslims around the 
globe, the major unifying de facto that contributed to the preservation of Iran as an Islamic State was an 
emphasis on the Islamic identity and sympathy with those who had been oppressed by the expansionist 
powers. On this issue, Mashayekhi argued that the political cohesiveness that was achieved following the 
Islamic Revolution was through replacing the Western discourse of “nationalism” with a “populistic pact” 
that emphasised the unity of Muslims around the globe through condemning imperialism and dictatorship 
(Mashayekhi 1992:56-7). He defined “populist movements” as a multi-class movement, led by a 
charismatic leader, in which the participants are viewed in a homogenous fashion as “masses” or 
“common people” (ibid.). In such movements, the class tensions are overcome in a euphoria of 
heightened nationalism where hostility is directed towards the imperialist powers (ibid.). Khomeini’s 
Government championed defending the right of the mostazafin (oppressed masses) through the discourse 
of Shi’a nationalism (Abrahamian 1993:47; Ansari 2003:222). It is important to note that these concepts 
are deeply embedded in the rhetoric of Shi’ism. 
This situation changed with the commencement of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980. According to Chubin and 
Tripp, both Iran and Iraq “universalised” the War (Chubin & Tripp 1991:9). Iraq’s attempt at 
universalising was by “Arabising” the War and Iran by “Islamising” it (ibid.). However, as Iran also 
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emphasised Iranian nationalism (ibid.), the War may be considered as an instrument of unification by 
appealing to both Iranian nationalist and Islamists who sought to defend the integrity of Iran’s territories 
(Hunter 1992:93). There is also an argument about Shi’ism being a “Persianised” and hence nationalised 
form of Islam (Keddi 2003:21). Ansari (2005:329) further contended that through Shi’a nationalism, the 
Islamic Republic facilitated the process in which Islam was nationalised. These factors assisted the 
construction of Iran as an Islamic State in the years following the Islamic Revolution. 
 
2.4.1.1. Khomeini’s Government & Reforms 
 
Immediately after the Islamic Revolution, a Provisional Government was formed with Mehdi Bazargan as 
the first Prime Minister (February 1979-November 1979). The significance of Bazargan’s Government is 
attributed to its embracing nature towards a diverse group of politicians with various political agendas 
who had united in opposition to the Shah (Ansari 2003:219). This was immediately prior to the 
transformation of institutes which will be discussed below. Within Bazargan’s temporary establishment, 
there were Cabinet members with affiliations to political entities, such as the National Front 
Organisation, that became decimated subsequent to the establishement of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
March 1979. This fact is of special concern to this section considering the impact of such members on the 
Cultural Ministry and its pivital role on Iranian cultural heritage. The majority of reforms, however, 
commenced subsequent to the replacement of the Provisional Government with an Islamic one.  
One of the major components of Khomeini’s doctrine in the composition of an Islamic State was the 
inseparability of “religion” from “state” in the Islamic tradition (Nafisi 1992:172). Therefore, a defining 
aspect of the Islamic Revolution was the transformation of the Iranian political culture and the 
internalisation of the Islamic traditions within the Iranian society. Thus, the Islamic State’s reforms not 
only targeted the official organisations and institutions, but aimed to conform every aspect of the Iranian 
life-style to the ‘authentic’ Islamic identity. The ‘Islamitisation’ of society began with the control of 
major institutions by the newly-formed State. Of particular interest was the ‘Islamitisation’ of the 
education institutes and their transformation to platforms for the promotion of Islamic ideology and 
values.  
In an analysis of the course of development in culture and education system following the Revolution, 
Nafisi (1992:162) demonstrated that the modification of the education structure was a key activity 
pursued by the State in order to implement the new Islamic ideologies and legitimise its authority. 
Khomeini himself repeatedly targeted the education organisations and accused them of being the “hub of 
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immortality and corrupt attitudes” that infused innocent Muslim youth with alien ideologies imported 
from the West (ibid.:163). Khomeini held the universities responsible for the prevalence of all the 
immoral values in Iranian society (Algar 1981:291). Thus, after the Revolution, the State’s priority was an 
institutional change that ‘purified’ the education system, with special emphasis on universities and 
Professors who had ideological links to East or West (ibid.).  
These messages were directed to the management of universities when in April 1980 the Islamic 
Associations began issuing statements demanding the closure of universities and the preparation for the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ and an Islamic paksazi (cleansing) (Behdad 1995:193). In June 1980, the Islamic 
Government called for the closure of all 200 universities and colleges throughout the country, an appeal 
that remained in effect for the next four years (ibid.:194). The authorities established an institute known 
as Jihad-e daneshgahi (The University Crusade) to “purify” all educational institutes from non-Islamic 
conformities (Hiro 1985:255). The Islamic rejuvenation specially targeted the review of the social 
sciences and humanities (Behdad 1995:194). Furthermore, all connections with foreign universities were 
terminated in order to “minimise any cultural contact with the outside world” (Hiro 1985:255). Many 
books were burnt and replaced by ones that conformed to the Islamic framework of the political system. 
By the spring of 1983, the Cultural Revolutionary Committee (CRC) had produced 3000 new textbooks, 
among which were also history books (ibid.). Nafisi (1992:168-9) argued that the higher education text 
books were re-fashioned to include Islamic attires, elaborate anti-authority themes, and promote sympathy 
with the poor and oppressed. As demonstrated, similar to the Pahlavi period, the legitimisation of the 
Islamic State was accomplished through the manipulation of historical events. However, a different 
period of the historical legacy was selected to legitimise the new establishment. In doing so, the Islamic 
State defended the retrieval of pristine Islam through the embracement of the inception of Islam in the 
Iranian history and the Shi’a culture as the pillars of Iranian identity (Shorish 1988:58). A crucial 
development during this period was the establishment of the Islamic Azad (Open) University in 1982 
(http://www.iau.ac.ir/index.php/2012-11-06-07-00-12/about-2/6-history.html). This private University initiated 
campuses across the country, providing remote Provinces with access to higher education institutes. 
In addition to the reforms that targeted the modification of Iranian society, there were also reforms to 
implement austerity measures in managing the Iranian economy. These reforms were particularly 
intensified given the financial pressures that followed eight years of war. These policies were 
predominantly based on the advocacy of Iran’s independence and ‘self-sufficiency’, the impact of which 
on Iranian archaeology will be discussed in the following chapters.  
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2.4.1.2. The Eradication of Archaeology  
 
Whereas during the Pahlavi period, archaeology was politicised and utilised as an instrument that aided 
the construction of a united nation-state, after the Revolution, archaeology was dismissed as a Western 
science and condemned for its contributions to glorifying the monarchs. Thus, not only did archaeology 
not play a role in the formation of the new Shi’a State, but it was widely denounced by the new 
Administration. In this section, an introduction to the locus of archaeology during this period is provided 
by first reviewing the proceedings of the Provisional Government and then discussing the perceived 
conflicting nature of archaeology with the Islamic State. 
As discussed in the previous section, immediately following the Revolution a Provisional Government 
was formed to intermediate the changes in the Iranian society towards an Islamic State. During this 
period, in the absence of legislative agencies such as cultural heritage organisations, and due to the 
termination of a number of archaeological institutes, such as the Department of Archaeology and Institute 
of Archaeology at Tehran University, and reduction in the activities of others, such as NOCHMI, the task 
of managing Iran’s cultural heritage fell under the domain of the Cultural Ministry.  
The political climate of the period and the tendency to dismiss Iran’s cultural heritage on the premise that 
it was an instrument for the monarchy to legitamise its tyranny, directed a significant blow to many 
cultural aspects of  Iranian society. Considering this antagonism towards Iran’s past and with the closure 
of universities and the collapse of central authority, the Provisional Government, with its nationalistic 
tendencies and the election of individuals such as Varjavand, played a vital role in rescuing Iran’s cultural 
heritage from destruction. Varjavand was intrumental in preventing the abolition of the Cultural Ministry 
during the early days of the Revolution. His contributions to Iranian archaeology during this period are 
discussed in the following chapters. 
The Provisional Government was terminated with the Referendum of March 1979 that appointed the 
Islamic Republic as the official Government. The immediate consequences of this development were the 
complete closure of universities (1980-1983 AD); the launch of the Cultural Revolution (1980-1987 AD); 
the dissolving of the Ministry of Culture and the formation of the new Ministry of Culture and Higher 
Education; and the establishment of the Iranian Cultural Heritage Organisation (ICHO) in 1986. The 
combination of these outcomes, in addition to financial curbs, restricted foreign policies, the loss of 
civilians and the destruction of heritage sites that resulted from the impacts of the Iran-Iraq War, 
dominated a decline in the management of cultural heritage and treatment of archaeological institutes.  
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During this process, the closure of Tehran University and the Department of Archaeology along with it, 
was of most significance. The closure of the Archaeology Department was highly contested by Iranian 
archaeologists, and therefore, it was re-launched in 1982 (Abdi 2001:70). Although the Department 
survived the Cultural Revolution, the Institute of Archaeology established by Negahban in 1959 survived 
only nominally, and resumed its activities in 1990 (http://archaeology.ut.ac.ir/about_us2.htm). The relegation 
of the Institute of Archaeology restricted research and excavations, paralysing Iranian archaeology for 
more than a decade. These restrictions were further enhanced given constrains on collaborating with 
foreign archaeologists. In 1985 a decree was released by the Qazvin’s Islamic Revolutionary Court to 
transform the Mohammad Abad Kharre Caravanserai, which was established as a base camp by 
Negahban to accommodate students from the Institute during field work, to a penitentiary (ibid.). Malek 
Shahmirzadi (http://archaeology.ut.ac.ir/moh-abad.htm) argued that the project was terminated owing to the 
expedient response of Doctor Ali Sheykh al-Islami, the Head of School of Literature and Humanities at 
Tehran University, who quoted Imam Ali’s statement about “transforming Iran to a school” and thus 
provided an Islamic justification for the preservation of the Caravanserai in its capacity as a “school”. The 
antagonistic rhetoric against the discipline of archaeology also targeted the Iranian archaeologists who 
were employed at the Departments of Archaeology. The restrictions directed towards these 
archaeologists, particularly those educated at higher institutes in the United States, is discussed in the 
following chapters.  
This period in the history of Iranian archaeology is often dominated by themes that demonstrate attempts 
to eradicate Iranian archaeology. However, in January 1986 the foundation of the ICHO greatly 
influenced the course of archaeology as a discipline (Appendix I, Doc 1). The establishment of ICHO 
following the Cultural Revolution was indicative of a new ‘purified’ discipline of archaeology amenable 
to the jurisdiction of the Islamic State. Certainly, in addition to the new drift in the re-organisation and re-
launch of institutes during this period, the deficiencies imposed by the de-centralised nature of 
archaeology was recognised by certain authorities who proposed the integration of difference offices and 
organisations responsible for archaeology and cultural heritage (http://www.icar.ir/documents/). ICHO was 
initially affiliated to the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and later in 1993 was assigned under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (ibid.).  
The archaeological activities during this period can mostly be summarised by partial restoration of 
archaeological sites. This is particularly significant given the ongoing War. Although both Iran and Iraq 
had signed the Hague Convention in Respecting Cultural Properties in 1954 
(http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/GC-message-from-pres-1999.pdf), the sudden nature of the War 
hindered any attempts to safeguard the territories immediately surrounding cultural properties 
48 
 
(http://www.iranicomos.org/?page_id=42). Thus, numerous sites were damaged as they were situated within 
the peripheries of hostilities during the course of the War. This area encompassed the western frontiers of 
Iran, including the sites of Qasr Shirin, Susa, Haft Teppeh, Chuga Zanbil, Ivan Karkhe, and many more. 
The heritage site of Susa with its cultural significance as an Elamite settlement and the capital of the 
Achaemenid Empire was also considerably damaged (Rouhani 2011). Susa did not recover until 1991 
when Mohandes Shirazi nominated the Susa citadel for the first archaeological congress in Iran after the 
Revolution, which was held in 1994. The direct impact of the War on the Prehistoric mounds and the 
Islamic site of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan are analysed in Chapters 4 and 6. With the end of the War, 
Iran and its archaeology entered a new phase often declared as the period of reconstruction. 
 
2.4.2. Period of Reconstruction  
 
In 1988 finally Iran accepted the UN-mediated ceasefire (Abrahamian 2008:181). With the termination of 
the War and the death of Khomeini in 1989, the Islamic Republic entered a new phase. The election of 
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the President in 1988 had various implications for the recovering 
Iranian economy and the cultural aspects of the Revolution. The new Administration strove to espouse 
favourable policies towards construction projects and economic liberalisation. It also aimed to inject 
liberal themes into the socio-cultural sectors through embracing the ideas of the new Minister of Culture 
and Islamic Guidance, Mohammad Khatami who replaced Hashemi in the subsequent round of 
Presidential elections (r.1997-2005 AD) (Moslem 2002:143).  
In terms of Iranian identity, Hunter (1992:93) argued that by the end of the War, the authorities had 
grown more moderate in advocating the Islamic identity, and elements of pre-Islamic Iranian identity 
were acknowledged. As will be discussed in the following sections, the adoption of these policies and the 
re-interpretation of Iranian identity during this period, had imperative outcomes for the institutes entrusted 
with managing cultural heritage in Iran. In fact the tenor of these reforms set the foundations for the re-
birth of Iranian archaeology. 
 
2.4.2.1. Rafsanjani’s Administration & Reforms  
 
The period of Rafsanjani’s Presidency (r.1989-1997 AD) is often considered as the phase of 
reconstruction following the war. Most of reforms undertaken by Rafsanjani’s Administration targeted 
improvements in economic and cultural spheres. These reforms were made possible through restoring 
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international relations and promoting technocrats (Keddie 2003:264). Accordingly, the government 
expanded institutes, encouraged expatriates to return, liberalised cultural themes, as well as improved the 
economic state (ibid.). These reforms were made to assist the process of khodkafai (self-sufficiency).  
One of the more significant cultural reforms was the substitution of CRC that launched the Cultural 
Revolution, with the more liberally associated Cultural Principles of the Islamic Republic (CPIR) in 1992 
(Moslem 2002:167). Following its establishment, the CPIR declared that it aims to surrender socio-
cultural issues to experts rather than to the clergy (ibid.:168). The launching of this amendment may be 
considered as a manifestation of a more liberal outlook towards socio-political issues. The 
accommodation of these liberal policies coupled with the open-door foreign policies to provide the initial 
basis for the return of the experts who had been marginalised by the cleansing committees of the Cultural 
Revolution. In what follows, the implications of these policies on Iranian archaeology are discussed.  
 
2.4.2.2. Re-introduction of Archaeology 
 
The archaeological activities during the reconstruction period may be considered as a reflection of the 
more liberal socio-political dynamics of Iran and the return of the experts to official positions. These 
developments were further aided by the re-launch of institutes and the foundation of organisations 
discussed in the previous section. In 1999 the activities of the Institute of Archaeology, which was 
terminated during the Cultural Revolution resumed (Abdi 2001:70). Further the ICHO began to launch its 
activities following the ratification of the institute’s constitution in 1988 (ibid.:71). According to this 
decree, most archaeological organisations were brought under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and 
Higher Education, while executive sectors remained under the management of the Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance. These policies continued until 1994 when all institutes and organisations affiliated with 
archaeology and management were consolidated under the auspices of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic 
Guidance in order to centralise the management of Iranian cultural heritage and avoid discrepancies.  
With the consolidation of the ICHO, further developments were exerted to enhance the efficiency of the 
Institute. These included the establishment of ICHO offices in all Provinces, the resumption of problem-
oriented excavations, the inauguration of new series of archaeological journals, and the hosting of annual 
symposiums in archaeology. Further, in 1995, the Abhar branch of Azad University initiated a 
programme in archaeology (Ganjavi 2004:62), a trend that was followed by other branches of Azad 
University. Although these programmes were limited to a Bachelor of Art Degree, the offering of the 
course by the Islamic Azad University popularised the discipline of archaeology by making it available in 
various institutes outside of Tehran.  
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The most significant development was the resumption of relations with foreign institutes, albeit with 
restrictions. This was in confirmation with the open-door policies and the encouragement of the 
expatriates to return, that was advocated by Rafsanjani’s Administration. The first foreign archaeological 
project after the Revolution was granted to University of Chicago under the Direction of Abbas Alizadeh 
(Lawler 2003b). The reconstruction period can be considered as the initial phase in attempts to re-
introduce Iranian archaeology and assist its institutionalisation. As will be discussed in the following 
sections, these foundations provided the means for a more active phase of Iranian archaeology during 
Khatami’s Presidency.  
  
2.4.3. Dialogue among Civilisations 
The reconstructing projects of Rafsanjani’s Administration and the demeanor to return the bourgeoisie 
economy led to various social disapproval and subsequent reforms (Ansari 2012:248). In 1997 
Mohammad Khatami became the elected President. Khatami’s main asset was his liberal reputation, and 
his slogans nourished the themes of curing the sick economy, implementing a civil society and replacing 
the “Clash of Civilisations” with a “Dialogue of Civilisations” (Abrahamian 2008:186).  
Central to these modifications were the resumption of durable international relations and the promotion of 
a holistic cultural identity that endorsed Iran’s pre-Islamic and Islamic past. The latter issue is of 
particular interest to this thesis, given Khatami’s contentions about the compatibility of religion and 
liberty. According to Ansari (2012:248), Khatami considered the achievements of Western Enlightenment 
not in the scientific Positivism, but in the Anglo-American marriage of religion and liberty. Therefore, he 
advocated the Islamic identity not as a contradiction to liberty or Iranian identity, but as a compatible part 
of it. Further, his Administration employed the policy of ‘dialogue’ as a means to re-connect with the 
Iranian diaspora and the West. Holliday argued that the Iranian diaspora became the mediators between 
Iran and “Western civilisations” (Holliday 2011:111). To foresee these socio-political changes, Khatami’s 
Administration employed a number of reforms that will be discussed in the following section. 
 
2.4.3.1. Khatami’s Administration & Reforms 
The period of Khatami’s Presidency, is often associated with reformist politics. At the core of these 
reforms were the aims to establish what he called “Islamic democracy” (Owen 1992:103). These reforms 
targeted both domestic policies and international relations. In terms of domestic Iranian politics, his 
Administration aimed to cultivate the idea of civil society by adopting a liberal discourse, while the 
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foreign policies aimed to narrow the gap of cultural understanding between Iran and the Muslim world 
from the West (Kamrava 2011:166). Of significant importance was the dramatic expansion of printed 
media. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance adopted more relaxed guidelines, allowing for the 
expression of various forms of art and academic interest (ibid.:166). As Ansari argued, these policies 
provided for the cultivation of the culture of debate and the frequent crossing of presumed “red lines” 
(Ansari 2012:250). Further, Khatami’s Administration stressed on the rule of law, respect for civil rights, 
greater openness in society, acceptance of political criticism, social justice, and reinforcement of 
institutions of civil society (Hiro 2001:225). An amalgam of these reforms provided a context for debate 
and self-criticism that became incorporated in all aspects of Iranian society, including cultural heritage 
and archaeology. In the following section, the impact of these reforms is evaluated in terms of 
modifications made to archaeology during this period.  
 
2.4.3.2. Re-birth of Iranian Archaeology 
 
The undertaking of cultural reforms during the presidency of Khatami had overarching implications for 
Iranian archaeology. In particular, the improved foreign relations through the themes of ‘dialogue’ and the 
cultivation of a culture of debate were essential in providing the foundation for the recovery of Iranian 
archaeology. In terms of institutes, in 1997 the ICHO was transformed into a research institute, headed by 
the reformist Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti who supported the return of foreign experts and collaborations 
with international archaeological institutes (Lawler 2003b:976). As ICHO matured, new conservation labs 
were established, museums were renovated and opened to public, and the most significant archaeological 
sites in the country received independent research institutes (Lawler 2003a:971). In 2004 the ICHO was 
combined with the Organisation of Iran Touring and Tourism to create the Iranian Cultural Heritage 
Organisation and Tourism (hereafter ICHTO) (http://www.ichto.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=207). This 
Organisation was placed directly under the auspices of Iran’s President, signifying the importance of 
cultural heritage to the new Administration (ibid.). In addition, higher education institutes launched 
programmes that targeted increasing the number of Iranian archaeologists and the advancement in the 
quality of programmes offered.  
In the academic year of 1999-2000, Tarbiat Modarres University in Tehran, offered the first Doctoral 
course in archaeology in Iran (Ajorloo 1999:58). The incentive for the creation of this programme was 
described by the Council of Higher Planning as the recognition of deficiencies in Iranian archaeology 
despite its long history in Iran (Appendix I, Doc 2). It was argued that foreign archaeologists had been 
working in Iran and “exporting its rich antiquities to museums abroad, while Iranians had fallen behind 
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other countries in the region to train their archaeologists” (Appendix I, Doc 3). According to this council, 
the training of Iranian archaeologists was the main objective for launching a Doctoral Programme. Within 
a year, Tehran University followed by offering a Doctoral degree. Therefore, for the first time in the 
history of Iranian archaeology, archaeologists who were interested in Prehistoric, historic, and Islamic 
archaeological periods could be trained in Iran and by Iranian archaeologists. These improvements were 
further re-enforced by the research activities carried by the Iranian Center for Archaeological Research 
(ICAR) which became under the direction of Masoud Azarnoush in 2000 (Mousavi 2010:3).  
The concerns with cultural heritage during this period also provided for the beginning of co-operations 
with the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) by establishing the Cultural Institute 
of Iranian ICOMOS in 2002 (http://www.iranicomos.org/?page_id=42). Further, improved foreign relations 
and loosened visa restrictions provided for the return of many foreign archaeologists to Iran. The appeal 
to foreign institutes and encouragement for their return to Iranian archaeology is particularly apparent in 
the allocation of 300,000 U.S. Dollars to host an international conference with the participation of more 
than 40 foreign archaeologists, many of whom were returning to Iran for the first time since the 
Revolution (Lawler 2003a:971). Following this appeal, many foreign scholars from institutes in Germany, 
Australia, Japan, United Kingdom and even the United States, once again engaged in archaeological 
projects in Iran. Some of these international co-operations are discussed in the following chapters. It is 
further argued, that the nature of the reforms made in the discipline of archaeology during Khatami’s 
Presidency were shaped by nationalist rhetoric and the means to articulate the cultural significance of Iran 
and its contributions to world civilisations. It is contended that during this period, Iranian archaeology 
was once again instigated as a nationalist instrument to assist the domestic and international reforms of 
Government. Nevertheless, the culture of debate, provided for the initial re-evaluation of deficiencies 
experienced in the discipline. These themes are discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
 
2.4.4. Populism & Principalism  
 
In the election of 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was elected as the new President. The period of his 
Presidency may be defined with the themes of populism, principalism, lack of well-crafted policies, and 
economic decline (Karimianpour 2011:168). Arjomand (2009:160) has argued that the domestic policies 
of Ahmadinejad’s Administration were founded on the rhetoric of populism with severe political and 
economic consequences. A key component of this populist approach was to fight corruption and Western 
cultural invasions that were created by the reformists (ibid.). This rhetoric was a reflection of another 
component of the political narrative adopted by Ahmadinejad’s Administration which is often associated 
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with principalism. Kamrava (2011:167) contended that the principalists (Osulgarayan) convicted the 
reformists to have deviated from the true principles of the Revolution and aimed to return the country to 
the earliest days of the Revolution. Therefore, the populist themes of the Revolution, such as national 
independence and serving the oppressed were rejuvenated.   
This political discourse led to a sharp decline in foreign relations and contributed to Iran’s alienation. A 
particular crisis during this period was the issue of Iran’s quest for nuclear energy. Ansari (2006:230) 
argued that the state of tension between Iran and the West was presented in the context of the myth of 
Mosaddeq and the new President as a latter-day national hero, and the nuclear crisis as another Oil 
Nationalisation crisis. In fact, given the discourse of populism adopted by Ahmadinejad’s Administration, 
Iranian nationalism, was too, employed as a populist political instrument to convey a different aspect of 
Government’s policies. In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the utilisation of ethnic, dynastic and Islamic 
nationalism by Ahmadinejad’s Administration are discussed. In this analysis the promotion of 
‘Aryanism’, the glorification of pre-Islamic Iran, and the adoration of Imam Mahdi are themes that 
demonstrate the nature of his Administration’s populist nationalism. 
 
2.4.4.1. Ahmadinejad’s Administration & Reforms  
 
In the previous section it was demonstrated that Ahmadinejad’s Administration represented the culturally 
and politically conservative faction of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the policies of his Administration 
were to implement radical shifts from the types of reforms that Khatami’s Administration had perused in 
the social spheres and foreign affairs (Pesaran 2011:169). According to Keddie (2003:343), 
Ahmadinejad’s Administration introduced a few economic reforms with popular appeals, but experts 
doubt their practicality and efficacy. These populist reforms were funded by the Oil Stabilisation Fund 
(Rieffer-Flanagan 2013:194) and implemented by officials who lacked previous experience and capability 
to run administrative offices and ministries (Pesaran 2011:168). In the following section, the outcome of 
this mismanagement is evaluated in terms of its impact on Iranian archaeology.  
 
2.4.4.2. Populism & Archaeology 
 
The political discourse of Ahmadinejad’s Presidential period was dominated by financial deficiencies, 
mismanagement, international isolation, and lack of freedom in formidable debates. These issues were 
also reflected in Iranian archaeology during this period. It is here argued that the improvements made to 
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Iranian archaeology during Khatami’s Presidency permeated to Ahmadinejad’s period, albeit 
degenerating soon after. In 2007 to support the handicraft industry, the ICHTO was re-organised to 
become the Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handicraft and Tourism Organisation (hereafter ICHHTO). The 
most significant change in Iranian archaeology during this period was the decision to break down the 
structure of the ICHHTO and relocate certain structures to Shiraz and Isfahan. In 2010, despite the efforts 
of Iranian archaeologists to communicate their disapproval of infrastructural changes to ICHHTO, the 
ICAR was relocated to Shiraz (http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/pages/?cid=109529). Although in 2012 the ICAR was 
moved back to Tehran, the execution of abrupt decisions about the most significant research institute in 
archaeology demonstrates the extent of mismanagement in Iranian archaeology during this period.  
The mismanagement in various sectors of Ahmadinejad’s Administration disseminated on to 
developmental projects. These projects, in addition with insufficient legislative laws to protect cultural 
heritage, had devastating consequences for a number of archaeological sites (see Rouhani 2011). Some of 
these issues will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is argued that despite the Government’s lack of 
attention to archaeology as a discipline, archaeology continued to be implemented for nationalistic 
purposes. It is contended that the de-centralisation of archaeological institutes during this period deviated 
Iranian archaeology from professionalism and incorporated it within the populist discourse that was 
advocated by the State. In the following chapters, some of the Government’s exploitive attitude towards 
archaeology as an instrument to implement a populist rhetoric is articulated.  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter has been to historically contextualise the development of nationalism and 
archaeology in Iran from the time of the Qajar dynasty to the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and through to 
the present. The illustration of the roots of nationalism and its relation with archaeology is essential, as 
the two have been influencing each other through various means in the history of their development. It 
has further been the intention of this chapter to articulate the ways in which the intertwined relationship 
between nationalism and archaeology was influenced by intellectual trends and socio-political dynamics 
that accommodated the emergence of Iranian nationalism and the formation of Iran as a modern nation-
state. Lastly, the position of Iranian archaeology during different historical periods has been analysed. 
Through these analyses it has been argued that the emergence of Iranian archaeology was simultaneous 
with the rise of Iranian nationalism, and the course of its development directly reflects the interpretations 
of Iranian nationalism during different political periods. Therefore, as Trigger (1984:359) argued, Iranian 
archaeology is Nationalistic in its tradition. Having provided a descriptive analysis of the Internalist and 
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Externalist approach to Iranian archaeology, the next chapter is dedicated to defining the concepts of this 
thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
Approaches, Methodology and Data 
 
“No historical problem should be studied without studying … the history of historical thought about it” 
(Collingwood 1939:132) 
 
3.1. Epistemological Framework   
 
The preceding two chapters have considered the association of nationalism with archaeology and the 
socio-political events that contributed to the rise of different aspects of Iranian nationalism during various 
historical periods. This chapter provides an outline for the theoretical framework and methodology 
applied in this research. It is argued that a nationalist approach to the study of Iranian archaeology is 
essential given that various aspects of Iranian nationalism induced the birth of Iranian archaeology and 
are embedded in the development of the discipline’s unique traditions.  
From a general outlook, it is important to note that this research is also influenced by intellectual 
movements such as Post-Structuralism and Post-Modernism. Therefore, as Wetherall argued, in this 
thesis, it is recognised that “the process of analysis is always interpretive, always contingent, always a 
version or a reading from some theoretical, epistemological or ethical standpoint” (Wetherall 2001:384). 
The objective here is not merely to consider whether the existence of Nationalist archaeology in Iran is 
“true”, but how its traditions “might become formed” (Foucault 1980:237). To facilitate this perspective, 
this research is also influenced by the Post-Processual approach, which itself is arguably a Post-Modernist 
movement against the Positivist and anti-historical tendencies of the Modernist Processual archaeology 
(Trigger 1994:114). Although the recognition of the unavoidable influences of social context on the 
development of various approaches to the study of archaeology is not a new concept, with the rise of 
Post-Processualism in the early 1980s, there has been an unprecedented attention to the application of 
social theories to archaeological studies. As Trigger argued, this trend could be a manifestation of the 
Post-Modern emphasis on self-reflection, subjectivity, and relativity (ibid.). While the Post-Processual 
approach emphasised the significant role of social context on the formation of archaeological traditions, 
Processualists argued that archaeology is shaped by scientific analysis (ibid.:118). Such dispositions are 
embedded in the Positivist Processual approach with its emphasis on the strict separation between the 
object of research and the social context of the subjects conducting the research (Hodder & Hudson 
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2003:207). Therefore, the Processual framework provides little space for the consideration of socio-
political issues that concerned the Post-Processualist. In a way, as Hodder (1995:77) argued, Post-
Processual archaeology, with its emphasis on diversity, could be considered as a maturing phase for the 
discipline of archaeology where reflection, criticism and diversity are embraced. He further proposed that 
the positive and explanatory label of “interpretive archaeology” is more appropriate for approaches 
currently employed in what has been called Post-Processual; “these are archaeologies … which work 
through interpretation” (Shanks & Hodder 1998:5). This could mean that there is “no one meaning to the 
past” and that the same object can have different or conflicting meaning along different dimensions and 
from different perspectives (Hodder & Hutson 2003:209). To demonstrate these different dimensions, this 
thesis analyses the influence of various brands of Iranian nationalism on the formation of Iranian 
archaeology during the Qajar, Pahlavi, and post-Revolutionary Regimes. In this regard, this thesis aims to 
provide a history of Iranian archaeology in a manner similar to analysts who have written the history of 
archaeology in various parts of the worlds, over the past decade (see Section 3.3).  
It has to be considered that it was from two particular theoretical orientations within the Post-Processual 
approach that a generation of archaeologists emerged as dedicated writers of history of archaeology. 
These were either based on the Internalist or the Externalist approach (Trigger 1994:118). While the 
Internalists argued for the influence of intellectual climate, such as Rationalism, Romanticism, and 
Positivism, on formulating theoretical trends in archaeology (Moorey 1991; Willey & Sabloff 1993), the 
Externalists articulated archaeology’s predisposition to be shaped by ethnic and class interests of those 
who practice or sponsor archaeological activities, such as politics and religion (Trigger 1994:120). As it 
will be demonstrated in this thesis, references are made to address the concerns of Internalist and 
Externalist approach. This is due to the realisation that as Trigger (1994:118) argued, these two 
approaches are complementary, and while the understanding of the relationship between archaeology and 
the socio-political context within which it is practices is indicative, such relations do not occur in an 
intellectual vacuum and are rather influenced by the ideals set and followed during each historical period.  
The arguments presented in this thesis are built against an Externalist backdrop where the influence of 
politics is measured in its contribution to the development of Iranian archaeology. The Externalist 
patterns are further addressed in the discussions of what was, or which period was, considered as a 
suitable topic of archaeological research by the different Iranian Governments. Meanwhile, this thesis 
concerns itself with the Internalist approach in stressing the intellectual trends that influenced the 
development of Iranian archaeology. This approach is especially prominent in Chapter 4 as the influence 
of the Modernist outlook during the reign of  the second Pahlavi monarch is discussed in relation to the 
receptiveness of Iranian archaeology to the positivist ‘New Archaeology’ of the Americans; and in 
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Chapter 5 and 6 as references are made to intellectual movements that manifested in the Bazgasht, 
Aryanism, and Westoxication rhetoric of the elite during different historical periods and their influence on 
the general outlook towards Iranian past. 
 
3.2. Aims & Objectives  
 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the Nationalist tradition of Iranian archaeology. In particular, the 
central premise of this research is to evaluate how archaeology was employed in the service of nationalist 
movements and how nationalism as a political discourse influenced the birth and development of Iranian 
archaeology.  
In order to achieve the general aim of this thesis, three objectives are proposed. The first concerns the 
treatment of Prehistoric sites based on their suitability for the purpose of instigating a past that assisted 
the validation of the political agendas of contemporary states, their brand of nationalism and projected 
national identity. The second evaluates these same concerns with respect to pre-Islamic sites, while the 
third investigates the suitability of Islamic sites for reaching the above aims. For the purpose of this 
analysis three archaeological sites, Sialk, Persepolis, and the Friday Mosque of Isfahan, that represent 
three different archaeological periods, Prehistoric, pre-Islamic, Islamic, have been selected as case studies 
to demonstrate the relationship between archaeology and nationalism in Iran during the Qajar, Pahlavi, 
and post-Revolutionary periods. Through investigating these objectives, this research demonstrates that 
similar to the experience of European nations (see Diaz-Andreu & Champion 1996:3), Iranian 
archaeology was politicised in various periods to serve nationalist purposes. This analysis will in turn 
facilitate an enhanced understanding of the Nationalist tradition of Iranian archaeology. These objectives 
are further discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
 
3.3. Justification for the Study  
 
As Trigger (1994:114) argued, the history of archaeology has been winning unprecedented recognition as 
a field of research that is essential for the successful practice of archaeology. Given that this analysis has 
increased since the early 1980s, there has been an upsurge of interest in the history of archaeology in the 
United States and Europe (Willey & Sabloff 1993; Trigger 1989; Diaz-Andreu & Champion 1996; Diaz-
Andreu 2007; Shanks & Tilley 1987; Hodder 1991, 1995; Kohl & Fawcett 1995a; Kohl et al. 2007), 
Africa (Robertshaw 1990), Middle East (Silberman 1989; Meskell 1998; Ried 2002; Bernhardsson 2005; 
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Shaw 2007) and Asia (Chakrabarti 1988; Ratnagar 2007), and the Far East (Fawcett 1995; Nelson 1995). 
While some of these works developed out of general concerns over research methods and the theoretical 
biases in interpreting archaeological data, others emphasised the role of politics, and in particular the 
doctrine of nationalism, on the formation of archaeology as a scientific discipline. According to this 
predisposition, archaeology was developed as an essential instrument to legitimate the state through 
permitting the reconstruction of the national past, creating national identities, and justifying territorial 
peripheries (Smith 2009:27). 
It is argued here that despite the long standing global recognition of the significance of history of 
archaeology and the contributing factors to the development of this discipline, there has seldom been an 
interest in the history of Iranian archaeology (see Section 1.3). This lack of interest is despite the wealth 
of historic experiences (both pre-Islamic and Islamic), variation of cultural material, and competing 
theories of nationalism, which provide Iran with a unique set of conditions for a case study. Given this 
academic vacuum, this thesis is a preliminary attempt at providing an analytical study of the history of the 
development of archaeology in Iran. In other words, this research is the first focused introspective study 
of Iranian archaeology that considers the development of the discipline across different historical periods. 
In this thesis, the lack of interest in the analytical interpretation of history of Iranian archaeology has been 
explained in terms of Iran’s failure to incorporate new theories and epistemological approaches. As will 
be discussed in Chapter 4, due to the recognition and condemnation of the substantial influences of socio-
political factors on Iranian archaeology during the Pahlavi and early post-Revolutionary periods, in the 
1990s and with the revival of Iranian archaeology, the approaches associated with ‘New Archaeology’ 
that were introduced by the Americans in the 1960s, became to represent a progressive epistemological 
framework for the study of archaeological data. This outlook was influenced by the predispositions held 
that the emphasis on objectivity and scientific methods embedded in this approach is impartial to the 
socio-political influences and therefore leads to a more scientific research outcome. While taking refuge 
in what has now become Processual approach to avoid the social constrains and career-threatening 
repercussions of interpreting the influences of socio-political influences on Iranian archaeology, 
archaeologists in Iran have failed to become acquainted with more interpretive approaches. With the 
exception of limited but significant academic works by Kamyar Abdi (2001) that attempted to analyse the 
impact of socio-political factors on Iranian archaeology, archaeologists have rarely demonstrated interest 
in theories associated with an analytical study of Iranian archaeology. Therefore, Iranian archaeology, and 
its relations to political ideologies, and in particular nationalism, have not been subjected to in-depth 
examination. As an additional constrain to Iranian archaeology, according to Niknami (2000) and Fazeli 
(2010), even the Processual outlook, while advocated by Iranian archaeologists, does not adhere to the 
60 
 
problem-oriented research procedures often associated with this approach and rather represent a “Culture-
Historical tradition” that is a residue of the French archaeological legacy in Iran (Niknami 2000:42-44; 
Fazeli 2010:3).  
Considering the above argument, the provision of a comprehensive analysis of the historical development 
of Iranian archaeology and the impact of socio-political factors, such as nationalism, on the formation of 
its traditions is vital for the future practice of Iranian archaeology. As will be demonstrated, the influence 
of Iranian nationalism in its various forms and their influences on the study of archaeology are at the heart 
of this thesis and all the data and information incorporated in this study will be seen through the prism of 
this concept. Given that Iranian archaeology lacks contextualisation, this thesis also aims to provide an 
efficient means for transmitting the basic concepts and traditions within Iranian archaeology to a broader 
non-Persian speaking audience.  
 
3.4. Theoretical Concepts & Methodology  
 
 3.4.1. Nationalism  
 
For the purpose of clarity, this section aims to define the concept of nationalism and to situate it within 
the global historical and social context. To articulate the elements of nationalism the various theories 
proposed by Western scholars are discussed. Before proceeding, it is important to mention that although 
in this research certain approaches to the underlying concepts of nationalism are influences by Western 
scholarship, such as Anthony Smith’s Ethno-Symbolic approach, greater emphasis is laid on the unique 
experience of nationalism in Iran and the work of Iranian scholars on the subject. This reflects the 
availability of a wealth of literature on various forms of nationalism that are particular to Iran, albeit with 
epistemological influences from Western scholarship. These forms of nationalism are discussed in the 
following section.  
The concept of nation is rooted in the Enlightenment and based on the ideas of the French philosopher 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau who is credited as the founder of modern politics and the promoter of the 
significant role of citizenship and their collective participation in public festivals (Harris 2009:22). Once 
the roles of citizens were recognised, various means were employed to manipulate and control the 
“masses”. This has continued through various movements into the modern and post-modern world, where 
as Smith (1995b) argued, nationalism has become a means to provide the legitimation of the state all over 
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the world and the most widespread popular ideology and movement. According to Smith nationalism may 
be defined as: 
“An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population  
which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’.”  
(Smith 2010:9) 
As the above extract implies and as Ernst Gellner (1983:1) argued, nationalism belongs to an era of 
nation-states, therefore, there can be no nationalism without the nation-state. Gellner identified a nation as 
a group “that shares some cultures or system of ideas, assumptions, behavior and communication” and 
whose members “recognise each other as belonging to the same nation” (ibid.:7). However, this definition 
is rooted in the Modernist paradigm of Gellner (1983) and others such as Erie Hobsbawm (1990), Tom 
Nairn (2003), and Benedict Anderson (1991). According to Smith (2009:6), all these scholars considered 
nations and nationalism as recent phenomena, arising from the French Revolution. From this Modernist 
perspective, the idea of nations existing through antiquity and Middle Ages is “retrospective nationalism” 
(ibid.). The Modernist approach developed against the romantic notions of the Primodrialists who had an 
ethnocentric outlook to the concepts of nations and nationalism (Smith 1995a:146). Although all the 
Modernist scholars hold a Materialist perspective and regard nationalism as an aspect of Modernism, the 
existing literature is suggestive of the existence of various approaches to nationalism. For example, while 
Gellner (1983: xxxvi) and Anderson (1991:37-46) considered the standardisation of literary education and 
technology of “print-capitalism” as essential in the development of nations and nationalism, Nairn 
(2003:323) regarded nationalism as a product of a mass response to “uneven development” of Capitalism. 
According to Smith (1995b), Anderson and Howbsbawm also fall into the model of Deconstructionists by 
stressing the imagined community and invented traditions in the fabrication of nations. In Anderson’s 
approach, nation was “an imagined political community”, considering its “members will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson 1991:6). In Hobsbawm’s model, the nation and its historical continuity was 
achieved through the “invention of traditions” and “invention of a collective memory” (Hobsbawm 
2012:1-22; 1994:76-83). He further argued that such traditions were deliberately invented though the 
process of re-creating and repeating rituals and symbols and tailoring historical events (Hobsbawm 
2012:4).  
Having described the above debates on the different existing approaches to the concepts of nation and 
nationalism, it has to be mentioned that the orientation of this thesis is more in line with the proposal of 
Anthony Smith and the Ethno-Symbolic approach. This is considering that the birth of nationalism in Iran 
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was prior to any forms of industrial condition that embody the age of modernisation and mainly relied on 
“ethnic ties” and cultural sentiments (Smith 2009:27). For this approach, which was provided as a counter 
argument to the Modernist theories, the network of ethnic ties are the single most important factor in the 
rise and persistence of nations and nationalism. According to this approach, an ethnic community is 
defined as “a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common 
ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a territory, 
and a measure of solidarity, at least among upper strata” (ibid.:22). By this, Smith does not imply that 
nations emerged on the basis of ethnic ties, rather he argued, “it was on the basis of ethnic model and 
around the dominant ethnic core population that political actors and institutions helped to forge the 
nation” (ibid.:28).  
Smith’s approach was influenced by the cultural definition of nationalism and the ethnocentrism that was 
pioneered by Johann Gottfried Herder and John Hutchinson. In Herder’s view, cultural nationalism is 
defined in terms of Volk (Spencer 2012), while for Hutchinson a nation is defined as a “distinctive 
civilisation, which is the product of its unique history, culture and geographical profile” (Hutchinson 
1987:12-13). As Smith (1995a:178) argued, this approach was further introduced by Herder into Eastern 
Europe. In fact, Heyd (1950:164) articulated that Turkish nationalism during the Ataturk period (r. 1923-
1938 AD) was inspired by the German Primordialist form of nationalism advocated by Herder. This is 
interesting, considering that although the form of nationalism propagated by the Pahlavi Administration 
was imported from the West, it did not correspond with the philosophy of Enlightenment that produced 
the nation-states of France and England, and was rather a repercussion of the Turkish nationalism itself 
inspired by a German Romanticist model. The ideology of this German nationalism was built upon 
Herder’s concept of Volk. The Nazi ideology added further meanings to this concept by idealising 
German racial superiority and theories of Aryanism (Katz 2004:97). The traces of German’s Primordialist 
model and its ethnocentric approach are visible everywhere in the Iranian nationalism during the early 
Pahlavi period where emphasis was laid on the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘superiority’ of the Iranian race, and the 
Shi’a differentiation from the rest of the Muslim world after the Islamic Revolution. Due to this 
ethnocentric outlook, it is importance to clarify the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism.  
There have been numerous scholarly works by political theorists and sociologists on the essential 
distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism (Ignatieff 1994; Miller 1995; Breton 1998). In this 
thesis, Anthony Smith’s definitions are applied considering he differentiates between a Western model 
and a non-Western model for a nation. According to Smith, the Western model of nation is based on 
“civic” nationalism and it relies on “historic territory, legal-political community, legal-political equality 
of members, and common civic culture and ideology” (Smith 1991:11). This is in contrast with the non-
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Western model that is based on the “ethnic” concept and the emphasis is on “a community of birth and 
native culture” (ibid.). Within this approach, presumed descent ties, popular mobilisation, vernacular 
languages, customs and traditions are considered as decisive elements that form a nation (ibid.). 
Therefore, there is a heavy emphasis on the re-discovery and re-interpretation of the living past by 
providing “folk” or other cultural material that could become the blueprint of the “nation-to-be” 
(ibid.:12). The creation of a widespread awareness of the myth, history and linguistic traditions of a 
community are allocated to historians and archaeologists who appropriate their discoveries to support the 
political objectives of the state (ibid.; Smith 1999:10). It is interesting to note that according to Smith 
(1986:81-82; 1991:55), Iran is an example of an ‘ethnic nation’ considering its pre-modern roots in the 
Achaemenid and Sassanid Empires. Having provided a general outline for the existing theories of 
nationalism, the next section considers various forms of Iranian nationalism.  
 
3.4.2. Iranian Nationalism  
 
The study of Iranian nationalism has been the subject of several important work published in the recent 
years (Cottam 1964; Katouzian 1979; Arjomand 1984; Ghods 1989, 1991; Richard 1989; Yann 1989; 
Chehabi 1993; Kashani-Sabet 1999; Marashi 2008; Ansari 2008:2012). Despite the differences in their 
approach, they all agree on the fundamental point that Iranian nationalism was born as a form of 
resistance to Western imperialism, in particular to Russia and Britain (Ghods 1991:37). The purpose of 
this thesis is not to outline and discuss existing literature on Iranian nationalism, rather, the aim is to 
select nationalistic trends that served to define and develop Iranian archaeology. This section addresses 
these concepts of nationalisms and how they are to be defined in the context of this research. Therefore, 
first and foremost, it is contended that although Iranian nationalism is fluid, it is to be understood in terms 
of Smith’s ethnic nationalism (see Section 3.4.1). Further, according to the existing debates on the nature 
of Iranian nationalism, three distinct types of nationalism are to be recognised; dynastic, religious (Shi’a) 
and secular (Ansari 2008:323-327). It is important to note that such distinctions are also articulated in the 
work of Abdolkarim Soroush (2000:162), who divided “culture” in Iran into Iranian, Islamic, and 
Western types. Holliday (2007:20-21), further argued that these cultural divisions represent the competing 
“authentic” Iranian identities that co-exist in Iranian society. This competition between different Iranian 
identities is interpreted by Ansari (2003:15) as the lack of communication between different social classes 
of the society who hold different social identities. Also, as it shall be demonstrated, the type of 
nationalism promoted in each historical period in Iran, varies in accordance to what is perceived as 
‘authentic’ identity by the ruling administration. Thus, during the Qajar and post-Revolutionary periods, 
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Islam was adopted as the ‘authentic’ Iranian identity, while the Pahlavis considered pre-Islamic Iranian 
identity as ‘authentic’. In this thesis, emphasis is laid on dynastic and religious (Shi’a) nationalisms, albeit 
with ethnic nationalism as an essential component. In the following, these different forms of Iranian 
nationalism are defined.   
 
3.4.2.1. Ethnic Nationalism  
 
As previously argued, in this thesis Iranian nationalism, despite its variations, is treated as rooted in the 
ethnic nationalism characterised by Smith. According to Smith (1988:22-31), “ethnie” is defined as a 
distinctive shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity. He further 
argued that four conditions are necessary for ethnic consolidations: territory, struggle with enemies, 
religion, and sense of “chosenness” (ibid.:119-120). Smith’s first two emphases were manifested during 
the Pahlavi period as Iranian ethnic-dynastic nationalism increasingly relied on the borders of the Persian 
Empire and antagonising the Mongols and Arab invaders. This is while the religious aspects of ethnic 
consolidation were emphasised in the religious nationalism that followed the Islamic Revolution.  
In this section, it is argued that apart from the above mentioned, ethnic nationalism is also employed in 
Primordial terms to characterise the proclaimed brand of nationalism used during the reign of Reza Shah. 
This concept needs further clarification considering that the term ‘ethnic-dynastic’ is often used in this 
thesis to refer to the model of nationalism applied by the Pahlavis. However, it is contended that during 
the reign of Reza Shah, nationalism was considerably skewed towards the ethnic elements. This is while 
Ansari (2008:325-26) recognises “dynastic nationalism” as the foremost appropriate designation of the 
type of nationalism practiced during the Pahlavi era. Although even Ansari contended that “dynastic 
nationalism did not gather pace until the overthrow of the National Front Government in 1953” during the 
reign of Mohammad Reza Shah (ibid.:326).  
The decision to refer to the brand of nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s Government as ethnic 
nationalism is based on the existing literature on the pro-Aryan propaganda that dominated the intellectual 
and cultural sphere of the Iranian society. While Ansari (2000:323-24) referred to the development of the 
“Aryan myth” during this period as “secular nationalism”, in Chapter 4, the birth of Prehistoric 
archaeology and the archaeological activities at the Prehistoric site of Sialk are articulated to reflect the 
fascination with migration theories that made suggestions about the origins of the Aryan race within the 
Iranian peripheries during the reign of Reza Shah (Schmidt 1933, 1937; Arne 1935; Ghirshman 1938, 
1978). It is argued that although this inclination was secular, in that it contested Islam as a feature of 
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Iranian identity, it was based on the ‘superiority’ and ‘continuity’ of Iranian racial composition, and 
therefore “ethnic” in nature. The change of the country’s name from Persia to Iran in 1934 in order to 
highlight the birth-place of the ancient Aryans (Wilber 1975:162; Vaziri 1993:67), was yet another 
manifestation of this dedication to the promotion of ethnic nationalism (see 2.3.1. on Herzfeld and “the 
empire of Aryans”). The intellectual movements during the late Qajar period further foreshadowed the 
appeal towards the Iranian ‘superior race’ in the writings of Mirza Fath-ali Akhundzadeh, Mirza Agha 
Khan Kermani, and the French diplomat J.A. de Gobineau who advocated the pure Aryan race and 
blamed Islam for the demise of Iran (see 2.2.2.). 
It is further argued that ethnic nationalism was a more appropriate instrument of unification, in 
comparison with the monarchic-centred dynastic nationalism. This is considering that in the preliminary 
stages of building Iran as a nation-state and in consolidation of the polyglot Iranian society, the injection 
of a common racial, historical and cultural past was more essential. This is apparent in the speech that 
Prime Minister Mohammad Foroughi made on the eve of Reza Shah’s Coronation on 25 April 1926. He 
argued “the Iranian nation realises that today a Shah who is of the pure Iranian race has ascended to the 
throne” (Goode 2004:134). This emphasis on the “pure Iranian race” is a reflection of the political 
discourse that preferred the adoption of the imported notion of ‘Aryanism’ and the ‘superiority’ of Iranian 
race as an apparatus of legimisation to the dynastic brand of nationalism that articulated the centrality of 
the institution of monarchy as an essential component of Iranian nation. In fact, Reza Shah himself was in 
favour of the idea of Republicanism in Iran, and only established a monarchy out of the fear of opposition 
by the Ulama (Ansari 2003:37). Therefore, the brand of nationalism his Government adopted could not 
solely rely on the institution of monarchy. Similarly, it is contended that the fascination with previous 
Iranian monarchies, such as the Achaemenid and Sassanid, that was manifested during the reign of Reza 
Shah, is a component of Iranian culture that has been displayed by different dynasties, during various 
historical periods. For example, as Meisami (1993:25) argued, the Parthian, Sassanid, Tehirid, Saffarid, 
Buyid, Samanid and the Qhaznavid sought legitimacy through tracing their roots back to the kings of the 
Shahnameh. In addition, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, Qajar monarchs had already begun to be 
fascinated by pre-Islamic (dynastic) archaeological monuments, such as Persepolis, and the traces of such 
fixation could be detected in the Bazgasht movement (Luft 2001:37) and the imitation of pre-Islamic 
motifs in residential palaces (Grigor 2007:567). Therefore, some of the main incentives that laid the 
foundation for the adoption of dynastic nationalism as the only form of nationalism practiced during Reza 
Shah’s reign are refuted. Despite these arguments, it is contended that there are certain overlaps between 
‘ethnic’ and ‘dynastic’ nationalism during this period.  
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3.4.2.2. Dynastic Nationalism  
 
In the previous section, the brand of nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s Government was recognised as 
ethnic nationalism and although it was suggested that it contained certain ‘dynastic’ elements, this period 
is considered as an instrumental stage that allowed for the institutionalisation of dynastic nationalism as 
Mohammad Reza Shah took power. By this time, the main objective of the ruling Administration had 
altered from constructing a unified nation-state based on a common ethnic identity, into legitimising the 
institution of monarchy. The term “dynastic nationalism” was coined by Ansari (2000:326-27; 2003:33) 
who defined it as a model of nationalism that centred on the person of the Shah. He further contended that 
the narrative of dynastic nationalism adopted by Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government was founded on 
the principle that “monarchy was the natural form of government for the Iranian nation, and that every 
system of government eventually and naturally returns to a monarchy” (Ansari 2012:171). This was best 
articulated in Mohammad Reza Shah’s book, Toward the Great Civilisation where he stated: 
 
“In Iranian culture, the Iranian monarchy means the political and geographical unity of Iran in 
addition to the special national identity and all those unchangeable values which this national 
identity has brought forth. For this reason no fundamental change is possible in this country 
       unless it is in tune with the fundamental principles of the monarchical system.” 
 (Pahlavi 1961:24) 
This narrative of nationalism was composed to legitimise the compatibility of the institution of monarchy 
in comparison with other rising alternative forms of government. Evidently, the endorsement of dynastic 
nationalism required the restoration of the dynastic past, which mainly focused on the Achaemenid and 
Sassanid Empires. This was achieved through various celebrations, such as the Anniversary of 2500 years 
of Persian Monarchy in 1971 and the Shah’s Coronation, as well as by changing the Iranian calendar to an 
imperial calendar which began with the ascent of Cyrus the Great to power and the establishment of the 
Achaemenid dynasty (Ansari 2012:183). In Chapter 5, the development of Iranian archaeology is further 
explored in relation to the dynastic nationalism and national policies adopted byMohammad Reza Shah’s 
Government.  
 
3.4.2.3. Religious Nationalism  
 
In the earlier literature on the state of nationalism following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, it is often 
conceived that Khomeini condemned nationalism as an evil invention of the West to divide the Muslims 
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and prevent the spread of Islam (Algar 1981:302; Martin 2000:124). Ansari (2003:222), however, 
suggested that despite Khomeini’s ambivalent manner in displaying his nationalistic disposition, 
following the Islamic Revolution, “dynastic nationalism” was simply replaced by “Shi’a nationalism”. 
However, the association of Iranian identity with Shi’ism was not a newly introduced concept. In fact, 
when in the sixteenth century under the Safavids, Shi’ism became the official religion of Iran, Iranian 
identity had been very much associated with Shi’a Islam (ibid.). Ansari further argued that this 
association persisted due to the absence of a distinct “national” historiography, with the exception of the 
Shahnameh (ibid.:7). Therefore, while nationalist myth was underdeveloped in the Iranian culture, Islamic 
mythology enjoyed deep roots within society (ibid.). In addition, a division of Iranian intellectuals during 
both the Qajar and Pahlavi periods considered Shi’ism as a doctrine of resistance against imperialism and 
Westernization. This provided for Ulama’s hostility against the Qajar kings and their insistence on Islam 
and the “Persian way of life”- Shi’a Islam- against Western imperialism (Bayat-Philipp 1991:4). Among 
the Ulama of this period, Jamal al-Din Asadabadi (al-Afghani) played a pivotal role as the leader of a 
pan-Islamic movement (ibid.:22). During the Pahlavi period, these narratives were best represented in Al-
e Ahmad’s portrayal of the West as a “plague” and Shi’ism as a vaccine that could cure Gharbzadegi 
(Westoxification) (Yann 2003:188-212,189). Similar rhetoric defined the work of Ali Shari’ati who upon 
complementing Al-e Ahmad’s discourse on anti-imperialism, argued for Shi’ism as the ‘authentic’ Iranian 
identity and the necessities of returning to it. These same issues were central to Khomeini and the 
movement that resulted in the Islamic Revolution.   
It is argued, that by considering Shi’ism a distinctively Iranian narrative of Islam, it can be categorised 
within Smith’s ethnic definition. This consideration is supported by Keddie’s (2003:21) argument that 
until the twentieth century the Shi’a components of Iranian identity were more important than the Iranian 
ones. Further, from 1501 until the current century, Iranianism and Shi’ism were for many people parts of 
a single blend (ibid.).  
The significance of Shi’a nationalism becomes apparent, particularly following the Revolution and the 
reliance of the discourse of Shi’ism as the “authentic” culture and “true” national identity of Iranians. It is 
fundamental to note that this “Islamisation” of Iranian society was founded on “populist” concepts that 
portrayed Shi’ism and its leaders as hostile towards the oppressed (Abrahamian 1993:20). Abrahamian 
argued that “Khomeinism” resembled the “Latin American populism” with its emphasis on the 
mobilisation of the masses, eradication of imperialism and cosmopolitan ideas, as well as returning to the 
“native roots”, which he claimed to be Islamic in nature (ibid.:38). Given that this populism was 
articulated as the basic component of Shi’ism, in this thesis, Shi’a nationalism is often discussed within 
the framework of populist ideologies of the post-Revolutionary Government. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, it is 
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argued that due to the populist nature of the Revolution, the source of legitimacy was no longer sought in 
the ruins of the past and the discipline of archaeology was repudiated as an unnecessary ‘fake 
knowledge’.  
 
3.5. Trigger & Nationalist Archaeology  
 
In recent years and with the renewed interest in the discourse of nationalism, as the stigma of the 
calamities of World War II subsided, various publications have analysed the interactive relationship 
between archaeology and politics. In this regard, Bruce Trigger’s (1984) publication of Alternative 
Archaeologies: Nationalist, Colonialist, Imperialist, became a pioneering reference upon which various 
work within the Externalist approach that argued for the predisposition of archaeology to political trends 
were built on. In this article, Trigger argued that archaeological tradition was strongly influenced by the 
position that the countries and regions in which it is practiced occupy within the modern world-system 
(ibid.:355). While recognising the limitations of this approach, Trigger divided these traditions into 
Nationalist, Colonialist and Imperialist (ibid.).  
In this thesis, the Nationalist approach is applied to analyse the history of Iranian archaeology and, 
therefore, Section 3.4. has been dedicated to outlining the Nationalist framework. However, an 
understanding of the Colonialist and Imperialist approaches are also necessary in order to demonstrate 
how Iranian traditions of archaeology differ from these others. By Colonialist, Trigger (1994:360) 
referred to archaeological traditions that developed either in countries whose native population was 
wholly replaced or overwhelmed by European settlement or in ones where Europeans remained politically 
and economically dominant for a considerable period of time. Iran was never a colony of the West, but it 
was what Vladimir Lenin termed as a “Semi-colony” (Chehabi 1993:8). This term was based on Samuel 
Huntington’s idea of an intermediary category of nation-states between new states of the Third World and 
the old nations of the West. According to his definitions, these intermediary states continuously 
experienced threats to their sovereignty due to internal unrest, contact with European commerce, finance 
and politics, and by ignorance and administrative inefficiencies which restricted them to fit the modern 
world (ibid.). Given that Iran was never considered as a colony and instead shared the features of a semi-
colony, it would be erroneous to attribute colonial traits to its archaeological traditions, albeit considering 
the French archaeological activities in Iran during the Qajar period were closely associated with such 
colonial trends.  
On the other hand, Imperialist or world-oriented archaeology was associated with a small number of 
states such as United States, United Kingdom, that enjoyed or have exerted political dominance over large 
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areas of the world (Trigger 1994:363). It is contended that the Iranian archaeological traditions failed to 
correspond with this identified category either. Rather, it is argued that Iranian archaeology should be 
analysed within Trigger’s Nationalist traditions. This is due to Trigger’s consideration that while the 
development of scientific archaeology corresponds with a specific state of social development, “most 
archaeological traditions are probably nationalistic in orientation” (Trigger 1984:358). Trigger defined  
Nationalist archaeology as the following: 
“The primary function of nationalistic archaeology, like nationalistic history of which it is normally 
regarded as an extension, is to bolster the pride and morale of nations and ethnic groups. It is probably 
strongest amongst peoples who feel particularly threatened, insecure or deprived of their collective right 
by more powerful nations or in countries where appeals for national unity are being made to counteract 
serious divisions along class lines.” (Trigger 1984:360) 
The proposal offered by Trigger was further extended by Diaz-Andreu and Champion (1996:3), who 
argued that the appearance of nationalism stimulated the very creation of archeology as a scientific 
discipline in Europe. Therefore, based on the European experience, it was concluded that, nationalism is 
deeply imbedded in the very concept of archaeology, its institutionalisation and development (ibid.). 
Given Trigger and Glover’s (1981) proposal for the prominence of “regional traditions” in archaeology, 
the use of archaeology in the construction of the Iranian national identity and the building of the nation is 
selected as a case study, in order to outline the Iranian archaeological traditions. As with the case of 
Europe, this case study illustrates that the distinct features of archaeology make it predisposed to the 
political manipulations manifested in various forms of nationalism.  
 
3.6. Selecting Case Studies  
 
Having discussed and defined the theoretical concepts used in this thesis, this section describes how the 
above correspond with the three archaeological sites selected as case studies for this research. It is further 
aimed to provide justifiable arguments for the selection of these particular sites. Through the analysis of 
these case studies, the thesis intends to illustrate the pivotal role of nationalism, irrespective of its form, as 
one of the major driving forces for archaeological studies. It is further intended to articulate the 
manipulation of national heritage by the nation-states to re-construct and appropriate a past that validates 
the contemporary political agendas of the State. This is done through deconstructing the multifaceted 
political and cultural treatments received by three different archaeological sites that belong to three 
distinctive periods extending from the Prehistoric site of Sialk, to the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis and 
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finally the Islamic site of Friday Mosque of Isfahan. This will be achieved, on the one hand, by 
illustrating the ideological notions of nationalism prevailing within the distinctive Administrations of the 
Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties and the post-Revolutionary period, and on the other hand, by highlighting the 
mode of treatment these sites received based on their affiliation to the type of nationalism and ‘authentic’ 
identity preferred by the State. The role of foreign archaeologists in directing attention towards or away 
from these sites is also investigated. 
In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, each of these archaeological sites are introduced and their significance outlined. It 
is argued that the Prehistoric site of Sialk, as the representative of one of the oldest archaeological sites in 
Iran, provides a suitable case study considering it allows for the analysis of various traditions of 
archaeology that dominated the discipline of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran during various historical 
periods. In addition, considering the somewhat better quality of Ghirshman’s excavations at Sialk in 
comparison with other excavations in the 1930s (Young 1986), this Prehistoric sites became a reliable 
source of reference for the chronological sequence of the Iranian Central Plateau, and therefore a 
significant case study for further analysis. The pre-Islamic site of Persepolis is selected given its 
prominence as one of the early archaeological sites visited and studied by foreign travellers and 
archaeologists. Further, given its intimate association with the Pahlavi dynasty and the institution of 
monarchy, the site provides an effective means to illustrate the impact of politics, and various forms of 
nationalism on the treatment of archaeological sites. The Islamic site of  Friday Mosque of Isfahan is 
selected given its significance as one of the oldest mosque structures within the Iranian peripheries and 
the first example of a four-ivan mosque which became the archetype of Iranian mosques thereafter. This 
site was selected following much contemplation, given that the Shi’a pilgrim site of Imam Reza Shrine in 
Mashhad would have been a more convenient candidate to illustrate the impact of Shi’a nationalism. The 
decision to select the Friday Mosque of Isfahan as a case study was based on the factor that it had been 
archaeologically excavated in the 1970s. Therefore, given that this thesis concerns itself with 
archaeology, the Friday Mosque was recognised as more appropriate.  
 
3.7. Accessibility & Limitations  
 
With regards to the limitations of this study, a few factors have to be taken into considerations. These 
limitations are first concerned with the general constraints associated with the selected method of study, 
and second with the availability and accessibility of data. In Section 3.1., it was contended that the 
methodological orientation of this thesis is within the framework of an interpretive approach and, 
therefore, prone to the conventional criticisms of those who argue that such an approach is subjective. 
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Similar criticisms are often held against the Externalist and Internalist approaches employed in this 
research. It is argued that despite this shortcoming, it is the aim of this thesis to remain objective. 
Therefore, in the context of this research, the adherence to an interpretive study of Iranian archaeology 
does not imply the embracement of relativism and the rejection of scientific approaches. Rather by 
adopting this approach, this research has taken into account the consultation of literature on a variety of 
topics in archaeology, politics, and history in order to achieve a fuller understanding of the topic. 
Naturally, given that this thesis is focused on archaeology, despite addressing political and historical 
concepts, they will not be explored in detail. Further criticisms have been made by Murray (2012:143-
145) who cautious on retrospectively denouncing the past archaeological practices while taking the 
contemporary views of archaeologist as “natural”. He suggests that such analysis should take into 
consideration that the current academic orthodoxies have histories too (ibid). Although this criticism is 
acknowledged in this thesis, it is argued that the lack of working knowledge on core concerns in Iranian 
archaeology requires the provision of a historical base that highlights milestones in the maturation of this 
discipline in Iran. This preliminary research, therefore, can provide a foundation for future research. 
Second, this research was conducted in the United Kingdom and, therefore, restricted by the sources that 
were available to the researcher. This was partially due to travel restrictions placed by Durham University 
in 2010 which further limited the consultation of available sources inside Iran. In the year 2011 a research 
trip was made to Rome-Italy, in order to consult the data available on Persepolis and the Friday Mosque 
of Isfahan at IsIAO. Unfortunately, following the passage of a decree by the Italian Council of Ministers 
to shut-down IsIAO and the removal of the documents related to Iran to an inaccessible storage, this field-
trip was restricted to consulting the published sources that were still available at the Institute in Rome. It 
has been the aim of this research to compensate for these shortcomings by selecting primary sources, such 
as major literature on particular subjects held in different institutes (IsIAO in Rome; Durham University; 
Iranian Cultural Heritage, Handicrafts and Tourism Organisation), various articles, speech transcripts of 
Iranian officials, news archives and press releases (including The Times; Hamshahri; Peyvand; Press TV; 
BBC), published official documents (including Samedi Rendi 1993; Yazdani 2001), preliminary 
excavation reports, travelogues and museums archives (including the British Library, Staatliche Museen 
zu Berlin; Smithsonian Gallery Collection Archives; Herzfeld Collection Smithsonian; Freer Digital 
Gallery; The Metropolitan Museum of Art; ICOMOS; UNESCO). In addition, literature in various 
languages, such as English, Farsi, French, German and Italian were consulted to assist meeting the 
objective framework of this research. In some cases, this practice was restricted to the official news and 
institutional web-pages available online. Unfortunately, due to political concerns some of this information 
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has now been removed from online sources. The above outlines the limitations identified by the 
researcher. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
 
Having discussed the orientation and methodological framework of this thesis, the next three chapters are 
concerned with providing the history of Iranian archaeology in terms of its development in Prehistoric, 
pre-Islamic and Islamic subfields. By analysing the three case studies of Sialk, Persepolis, and the Friday 
Mosque of Isfahan it is intended to demonstrate the distinct features of Iranian archaeology which were 
influenced by different socio-political dimensions and various brands of nationalism. Through outlining 
factors that contributed to the formation of this tradition it is contended that Iranian archaeology adheres 
to Trigger’s Nationalist category as the various division of the discipline were born and institutionalised 
once their suitability for supporting political intentions were realised. 
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Chapter 4 
Nationalism & the Treatment of Prehistoric Archaeological Sites: Sialk 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The study of the Prehistoric periods in Iran has been conducted in an irregular manner with some regional 
areas and chronological periods investigated in more detail than others. This imbalance is occasionally a 
reflection of political desires to accommodate Prehistory within the appropriate ideological frameworks of 
a particular administration. Kaeser (2002:171) argued that it was document-based historical enquiry rather 
than Prehistory that got incorporated into politics in that it modified the cultivation of ethnic identities and 
lifted national sentiments. Although as a general trend, this statement resonates with the nation-building 
strategies of Iranian Administrations, during the Pahlavi period with the epitomisation of the Achaemenid 
period and in the post-Revolutionary period with an emphasis on Shi’a history, it is contended that similar 
to other archaeological periods, the Prehistoric period too, was adopted by different Administrations to 
complement their preferred nationalistic rhetoric. Further, Prehistoric archaeological sites played a role in 
reinforcing the Iranian national identity by feeding into the pro-Aryan propaganda that dominated the 
intellectual spheres of Iranian society during the reign of the Qajars and Pahlavis and the fascination with 
affirming Iran’s ancient past and its contributions to World Civilisation during Khatami’s Presidency. In 
this chapter, the sporadic governmental support rendered to the development of Prehistoric archaeology is 
analysed against the formidable influence of foreign archaeologists in shaping the primarily outline of 
research in this discipline. In doing so, the dominating tendencies in theoretical frameworks of each 
political period and their contributions to Iranian archaeology will be investigated.   
This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to the Prehistoric site of Sialk against the backdrop of 
political events during different historical periods. Following this, the chapter will turn to the Qajars’ 
treatment of Prehistoric sites. Since it is argued that there was an absence of archaeological activities at 
Sialk during this period, this section will present a prelude to the launch of Prehistoric archaeological 
activities during the Pahlavi period. This section further aims to investigate the prevalent causes behind 
the Qajars’ lack of investment in the study of Prehistory. By the time Reza Shah ascended to power in 
1925, the Western practice of utilising the past as a coveted currency to support the legitimacy of the 
government and unify the nation-state was adopted into the Iranian context. In this section, it will be 
argued that despite the Pahlavis’ ethnic-dynastic nationalism and their over-emphasis on the Achaemenid 
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period as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian civilisation, their pursuit of the past was influenced by the nationalist 
rhetoric of ‘Aryanism’ that paved the way for the study of the origin of Iranian civilisation in the 
Prehistoric period. With the birth of Prehistoric studies during this period, Sialk became one of the earliest 
Iranian sites to be ‘scientifically’ investigated. The provision of a broad theoretical context in this chapter 
is aimed at highlighting the prevalent debates that dominated the field of archaeology while Sialk was 
under excavation, and how such debates influenced Ghirshman’s outlook in his investigations. Finally, 
the chapter concludes with an analytical review of the recovery of Prehistoric archaeology during the 
post-Revolutionary period, and the initial attempts that suggest the use of Sialk for the purpose of 
restoring Iranian archeology and facilitating the foreign policies adopted by Khatami’s Administration. It 
is further argued that during Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, this interval of archaeological activity was once 
more terminated and Iranian archaeology fell into another phase of negligence and isolation. Within this 
context, references are made to violations and negligence that once again threatened the site of Sialk. 
 
4.2. Historical Background 
In his Prehistory:The Making of the Human Mind, Renfrew (2008:3) argued that two centuries ago in 
Europe, the notion of Prehistory did not exist and many scholars traced their origin to the narratives 
provided in the Bible. In Iran during the Qajar period, similar tendencies prevailed and Iranian history 
stretched only as far back as the mythical kings in the Shahnameh. Therefore, the Iranian encounter with 
archaeological sites was often framed through their affiliation with distant mythical chronicles. Of course 
these fabrications were amply achieved for archaeological sites with imposing structures that often 
belonged to the historic period, while Prehistoric sites were comparatively less frequent and solely 
appreciated for the occasional invaluable treasures they yielded.    
This can be considered as the de facto cause for the fabrication of folk tales and legendary characters that 
were associated with the monumental South Mound at Sialk, by the local inhabitants. According to 
Ghirshman, the source of the name of Sialk was traceable to three different origins; these included 
derivation from the names Solukous as the Mound was associated with the Greek and Hellenic periods; Si 
Arg (30 Citadels) which referred to the 30 towns that enclosed the site; and finally, Sckytharkes which 
corresponded to the name of a Scythian king “King Saka” (Ghirshman 1938:21). Ghirshman further 
maintained that the third alternative was more indicative of the history of Sialk (ibid.:21). According to 
Abdol Rahim Kalantari Zarabi Kashani who offered the first reference to Sialk in 1867 in his book called 
Maraat Alghasan, Sialk was an old citadel by the name of Si Arg, which itself came from modifying the 
name Sepid Arg, imposed on the site given the relatively whiter colour of the earth covering the site in 
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comparison with the surrounding (Afshar 1999:116). In support of the latter, local inhabitants continue to 
refer to Sialk as Sepid Arg to present day.  
The site of Sialk is a part of the ancient city of Kashan and comprises two ancient mounds, 600 metres 
apart (Fig. 4.1). The earliest archaeological remains have been recovered from the North Mound, which 
dates back to the middle of the sixth millennium B.C.E. According to Fazeli (et al. 2013), this Mound 
covers the Neolithic and Early Transitional Chalcolithic periods. It is contended that the inhabitants of the 
North Mound deserted the site sometimes in the middle of fifth millennium B.C.E, and settled on the 
South Mound (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:2). Soon the South Mound was deserted too and the site 
remained uninhabited for almost 1000 years. According to recent investigations, the South Mound covers 
the main periods of Early, Middle and Late Chalcolithic, proto-Elamite and Iron Age (Fazeli et al. 2013). 
In the middle of the Second millennium B.C.E., a group of nomads are thought to have migrated into Iran 
from the north-east and settled in Sialk (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:2). The remains of this community was 
uncovered in Cemetery A in the South Mound. During the first millennium B.C.E, a second migratory 
group settled in Sialk with a relocated Cemetery B, 150 metres to the west of the South Mound (ibid.).  
It is reported that by the year 1930, valuable items of pottery from Sialk had reached the auctions in Paris 
and the French realised the archaeological value of this Prehistoric site. In 1931 Sialk was registered as 
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on the list of the Inventory of National Monuments. According to Malek Shahmirzadi 
(2002:21), the circumstance under which the cultural value of Sialk was evaluated was not clear. The only 
remaining evidence that records the event of registration is the existence of two identity cards with French 
inscriptions (ibid.). Naraghi (2004:19) indicated that when Sialk was registered, it was presumed that the 
site belonged to the Seleucid period. It was only subsequent to the French archaeological excavations that 
the significance of Sialk as a Prehistoric site was recognised. 
The man who introduced Sialk as one of the centres of ancient civilisation was the French archaeologist, 
Roman Ghirshman. He began his investigation at the site in 1933 and continued his research in 1934 and 
1937. According to his personal writings, Sialk was selected following the dissemination of a number of 
unusual vessels, which surfaced in 1933 in the antiquity markets of Iran and France. In this context 
Ghirshman’s interest in pottery, in comparison with the traditional French interest in collectable museum 
objects that corresponded with Mesopotamian civilisations or Luristan Bronze is noteworthy. Once 
Godard traced the origin of these items to Sialk, the Louvre Museum made the necessary enquiries to 
attain the right to excavate the site (Ghirshman 1938:16). This permission was received promptly and the 
French began their excavation at Sialk in the same year.  
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Ghirshman’s investigations at Sialk are of eminent significance as they contributed to establishing the 
first chronological sequence for the Iranian Central Plateau. From Ghirshman’s report in 1939, we may 
draw few indications reflective of Sialk’s bad state of preservation during the early Pahlavi period. Apart 
from irreplaceable damage that was inflicted on the site by natural causes, Ghirshman (1939:3-4) stated 
that Sialk had been truncated in the north by cultivated fields, and to the east by the houses of the village 
of Diz-Cheh. He further contended that local farmers had been clearing material from the site for housing 
and agricultural purposes (ibid.:3).  
Ghirshman’s discoveries at Sialk were published in 1938 in two volumes under the title Fouilles de Sialk. 
As will be argued, due to the publication of this paramount work in French, despite acknowledgment of 
its significance, the content was often overlooked by non-French archaeologists. Based on his 
excavations, Ghirshman identified six successive cultural sequences at Sialk. Accordingly, Ghirshman 
divided the occupation layers on the North Mound (Trenches 1, 2, 3) into two phases: Sialk Period I (1-5) 
and Sialk Period II (1-3). Ghirshman concluded that these findings demonstrated the existence of the 
“oldest human settlement” in the plains (Ghirshman 1954:29). The South Mound (Trenches 1, 2, 3) 
contained the cultural sequence of Sialk III (1-6) and IV (1-2), which according to Malek Shahmirzadi 
(2006b:19) corresponded with the early urbanisation and initial signs of writing in the Central Plateau. 
Cemetery A, located 500 metres south of the South Mound, was identified as Sialk V and Cemetery B, 
located 150 metres west of South Mound was identified as Sialk VI. Based on the grey vessels and burial 
goods, both of these cemeteries were associated with the Iron Age (ibid.:19; Malek Shahmirzadi 
2004:11). Ghirshman’s (1938;1954;1977) excavations at Sialk were significant as they addressed the 
nationalist rhetoric of Aryanism by offering hypothesis that traced the migration of “Indo-Iranians” and 
their spread into the Iranian Plateau through this Prehistoric research and their identification in Sialk’s 
cemeteries. 
Following World War II, the direction of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran changed and become more 
concerned with accommodating the theoretical frameworks associated with ‘New Archaeology’ 
introduced by the Americans. Therefore, in the 1960s and 1970s scholarly research began to focus on the 
concepts of origin of agriculture and urbanism in western Iran. The domination of archaeological 
activities in this region marginalised more central sites such as Sialk. With the exception of scattered 
efforts in the late 1970s (Majidzadeh 1976; Amiet 2002) to evaluate the validity of the cultural 
chronology achieved by Ghirshman, the site was largely abandoned during the later Pahlavi period.  
Following the Islamic Revolution, Sialk suffered from sporadic occasions of violation to its vicinity due 
to the self-sufficiency projects that fostered agricultural developments. In addition, the site of Sialk, 
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among other Prehistoric archaeological sites suffered from negligence and maltreatment resulting from 
the degradation of the discipline of archaeology and its irrelevance to the nationalist doctrine of the 
Islamic Regime. It was only during the Presidency of Khatami and in conformity with his 
Administration’s discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ that a proposal to re-investigate Sialk was 
ratified. The initial objective of the project, which became known as the Sialk Reconstruction Project 
(SRP), was to operate a rescue mission to salvage the site from its desolate state of preservation (Malek 
Shahmirzadi 2002; 2003; 2004; 2006a and 2006b). On the third year of this five season operation, the 
SRP which was conducted under the Directorship of Dr. Malek Shahmirzadi, and managed by of the 
Research Institute of Archaeology, became a multidisciplinary project with the co-operation of foreign 
archaeological institutes. It was within this research context that Malek Shahmirzadi hypothesised that the 
“La Grande Construction” identified by Ghirshman in the South Mound was one of the “earliest Ziggurats 
in Mesopotamia” (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:15). The archaeological activities at Sialk continued into the 
early years of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency when the most recent archaeological investigation under the 
joint co-operation of an Iranian-British team determined the validity of chronological sequence at the 
North Mound of Sialk using both absolute and relative dating methods (Fazeli et al. 2013). These 
activities came to an abrupt end after the 2009 Presidential elections. 
 
4.3. Qajar Nationalism: The Case Study of Sialk 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the determining role of social and political factors in directing 
the path of Prehistoric Iranian archaeology. Although the influential force of these factors may have 
manifested themselves more readily during the Pahlavi and post-Revolutionary periods, the application of 
these themes to Prehistoric studies during the Qajar period is difficult given the non-existent notion of 
Prehistory and the lack of an appropriate comprehension for its potential application. The Qajars’ 
perceived little socio-political redemption in utilising the Prehistoric sites and instead gratified their 
monetary interest through occasional treasure hunts. In his memoire Etemad Al-Satlaneh, a Trustee of 
Naser al-Din Shah, attested to the Shah’s interest in the practice of Tala-shuyi. In addition, in 1875 A. 
Houtum Schindler who was in Persia for the purpose of laying the Tehran-Mashhad telegraph line 
encountered a group of locals who were “working to find marvelous objects” at Teppe Hissar near 
Damghan (Nashat 1982:158; Abdi 2001:53). Similar affirmations of interest in the monetary value of 
Prehistoric sites was found across numerous sites during this period.  
In this section, it has been suggested that the Qajars’ disregard for Prehistoric sites was twofold; firstly, 
the absence of political motivations for the Qajar to employ Prehistory as an appropriate tool to legitimise 
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their authority and secondly, the non-existence of a concept of ‘Prehistory’ which led to substantial 
looting of these sites by Iranian and foreigners alike. More specifically, the Qajar model of kingship did 
not entail the necessity of historical verifications to legitimise its authority. Despite this disposition, in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it will be argued that the foundation of Qajar authority on the two pillars of monarchy 
and Shari’a (Amanat 1997:7-9) aroused interest in the pre-Islamic and Islamic past. This curiosity became 
the incentive for the realisation of the suitability of historical past as a viable tool for political action. 
However, this trend was chiefly concerned with pre-Islamic and Islamic monuments while ‘Prehistory’ 
remained an alien concept. Reflecting on this notion, in this section it is argued that the Prehistoric period 
occupied no eminence in the legitimisation of Qajar kings and therefore was subject to negligence.  
It is further argued that the absence of the notion of ‘Prehistory’ provided an additional pretext for 
overlooking sites that belonged to this period. It is important to note that the Qajar lacked a 
comprehensive understanding of Iranian history. Rather, history was disguised by the mounting influence 
of Islamic past and the mythical fables of the Shahnameh. It was only with the re-discovery and 
translation of historical texts and foreign archaeological discoveries that Iranians grasped a better 
understanding of their past and began investing in archaeology for the verification of similar historic 
documents. Although the prelude to the appreciation of the past began during the Qajar period, it only 
became prominent and fully apprehended as a political instrument during the rule of the Pahlavis. The 
dominance of the above discourse became a catalyst for the surrender of Iran’s Archaeological Monopoly 
to the French. With the supremacy of the French, their external commercial and scientific mandate 
managed the direction of Iranian archaeology. This mandate called for the exploration of sites with 
Biblical or Classical affiliations. According to these preconditions, Prehistoric sites such as Sialk with no 
cultural relations to the above were not initially included in the circle of the French scientific domain.  
It has to be noted that the Qajars’ attitude towards the concept of ‘Prehistory’ was echoed in the Iranian 
society at large. While as Keddie (1988:301-2) argued the Ulama, who had profound influence in the 
Qajar society, opposed the various concessions granted by the Qajar kings to foreign companies, no 
complaint was targeted towards the French Archaeological Concession. To the Ulama, any remains that 
constituted the period prior to the birth of Islam were considered to be from the age of Jaheliat 
(ignorance) and therefore unworthy of consideration. Notwithstanding these apathies for Iranian cultural 
heritage, the nationalists who drove the wheels of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution were the single 
group who demonstrated sporadic concerns over the exploitation of antiquities by the French. As Goode 
(2007:130) argued, one newspaper condemned the sale of a statue from Susa for the price of 5 million 
Pounds at a time when Mohammad Ali Shah (r. 1907-1909 AD) could not borrow 10000 Tomans from 
England or Russia. These initial tensions were not confined to the monetary value of antiquity, rather 
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inspired by the emergence of nationalist paradigms that envisaged a sovereign country founded on the 
infrastructure of an ancient civilisation. The peripheries of these inspirations were curbed by the ethnic 
nationalist theories introduced by the likes of J. A. de Gobineau. In his capacity as First Secretary of the 
French Mission, and later as the French Charge d’Affairs in Tehran (1855-1858 AD and 1861-1863 AD) 
(Afshar 2003:284), Gobineau fostered the notion of Persians as Aryans. In his book The Inequality of 
Human Race, Gobineau (1915:33) claimed that if the Persians had retained their “purity of blood, as real 
Aryans”, Persian domination would have never terminated. The writings of Gobineau were subsequently 
echoed in the intellectual works of authors such as Franz Cumont, who mapped the migration of 
Mithrasim and Manichaesim from Iranian to Roman territory, and Josef Strzgowski in his argument that 
the source of Western art was traceable to Iran (Grigor 2007:562).   
As the pro-Aryan propaganda began to dominate the intellectual spheres of the Iranian society in the early 
1900s, various Iranian authors began to cultivate public fascination with the Aryan and pre-Islamic 
Iranian heritage and initiated the promotion of ethnic nationalism (see Chapter 2). Although the pursuit of 
the past in the promotion of the Aryan race may have prepared the foundation for the birth of Iranian 
Prehistoric archaeology, it initially manifested itself with interest in the Achaemenid period, mainly in the 
absence of any evidence that pointed to a more distance past. By the time the archaeological 
investigations began to uncover pre-Achaemenid civilisations, the antiquity of the Achaemenid Empire as 
the heir to the Aryan race was sealed and its far-reaching implications for Iranian politics recognised. As 
shall be argued in the following section, it was only through additional efforts during the Pahlavi period 
that archaeologists were able to extend and consolidate the origins of Iranian civilisation back to 
Prehistoric periods.   
It has been the intention of this section to argue that Prehistoric remains were dismissed by the Qajar 
kings and the Iranian elite due to the non-existence of a concept of Prehistory during this period. This 
trend was reflected in other strands of the Iranian society. Whereas the historic archaeological sites were 
partially protected by the prevalent belief in ‘talisman’ or the bad omen that befell those who removed 
objects from the fabled sites (Drijvers & Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991:7), and the Islamic archaeological 
sites were refurbished and protected in their capacity as functional centres of society, Prehistoric sites 
were often subject to looting for their monetary values. These sites were frequently discovered through 
chance or by ploughing agricultural land. In the absence of monumental structures, no reservation was 
placed on the looting of lands that gave birth of ‘treasures’. In this process, while the luxury items were 
preserved for their monetary value, other Prehistoric material, for example pottery, were destroyed and in 
so doing the chronological sequence of numerous Prehistoric sites were disturbed. Sialk is an example of 
such destructions considering its close proximity to an agricultural village (Ghirshman 1939:3-4).  
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It was due to this indifference to the value of cultural heritage that in 1895 Marcel Auguste Dieulafoy 
obtained the concession to excavate the ancient relics of Susa, followed by the French Archaeological 
Monopoly in 1900 that gave the French exclusive right to excavate all over Iran (Amiet et al. 1993:16). 
The French’s involvement in Iranian archaeology corresponded with a period when antiquarianism was 
gradually replaced by an outlook that favoured the acceptance of scientific investigations to unravel 
human antiquity. In effect, Prehistoric archaeology was already considered as a scientific discipline 
following its professionalisation in 1869 by the Urgeschichte (German Society for Anthropology, 
Ethnology and Prehistoric Archaeology) (Trigger 2007:235). Although these events preceded the launch 
of the French archaeological activities in Iran, nevertheless, the rivalry between different Western 
museums, such as the British Museum and the Louvre, that began in the age of colonialism continued to 
persist in the region and this transpired into focus on archaeological sites with exhibitable items. This 
pursuit was particularly apparent in the French desire to maintain their Monopoly in Iran considering the 
colonial structures they maintained in the Middle East in the 1800s were gradually shattered by anti-
colonial movements and the emergence of new nation-states. Therefore, to secure Iran as a source of 
archaeological riches to facilitate the Louvre was critical.  
It is appropriate to contextualise the colonial outlook of the French Delegation with regard to their applied 
theoretical approach. As Trigger (2007:254) argued, it was not until after World War I that the 
Evolutionary approach was replaced by Culture-Historical theories in Britain and France. The 
Evolutionary approach of the French Delegation towards their archaeological mandate in Iran 
demonstrates their prevalent belief in the unilinear development of cultural advances. As Trigger 
(1980:23) contended, this unilinear evolutionary pattern attested to the colonial attitude of imperial 
powers towards the less advanced countries according to which less technologically advanced people 
were viewed as being at lower stages of cultural development. This view was heavily entrenched in the 
political disposition of France in the nineteenth century and reflected in the rhetoric of politicians such as 
Jules-Francois-Camille Ferry who firmly believed in the racial superiority of the French and their right to 
rule and civilise the inferior races (Ferry cited in Colonna 1997:351).  
Although Iran was never formally under the colonial domain of French imperialism during this period, the 
employment of methods associated with the Evolutionary approach with an embedded colonial attitude 
testified to the French archaeological mandate in Iran. As Meskell (2003:151) argued, central to this 
attitude was the position that Western scholars were the rightful inheritors of the past as their subject 
cultures were unable to manage and control their own resources. These attitudes were accentuated 
through interests in excavating at Susa. Despite its Achaemenid legacy, the French selected Susa to rival 
the British dominance over Mesopotamian archaeology and to participate in the race for the recovery of 
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the origins of human civilisation, which according to Jacques De Morgan, the Director of the French 
Archaeological Mission to Persia from 1900 to 1912, could be traced back to Susa (Amiet 1994). The 
Achaemenids were considered by the French as lacking in originality and thus unworthy of detailed study 
(ibid.). Nevertheless, Susa offered the French Delegation a wealth of material from both Elamite and 
Achaemenid periods.  
The above argument denotes the French Colonial approach to Iranian archaeology, both in its attitude and 
in its mandate, and through the preference in selecting a site that aptly corresponded with their 
requirements of collecting museum objects and investigating a region that was culturally within the 
margins of Mesopotamian civilisations. Considering the above discourse, the French’s lack of interest to 
invest in other archaeological sites even following their Monopoly to excavate all over Iran is 
comprehensible. In addition, according to Daniel, it was only after the report of Pumpelly at Anau in 1904 
that all stratigraphic levels were identified as “cultures” (Daniel 1981:149). Prior to this study and at the 
pinnacle of Colonialist approaches, the study of Prehistory was considered as the investigation of 
barbarians, and viewed with apprehension (ibid.:148). 
In this section it was argued that the irrelevance of Prehistory to the legitimacy of Qajar kings hindered 
the emergence of this subject as a viable scientific discipline. While this disposition was forced by the 
non-existent notion of Prehistory in Qajar society, the French Delegation’s disregard for this period 
further delayed the study of Prehistory. To a certain degree, the debates in this section may seem 
irrelevant in that they do not provide a lucid outline for the treatment of Sialk during the Qajar period. 
However, considering that, Prehistoric sites such as Sialk may have only been identified by the locals as 
treasure hubs, it is only through facilitating this backdrop that one can provide a thorough investigation of 
the legacy of Prehistoric studies during the Pahlavi period. 
 
4.4. Pahlavi Nationalism: The Case Study of Sialk 
In this thesis the Pahlavi period is presented as a preface to the introduction of Western concepts, the most 
significant of which was the notion of a modern nation-state built on a mélange of ethnic nationalism, 
manifested in the Aryan propagandas, and the inherent dynastic nationalism with its emphasis on the 
institution of monarchy. Under the Pahlavis, the political dilemmas of nation-building were resolved 
through an ‘invention of traditions’ that relied on the Achaemenid period as the ‘golden age’ in Iranian 
history. Nevertheless, the ‘invention’ of this collective memory also relied on the Primordial principle of 
cultural ‘continuity’ and racial ‘superiority’. Although these incentives were met by the Pahlavis’ refuge 
in the historic periods, the infatuation with the origins of the Aryan race reflected in Nazi ideologies 
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instigated further impetus for the study of the Prehistoric past. Such rhetoric provided for the promotion 
of an image of Iranian identity as ‘civilised’. The investigations of foreign archaeological teams in Iran 
provided a catalyst for the Pahlavis to recognise the potentials of a period that extended beyond the 
Achaemenid kings and into the Prehistoric past. It was against this backdrop that archaeological 
investigations slightly deviated towards the study of Prehistoric sites during the first Pahlavi period and 
Sialk became one of the prime excavation sites under this mandate. 
The intention of this section is to establish two points. Firstly, it is argued that the discipline of Prehistoric 
archaeology during this period was mainly dictated by the theoretical trends and methods that were 
introduced to Iran by foreign archaeological teams. These approaches were often framed to further 
complement the prevalent mandates of the Iranian society during each political period. In this respect, the 
1930s and 1960s are considered as the apex of foreign archaeological influence during the Pahlavi period. 
In general terms, the archaeological activities during the 1930s were dominated by French and 
Americans, while in the 1960s these influences skewed towards more American involvement in shaping 
the landscape of Iranian archaeology. This prelude provides a comprehensive path for the analysis of the 
approaches embraced by foreign archaeological teams during each period. Therefore, the prevalence of 
the migration theories associated with the Culture-Historical approach that supported the proposed 
‘superiority’ of Iranian race in the 1930s and the introduction of ‘New Archaeology’ during the phase of 
‘progress’ in the 1960s are analysed.  
The second point is that as a result of the unique socio-political dynamics that prevailed during this 
period, the archaeological concepts introduced in the 1930s and 1960s facilitated the birth and 
professionalisation of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran. It is argued that although initially the Achaemenid 
period satisfied the nationalistic mandates of Reza Shah’s Government, with the encouragement of 
foreign archaeologists, and the introduction and appropriation of migration theories, the Pahlavi 
authorities gradually became prepared to invest in the exploration of the more distant past. The suggestion 
that Iran was the homeland of Aryans, was perceived as a narrative that could supplement the recovering 
reputation of Iran as a sovereign nation with an ancient civilisation. This is followed by investigating the 
advance of Prehistory as a scientific discipline during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah when a 
discernible political shift from the concept of ‘Aryanism’ reduced the ethnic elements of Iranian 
nationalism, while perpetuating the role of monarchy as the focal component of the Pahlavi nationalist 
mandate. With this shift in the nationalistic rhetoric, emphasis was directed towards pre-Islamic sites (see 
Chapter 5), allowing Prehistoric archaeology to advance without political interference. It is further argued 
that the introduction of ‘New Archaeology’ by American scholars, aroused sympathies from the emerging 
generation of trained Iranian archaeologists who struggled to dissociate Iranian Prehistoric archaeology 
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from both Colonialist and Nationalist trends. These events provoked an impetus for a positive step 
towards creating a professional and scientific ethos in the discipline of Prehistoric archaeology before the 
Islamic Revolution.  
Although Sialk was not the first Prehistoric site that was investigated in the socio-political backdrop 
discussed above, its treatment embodied many of the concerns that were prevalent during the Pahlavi 
period. The impact of these concerns are depicted in following sections, the first focuses on the treatment 
of Sialk during the reign Reza Shah and second investigates these same incentives during Mohammad 
Reza Shah’s reign.  
 
4.4.1. Reza Shah’s Government & Ethnic Nationalism: Prehistoric Archaeology 
 
“Few Archaeologists in Europe can work without the shadow of the misuse of the past for 
nationalistic purposes during the Third Reich.”  
(Hodder 1991: x) 
 
 In the previous section, it was argued that during the reign of Reza Shah the necessities of constructing a 
united nation-state based on a common ethnic identity required emphasis on the stages in Iranian history 
that were recorded through written documents. Therefore, the Achaemenid period was epitomised as the 
‘golden age’ of Iranian history and Reza Shah’s Government actively promoted archaeological activities 
that corresponded with this period of Iranian past. It was due to this tradition that the study of Prehistory, 
with its lack of explicit documentation, failed to arouse an immediate interest in the Iranian officials. In 
addition, as will be argued in Chapter 5, given the racial identification of Achaemenid kings as Aryans 
(Butcher 2003:52), this period satisfied the Pahlavis’ model of ethnic-dynastic nationalism. Therefore, the 
Achaemenid period allowed for the promotion of ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of Iranian race and added 
to the Government’s ambivalence towards Prehistoric studies. 
Although the study of Prehistory was not a vigorous component of the nation-building process undertaken 
by Reza Shah’s Government, it is argued that the prevalence of certain theoretical frameworks introduced 
by foreign archaeologists during this period resonated with the Government’s mandate to adopt a model 
of nationalism that embraced the ‘ethnic’ elements of Iranian identity. In a global context, the 
contemporary infatuation with the superiority of the Aryan race and the search for the discovery of their 
origins should be noted. Such tendencies provided for the Iranian’s receptiveness of foreign 
archaeological theories that further supported the notion of Iranian ‘superiority’ and nominated Iran as the 
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possible homeland of Aryans. Given this pretext, despite the failure of Prehistoric studies to presume a 
central position within Iranian politics, the incentive for the foundation of Prehistoric archaeology was 
instigated. Within this context, the significance of Sialk and the implications of the prevalent theoretical 
frameworks on its analysis are discussed in further detail.  
 
4.4.1.1. Foreign Expeditions and the Utilisation of Archaeological Theories towards an Ethnic 
Brand of Nationalism 
The previous section contextualised the state of Prehistoric archaeology during the Qajar period by 
illustrating the archaeological approach of the French who maintained a monopoly over archaeological 
activities in Iran until 1930. In doing so it was established that the French mandate and their adoption of 
methods associated with the Evolutionary approach facilitated their colonial attitude towards archaeology 
in Iran. With Reza Shah’s ascension to power in 1924, the political climate of Iran changed and became 
increasingly anti-colonial and nationalistic. Under these circumstances, the French mandate and their 
Archaeological Monopoly was perceived by the Iranian nationalists as a colonial legacy that epitomised 
the Qajar period. Applying Kohl’s terminology of “subaltern perspective”, this period represented a phase 
in Iranian history where the ideas of liberation from an imperial power were imbued into archaeological 
research (Kohl et.al 2007:4). Indeed, as Goode (2007:131) contended, many prominent Iranians had 
become convinced that the past held a special significance for the “new” Iran that they hoped to create. 
To create the utopian Iran they yearned for, the French Monopoly had to be obliterated and a new set of 
cultural values had to be introduced into the Iranian society.  
Apart from the Government’s mandate to ‘liberate’ Iranian archaeology as a precursor to Iran’s national 
independence, the French archaeological policies in Iran were detested for their inadequate approach in 
promoting Persian culture and their obsolete methods of excavations (Gholi Majd 2003:67). These claims 
were supported by American diplomats who maintained that the French through their “closed-door” 
policy had achieved little in the field of Iranian archaeology and Iran should adopt an “open-door” policy 
to allow other nations make “marvellous discoveries” (Goode 2007:135). In addition, the Iranian 
Government regularly complained about the loss of antiquities to France, with no benefit for Iran 
(ibid.:133). The primary step to make Iranian archaeology independent from French influence was 
conceived in the annulment of their lengthy Monopoly. This initiative was further supported by the 
Americans, who expressed a keen interest in becoming involved in Iranian archaeology. It is important to 
note that the Americans had gained prominence in the Pahlavi Administration as the ‘saviours’ of Iranian 
archaeology. This mindset was mainly achieved through the initiatives of Arthur Upham Pope, who had 
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become the source of aspiration for Iranian nationalists through nurturing the myth of saviour and 
envisaging a utopian Iran through reviving its ‘glorious past’ (see Chapter 5). This is while, as Goode 
indicated, the French archaeological activities at Susa were perceived as the residue of French colonialism 
and castigated by Reza Shah as “thievery” (Goode 2007:174). The hostility towards the legacy of French 
archaeologists in Iran had unprecedented impacts on the general outlook towards their forthcoming 
archaeological activities. In essence, the annulment of the French Monopoly in 1927 forced a serious 
blow to the authority of French archaeology in the region. 
The above analysis was an attempt to articulate the incentives that compelled the French to abandon their 
previous policies and adopt strategies that assisted the maintenance of their dominance in the modified 
terrain of Iranian archaeology. It is argued that the restoration of the French archaeological authority in 
Iran was facilitated through a binary transformation which supplied the initial proceedings that led to the 
study of Sialk. These modifications were instigated by altering the administrative assembly, through 
hiring André Godard as the Director of the Archaeology Service of Iran (1930), and Roman Ghirshman as 
the new Head of the Archaeological Mission in Persia (Delegations Archaeologiques Francaises) (1931); 
and, by expanding the scope of French archaeological activities beyond Susa and into novel peripheries. 
This is not to overlook the excavations that were conducted outside Susa and in the Khuzistan region, 
such as Teppe Duvaisyah, Ja’far abad, Musian, or the surveys in Gurgan and Talesh region under De 
Morgan’s direction before the 1930s. Nevertheless, as Young (1986) argued, despite De Morgan’s 
professional inclinations towards scientific epistemology, his methods in Iran remained ‘antiquarian’ in 
nature with no effort to meet the excavation standards recognised in the neighbouring Near Eastern sites. 
It may be argued that Iranian archaeological independence from the French and the rise of Americans as a 
prominent rival, encouraged a new phase of French involvement in Iranian archaeology with less reliance 
on Colonialist approaches of antiquarianism and more favorable attitude towards the scientific study of 
Iranian past. In fact, one of the major French excavations during this period, Ghirshman’s excavations at 
Sialk, marked a true break from their legacies prior to the 1930s.  
Considering the scientific achievements at Sialk, the impending question of why this Prehistoric site was 
selected by the French needs to be addressed. The argument to validate this choice is twofold. Firstly, the 
prevalence of a new theoretical framework in the late nineteenth century, which focused on migration and 
diffusion of cultures, altered the orientation of French activities in Iran in order to compete with 
Americans. Secondly, the socio-political climate of Iran with its new emphasis on ethnic nationalism 
encouraged the French to venture out of their preferred region of Susa and investigate archaeological sites 
outside of the Mesopotamian cultural domain to assist the maintenance of their archaeological authority. 
As is evident, the incentives for the selection of Sialk ran parallel to the overarching context that defined 
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Prehistoric archaeology during the reign of Reza Shah. Therefore, the analysis of Sialk is pursued in the 
backdrop of theoretical trends introduced by foreign archaeologists that appealed to the ethnic nationalism 
of Reza Shah’s Government. 
 
4.4.1.1.1. Migration & Diffusion Theories 
By the 1930s the coercive efforts of Iranian and Americans compelled the French to renounce their 
Archaeological Monopoly in exchange for the Directorship of Iranian Antiquities. As discussed above, 
one way to re-establishment French authority in Iranian archaeology was through introducing a new 
generation of archaeologists, who were accustomed to the contemporary advances in archaeological 
theories. These theoretical frameworks particularly focused on the Culture-Historical approach and 
challenged the cultural evolutionism, which had provided a catalyst for the colonial mandates of 
expantionist powers (Trigger 2009:211). The two main advocates of Culture-Historical approach were 
Gustaf Kossina (1858-1931 AD) and Gordon Childe (1892-1957 AD) whose research focused on the 
identification of the Indo-European homeland. While Kossina traced the origin of the Aryans to Germany 
and Scandinavian countries (Dhavalikar 2007:34), Childe (1926:193) proposed that the Aryans migrated 
from their original homeland in the Russian Steppes to the south-east (Mesopotamia & Iran), south-west 
(Troy & the “Balkans”), and north and north-west (Northern Europe). Similar hypothesis by scholar Max 
Muller (1875) had already encouraged archaeologists to pursue the discovery of material remains that 
confirmed such claims. While the Germans were excavating the remains of Ancient Hittites in Anatolia 
(1906-1912) and the British were tracing the route of Aryan migration into the Indus Valley and the site 
of Mohenjo-daro (1921-22) (Dhavalikar 2007:4), in 1903 Raphael Pumpelly was excavating at Anau in 
Soviet Turkamanestan (Greater Iran), to confer similar verifications. De Morgan’s surveys in the Caspian 
region of Talysh and Gurgan in this same period may signify the dissemination of these hypotheses to 
Iran. 
It is contended that the hypotheses instigated by Childe’s publications The Dawn of European Civilization 
in 1925, The Aryans: A Study of Indo-European Origins in 1926 and The Most Ancient East in 1928 
refocused attention to the Near East in the 1930s. The placing of Iranian Prehistory into a larger 
interpretive context and the ensuing migration theories directed focus to the Prehistory of a region which 
according to Young (1986) was largely dismissed due to the prevailing misconceptions with regards to its 
Prehistoric time depth. Given that Childe (1926:192) considered Pumpelley’s discoveries at Anau as a 
Neolithic culture characterised by Aryan features, it was deduced that this was the route of Aryans 
diffusion into the Iranian Plateau. In 1931 the Americans began to excavate on the same route through 
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investigations at Tureng Teppe with Frederick R. Wulsin as the Director, and Teppe Hissar under 
Schmidt’s direction  (Moreau 2010:4). The work at Teppe Hissar was particularly interesting due to the 
discovery of 1637 burials and the measurement of full skulls recovered for racial identification (Gursan-
Salzman 2007:36-7). In his first report from Hissar, Schmidt (1933:367; 1937:303) offered a working 
theory according to which the carriers of the cultures who settled in Tureng Teppe and Hissar were to be 
traced to southern Turkestan and the northern Steppe. Therefore, it may be argued that by the early 1930s, 
the Americans, who were considered a serious threat to the authority of French archaeology in Iran, were 
fully engaged in the employment of the migration theories prevalent during this period, especially in the 
northeast. Further, the Swedish Archaeological Expedition in 1932 was pursuing similar research under 
the direction of T.J. Arne at Shah Teppe, also in north-eastern Iran (Arne 1935). In 1934 the British 
archaeologists Sir Aurel Stein was surveying archaeological sites, particularly from the chalcolithic 
period, all over Iran to trace relations between “the Indus Valley and Indo-Iranian borderlands” on the 
eastern and  “south-western Persia and Mesopotamia” on the western borders (Stein 1936:111).  In their 
attempt to instigate a scientific enterprise on a par with the contemporary approaches, the French were 
encouraged to diversify their research by locating a Prehistoric site with the potential capacity to restore 
their authority in Iranian archaeology. This provided for their effort to secure a Prehistoric site outside 
their preferred region of Susa. The Musees Nationaux and the Ecole du Louvre had already sponsored two 
seasons of excavation at Teppe Giyan located in Luristan, Directed by Conenau and Ghirshman in 1931-
32 (Negahban 2001). These excavations were however, conducted for the traditional motive of 
discovering museum objects, in this case finding the source of the Luristan Bronzes (Young 1986). 
Considering the scattered surveys in the Central Iranian Plateau, it is conceivable that the French 
countered the American Prehistoric projects in the north-east by selecting a site in this region. The site of 
Sialk, to the east of Teppe Giyan, was selected perhaps party due to its geographical location. The site is 
positioned on the Kashan Plain enclosed by the Karkas Mountains to the west and the Great Salt Desert to 
the east (Coningham et al. 2006). If the Indo-Iranians had migrated to Iran through the north-east, Sialk 
may have performed as a gateway to the rest of the Iranian Plateau (see Ghirshman 1978). This thesis was 
already put forward by Ghirshman (1938:101-3) when he made attempts to trace the origins of the early 
inhabitants of Sialk, by comparing their pottery, metal, ornamentation and way of life, to those of the 
Anau culture in Turkmanestan. Later on, Ghirshman (1977) published L'iran et la Migration des Indo-
Aryens et des Iraniens, based on the study of archaeological evidence which further attested to his 
conclusions that the original homeland of Indo-Iranians was to be sought in the lower reaches of Volga in 
southern Russia. 
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 In spite of these efforts, it is not intended here to relate all archaeological activities during this period to 
the study of Indo-Iranians and their origins. Rather, the aim is to articulate the dominance of the concept 
of migration in explaining cultural change. In fact, Ghirshman further displayed his commitment to this 
approach by explaining cultural change in Sialk IV2 in terms of expansion and migration of Elamite 
culture from the southern region of Susa. Ghirshman (1978:47) argued that the correspondence of 
material culture from Sialk IV2 to the proto-Elamite period demonstrated the invasion of the former by 
the later culture in order to establish a trading station in the heartland of the Plateau. Nevertheless, given 
the political setting of the early 1900s, it is justified to assert that the path of French archaeological 
activities, too, was shaped by debates concerning the origins of Iranians, also due to pressures from the 
rival Americans and the Government’s inclinations towards ethnic nationalism. 
The prevalence of the migration theories and the political climate under which Sialk was excavated 
exposed the site to various technical and methodological weaknesses. These were challenges that 
threatened all Prehistoric sites that were excavated within this paradigm. Trigger (2007:290) indicated 
that these constraints were especially evident in the considerable elaboration of stratigraphy, seriation, 
and classification. In particular the construction of chronological charts was considered as the 
fundamental aspect of creating archaeological knowledge (Willey & Sabolff 1980:110). Trigger 
(2007:288) further contended that by focusing on migration and diffusion as the main attributes of culture 
change, archaeologists failed to recognise the internal factors that led to cultural evolution. Additionally, 
as Johnson (2010:19) argued, such approaches produced descriptions of cultural phases and their changes 
rather than explaining why such changes occurred. This descriptive emphasis facilitated archaeologists 
with the tools to interpret past cultures with accordance to prevailing political criteria and therefore 
susceptible to political trends that sought to legitimise their existence by promoting ethnic nationalism.  
In Sialk, the attention to theories associated with the Culture-Historical approach was evident by 
Ghirshman’s grave reliance on the stylistic character of pottery to establish a cultural sequence for Iran. In 
his critique of Ghirshman, Amiet (2002:182) argued that due to the archaic methods of documentations 
employed, only painted and intact pottery was recorded, while broken and plain pottery was discarded. 
This approach resulted in a selective method in collection of data and as Malek Shahmirzadi maintained, 
hindered a comprehensive understanding of different pottery styles for the site (ibid.). Nevertheless, the 
defining of cultures on the basis of a small number of “diagnostic artefacts” was a practice that even 
Childe employed in his initial research (Trigger 2007:244). These diagnoses were inferred from artefacts 
that were intact and representative of particular cultures.  
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 As is evident, Sialk was not excavated independent of archaeological traditions that dominated the field 
in the 1930s and consequently suffered from the weaknesses that were embedded in these approaches and 
the political mood that facilitated their advance. To assign such constrains to the inadequacy of techniques 
applied by Ghirshman devoid of contextual consideration would only undermine his unprecedented 
achievements at Sialk. These achievements, too, were deeply affiliated with the technical developments 
that followed the application of Culture-Historical approach. Particularly, it was the tighter control over 
chronological as well as cultural variations (see Trigger 2007:290) that allowed Ghirshman to follow the 
pioneering work of archaeologists such as Schliemann (Turkey) and Petrie (Palestine & Egypt), in 
constructing a detailed historical sequence for the site of Sialk.  
Ghirshman’s excavation at Sialk is recognised as one of the early scientifically-oriented studies in Iranian 
archaeology (Dyson 1965; Azarnoush 2002:7) and the relative chronology that he established in the 1930s 
went unchallenged until the late 1970s as a criterion for analysing other archaeological sites in Iran. Some 
argue that Ghirshman’s significant contribution to establishing a cultural chronology for Sialk was due to 
his elaborate methods which contrary to the contemporary traditions ‘did not rely on Culture-Historical 
approach’. For instance, Fazeli (2010:5) contended that Ghirshman attributed cultural changes observed 
between Sialk I and Sialk II, to internal factors and the natural pattern in technological advance over time. 
Ghirshman argued: 
“No war or violent upheaval seems to have troubled this Prehistoric village, which continued 
unaffected by any outside influence.” (Ghirshman 1978:32) 
Furthermore, Fazeli (2010:5) commented on Ghirshman’s argument that Sialk II was abandoned not in 
respond to external factors, such as migration of newcomers, but due to an environmental catastrophe, 
possibly an earthquake. In support of these contentions, it is here acknowledged that although 
Ghirshman’s approach essentially corresponded with methods associated with the Culture-Historical 
paradigm, he occasionally implemented theoretical elements that were characteristic of Soviet 
archaeology. It has to be noted that Ghirshman’s position as a Russian-born French scholar enabled him 
to acquaint himself with the work of contemporary Russian archaeologists, such as Tolstov, Trever, 
Smirnov, Grigoriev and Bernchtam, which was not readily available to other archaeologists working in 
the region (Olivier-Utrad 1997:138). In fact, some of Ghirshman’s research orientation may have been 
influenced by his Russian colleagues who aimed to interpret archaeological data through Marxist 
approaches (Dolukhanov 1995:324; Trigger 2007:328). The evaluation of Ghirshman’s political 
disposition is difficult given the complexity of his ethnic background as a Jewish Russian who supported 
the Counter-Revolutionaries in the 1917 Russian Revolution while detesting the Vichy sympathisers 
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when working in Afghanistan in 1941 (Martinez-Steve 2001). What is evident is that Ghirshman was a 
product of his time and, therefore, influenced by political affinities which he held in the turbulent period 
of the early twentieth-century. Therefore, it is conceivable that despite his initial resistance to Marxism, 
by the mid 1920s and in respond to the anti-Semitic racial rhetoric of Germany, his political affiliations 
skewed towards the dominant Russian doctrine of the time. 
It has to be taken into consideration that while Ghirshman was excavating at Sialk, Soviet archaeology 
itself went through emblematic transformation. These modifications aimed at replacing the 
internationalist doctrine of Marr, which emphasised the uniform ancestry of all humankind (Shnirelman 
1995:124), with the “ethnogenetic” research orientation which had a lot in common with the Culture-
Historical approach. The termination of the internationalist paradigm in 1934 was in respond to political 
threats from Germany and Stalin’s attempt to boost patriotism by destroying “the myth of the German 
cultural expansion”, while investing in the superiority of Slavic culture and its independent formation in 
Russia (ibid.:132-33). In this respect, Ghirshman’s investment in seeking the origin of Aryans in southern 
Russia to counter the German theory of Aryan origins in northern Germany articulates his political 
orientation following the events of World War II. Therefore, while Western archaeologists had to adhere 
to Culture-Historical approach and Soviet archaeologists were confined by the various forms of Marxist 
Archaeology, Ghirshman’s position as a Russian born French scholar working in the Middle East 
provided him with the opportunity to integrate various elements of different schools of thought to his 
archaeological approach in Sialk. Therefore he occasionally drifted in his analysis of Sialk from Marr’s 
doctrine on the interconnectedness of races and the attribution of cultural change to internal factors such 
as socio-economic variables, to migration theories imbedded in the Culture-Historical approach and 
Soviet archaeology post 1934. This argument is supported by Ghirshman’s consideration of Iran as a 
highway open to the invasion of diverse cultural groups who contributed to the enrichment of the natives 
by infusing new blood and creating “hybrid cultures” (Ghirshman 1977:11; 1978:49-50). This claim drew 
a parallel with the internationalist approach of Marr’s theory which rested on interbreeding of different 
groups as its principle factor to attest the concept of “culture” (Shnirelman 1995:121). Ghirshman’s 
familiarity with Marr’s approach is further articulated in the concept of autochthonous development of 
cultures and socio-economic shift as the primary impetus for cultural change. Along similar lines 
Ghirshman (1951:28) focused on the indigenous process of agricultural development and the evolutionary 
process of technology as observed in the ceramic industry, metallurgy, animal domestication and trade. 
Ghirshman argued:  
“… by this period [Sialk II], the basic elements of human economy were already in existence: 
hunting and fishing, the care of garden and field, had been followed by stock-breeding and the 
91 
 
exploitation of mineral resources. Man had emerged from the state in which he was constrained 
to hunt for his daily food; he had become a producer ….”  
(Ghirshman 1978:31) 
This extract is interesting because it articulates Ghirshman’s consideration of the concepts of ‘economy’ 
and his attention to the ‘evolutionary progress’ of human cultures from simple hunters to complex 
society. These were the themes that defined Soviet archaeology in the socio-political climate of the 1930s 
(Dolukhanov 1995:324). 
In sum, while Ghirshman incorporated the social evolutionary elements of Soviet archaeology, in his 
analysis of Sialk, his approach remained Culture-Historical in nature in that he aimed to reconstruct what 
Trigger referred to as the “visual impression of life in the past” (Trigger 2007:301). In addition, although 
Ghirshman ascribed certain cultural developments to internal factors, the more radical changes were 
explained in terms of migration of invading cultures. Furthermore, through his analysis, he remained 
committed to the discourse of identifying cultures with ethnic groups and races. Despite the above 
analysis, Ghirshman’s studies at Sialk produced a comprehensive historiography of Iranian Prehistory and 
widely contributed to the analysis of other Prehistoric sites. 
In this section the essential features of Culture-Historical approach and its application to the site of Sialk 
was discussed in detail. The aim of highlighting these features has been to identify the influence of such 
approaches on the study of Sialk and further to lay the ground for demonstrating the appeal of this 
approach to the ethnic model of nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s Government which will be discussed 
in the following section.  
  
4.4.1.1.2 Ethnic Nationalism & the Myth of Aryans 
 
“European influence and in particular the development of the ‘Aryan myth’ determined that modern 
Iranian nationalism as an ideology of political action sought to emulate and imitate the logic of the west.”  
(Ansari 2005:323) 
 
It has been argued that the defining feature of Culture-Historical approach was the theme of migration as 
the main contributing factor to cultural change. The emergence of these theories instigated a wave of 
research to locate the cradle of Indo-European civilisations in a region that included Iran. For Reza Shah’s 
Government, whose political mandate centered on “reawakening an ancient civilisation” (Abrahamian 
2008:34), the revival of Iran as a cultural and political power, as well as the unification of Iran as a nation 
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was firmly tied to the ethnic assertion of Iranians as Aryans. Given that the ethnic model of nationalism 
was carefully tailored by the Government to endorse the ‘superiority’ of Iranian race and its ‘continuous’ 
habitation in the region, the assumptions of migration and diffusion theories were seen as a suitable 
approach to be adopted into Iranian archaeology. In doing so, these theories provided archaeological 
evidence and validated the political mandates mentioned above. Such proceedings were deemed 
necessary in order to reclaim the nation’s competence as an imperative political power, following the 
setbacks it suffered during the Qajar period. Therefore, the suggestions of archaeologists who used the 
approach to trace the origins of the highly developed European nations to Iran and Iranian race were 
embraced by Reza Shah’s Administration. These attempts were clouded by the rhetoric of archaeologists 
who argued for the racial superiority of the Aryans and even Childe declared that the “Aryans must have 
been gifted with exceptional mental endowment” (Childe 1926:4). The Pahlavi Administration capitalised 
on such notions through national projects executed by the SNH (see Chapter 2) that exhumed the remains 
of selected Iranian icons and measured their skulls to “prove” that their physical characters corresponded 
with the criterion of “true Aryans” (Abrahamian 2008:87).  
Apart from articulating the ‘superiority’ of Iranian race, the Aryan myth was also adopted to emphasise 
the ‘continual’ habitation of Iranian tribes on the Iranian Plateau. This latter concept was essential in the 
international discourse of Reza Shah’s Government and the aim to re-assert Iran as a political power 
entitled to national sovereignty. It is contended that although the Pahlavi Administration was invested in 
the discourse of Aryanism, their policies reflected discrepancies in adopting related dominant theories. 
Therefore, although the Government appreciated the archaeological research at Sialk and Hissar and their 
suggestions that traced the origins of Iranians to Aryans who emigrated from southern Russia, the socio-
political links with the Germans and their shared Aryan heritage were embraced more vigorously. Perhaps 
this was reflective of Iran’s attempt to maintain its sovereignty by resisting the implications of the Soviet 
archaeology, which promoted Slavic nationalism and legitimised the expansionist ideals of the Soviet 
Union (Shnirelman 1995:134). Meanwhile, the Pahlavi authorities scorned the German model that traced 
the origins of Aryans to Germany and Scandinavia and instead accredit Iranians as the forbearers of the 
Aryan race. Such approaches reflected the ideological policies of Reza Shah’s Government and their 
political sympathies towards Germany. While it is not the aim of this section to investigate the alliance 
between Iran and Nazi Germany (see Ghani 2000 & Milani 2008), it is necessary to articulate that it was 
in the Nazi ideology that the Pahlavi Regime found the opportunity to assert Iran as an international 
power and claim national unity and racial ‘superiority’. Despite such discrepancies, the overarching 
intention of migration theories in tracing the origins of Aryans to Iran was highly valued. Although no 
record of the Government’s eminent attention to the Prehistoric excavations, such as that of Sialk exists, 
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the implication of such investigations were highly prized by the Pahlavi Administration and Prehistoric 
archaeology gained recognition by becoming acknowledged as a division of the discipline of archaeology. 
From the above argument it may be contended that the introduction of migration theories and their 
application to Prehistoric archaeology by foreign scholars in the 1930s greatly supported the political 
ambitions of Reza Shah’s Government, both domestically and internationally. The ethno-centric 
orientation of these theoretical frameworks not only helped consolidate the establishment of ethnic 
‘continuity’ in Iranian history, but supported the Government’s narrative that presented the ethnic origins 
of Iranians as a ‘superior’ race. Such affiliations were rewarding to Iran’s political mandate while the 
foreign archaeological delegations too benefited from granted courtesies reserve for projects they 
submitted to support such favourable ideologies. Therefore, as previously noted, the second impetus that 
compelled the French to excavate at Sialk was dominated by the socio-political climate of Iran and the 
French attempt to consolidate their threatened authority in Iranian archaeology by becoming more 
engaged with the ‘scientific’ study of Iranian prehistory. To the Iranian authorities, the Sialk project 
would represent the first scientific endeavor of the French that did not target the recovery of treasures for 
museums abroad, as was done at Susa and Teppe Giyan, or intend to confirm the dominance of 
Mesopotamian civilisations on Iran and instead, focused on the question of Indo-Iranians and their likely 
origins. Although Sialk was not explicitly distinguished by the Pahlavi officials to booster the Aryan 
propaganda, the involvement of French archaeologists at this Prehistoric site, along with the Americans 
who excavated in Tureng Teppe, Teppe Hissar and later the site of Rey (1934-36) were highly reassuring 
for the ethnic nationalist discourse that dominated the reign of Reza Shah. In the following, the birth of 
Prehistoric archaeology in Iran is traced to the suitable incorporation of migration theories to support the 
discourse of ethnic nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s Government.  
 
4.4.1.2. Birth of Iranian Prehistoric Archaeology 
From the above discussion, it may be concluded that contrary to what Trigger (2009:213-16) described as 
the European experience, the establishment of Prehistoric studies in Iran was not a direct reflection of the 
Pahlavis’ sponsorship and exploitation of Prehistoric archaeology to implement its brand of nationalism 
and form a modern nation-state. Rather, while Reza Shah’s Administration fully invested in the 
sponsorship of pre-Islamic archaeology, the introduction of migration theories by foreign archaeological 
teams, and the support it provided for the ethnic nationalism of the Iranian Government, assisted the 
establishment and consolidation of Prehistoric studies in a country that considered document based pre-
Islamic period as its ‘golden age’.   
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In this respect, the excavations at Sialk were essential. As previously argued, studies at Sialk marked a 
true break from the dominant archaeological traditions of this period by applying a theoretical framework 
that relied on constructing stratigraphies and tracing patterns of migration. Given this ‘scientific’ 
approach, it is contended that Sialk must be credited as one of the instrumental Prehistoric sites that 
contributed to the birth of Prehistoric archaeology in the 1930s. It was through these efforts that 
Prehistoric archaeologists were enabled to refocus the attention of Iranian officials from the grand palatial 
structure to hilly residues of Prehistoric settlements. Although such efforts encouraged the study of 
Prehistoric archaeology, they left a lasting imprint on the orientation of Prehistoric research in Iran, which 
to this day deviates towards various implications of ‘Culture-Historical approach’. In fact, both Niknami 
(2000:42-44) and Fazeli (2010:3) attributed the contemporary weaknesses of Iranian Prehistoric 
archaeology and the “dominance of Culture-Historical approach” as a residual legacy of the French 
archaeological mandate in Iran in the 1930s. 
 
4.4.2. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government & Dynastic Nationalism: Prehistoric Archaeology 
It has thus been argued that during the early Pahlavi period, the Culture-Historical approach was adopted 
by foreign archaeologists, not only due to the prevalence of this doctrine in the field of archaeology in the 
early 1900s, but also given its implications to support the political mandate of ethnic nationalism 
endorsed by the Iranian Government. Given the lack of any further archaeological activities at Sialk 
during the second Pahlavi period, the content of this section is reduced to denoting the formative reasons 
that propelled the direction of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology away from studies at Sialk in this period. In 
doing so, the prevalent conceptual frameworks and models of interpretations that dominated the field of 
Iranian Prehistoric archaeology during this period are explored. This is followed by articulating the 
discernible impacts of Mohammad Reza Shah’s advocacy of dynastic nationalism in forming the path of 
archaeological activities and its ramifications for further studies at Sialk. Finally, the implications of 
‘New Archaeology’ and its contributions to the advance of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran are 
investigated.  
In the year 1941, Reza Shah was forced to abdicate and was replaced by his son Mohammad Reza Shah. 
These events coincided with World War II and the withdrawal of many foreign archaeological teams from 
Iran. Although in the analysis of other archaeological period it is argued that the discontinuation of 
foreign archaeological activities in Iran provided Iranians with the opportunity to replace positions 
previously reserved for foreign experts, with regards to Prehistoric archaeology no activities were 
undertaken by Iranians before 1947 (see Hakemi & Rad 1950). It is important to note that the focus of 
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these activities remained the identification of the “Indo-Aryan populations”, which were considered to be 
the ancestors of the Medes, Persians and modern Iranians 
(http://www.penn.museum/sites/hasanlu/projecthistory.html). When Ghirshman returned to Iran in 1946 as the 
new Director of the French Mission, he refocused his attention from the Prehistoric period in Sialk to the 
Elamite and Achaemenid periods; particularly at Chogha Zanbil and Susa (Gasche 1997:168-169). 
Meanwhile, the first single conceptual work aimed to establish an overall pattern in Iranian archaeology 
based on the data collected in the 1930s was undertaken by Donald McCown (1942a; 1942b) in his- 
Comperative Stratigraphy of Early Iran. McCown divided the Prehistoric sequence of Iran into two main 
cultural areas based on the recovered ceramics (ibid.). The treatment of Iranian Prehistoric sequences on 
the base of a series of relative ceramic chronologies continued until the 1960s when a new generation of 
archaeologists with a new set of conceptual frameworks once again diverted the course of archaeological 
investigations to Iran. This period marked the introduction of conceptual approaches closely associated 
with ‘New Archaeology’ by foreign archaeological teams and the attempts to dissociate Iranian 
Prehistoric archaeology from the restrains of political mandates.  
 
4.4.2.1. Foreign Expeditions & the Prevailing Theoretical Frameworks 
 
“Every year produces a fresh crop of archaeological excavations, a new harvest of Prehistoric artifacts … 
However, the nebulous doubt arises in our minds that a modern empirical discipline ought to be able to 
aim at more rewarding results than the maintenance of a relative status quo and a steady flow of 
counterfeit history books.” (Clarke 1972:3) 
As with many scientific disciplines in the post-World War II era, the intellectual current of theoretical 
archaeology was influenced by the prevalence of Positivism and a considerable reliance on Empiricism. 
In the 1960s, these contentions generated the new paradigm of New Archaeology, later developing into 
Processual archaeology, with attempts to transform archaeology into a scientific discipline free of 
political connotations. As Trigger (2009:314) argued, by the 1960s, the inadequacies of Culture-Historical 
approach became apparent in light of changing political trends that sought to reduce nationalist 
extremism. The strong de-emphasising movement that targeted the relationship between archaeology and 
nationalism was instigated by the catastrophes of World War II and the repugnance felts towards the role 
of archaeology in the promotion of Nazism and Fascism (Kristiansen & Rowlands 1998:32). These events 
led up to fundamental changes in the infrastructure of archaeological theoretical frameworks and the 
spread of New Archaeology with its embroidered message of making archaeology more “scientific” and 
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more “anthropological”. The father of this new paradigm, Lewis Binford (2008:14) polemically opposed 
the Culture-Historical approach and advocated a deductive testing method that relied on culture as a 
system.  
Within this emerging context, the distinguished legacy of Childe facilitated a second wave of interest 
towards the Middle East. Childe’s (1952:25-7) innovative model, traced the Neolithic Revolution and the 
origins of agriculture to the Fertile Crescent in the Middle East. Given that this model- Oasis Theory- 
lacked support from archaeological evidence, the American archaeologist, Robert Braidwood, began to 
test Childe’s hypothesis in the 1930s on behalf of the Oriental Institute of Chicago (Young 1986). After 
World War II, Braidwood returned to the Middle East (1948-58) to carry on what was known as the 
Jarmo Project in the Iraqi Kurdistan. This was the first project that applied an interdisciplinary research, 
laying the foundation for all subsequent paleoethnobotanical investigations on agricultural origins in the 
Near East (Warnock 2003:31). Despite considerable progress, in 1958 work was terminated following the 
nationalist Revolution in Iraq and the Project and its personnel were moved across the border to Iran 
(Watson 2006:11). It is contended that as a result of this adjustment, Iranian Prehistoric archaeology 
entered a new explosive phase in the 1960s, this time led by American scholars and their imported 
theoretical frameworks. Braidwood’s project, which became known as the Iranian Prehistoric Project, 
triggered the survey and chronological classification of 250 Prehistoric sites in the valley of Shahabad, 
Mahidasht, and Kermanshah (Braidwood et al.1961:2008). Furthermore, the Project was co-directed by 
E.O. Negahban who involved other young Iranian archaeologists in the process. This was the first 
encounter of Iranians with the theoretical approaches associated with ‘New Archaeology’ and the 
objective to locate the origins of food production and urbanism. The Iranian Prehistoric Project also 
triggered Prehistoric studies in other adjacent regions, namely the Deh Luran Plain (see Hole et al. 1969) 
with the intention to investigating early agricultural societies in terms of human ecology (Watson 
2006:12; Warnock 2003:31). While the origins of agriculture conjured up various theories; namely the 
“hilly flanks” hypothesis by Braidwood and Howe (1960:131), and “marginal zone” hypothesis by 
Flannery (1969; 1973), a second complementary theoretical framework emerged to discover the origins of 
States which appeared due to superior food production techniques (Wright & Johnson 1975). According 
to these investigations, certain fertile environmental units were detected on the Susiana Plain, Deh Luran 
Plain, Mehran Plain and a number of smaller plains at Ram Hormuz, Behbahan and Zureh for the study of 
successive agriculture and early State developments (ibid.:269). 
 The concentration of these investigations on the Prehistoric sites that were geographically located in 
south-western (later north-western) Iran were a direct result of the theoretical frameworks and the 
methodological approaches that dominated the field of Prehistoric archaeology during the 1960s and 
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1970s. The common denominator that brought all these new archaeological activities together was the 
concentration on Paleolithic and Neolithic periods. These themes disseminated from pioneers such as 
Braidwood, to the next generation of foreign archaeologists, such as Robert M. Adams who worked in 
Susiana Plain (Adams 1962; Adams & Hansen 1968), Frank Hole and Kent Flannery who excavated a 
number of sites in the Deh Lurah Plain (Hole et al. 1969), and Pierre Delougaz who launched the Chogha 
Mish Project (Delougaz et al. 1996). In the isolated cases of archaeological excavations in south-eastern 
Iran, in Bampur, Tal-e Iblis, Shahr-e Sukhteh and Teppe Yahya these same theoretical frameworks 
dominated the aim of research (see Cardi 1967, 1968; Caldwell 1967; Tosi 1968; Lamberg-Karlovsky 
1970).  
From the above analysis, it is concluded that due to the nature of research questions that dominated 
theoretical archaeology during this period, attention was diverted from Iron Age sites, such as Sialk, that 
were situated in the Central Plateau. This diversion hindered a comprehensive understanding of settlement 
pattenrs, agricultural and irrigation techniques, state formation and the nature of social hierarchy in the 
region. In fact, the steady influx of concentration on western Iran in the 1960s and 1970s led to the 
eventual abandonment of Prehistoric sites in other regions to the extent that their existence was 
threatened. In his publication, The Heritage of Kashan and Natanz, Naraghi (2004:19) indicated that the 
site of Sialk was withdrawn from the list of Inventory of National Monuments on 22 February 1949 and 
re-registered only on 25
 
September 1960. Furthermore, Negahban (2006:101-3) provided an account in 
which the elimination of Sialk from the Inventory was brought to his attention by Mr. Allahyar Saleh who 
represented the Province of Kashan at the Parliament in the early 1960s. In this report, Negahban 
explained the cause of this removal as the ‘greed of locals’ who wished to profit from the added value of 
land in the region, given the city of Kashan was expanding and taking over the peripheries of the site of 
Sialk (ibid.). Negahban further described the process of re-registering Sialk as site number 421 on the 
Inventory (ibid.). Although the withdrawal of Sialk may largely be attributed to the static conditions of 
Prehistoric archaeology in the 1940s and 1950s, as well as the lack of a proper body of Iranian trained 
personnel to manage archaeological institutes, it is clear that the shift of attention to the excavation of new 
Prehistoric sites in western Iran played a part in increasing insensitivities towards sites in other 
geographical locations. 
An additional result of the direction of research during this period was to further hinder the development 
of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology independent of Mesopotamian influences. Considering the long history 
of Prehistoric archaeology in Turkey, Syria and Iraq, the investigations in Iran began with the primary 
objective of comparative studies. While the majority of foreign archaeological excavations were 
concerned with western Iran, in the late 1960s and early 1970s GOA began to engage in various projects 
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that included a diverse range of geographical regions in the north (Negahban 1962; 1963; 1964a; 1964b; 
1965), centre (Malek Shahmirzadi 1977; Majidzadeh 1978; Negahban 1979), east (Negahban 2000), and 
south-west (Negahban 1956; 1968; 1969; 1977) of Iran. Of particular interest was the nine seasons of 
archaeological investigation (1970-78) in the Qazvin Plain that included excavations at Zaghe, Saqzabad, 
and Qabrestan (Dyson 1991). These investigations gradually initiated debates about the validity of the 
chronology established by Ghirshman (based on Sialk) for the Iranian Central Plateau. In this regard, 
Majidzadeh’s (1978; 1981) proposal of an invading Plum-Ware culture that yield to the abandonment of 
Sialk II (North Mound) and some of the neighbouring sites was of significance.  
It must be noted, that although the new conceptual frameworks and models of interpretation introduced by 
foreign archaeologists in this period were diverse, in Iran they were all joined under the broad umbrella of 
‘New Archaeology’. The reliance of such approaches on conducting wide spread surveys to explain 
human patterns of adaptation to environmental and social circumstances, resulted in an unpresidented rise 
in the number of Prehistoric investigations due to the discontinuation of single site studies and their 
replacement by the analysis of whole regions. Therefore, it may be concluded that the introduction of 
these new conceptual frameworks presented a significant milestone in the development of Prehistoric 
studies in Iran, and therefore, to-date, Iranian archaeologists associate ‘New Archaeology’ with 
progressive techniques.  
In the following section, the socio-political context that provided for the introduction of ‘New 
Archaeology’ during the late Pahlavi period is investigated. It is important to consider that despite the 
pervasive employment of new theoretical frameworks by foreign scholars, the debates dominating the 
circle of Iranian archaeology were still very much concerned with the notions of ‘invasion’, ‘culture’, and 
‘chronology’. These debates were halted with the Revolution, before the different concepts embedded in 
the introduced methods got a chance to diffuse into the traditional bastion of Iranian archaeology.  
 
4.4.2.2. Dynastic Nationalism & ‘New Archaeology’ 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the nationalism corresponding to the reign of the Pahlavis was founded on 
ethnic and dynastic rhetoric. However, although during the reign of Reza Shah the preferred brand of 
nationalism focused more vigorously on the ethnic elements of Iranian nationalism, following 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s ascent to power the narrative altered to center on the person of the Shah and 
therefore became the ultimate expression of what Ansari termed as “dynastic nationalism” (Ansari 
2005:326). In this section, the impact of dynastic nationalism and the socio-political dynamics of the 
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1960s in providing for the introduction of ‘New Archaeology’ are discussed in terms of two overarching 
principles. This will be done by firstly contending that due to the maturation of Iranian international 
relations, there was less political emphasis on ‘Aryan superiority’, while the supremacy of the monarch 
was stressed. This argument is followed by articulating an additional element of the nationalism adopted 
by Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government that aimed to portray the Shah as both a revolutionary and 
progressive monarch (ibid.), who welcomed innovation. Considering the radical position of ‘New 
Archaeology’ as an avant-garde concept in the context of 1960s theoretical archaeology, it is argued that 
its notions were readily accepted in Iran. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, following the Arab-Israeli War (1967) and the departure of Britain from Bahrain 
(1971), Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government became increasingly eager to play the role of the regional 
power and an ally to the West (Daniel 2001:159). This involved a dynamic change in Iran’s outlook 
towards the State of Israel as a new ally (Parsi 2007:22). According to Stein (2010:43), Iran was the 
leading oil supplier to Israel during this period. It is argued that the foreign policies of this period obliged 
Iran to recognise certain international protocols to solidify her political position in the global context. 
Therefore, the ethnic elements of Iranian nationalism that emphasised the ‘superiority’ of Iranians as a 
race were confined to counter the fervour of pan-Arabism that was launched by Gamal Abdel Nasser (r. 
1956-1970 AD), as opposed to more general Nazi rhetoric of anti-Semitism (Parsi 2007:22). This is not to 
argue that elements of ethnic nationalism failed to disseminate into the narrative of dynastic nationalism. 
In fact, the adoption of the title Shahanshah Aryamehr (King of Kings, Light of the Aryans) illustrates the 
lingering persistent reliance of the monarchy on the myth of Aryans. Similarly, as Abrahamian 
(2008:115) argued, there were nationalist groups, mostly composed of university intellectuals, who 
continued to advocate the glories of pre-Islamic Iran and the Aryan origins. Nevertheless, these 
expressions were a political propaganda and while they occasionally targeted historic sites, such as 
Persepolis and Pasargadae, their association with Prehistoric archaeology remained loose. Therefore, it is 
contended that a large portion of financial resources during this period were allocated to appropriating 
pre-Islamic sites as the symbol of Iranian civilisation, while there was less pressure on Prehistorians to 
restrain their research towards accommodating the prevailing political order. This provided for skewing 
the direction of Prehistoric investigations towards the theoretical preferences of foreign archaeologists 
who worked in Iran. To that end, the platform for the introduction of ‘New Archaeology’ was provided. 
As discussed previously, it was due to the dedication of this generation of archaeologists and their 
pervasive objectives to seek archeological evidence for the ‘Neolithic Revolution’ and the world’s earliest 
villages that more central Prehistoric sites such as Sialk were largely ignored.  
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An additional incentive for the Iranian’s favourable attitude towards ‘New Archaeology’ was the socio-
political climate that prevailed in Iran. As already indicated, the core of Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
legitimacy rested on the notion of dynastic nationalism and the symbiotic, and mystic relationship, 
between the monarch and the nation (Ansari 2005:326). However, in the early 1960s in response to 
various social unrests, the Shah’s Government embarked on a quest to modernise Iran through an 
extensive reform movement that targeted the economy, education, land ownership, and the military 
(Abrahamian 2008:126). These reforms, referred to as the ‘White Revolution’, aimed to bring Iran into 
the twentieth century and in the process portray the Shah as a progressive and revolutionary monarch 
(Ansari 2003:152). The infatuation of Iranian society in the 1960s to receive all forms of technical 
advances and scientific innovations became the impetus for the incorporation of ‘New Archaeology’ into 
Iranian Prehistoric archaeology promptly following its introduction. In fact, the dominant socio-political 
climate of Iran during this period was parallel to that which provided for the reception of New 
Archaeology in the United States. As Lamberg-Karlovsky (1995:23) argued, it was in the two decades of 
American economic and political self-confidence following World War II that New Archaeology gained 
support among American archaeologists. Similarly, in Iran, the increasing oil revenues lifted Iranian 
economy in the 1960s and 1970s providing a certain degree of self-confidence and security (Milani 
2008:25). Subsequently, the wide reception of ‘New Archaeology' is attributed to the progressive mind-
set of the archaeological community which like other strands of Iranian society strived to bring their 
discipline in par with ‘modern’ standards. This resulted in the collective preference to overlook 
Prehistoric sites in the Central Iranian Plateau in favour of those in the western region.  
The economic prosperities of this period had an additional consequence for reinforcing archaeological 
project in western Iran as construction projects began to expand into the region. As Negahban (1991:3) 
argued, GOA began promoting surveys and excavations in the Khuzistan region following the proposal to 
build a great dam- Dez Dam- to improve the development of agriculture. Given that these projects 
threatened to demolish many archaeological sites, salvage work was required in order to recover the 
content of the sites that were to be destroyed forever (ibid.). No doubt, this provided for an additional 
impetus to concentrate archaeological activities in the region. Despite the fact that the introduction of new 
theoretical frameworks had an adverse impact on the study of more centrally located sites such as Sialk, it 
is here contended that the impact of such approaches and their contributions to strengthening the 
foundation of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran should not be overlooked. It is argued that these advances 
were provided considering the irrelevance of Prehistoric archaeology to the brand of nationalism adopted 
by Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government which allowed for the development of Prehistoric archaeology 
independent of nationalistic rhetoric during this period. These themes are further evaluated in Chapter 7.  
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It is important to note that although by the 1970s Prehistoric archaeology in Iran was in par with cutting 
edge theoretical frameworks and methodologies introduced by the Americans, the late arrival of 
archaeology as a scientific enterprise had unprecedented impact on archaeological sites that were already 
excavated and published. Considering the wealth of archaeological remains in Iran, the scientific 
expeditions of this period preferred to target sites hitherto unexplored in order to offer innovative theories 
rather than re-analysing already explored sites such as Sialk. By the late 1970s, as the explosive phase of 
archaeological activities in Iran was gradually receding, archaeologists became engaged in re-assessing 
some of these regions. These efforts were aimed at constructing a comprehendible chronology for Iran 
given the tremendous amount of data that was collected in the 1960s and 1970s. Considering the 
involvement of different institutes and the application of different theoretical and methodological designs, 
in 1979 a Conference was held in Susa to move beyond these discrepancies and construct a general 
chronology for Iran. However, what could have become a phase of theoretical debate in the history of 
Iranian Prehistoric archaeology was abruptly terminated following the Revolution in 1979.  
The consideration of the above noted is necessary as it highlights the pretext for the negligence of sites 
such as Sialk which were placed outside of the preferred area of research by the new wave of 
archaeologists. In the following section, the socio-political drawbacks that prevented the advance of 
Prehistoric archaeology into the phase of theoretical debate are investigated. 
  
4.5. Post-Revolution & Nationalism: The Case Study of Sialk 
Having demonstrated that the lack of State emphasis on Prehistoric archaeology during the reign of 
Mohammad Reza Shah led to the introduction of scientific approaches into the discipline of Iranian 
Prehistoric archaeology, this section turns to the analysis of the impacts of the Islamic State on the 
discipline. However, the investigation of this topic during this period is more complicated considering the 
marginalisation of concepts such as ‘nationhood’ and ‘nationalism’ as Western propaganda (Menashri 
2001:229), and the degradation of archaeology as a discipline. Although the theoretical frameworks 
offered by archaeologists in the 1960s and 1970s were partially successful in disentangling Iranian 
Prehistoric archaeology from nationalist connotations, the doctrine of post-Revolutionary ideology 
disapproved of the infrastructure of archaeology and considered the entire discipline as a pseudoscience to 
legitimate the rule of the Pahlavis. Therefore, the activities that concerned Prehistoric archeology were 
terminated alongside the eradication of archaeology as a discipline.  
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In this section, the analysis of the development of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology, in the context of the 
site of Sialk, continues by articulating the fluid nature of Iranian national identity after the Islamic 
Revolution. This section will begin by focusing on the populist appeal of Khomeini’s Government and 
the denunciation of archaeology as an imperial science to legitimise the Pahlavi dynasty. This will 
continue by evaluating the impacts of the Iran-Iraq War and the subsequent reconstruction phase on the 
direction of Prehistoric studies. This is followed by articulating the reconciliation with the Iranian past 
and improvements in foreign relations which allowed for the resumption of archaeological collaborations 
with archaeologists abroad during the Presidency of Khatami. The section concludes by evaluating the 
attitude towards Prehistoric archaeology during the Presidency of Ahmadinejad and the impacts of his 
Administration’s populist approach in driving Prehistoric archaeology into another phase of isolation.  
 
4.5.1. Populism & Return to Native Roots: Prehistoric Archaeology 
As Abrahamian argued, the Islamic Revolution was a “populist” uprising with emphasis on the 
mobilisation of oppressed masses, eradication of imperialism, as well as returning to the “native roots” 
which Khomeini claimed to be Islamic in nature (Abrahamian 1993:38). Given the populist nature of this 
Revolution, the source of legitimacy was no longer pursued in the ruins of the past but in the person of 
Khomeini and his doctrine of unity among Muslims through condemning imperialism and dictatorship 
(Farsoun & Mashayekhi 1992:56). Ansari contended that at the core of this movement was the 
endorsement of “Shi’a nationalism” (Ansari 2003:222). In the following Chapters, the impact of Shi’a 
nationalism on historic and Islamic archaeology will be discussed in detail. This section attempts to 
articulate that although Prehistoric archaeology was neutral in the debates that strived to Iranise or 
Islamise the Iranian identity, the association of the institution of archaeology with the dynastic 
nationalism of the Pahlavis provoked a general antagonism towards the discipline, its practitioners and 
their research activities.  
It has to be noted that as one of the pillars of this populist approach, the Islamic Revolution professed a 
return to the ‘golden age’ of Islam by ‘purifying’ the country from “foreign imperialism” and “corrupt 
western concepts” (Algar 1981:287). Considering the discipline of archaeology was both Western as it 
was imported by Western scholars, and corrupt as it was employed to legitimise the Pahlavi dynasty, it is 
conceivable that it fell particularly out of favour with the post-Revolutionary officials. In addition, in 
conformity with the Government’s ‘populism’ and ‘Shi’a nationalism’, great emphasis was placed on the 
poor workers or the “oppressed masses” (Abrahimian 1993:47). This identification with the ‘oppressed’ 
significantly hampered the allocation of national budget to pseudosciences, such as archaeology and 
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history, which were no longer necessary for the legitimisation of the State and condemn as alien to the 
nature of Iranian Islamic identity.  
In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated that Khomeini’s Government continued its crusade against foreign 
influences and Western concepts with the formation of CRC and the re-organisation of the education 
institutes. The closure of universities, among them the Department of Archaeology at Tehran University, 
and the ‘cleansing’ of universities of all non-Islamic conformities (Behdad 1995:193), was a turning point 
in the history of Iranian archaeology that also cast its influence on Prehistoric research. Although the 
Department was re-opened in 1982, the discipline was degraded from its former status as it fell under the 
category of ‘fake knowledge’ and suffered financial shortages to engage in any further research. In 
addition, a review of the list of Iranian Prehistorians who were employed at the Department of 
Archaeology at Tehran University reveals that they were mostly graduates from higher education 
institutes in the United States. Considering the Government’s denouncement of the Americans 
expansionist ambitions in Iran and following the hostage crisis at the American Embassy (1980-81) 
(Harmon 2005:62), foreign relations with the United States were critically severed. This enhanced 
antagonism towards American educated intellectuals and their dismissal from university positions. 
Among them, E.O. Negahban, a graduate of University of Chicago, who was the driving force behind the 
1970s Prehistoric projects left Iran in 1980 and Majidzadeh, another graduate of University of Chicago, 
retired in 1989. Others simply confined their research activities to publishing the results of previous 
excavations or authoring books, away from educational institutes. The ‘purging’ of Prehistorians from the 
Archaeology Department was a serious setback to the further development of this discipline in Iran. 
While Prehistorians in other parts of the worlds were engaging in heated debates about the applications of 
New Archaeology, and academics such as Ian Hodder, were introducing Post-Prosessual approaches, 
Iranian archaeology entered into a phase of isolation. These inadequate circumstances were further 
inflated by the restricted foreign policies that banned foreign archaeologists from working in Iran and 
forbade intellectual interaction between Iranian archaeologist and their foreign colleagues (Abdi 
2001:70).  
From the above arguments, it may be concluded that the period following the Islamic Revolution can be 
associated with efforts to degrade the discipline of archaeology and to distance it from all its scientific 
accomplishments due to its association with the ethnic-dynastic nationalism of the Pahlavis. In the 
following section, the resurrection of Prehistoric archaeology in response to the State’s appeal to modify 
the nature of Iranian identity is further investigated.  
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4.5.2. War Years & the Reconstruction Period: Prehistoric Archaeology 
The section now turns to the Iran-Iraq War and its influence on modifying the nature of Iranian identity 
and State promoted nationalism. This transformation is essential in the context of arguments that 
articulate the restoration of archaeology as a discipline during this period. As Hunter (1992:93) argued, 
the War provided the necessary foundation for the return of Iranian nationalistic rhetoric. This change had 
an overarching impact on the resurrection of Iranian archaeology as it was no longer considered a threat 
to the ‘authentic’ Islamic identity which composed one of the main pillars of the Islamic Revolution. In 
this section, the revival of Iranian archaeology is also traced to the relaxed foreign policies and improved 
economic conditions that followed the ‘reconstruction phase’ embarked on by President Rafsanjani’s 
Administration.  
It is reported that in the Iran-Iraq War at least 300,000 Iranians were killed (Sciolino 2000:179). The War 
was mainly fought on the Iranian territory, especially in the south-western regions, where an abundance 
of Prehistoric sites prevailed. The indifferent attitude of the Iranian authorities towards archaeology 
further added to damage these sites. In terms of archaeological sites, the most severe disturbances were 
made to Haft Teppe and Chogha Zanbil which were caught in the middle of the conflict. Due to their 
elevated height in comparison with the surrounding plains, these mounds were used by Iranian forces as 
air defence posts. The instillation of military artillery on these mounds further accounted for their 
destruction by the Iraqi rockets. Apart from directly destroying archaeological sites, the War also 
influenced the fate of Iranian archaeology by crippling the Iranian economy. After the War, in 1989, 
Hashemi Rafsanjani declared that the total amount of War damages inflicted on Iran was as high as 900 
Billion U.S. Dollars (Ganji 2002:241). Under these circumstances, engaging in archaeological activities 
was reduced to minimum. In addition, the exigencies to run a war economy led to the transformation of 
countryside districts into agricultural land as the slogans of self-sufficiency, was emphasised by the State 
(Ehteshami 1995:207). Seyf Allah Aminian (2009:10), the Director of ICHO in Kashan, reported that the 
site of Sialk was threatened by such encroachment during the War years. He argued that while the 
weakened cultural organisations struggled to raise awareness regarding the significance of this Prehistoric 
site, the emphasis on financial independency supplied the justification to dismantle the protective fences 
and transformed the site into agricultural land (ibid.:9).  
As is evident, this period was defined by an amalgam of post-war, financial restriction, and antagonism 
towards the discipline of archaeology. It was due to these conditions that any prospects of progress in 
Iranian Prehistoric archaeology dissipated. Despites these setbacks, this period is significant in the history 
of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology as it provided the foundation for the Islamic State’s reconciliation with 
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Iran’s pre-Islamic past. The modified outlook towards Iranian past lifted official hostilities towards the 
discipline of archaeology and provided for its return following the War.  
After the War, the economic situation in Iran began to improve as a result of increased oil revenue 
beginning in 1990 (IBP 2001:36). In addition, President Rafsanjani’s Administration embarked on a 
project of ‘reconstruction’ in 1992 that targeted various economic and educational reforms (Hiro 
2001:195-224). The ‘reconstruction’ phase had two valuable outcomes for Iranian archaeology. Firstly, in 
the economic sector, the Government’s approach in moderating domestic and foreign policies to attract 
investors and technocrats were essential in driving Iran out of isolation and restoring Iran’s economy 
(Vakil 2011:101-102). This meant more governmental budgets were available to be allocated to ICHO, 
which began its official duties in 1988 (see Chapter 2). Secondly, the improved international relations 
also provided for the return of a number of Iranian Prehistorians to Iran and the resumption of 
collaborative projects between Iranian and foreign archaeological institutes. One of these early 
collaborations was between ICHO and the Oriental Institute of Chicago, when in 1994, Abbas Alizadeh 
returned to Chogha Bonut for a re-evaluation of Kantor’s report of the site in the 1970s (Alizadeh 2003).    
The reconstruction phase and the development projects that followed posed new challenges for the 
management and preservation of archaeological sites. With respect to the site of Sialk, the intense housing 
projects and agricultural developments in the 1990s extended the peripheries of the residential areas of 
Kashan into the designated heritage district of Sialk. The encroachment of the vicinity of Sialk was 
reported in 2000 by Malek Shahmirzadi (2002:27) who documented the advance of the residential 
constructions into the eastern and south-eastern quarters of the South Mound. The locals were further 
advancing into the archaeological district as the Kashan Municipality supplied farmers with agricultural 
lands for the cultivation of wheat and cotton (Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:33). Malek Shahmirzadi 
(2002:27; 2006b:18) further reported that the construction of Amir Al Mo’menin Boulevard, on Cemetery 
A of the South Mound and the transformation of Cemetery B to the west of the South Mound into a 
pomegranate grove were seriously threatening the site of Sialk. In addition, during the day the desolated 
areas on and around the two Mounds were used for motorbike rallies and at night became a refuge for 
offenders to carry out illicit drug-related activities (Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:33). To combat these 
issues, the Kashan Municipality had flattened with bulldozers an area on the eastern and south-eastern 
side of the South Mound to create a football field (ibid.). These mistreatments continued as the locals 
began constructing villas between the two Prehistoric Mounds (ibid.). The maltreatment of Sialk provides 
a clear manifestation of the prevalent attitudes towards the cultural merit of Prehistoric sites, despite 
several initiations by the State to improve conditions. 
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The period of ‘reconstruction’ can be identified as a phase that generated the incentives for the revival in 
the infrastructure of Iranian cultural heritage and the discipline of archaeology after the Revolution, albeit 
with conformities to the legacies of Islam. Following these policies, the initial stage of restoring academic 
relations with foreign archaeological institutes was the dispatch of Iranian students to be trained abroad. It 
is significant to note that the majority of these graduate students, enrolled in Prehistoric programmes. The 
preference to acquire higher degrees in Prehistoric archaeology may be attributed to two incentives. 
Firstly, Prehistoric archaeology was considered to be independent of political connotations. This 
facilitated the redeeming of the discipline of archaeology from its affiliations with the ethnic-dynastic 
nationalism of the Pahlavis and avoiding close associations with periods patronised by them. Secondly, 
given the legacy of New Archaeology in Iran and its association with ‘science’, it is conceivable that the 
threatened stature of archaeology as ‘fake knowledge’ was consolidated through the resurrection of the 
heavily science-based discipline of Prehistory.  
 
4.5.3. Khatami’s Administration & Reconciliations with the Past: Prehistoric Archaeology 
It may be argued that Iranian archaeology was fully resurrected in the late 1990s following the social and 
political reforms that were introduced by President Khatami’s Administration. The doctrine of this 
Administration was constituted on the principles of curing the sick Iranian economy and improving 
foreign relations through the proposal of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ (Abrahamian 2008:186). Despite 
advocating a policy of international interactions to lead Iran out of isolation, Khatami continued to 
emphasise the central slogan of the Islamic Revolution which rested on the political independence of Iran 
by stating “we would like to announce that we are in favour of relations with all countries and nations 
which respect our independence, dignity and interest” (Pollack 2004:310). He further argued that this 
independence was achievable through “mutual respect between countries and in their efforts to 
understand different cultural identities and civilisations” (Khatami 2000). It was due to these international 
policies that the representation of the Iranian cultural identity became an integral component of Khatami’s 
Administration and, in response, archaeology re-emerged as a politicised discipline. Although the 
discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ was mainly targeted towards narrowing cultural and political 
gaps between Iran and the West, the rhetoric of ‘dialogue’ was equally significant in domestic politics as 
it facilitated the reconciliation of Iranian and Islamic identities. According to this discourse, there were no 
contradictions between the pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian identity; the two aspects of Iranian identity 
simply co-existed (Holliday 2011:103). The dissociation of pre-Islamic archaeology from the Pahlavi 
dynasty and its endorsement as an integral component of Iranian identity provided an additional platform 
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for the re-emergence of archaeology as a discipline. The overarching influence of this alliance between 
pre-Islamic and Islamic identities will be discussed in the following Chapters. 
In Chapter 2, the affirmative impacts of improved economy and the resumption of foreign academic 
collaboration, on the ICHO were discussed in detail. In this chapter it is argued that although following 
the Revolution the chief objective of Iranian archaeologists was the dissociation of their discipline from 
the constrains of politics, during Khatami’s Administration, Iranian archaeology was once more entangled 
in the propagandas of nationalism. At the core of these attempts was the representation of Iran by the 
Khatami’s Government as an ancient nation that had made contributions to human civilisation and thus 
worthy of national independence and international political recognition. This was best demonstrated in the 
ICHO’s attempts to promote a number of Prehistoric sites as the heirs to oldest civilisations in the world. 
The site of Sialk performed an active role in the representation of the Government’s discourse of Iranian 
identity. Additionally, it is argued that the emphasis on Prehistoric archaeology during this period was 
due to attempts of Iranian archaeologists to validate the prominent value of their discipline domestically 
and to revive Iranian archaeology internationally. As will be discussed, the elaborate campaigns to 
publicise great discoveries at Sialk conformed to these objectives.  
The politicisation of Iranian archaeology, and particularly Prehistoric archaeology, began anew with 
Khatami’s speech on ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ at the United Nation in the Year 2000. In this 
speech, he presented a Prehistoric mud-brick from Teppe Ozbaki to Kufi Annan. In addressing the UN 
convention Khatami stated: 
“I take this opportunity as the representative of one of the most ancient human civilisations to present the 
Secretary-General of the United Nation, as a token of friendship, one of the most ancient artefacts found  
in the world.” (http://www.un.org/) 
 
This extract is an articulation of the foreign policies Khatami’s Administration to present the Iranian 
nation in terms of the antiquity of its civilisation in order to legitimise Iran’s inherent competency to 
occupy a significant position in the international arena and among other civilised nations. As will be 
illustrated, the validity of this ‘antiquity’ was pursued in Prehistoric projects that became absorbed in an 
enterprise to discover the “most ancient” Iranian contributions to human civilisation. 
It is here contended that Khatami’s speech at the UN in the year 2000 is comparable to that which Arthur 
Pope made in 1925 to revive the ‘glories of Iranian past’ (for the latter see Chapter 5). This observation is 
based on the heavy reliance of both speakers on the “spirit” of Iranians and their “capacity to integrate” 
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various cultures to produce glorious civilisations (Khatami 2000). The essence of the Iranian character in 
both speeches was defined by the endorsement of the ‘ethnic’ elements of Iranian identity. This rhetoric 
further articulated the similarities between the brand of nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s Government 
and that which was central to the doctrine of Khatami’s Administration. To support this thesis, Holliday 
provided an argument for the ethnic nature of nationalism adopted bt Khatami’s Administration, albeit 
with certain references to other aspects of his discourse which rested on civic nationalism (Holliday 
2007:139). Given that according to Smith, ethnic nationalism relies on an “emphasis on community of 
birth and native cultures” (Smith 1991:11); it is justified to argue that Khatami’s Administration sought to 
validate this nationalist rhetoric by presenting Prehistoric archaeology as an instrument to confirm Iran’s 
‘civilised’ past. Therefore, for the first time in the history of Iranian archaeology, the Prehistoric period 
was politicised and the State, began sponsoring projects with a primarily focus on this period. 
Following the expansion of archaeological activities during this period, investigations on the Prehistoric 
sites of the Central Plateau were brought to the forefront of research in Iran. The site of Sialk with its 
considerable significance for Iranian Prehistory became one of the first major Prehistoric projects 
launched during this period (Fig. 4.2). It has to be noted that following the ‘reconstruction phase’, large 
sections of the site, particularly on the southern district, had been swallowed by the encroaching 
residential developments (Fig. 4.3). 
As Aminian (2002:9) reported, in order to restrict further damage to Sialk the ICHO lent its support to 
establish official boundary for the site and to prohibit further constructions in the area. These efforts were 
followed by the nomination of Sialk in 1997 as the first Prehistoric site to be submitted onto Iran’s 
UNESCO’s tentative list of World Heritage Sites. It was only after this nomination that in 2007 two other 
Prehistoric sites of Jiroft and Shahr-e Sukhteh were added (http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/ir). The 
above demonstrates that the initial incentives that directed attention to Sialk were to protect the site from 
the immediate threats of destruction. Once the significance of this site was officially re-introduced and 
recognised, efforts were made to further publicise the site and to re-instate its historical importance in the 
study of Iranian archaeology. Therefore, the ICHO of Kashan with the assistance of Asghar Karimi, 
pursued the translation of Ghirshman’s excavations report on Sialk from French to Farsi (Aminian 
2002:9). This was considered a significant development in Iranian Prehistoric archaeology, given the 
paramount position of Sialk as a criterion for analysing Iranian Prehistoric chronology. Prior to the 
translation of these reports, one of the main presumptions for restricted studies on Sialk was the language 
barrier. Given that all the Iranian Prehistorians who were graduates of foreign institutes prior to the 
Revolution had acquired their degrees from English-speaking American Universities, it is not surprising 
that this language barrier had a considerable impact on the negligence directed towards Sialk during this 
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period. With the exception of few studies, this trend continued to dominate the fate of Sialk following the 
Revolution until Ghirshman’s report was finally translated in 2001.   
In the previous section, it was demonstrated that towards the end of 1970s Iranian archaeologists began 
excavating Prehistoric sites and offering new chronological sequences for the Iranian Central Plateau. In 
particular, references were made to the work of Majidzadeh (1978) who contested the cultural sequence 
that was proposed by Ghirshman, based on his work at Sialk. These debates, which offered the existence 
of two additional cultural sequences at Sialk, continued with Majidzadeh’s publications in 1981 and 
Amiet’s proposal for the re-investigation of cultural sequences of Sialk IV and V (Malek Shahmirzadi 
2002:22). Given the above debates, it was conceived that after more than 70 years of no archaeological 
activities on the site, a re-analysis was necessary to review the chronology proposed by Ghirshman. This 
became an incentive to launch a research project at Sialk.  
In The Ziggurat of Sialk, Malek Shahmirzadi provided his account for the launch of the SRP. He stated 
that the Project began as a “rescue” operation in order to salvage the site from its obsolete state and 
prevent further damage by the encroaching residential developments (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:11). In 
2001 the proposal for the SRP was accepted and the Project was launched under the Direction of Dr. 
Malek Shahmirzadi and hosted by the Research Institute of Archaeology (ibid.:12, 19). As the importance 
of Sialk was increasingly recognised, the rescue operation was gradually transformed into a research 
project with the objective to update and re-evaluate the chronology of the cultural sequence proposed by 
Ghirshman (Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:7). In this regard Azarnoush (2002:7), the Director of Iranian 
Centre for Archaeology at the ICHO, argued, considering that for the past few decades the chronological 
analysis of Sialk formed the backbone of Prehistoric cultures in Iran, the re-investigation of this site in 
light of updated scientific approaches and new discoveries was compulsory. The SRP was an all inclusive 
operation that lasted for five seasons and finally terminated in December 2005. The results of this Project 
were published in five volumes under, The Ziggurat of Sialk, Silversmiths of Sialk, Potters of Sialk, 
Fishermen of Sialk, and Sialk the Oldest Fortified Village in Iran. It has to be noted that prior to these 
publications the provision of such detail reports was unprecedented following the Islamic Revolution. In 
addition to these publications, the ICHO, established a Permanent Research Base at the Sadr House in 
Kashan to accommodate further research; implement better management for the vicinity of Sialk; and 
restore certain quarters of the site (Fahimi 2004:8). These publicity efforts were further pursued by 
building a permanent exhibition on the site of Sialk to perform as an educational centre for the public who 
visit the site (Malek Shahmirzadi 2004:15). 
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It is contended that the excessive attempts to publicise the site of Sialk were in close correspondence with 
the general trends that were presented in the beginning of this section. In other words, it is proposed that 
these publicities, which were directly implemented by the government body of ICHO, aimed to provide 
further support for the foreign policies of Khatami’s Administration and its discourse of ‘Dialogue among 
Civilisations’. It is further suggested that the launch of the large scale Project of Sialk offered Iranian 
Prehistorians the means to re-introduce their discipline both domestically and internationally. The 
prevalence of this socio-political background generated proposals that intended to amplify the 
significance of findings at Sialk. Of particular interest was the declaration of the discovery of the “oldest 
Ziggurat” and the “oldest fortified wall” in the world (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:20).  
In his excavations in the 1930s, Ghirshman reported that during the cultural sequence of Sialk VI a large 
structure, which he called “La Grande Construction”, was erected at the southern quarter of the South 
Mound. According to Ghirshman (cited in Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:178), this was a mud-brick structure, 
which contained two terraces with designated areas for residential purposes on each terrace. The date of 
this structure was assessed by referring to the enclosing protective walls that resembled those of the 
Median and Urartan cities (ibid.:178-9). This theory was contested by Malek Shahmirzadi on two 
grounds. First, he argued that the “Grand Construction” was a Ziggurat (Fig. 4.4), and second, he 
proposed that the Ziggurat was constructed following the cultural sequence of Sialk III and prior to the 
migration of inhabitants who carried the cultural traits of Iron Age (Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:55). The 
identification of the Ziggurat as corresponding with the Jamdat Nasr period, pushed back the date of the 
construction of the Mound, resulting in the highly publicised conclusion that it was the ‘oldest Ziggurat’ 
in the ancient world (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:39).  
The proposal that the South Mound of Sialk was a Ziggurat had grave implications given that this 
structural configuration is particular to Mesopotamia and no such constructions have been discovered in 
the Iranian Central Plateau. Not only the location of this Ziggurat in the Iranian Central Plateau is 
disputable, but the proposed date of its construction is highly contested. Nevertheless, the rhetoric 
reiterated in SRP was in agreement with the political discourse of the Khatami period and his 
Administration’s emphasis on the “antiquity” of Iranian nation and the contribution of Iranians to human 
civilisation. Additionally, given the isolation of Iranian archaeology and its near demise following the 
Revolution, Iranian archaeologists were eager to use every opportunity to revive their discipline both 
domestically and internationally. In the domestic context, Iranian archaeologists struggled to benefit from 
favourable conditions that were provided for the revival of archaeology during Khatami’s Presidency. 
Such endeavours required large scale project that further validated and publicised the significance of 
archaeology as a discipline. In addition, the Iranian authorities were under pressure to confirm their 
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credibility in conducting large scale archaeological excavations following more than two decades of 
inadequacies in this field. In this regard, Azarnoush (2004:5) argued, that the launch of SRP was an 
opportunity for the young Iranian archaeologists to demonstrate that given a “proper setting”, they are 
capable of substantial academic achievements in the field of archaeology. Given the above context, it is 
contended that the proposals made by the SRP were to comply with these demands.  
Iranian archaeologists were also eager to restore the position of their discipline internationally. In Chapter 
2 it was argued that as an integral part of the doctrine of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’, deliberate 
campaigns were generated to improve relations with the West. As a part of this policy, Iranian 
archaeology was pulled out of isolation, and Iranian institutions resumed academic relations with foreign 
archaeologists. To further develop these relations, Iranian archaeologists aimed to resurrect their 
discipline within the global context through tantalizing, large scale projects that offered ground breaking 
theories. The assertion that the “oldest Ziggurat” in the ancient world was discovered in the Central 
Iranian Plateau may be accounted for the prevalence of such academic frameworks. This publicity 
continued with the proposal of other major discoveries. For example, Malek Shahmirzadi reported the 
discovery of the “oldest fortified wall” in Iran at Sialk (Fig. 4.5) (Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:58). Further, 
in 2002 the discoveries at Jiroft led Majidzadeh to conclude that the Jiroft civilisation corresponded with 
the Arrata Kingdom which predates the Sumerian civilisation. He argued that the “fabulous royal 
treasures” excavated at Ur, “may ultimately be traced back to the workshops of Jiroft” (Majidzadeh 
2007). The discovery of an inscription at Jiroft further led archeologists to conclude that this site offered 
the “oldest evidence of written language” in the ancient world (ibid.). As Majidzadeh (2010) indicated, 
the “discoveries at Jiroft could challenge the certainty of fundamental understandings about the cultures 
of Middle East”. It has to be noted, that these rhetoric were also emulating the “independence” policies of 
the Government’s discourse by emphasising the “independence” of Prehistoric Iran from the casting 
shadows of Mesopotamian archaeology.  
To further add scholarly validity to these discoveries, and considering the resumption of academic 
collaborations between Iranian and foreign institutes, the expertise of foreign archaeologists were 
employed to enhance the significance of these excavations. At Sialk, in the third season of excavations, 
the project became a multidisciplinary effort that was supported by an international team (Malek 
Shahmirzadi 2004:16). In addition, from the third season on, a more detailed and comprehensive English 
section was added to the preliminary reports in order to appeal to a broader audience and publicise the site 
further.  
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From the above analysis, it is contended that the Khatami period may be considered as the pinnacle point 
of Iranian archaeology after the Revolution, when Prehistoric archaeology was utilised to support the 
discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’. The sudden resumption of academic correspondence 
following two decades of isolation had a tremendous impact on Prehistoric archaeology in terms of 
theoretical approaches and methodological applications. Previously it was argued that despite the wide 
appeal of ‘New Archaeology’, it had a minimal impact on Iranian archaeologists in practice. Therefore, as 
Niknami (2003:3) argued, the nature of Iranian archaeology remained traditional and entrenched in the 
rhetoric of “Culture-Historical approach”. It is argued that the encounter of this traditional legacy with the 
contemporary theoretical concepts introduced by a new generation of foreign archaeologist who began 
co-operations in Prehistoric projects created a state of disorder in comprehending theoretical frameworks 
in Iran. This has resulted in Fazeli’s (2010:2) remark that the theories applied to the analysis of the 
Iranian Central Plateau not only followed the traditional “Culture-Historical approach”, but even failed to 
comply with all the aspects of this theory. Such disorientations can be attributed to the lack of theoretical 
debates that dominated Iranian archaeology both during the Pahlavi period and following the Revolution.  
 
4.5.4. Ahmadinejad’s Administration & Populism: Prehistoric Archaeology 
The previous section established that the discourse of ‘dialogue’ adopted by Khatami’s Administration 
had grave impacts on the resurrection of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology. It was further argued that in 
conformity with the policies of promoting the “antiquity” of Iranian nation,  the ICHO launched the SRP 
which as Malek Shahmirzadi argued became one of the “greatest projects of the cultural heritage” (Malek 
Shahmirzadi 2004:16). This section addresses the impact of the return of hard-liners to the Iranian 
political scene on the further development of Prehistoric archaeology in the post-Revolutionary period. It 
is argued that with the onset of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency in 2005, the political discourse was 
transformed to accommodate an amalgam of ‘principalism’ and ‘populism’. Within this political 
framework, the Government’s interpretation of nationalism relied on Khomeini’s principles of ‘anti-
imperialism’ and ‘independence’.  
It is argued that the populist nationalism adopted by Ahmadinejad’s Government was manifested in the 
emphasis on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its justification as the absolute right of the Iranian nation 
(Zathureezky 2011:244). These populist rallies to promote Iran’s nuclear programme were accompanied 
by slogans, stamps, banknotes, and medals that centered on the significance of this issue (Fig. 4.6) 
(Chubin 2010:84). Further, given that the suitability of archaeology as an instrument to support political 
agendas was recognised during Khatami’s Presidency, Ahmadinejad’s Administration continued to utilise 
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archaeology to aid its populist discourse. In this context, the Government’s emphasis was no longer on 
the “antiquity” of Iranian nation but on the “sovereignty” of Iran in both pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. 
Given the above contention, it can be concluded that the Government’s populist approach in this period 
endorsed the adoption of ethnic-dynastic and Shi’a nationalisms. In the following Chapters, the impact of 
this doctrine on pre-Islamic and Islamic archaeology is discussed in detail. In this section, it is argued 
that, given the populist nature of the Government’s nationalist discourse, despite the instrumental 
employment of archaeology, little attention was granted to research and preservation. Therefore, 
Prehistoric sites once more became the subject of neglect. These policies were amplified through Iran’s 
political isolation which discontinued international collaborations; and the ensuing economic hardship 
which reduced national budget for archaeological activities.  
With respect to archaeological activities, some of the collaborative projects that were initiated by 
Khatami’s Administration permeated into this period. This included the excavation of Prehistoric sites 
and the launch of foreign exhibitions. Within the same framework, excavations at Sialk continued in 
2008-9 through a collaborative project that involved a research group from Tehran University, under the 
Direction of Hassan Fazeli, and a team from Durham University in the United Kingdom, under the 
Direction of Robin Coningham. The excavation at Sialk was conceived within a larger project that began 
in 2005 with the aim to evaluate the origins of agricultural complexity in the Iranian Central Plateau, in 
the Plains of Qazvin (Fazeli & Abbasnejad 2005), Tehran (Coningham et al. 2004) and Kashan (Malek 
Shahmirzadi 2005; Fazeli et al. 2013). An integral part of this project was re-excavating Prehistoric sites 
in the region to achieve a reliable scientific-based chronology. With these aims, the North Mound of Sialk 
was excavated in 2008 and 2009 to achieve an absolute dating using the recovered charcoal samples that 
were transferred to Oxford University for C14 dating (ibid.). The absolute dating of Sialk was important, 
not only in the context of this specific Prehistoric site, but considering that it had been more than 30 years 
since any C14 method was employed to determine absolute dating in Iranian Prehistory. Considering the 
improvements made in enhancing dating accuracy, the use of absolute dating at Sialk was a significant 
leap forward in portraying a credible interpretation of Iranian Prehistoric period. The absolute dating at 
Sialk was accompanied by a re-analysis of relative chronology using ceramic finds and their stylistic and 
technological developments (ibid.). Based on these investigations, Ghirshman’s general proposal on the 
relative chronology of the Neolithic period was confirmed. It was further suggested that there was a 
ca.600 to 400 years of gap between the end of occupation on Sialk North and the beginning of occupation 
on Sialk South (ibid.). 
Given the above trends, it is argued that the lack of State’s sponsorship of Prehistoric archaeology in the 
first round of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency (r. 2005-2009 AD) provided the means to concentrate on the 
114 
 
scientific aspects of the discipline. This context was further provided given the revival of archaeology 
during the Khatami period and the resumption of international collaborations which had assisted in 
familiarising Iranian archaeologists with the contemporary theories and methodological concepts. In 
addition, the increased oil prices contributed to the continuation of archaeological excavations. Despite 
sporadic populist employment of Prehistoric archaeology (see Documentary Jiroft: A lost Civilisation), it 
is contended that Prehistoric studies during this period gradually advanced towards a problem-solving 
approach. This was evident in the archaeological projects in the Central Iranian Plateau that aimed to 
review the cultural sequence of the region through multidisciplinary projects and absolute dating methods.  
The interval of great archaeological activities in the Prehistoric period gradually dissipated during the 
second round of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency (r. 2009-2013 AD) as the Government began to exercise a 
doctrine of nationalism that fluidly alternated between ethnic-dynastic and Shi’a heritage. This approach 
was accompanied by a reduction in oil prices and the growth of budget deficit that threatened 
Government’s populist appeal (Ehteshami et al. 2013:237). By 2009, following a statement issued by the 
ICHHTO, Iranian archaeologists were prohibited from giving interviews to news agencies. These efforts 
were accompanied by a wave of mismanagement that continues to threaten Iranian cultural heritage and 
Prehistoric sites to-date. In respect to Sialk, archaeological excavations in collaboration with foreign 
archaeological teams were terminated. In addition, following the economic setbacks and the ensuing 
mismanagements, the ICHHTO appealed to review the vicinity that was allocated to the heritage site of 
Sialk (http://kashannews.net/1391/09/22). Within the content of this new proposal, a budget of 2 million 
Rials was allocated to a project that aimed to build a museum and develop further facilities for tourism 
(ibid.). Despite the above proposal, Malek Shahmirzadi argued that this is an attempt to violate the 
vicinity of Sialk and will lead to serious disturbance to the site (ibid.). He argued that in the third season 
of SRP the vicinity of Sialk was defined and the documents were stored, but the relating documents have 
since been “misplaced” (ibid.). The proposal raised concerns in the archaeology community about 
attempts to violate the vicinity of Sialk by permitting illegal developmental projects in the area (ibid.). 
The violation and negligence of archaeological sites during this period was often attributed to 
mismanagement and the entrusting of official positions to non-experts. The pervasive continuation of this 
trend has led to concerns for the well-being of other major Prehistoric sites that were publicised during 
the Khatami period, for example the site of Jiroft.  
From the above, it can be concluded that during the second round of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, 
Prehistoric archaeology once again fell into isolation and suffered neglect. The political isolation of Iran 
and the economic constrains that followed the Government’s determination for nuclear energy, justified 
the destruction of Prehistoric sites for national developmental projects. These ‘self-sufficiency’ projects 
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have once again marginalised the significance of archaeology as a scientific discipline. Further, the 
majority of international collaborations were halted and despite tremendous efforts, the development of 
archaeological theory and methodology was once again terminated without ever sufficiently taking root in 
the context of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology.  
 
4.6. Conclusion 
It has been the intention of this chapter to investigate the overarching influences of socio-political 
dynamics and different brands of nationalism on the birth and advance of Prehistoric archaeology with the 
site of Sialk providing for the demonstration of these trends. It has been argued that apart from spasms of 
sporadic appropriation of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology for political purposes, the discipline has 
advanced independent of nationalistic rhetoric, given it was seldom considered as the ‘golden age’ of 
Iranian history and largely failed to contribute to the verification of State’s nationalistic policies. These 
advances were particularly evident during the second Pahlavi period when the de-politicisation of 
Prehistoric archaeology and the introduction of a new set of theories under the banner of ‘New 
Archaeology’ contributed to directing Prehistoric studies toward a scientific orientation. Despite the 
above contention, considering the formative phases of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran were structured 
during the elevated stages of ethnic nationalism and the prevalence of theories concerned with the 
migration of Indo-Iranians, the residue of nationalistic traditions continues to dominate the discipline. 
Such traditions were demonstrated during Reza Shah’s reign when Prehistoric studies were utilised to 
support the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism and the link between Aryans and Iranians, and re-appeared 
during Khatami’s Presidency, when Prehistory became involved in providing a pretext for the 
Government’s discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’. It is argued that in both instances, the 
discipline was utilised to support Iran’s ‘authenticity’ and ‘national sovereignty’ through affirming her 
ancient past and contributions to world civilisation. This was achieved through presenting Sialk as a site 
on the route of Aryan migration during Reza Shah’s reign, while during Khatami’s Presidency the site 
emerged as one of the most ancient centres of civilisations with the proposal of the existence of the 
world’s “oldest Ziggurat” on the site. The nationalistic employment of Prehistoric archaeology also fed 
into the domestic policies of both Administrations by uniting the fragmented Iranian society into a 
coherent entity with a consolidated identity that was neither pre-Islamic nor Islamic, but ‘ancient’. The 
role of Iranian archaeologists in shaping Prehistoric studies was particularly stressed, given their 
involvement in assisting the resurrection of this discipline and supporting the nationalistic rhetoric of 
Khatami’s Government. It can therefore, be concluded that despite discrepancies, Prehistoric archaeology 
in Iran, similar to other nations, was born and developed for the nationalist purpose of pushing the 
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nation’s origin back in time and to demonstrate the “antiquity” of its remote past in order to establish a 
powerful State  (also see Diaz-Andreu 2007:395-397). In the following two chapters it is argued that apart 
from the Prehistoric period, Trigger’s Nationalistic tradition disseminated into all aspects of Iranian 
archaeology, including pre-Islamic and Islamic periods. 
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Figure 4.1: Topographic map of Sialk North and 
South. (After Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:map2.) 
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Figure 4.2: General view of the North Mound (left) and South Mound (right). (Photo by Coningham) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The close proximity of houses and the use of Sialk peripheries 
for grazing and agriculture purposes. Western fringes of Sialk. (Photo by 
Coningham) 
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Figure 4.5: General view of the mudbrick ‘fortification’ wall looking from west to east. (After 
Malek Shahmirzadi 2006b:fig.104.). 
Figure 4.4: Malek Shahmirzadi’s reconstruction of Ziggurat of Sialk.  (After Malek 
Shahmirzadi 2002:207) 
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                      Figure 4.6: Iran Issued Banknote to promote nuclear energy in 2007.  
                  (http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075048.html. Accessed 10/08/12) 
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Chapter 5 
Nationalism and the Treatment of Pre-Islamic Archaeological Sites: 
Persepolis 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4, it was proposed that the nature of Iranian Prehistoric archaeology adhered to the 
Nationalistic tradition as defined by Bruce Trigger (1984). Given that pre-Islamic Iranian identity has 
often been presented as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian history, in this chapter, it is argued that this 
archaeological period contributed more intensely to the implementation of various forms of Iranian 
nationalisms and the construction of Iranian national identity. To articulate these themes, the site of 
Persepolis has been selected as a case study given its distinction as one of the few symbolic national 
monuments that has been appropriated in various historical periods to support different Administrations 
or ideological concepts. These appropriations were initiated by the Qajars by associating the site with 
ancient mythical kings. During Reza Shah’s rule, with the proliferation of ethnic nationalism to construct 
a modern nation-state, Persepolis emerged as the symbolic capital of the Ancient Persian Empire. The 
celebration of the site persisted into the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah and his Government’s efforts to 
promote dynastic nationalism by presenting Persepolis as the birth-place of Persian dynasties that began 
with Cyrus and continued to the Pahlavi dynasty. Finally with the victory of the Islamic Revolution and 
the upsurge of Shi’a nationalism, Persepolis went through various treatments that fluctuated from 
association with the pillars of imperialism and corruption, to its resurrection as a national treasure that 
symbolised the pre-Islamic history of Iran and the architectural talent of Iranian master builders.  
A thorough investigation of Iranian accounts and foreign travelogues corresponding with the site of 
Persepolis demonstrates the perpetual concept of propaganda that has dominated the history of this 
monument. Although scholars have disputed over the function of Persepolis for years, most agree that this 
Achaemenid Capital had a ceremonial purpose at the formative stages of its history (Sami1955:89; 
Schmidt:1957; Sancisi-Weerdenburg:1991b:173-201; Wilber 1969; Tilia 1972:207). Therefore, the 
mysterious sense of grandeur that astonished many visitors for centuries was intended by the Achaemenid 
kings as they built their ceremonial centre to impress envoys travelling to Persia from the farthest parts of 
the Empire. The symbolic splendor of Persepolis as a site of propaganda remained to entertain the 
ambitions of those who carved their initials alongside the Achaemenid kings to register their triumph. 
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When Lord Curzon stopped by the site in 1889, he recorded the identity of many visitors who engraved 
their initials on the Gate of All Nations. These included both Iranian and foreigners who were intrigued 
upon seeing the site despite having different sources for eliciting their reverence for the monument (see 
Curzon 1892 II:156-7).  
 
5.2. Historical Background  
In recent years, various studies on the earliest foreign explorers who encountered Persian monuments has 
shed light on the significance of Persepolis as a prominent destination (Curtis 2005; Sarkhosh-Curtis 
2007; Simpson 2007; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:2). According to these studies, the first Europeans who 
visited the ruins were unaware of its origins and referred to it by the local name of Chehel Minar (40 
Column) (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:3). It was only in the seventeenth century that the ruins were 
identified by the Spanish Ambassador Don Garcias da Silva e Figueroa and Roman Pietro della Valle, as 
Persepolis, the Capital of the Achaemenids (ibid.:5). Following this identification, Persepolis became an 
attractive travelling destination for Europeans given the incentives discussed below.   
In Chapter 2, the fundamental causes for the delayed acquaintance of Europeans with Iranian monuments 
were discussed. For the purpose of this section it will suffice to identify two imperative features of 
Persepolis that appealed to European travellers; these were the Biblical and Classical references and the 
Persepolitan cuneiform. It is known that most of the early travellers who arrived at Persepolis were 
familiar with ancient history. Considering the inevitably speculative nature of early explorations and the 
lack of reliable guides, early travellers relied on local narratives. These narrations associated the site with 
various mythical characters such as Djamshid the grandfather of Alexander; King Solomon; Darius the 
king of Persians; Cyrus the Great; and Ardeshir who was known as Assuerus in the Bible (ibid.:8-9). 
These contradictory accounts drove European enquiry towards discovering the origin of the site, which 
according to all narratives was in one way or another affiliated with Biblical or Classical history. 
However, from the very beginning, there was pessimism towards the monuments of Persia. The 
supremacy granted to Mesopotamian and Classical remains was due to their affiliations with the 
foundations of the Western civilisation, while Persian monuments such as Persepolis were framed as 
representing the Oriental despotism of the East. The inferior treatment of Persian monuments was most 
apparent in the 1700s and with the growing interest in Greek history. During this period attempts were 
made to explain contemporary political events with references to the Classical past. The literary work of 
writers such as John Gillies, Pons-Augustin Alletz and many others demonstrated the prevalent 
antagonisms exhibited towards Persian history as a primitive and uncultured nation (Brosius 1990:82-3). 
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Therefore, for the foreign travellers who visited Persepolis towards the end of the 1800s and early 1900s 
the site represented the symbol of Western triumph over the Orient. These associations were a formative 
motive to bring foreign travellers to Persepolis where the Orient was defeated. In a way, Persepolis fed 
into the colonial ambitions of the West and authenticated the narrative of their perceived superiority over 
the ‘primitive Orient’ through historical records.  
Persepolis was also significant to travellers who focused on cuneiform scripts that later became known as 
the “Persepolitan inscriptions” (The Times 1816:2). The importance of these scripts became more 
pronounced by the 1850s with the discoveries made by the British expeditions at the Biblical sites of 
Nineveh and Babylon. The discovery of slabs with Persepolitan cuneiform in these sites inspired 
Europeans to pursue the task of deciphering the script with more fervor. In 1837 Persepolitan cuneiform 
was finally deciphered due to the accumulated efforts of Georg Fredrich Grotefend; M. Bournouf; 
Professor Lassen; and Colonel Henry Rawlinson, unlocking the riddle to the ancient cultures of 
Mesopotamia (The Times 1853:7). In spite of these contributions, considering European favouritism 
towards the art and culture of Mesopotamia as far more superior to that of Persia, the discoveries at 
Persepolis were conceived as a stepping stone towards further understanding the Assyrian and Babylonian 
civilisations (ibid.). Nevertheless, in the process, the name of the kings who had built Persepolis were 
revealed and thus this period of Iranian history was liberated from the shadow of myth and fables that 
surrounded it for centuries.  
In addition to the above, the lack of attention to Persepolis may be explained in terms of its location 
which was inadequate for the collection of museum objects. In his correspondence with Times News in 
1879, Curzon reported that despite the prominent position of the site on the caravan route between Shiraz 
and Isfahan and hence its accessibility, the site is about 213 miles from the nearest Sea port in Bushire 
(Allen 1892:5). He argued, considering the primitive road conditions and the difficult terrain, the task of 
carving huge blocks of Persepolitan statues and transporting them to the port would defy any ordinary 
method of handling (ibid.). Although this restriction hampered the extent of wide spread looting at 
Persepolis, clandestine excavations, mutilation, and destruction by native and foreign visitors caused 
damage to the site. The first foreign ‘excavation’ at Persepolis was under the operation of James Morier, 
who came to Persia as part of Sir Gore Ouseley’s diplomatic mission in 1810 (Sarkhosh-Curtis 
2007:166). In his two day effort to clear the site of Persepolis, he dismantled and shipped various works 
of art to England (Mousavi 2002:216). In 1825, Ephraim Gerrish Stannus uncovered a number of 
sculptures at Persepolis and in the following year Colonel MacDonald Kenneir visited the site and cleared 
part of the staircase at the Palace of Darius. His excavations lead to the discovery of the Persepolis Sphinx 
which was removed by Sir John McNeill in 1828 (Simpson 2007:159-160). These brief spurts of 
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activities at Persepolis continued with Robert Gordon, another member of Ouseley’s mission, who hired 
villagers to dig at Persepolis and removed fragments of sculptures (Mousavi 2002:217; Curtis 1998:48). 
These early expeditions were far from scientific excavations and firmly belonged to the age of 
antiquarianism.  
Scientific excavation at Persepolis was not pursued until the twentieth century when British, American, 
Iranian, and Italians began to work on the site. Nevertheless, during this period a number of visitors made 
discoveries that contributed substantially to the documentation and identification of the ruin. The first 
depiction of Persepolis to reach Europe was by Pietro Della Valle in 1672, who made copies of the 
Persepolitan cuneiform (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:4). Considering the prominence of Dutch activities 
in Persia in the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the majority of Persepolis documentations 
during this period were made by Dutch envoys. The most significant travellers were Philip Angle, an 
artist who visited Persepolis in 1651 (ibid.:8); Cornelis De Bruijn, another artist who made accurate 
drawings of the site and emphasised the faceless figures of the ruins (ibid.:18); Engelbert Kaempfer, who 
visited Persepolis between 1684-88 and during his three day stay at the site collected valuable information 
and made accurate drawings (ibid.:17); and finally Carsten Neibuhr, an scholar of German origin who 
travelled with the Danish Scientific Mission to Persia in 1765 and contributed immensely to the 
recognition and decipherment of Persepolitan cuneiform (Malek Shahmirzadi 1987:4-5). Among other 
travellers of this century were the French Jean Chardin who visited Persepolis during 1665-1677 and in 
addition to providing drawings and the first map of the site, speculated about the function of the site 
(Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:16).    
The wealth of information provided by travellers and artists in the 1600s and 1700s, in addition to the 
subsequent discoveries in Egypt and Mesopotamia, enhanced European interest in the monuments of 
Persepolis and the desire to dismantle and collect artefacts from the site and take them to museums 
abroad. However, on the realisation of transportation restrictions, the main concern became the 
production of casts that could be made and sent to museums as a mere representation of architectural 
elements at Persepolis. In the nineteenth century the Dutch dominance in Persia was replaced by that of 
the British who became major players in contributing to the discoveries at Persepolis. As was discussed 
above, the majority of activities during this period can be categorised as antiquarianism, however, the 
discoveries made by the British should not be overlooked. In 1818 Sir Ker Porter, commissioned by A. 
Olinen, the President of the Russian Academy of Fine Arts, travelled to Persia to reproduce the Persian 
sculptures at Persepolis “as accurately as possible” (Barnett 1972:20). His 24 drawings of the monuments 
at Persepolis are among the most detailed depictions of the site before the introduction of photography 
(ibid.:23). In 1825, Stannus succeeded in making the first casts of Persepolis which were subsequently 
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presented to the British Museum (Simpson 2007:160). Following the first attempt, in response to Lord 
Curzon and Cecil Smith’s plea to preserve a satisfactory record of the decaying site of Persepolis (Burton 
1892:7; Allen 1892:5), Herbert Weld was sent to Persia in 1891 on behalf of the British Museum and with 
the private donation of Lord Savile, to make castings of the monument (Allen 1892:5). Apart from the 
innovative technique of casting employed by the skilled Italian moulder, Mr. Giuntini, Herbert’s mission 
led to a small scale excavation through which he detected the use of colour in the Achaemenid palatial 
quarters. His excavation is recognised as the first ‘problem-oriented’ archaeological excavation at 
Persepolis by Simpson (2007:163). It is interesting to note the prevalence of the Evolutionary approach in 
archaeology during this period. In The Times correspondence, the British activities at Persepolis were 
justified by the statement that “a rich country like England is under an obligation to humanity to perform 
a service such as this [excavations and castings]” given that the “Persian government does not value them 
[Persepolis]” (Allen 1892:5).  
Apart from British scholars, a number of French visitors made significant discoveries at Persepolis. In 
1839, Charles Texier detected colours on the sculptures of Persepolis and even conducted chemical 
experiment to validate his speculations (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:28-29; Mousavi 2002:217). Among 
other French contributors were Eugene Flandin and Pascal Coste who supplied the most accurate 
drawings of the site in the late 1840s (ibid.). This was followed by castings of M. Pieerre-Victorien Lottin 
in 1844 who made the second set of castings at Persepolis for the Louvre Museum (Simpson 2007:160). 
Following the rise of the Pahlavi dynasty and the establishment of Iran as a modern nation-state, 
Persepolis was adopted into a narrative that represented the integrity of an ancient civilisation capable of 
administering an Empire. The Americans played a major role in dispersing this propaganda through their 
archaeological excavations, publications, international exhibitions, and congresses (see Chapter 6). The 
American activities began in Iranian archaeology by applying diplomatic pressure to annul the French 
Monopoly in 1927 and push through an Antiquity Law in 1930 (Gholi Majd 2003:16). The central motive 
behind the preceding two initiatives rested on the Americans ambitions to monopolise archaeological 
activities at Persepolis (Mousavi 2002:223; Gholi Majd 2003:17). Therefore, the Oriental Institute of 
Chicago, under the Direction of Ernst Herzfeld (1931-34 AD) and subsequently Erich Schmidt (1935-39 
AD), took over the task of preservation and excavation of the site (Gursan-Salzmann 2007:75). Following 
the ratification of the Antiquity Law, Persepolis was the 20
th
 site to be registered on the Inventory of 
National Monument on September 1931 
(http://persepolis.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=29&Itemid=64). The halt of these 
activities following World War II, gave Iranians their first opportunity to take over the excavations at 
Persepolis. From 1939 to 1941 the task of excavation and restoration of Persepolis was delegated to a 
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number of Iranian archaeologists. From October 1939 to January 1940, Hossein Ravanboud was in charge 
of these restorations. The position was subsequently given to Dr. Issa Behnam who worked at the site 
from January to June 1940. Mahmoud Rad was next in line for the position from the end of 1940 to 
September 1941 (Mousavi 2002:235). In 1941 Ali Sami began his career at Persepolis and continued his 
studies at the site until his retirement in 1961 (ibid.:236). No other significant work was initiated at the 
site until 1964 when extensive restoration work was initiated by Italians under the Directorship of Ann 
Britt and Guiseppe Tilia (Tilia 1972). These restorations were in collaboration with NOCHMI and 
continued until the Islamic Revolution. Meanwhile in 1968, Akbar Tajvidi (1973) proposed a new 
research programme for excavations at Persepolis but his research was interrupted in 1972 and never 
resumed. 
The most profound moment in the modern history of Persepolis was the proliferation of the site as the 
manifestation of the Pahlavi’s nationalist agenda in the celebration of the Anniversary of 2500 years of 
Persian Monarchy in 1971. The site that became the symbol of dynastic nationalism during the Pahlavis’ 
reign was later condemned by the Islamic Regime after the Islamic Revolution as the embodiment of 
‘imperialism’ and ‘corrupt monarchies’. Thus, the treatment of Persepolis was significantly altered 
following the political changes that surfaced after the Revolution.  
During the early days of the Revolution Persepolis escaped threats from the zealous Islamist who sought 
to demolish the site due to its strong affiliations with the Pahlavi dynasty and the Persian monarchies. 
Following the socio-political changes after the Iran-Iraq War, and in light of improved economy, the post-
Revolutionary Government asserted a more favourable outlook towards the pre-Islamic Iranian identity 
and thus Persepolis once again became the symbol of Iranian sovereignty. The sequence of visits from 
Government officials eased the way for the launch of Pars-e Pasargad Research Institute in August 2001 
(http://persepolis.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=29&Itemid=64). The new Iranian-
Islamic identity promoted by the doctrine of President Khatami’s Administration and the relaxing of 
foreign relations, re-introduced scholarly exchange with Western institutes. These policies influenced 
Persepolis with the resumption of archaeological activities through a collaboration project between 
French and Italian teams and the Iranian institutes. Some of these resumed projects were not chiefly 
concerned with the palatial buildings of Persepolis, but focused on the geographical district of Pars-e 
Pasargad. Persepolis became the focus of political attention when Ahmadinejad’s Administration 
proposed to celebrate Norouz (Persian New Year) at the site. This populist tactic aroused the reaction of 
hard-liners who compared the policies of this Government to that of Pahlavi’s adoption of pre-Islamic 
national identity. Further, in 2009 arrangements were made to revive the Iranian-Italian collaborations for 
the restoration of Persepolis. Like so many features of the post-Revolutionary politics, the treatment of 
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Persepolis remained inconsistent and confound to the nationalistic rhetoric of the Administration in 
power. In the following section, the treatment of Persepolis is analysed in consideration to the nationalist 
ideals of the Qajars, Pahlavis and in the post-Revolutionary Administrations.  
 
5.3. Qajar Nationalism: The Case Study of Persepolis 
 
“The image of a mosque which you have reproduced in your paper as a symbol of the Iranian nation, 
seems to me inappropriate. This is because if by the word ‘nation’ you refer to its accepted meaning, that 
is the people of Iran, the mosque is not particular to them … The symbols of the people of pre-Islamic Iran 
are Ancient Persian monuments, such as Persepolis, the fortress of Istakhr, and the like.” 
 (Akhundzadeh cited in Parsinejad 2003:267) 
 
It is predominantly conceived that in the absence of modern concepts such as nation-state, nationalism 
and national identity during the Qajar period, the political use of archaeological monuments such as 
Persepolis began with the Pahlavi dynasty. Although archaeology was a prominent component in the 
construction of national identity for the Pahlavis (Abdi 2001; Goode 2007; Mousavi 2002), there are 
indications that the Qajars had already begun to appreciate the potentials of archaeological monuments for 
portraying political aims. However, it may be argued, that due to the nature of the Qajar court and the 
socio-political dynamics of this period, these manipulations remained sporadic rather than taking the form 
of widespread official policies. The Qajar court was institutionalised on the dual authority of monarchy 
and Shari’a (Amanat 1997:8). The Qajar kings were perceived as the “shadow of God [zillulah] on earth” 
(ibid.:10) and thus did not need to seek legitimacy through the appropriation of history. While this general 
paradigm can be applied to the Qajars’ political comprehension of the issue of legitimacy, the intention of 
this section is to illustrate instances of Qajar acquaintance with the potential of the past as a legitimising 
instrument. In doing so, it is the intention of this section to emphasise the Qajars’ attention to the 
institution of monarchy as a rudimentary source of legitimacy. It is argued that this fascination is 
portrayed in the Qajars’ emulation of pre-Islamic symbols and their interest in the Persepolis monument. 
In addition, this section will investigate the intricate role of the Constitutional Revolution in the birth of 
Iranian nationalism and its ramifications for the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis. To illustrate this impact 
more clearly, this section will investigate the pre- and post-Constitutional Revolutionary period 
separately.  
 The reign of the Qajar dynasty persisted long enough to witness erratic changes in their outlook towards 
cultural heritage. This was in part due to the conspicuous inflation in interactions between Iranians and 
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foreigners, which allowed for the perpetual but restricted import of Western concepts (see 2.2). Prior to 
the Constitutional Revolution, the Bazgasht movement during the reign of Fath-ali Shah (r. 1797-1835 
AD) coupled with the anti-Arab and nationalistic doctrine of intellectuals such as Akhundzadeh and 
Kermani, to elevate the curiosity of Qajar kings towards their pre-Islamic past. This new fascination with 
the past is perceived through the imitation of Sassanid motifs and mannerism (Sarkhosh-Curtis 
2007:177). The spark of interest and emulation of the past even prompted Farhad Mirza, the Crown 
Prince, to carve an inscription on the walls of Persepolis in the manner of ancient kings, to register his 
1872 crushing of rebellion in Fars (Mousavi 2002:219). This attempt indicates that the political potential 
of archaeological monuments was already recognised during the Qajar period. It further demonstrates the 
symbolic value of Persepolis and its connotation with the concepts of noble greatness and permanence. 
However, one would speculate over the rationale behind these affiliations in an era that history lagged 
behind conventional mythology to explain the past. To satisfy this debate the growing influence of the 
Shahnameh during this period is analysed.  
Apart from rising interest in the pre-Islamic history of Iran, the Bazgasht movement was prominent as the 
force behind the revival of Shahnameh during the Qajar era. In fact, as Luft (2001:43) has argued, the 
Bazgasht was a literary movement in sympathy with the epical style depicted in the narratives of the 
Shahnameh. Therefore, in the absence of historical accounts to explain the ambiguous remains of the past, 
the Shahnameh became the chief source of reference to reveal insight about previous dynasties. Persepolis 
benefited from the Shahnameh and acquired an escalating mythical repute, as it contained references that 
glorified previous dynasties who ruled at Takht-e Jamshid (Persepolis).  
Worthy of comment here is Meisami’s (1993) argument for the dismissal of the Shahnameh as a fable 
immediately upon its completion. He argued that due to the literary adjustments of this period, which 
stressed reliability and truthfulness based on eye-witness accounts as oppose to the epic narratives of 
Ferdowsi, the Shahnameh was dismissed as a collection of fanciful tales with no use but to entertain 
(ibid.:264). The relegation of the Shahnameh to a chronicle not only removed Persepolis from the 
historical context and recast it as a mythical place, but also transformed the site to an eternal city of 
legendary kings who ruled over a vast empire. Persepolis retained this symbolic quality as many 
subsequent dynasties such as the Parthian, Sassanid, Tehirid, Saffarid, Buyid, Samanid and even the 
Qhaznavid, sought their ruling legitimacy in tracing their ancestry back to the kings of Shahnameh 
(ibid.:250; Sarkhosh-Curtis 2005:251-2). Therefore, Persepolis became a visual memoir to register the 
triumph of kings who sought potency and respect through linking themselves with the legendry kings of 
Ancient Persia. The Qajar too, sought legitimacy in this hereditary model. Nevertheless, given the 
potency of Shi’ism as the unifying factor employed to contain a nation, the Qajar did not actively promote 
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the historical verification of their legitimacy. Having noted that, it has to be considered that the Qajar 
were gradually discovering the potential of historic monuments as political instruments and supplied the 
preliminary foundation for their utilisation during the Pahlavis. 
 The prevalent consumption of the fables of Shahnameh diffused into all ranges of the Qajar society 
through the practice of naghali (recitation of epic stories). Therefore, the kings of Shahnameh with the 
seat of their throne at Persepolis were known to all strands of the Iranian society. Despite sporadic 
digging, vandalism, and the re-processing of fragments from Persepolis for building purposes, the 
mythical affiliations with the site saved it from complete neglect. This is articulated in the travel accounts 
of number of Europeans who were astonished to learn about talisman on their efforts to remove or 
uncover remains from the site. The German traveller Von Poser was, for example, told that the animals at 
the Gate of All Nations cause temporary blindness on curious visitors who attempt to get close to the 
monument (Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:7). In addition to the legendary fables that surrounded the site of 
Persepolis, European travellers also detected a lack of respect, ignorance, and religious fanaticism 
towards the ruins. In his travelogue, Morier (1818:76) complained that his excavations at Persepolis were 
interrupted by a local ruler who was jealous that the money he had given to a peasant had not passed into 
his pocket. Further, De Bruin (cited in Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1991a:18) argued that Persepolis was subject 
to deliberate destruction by the Governor of Shiraz who was irritated by many European visitors to 
Persepolis that sought preferential treatment from him. Finally, Wilber (1969:51) argued that the many 
mutilated faces of icons at Persepolis were inflicted by Muslim visitors to whom the representation of 
living forms was anathema.  
Following the enhanced interest of European visitors in enquiring about Persepolis in their travels, 
Iranians’ outlook towards the site was eventually altered and replaced by curiosities about its monetary 
value. In other words, it was the European interest in Persepolis during this age of discovery that 
unleashed the Western phenomena of antiquarianism. However, this is not to undermine Iranian curiosity 
about the historical value of Persepolis, which according to a number of accounts resembled a form of 
‘patriotism’. In his travels to Persepolis, Morier referred to the encounters he had with the local shepherds 
and his astonishments at the “air of superiority” with which the locals described Persepolis (Morier 
1818:86-89).  
In the 1850s, dynamics altered once again as traces of attributing a cultural value to the site began to 
emerge with attempts to photograph it. In 1858 Naser al-Din Shah hired Jules Richard, his Royal 
Photographer, to record Persepolis (Mousavi 2002:217; Sarkhosh-Curtis 2007:177). Richard’s project 
was terminated due to financial difficulties and instead the activity fell to Luigi Pesce, an Italian Infantry 
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Officer, who presented an album to the Shah and was rewarded by the Court for his endeavour (Fig. 5.1) 
(Mousavi 2002:217-18). The Court’s interest in the ruins was further expanded when the Shah then 
ordered Aqa Reza to learn photography in the1860s with the purpose of taking photographs of the site 
(ibid.:218). From the late 1870s the new Court Photographer, Antoin Suvruguin provided a range of 
photographs of monuments, including Persepolis.  
The Qajar interest in Persepolis was further expressed through the first extensive excavation by Iranians. 
Mostowfi (1955:10) argued that in 1875-77 the Governor of Fars, Shahzadeh Mo’tamed Al-Dowle 
Farhad Mirza and his son Soltan Avis Mirza Ehtesham Al-Dowle, hired thousands of workers to clear 
Persepolis. According to Mousavi (2002:219) this excavation took place in 1877 and continued for over a 
month to uncover “asbab-e atiq” (antique tools). The remnants of these activities were evident in the 
Governor’s attempt to engrave his name on the northern wall of Tachar in emulation of European 
travellers (Fig. 5.2). The extent of interest is also revealed in the work of Mirza Fursat Shirazi who 
travelled around Fars in 1896 and published Asar-e Ajam (remains of non-Arabs) with plans and drawings 
of the ruins at Persepolis (Sarkhosh-Curtis 2005:256; 2007:177). 
As previously argued, prior to the Constitutional Revolution, the Qajars had comprehended the 
significance of Persepolis as an ancient monument but, lacked official policies to promote the site for 
political purposes. This was a period when the Qajars were consumed with both the monetary value of 
antiquities and an invoked sense of pride taken in the monuments of Persepolis. This is best illustrated by 
the refusal of Farhad Mirza to permit the German explorers Friedrich Carl Andreas and Friedrich Stolze 
to take possession of items recovered from excavations at Persepolis (Mousavi 2002:220). It is difficult to 
detect whether this reluctance was driven from patriotic sentiments or his discomfort with loosing 
antiques of high monetary value to foreigners. Similarly Morier’s (2004:76) remark about the halt of his 
excavations by the local Governor at Marvdasht, who claimed excavations were illegal without the order 
of his Government, demonstrate a benign sense of concern towards Persepolis. Nonetheless, in light of the 
surrender of archaeological concession to the French in 1900, one is inclined to conclude that despite 
sporadic interest towards ancient heritage, the Qajars were on the whole drawn to the monetary value of 
antiques.  
The period that constitutes the era of pre-Constitutional Revolution can be distinguished as a phase of 
initial introduction to Persepolis. Even though the body of documents provided by Europeans was 
primarily descriptive, the enthusiasm expressed towards the site aroused an unprecedented interest that in 
the subsequent periods assisted the unfolding of Iranian history. Despite these advancements towards 
revealing the history of Persepolis, in the absence of a modern nation-state, the Qajars were not compelled 
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to rely on historical facts to legitimise their authority. Nevertheless, certain imitations of pre-Islamic 
motifs and practice were increasingly influencing the Qajar Court and references were made to 
appropriate a number of foreign imports. This was evident in the revival of Achaemenid and Sassanid 
style rock carvings during the reign of Fath-ali Shah (Fig. 5.3) (Lerner 1991). The expression of Qajars’ 
appropriation of past dynasties was also apparent in Mohammad Shah’s claim who in 1840s argued that 
the European style military dress was in fact an adaptation of Ancient Persians military uniform found on 
the sculptures of Persepolis (Floor 1999:135). The allusion of Persepolitan motifs could also be perceived 
in Iranian architecture as early as 1879 at the residences of the Qajars in Shiraz, including the Narenjestan 
and Affif Abad palaces (Grigor 2007:567). According to Abrahamian, the Qajars tapped into pre-Islamic 
Iranian sentiments by naming the Crown after the mythical “Kayan” dynasty, naming their sons after the 
heroes of the Shahnameh, discovering genealogical links between themselves and ancient Parthian, as 
well as celebrating ancient Norouz (Abrahamian 2008:19). 
As Persia reached the twentieth century and with the socio-political reforms that led to the Constitutional 
Revolution, the necessity of having a past became inevitable. The numerous publications during this 
period such as Asar-e Ajam (1896), Guide to the History of the Parthian House (1892), History of 
Sassanian Monarchy (1897), and History of Iran (1901), were a testament to the growing awareness of 
Iranians towards their ancient past (Grigor 2007:567).  
The intricate driving force behind the nationalist movement that led to the Constitutional Revolution was 
the notion of resistance to the expansionist policies of Western powers that gained ground subsequent to 
connotations that link Iran with the ‘superiority’ of Aryans. Therefore, despite the absence of a modern 
concept of nationhood, the nature of Iranian nationalist movement advocated by the Iranian intelligentsia 
leaned towards ethnic nationalism. The perceived form of nationalism had surfaced following the anti-
Semitic movements that dominated Europe and it is contended that, had the Qajar court not relied on 
Shi’ism as the source of legitimacy, the active manipulation of Iranian archaeology may have been 
initiated during this period. While ancient monuments were spared from immediate political exploitation, 
with Iranian’s appreciation of their past, an interest in pre-Islamic history emerged. The quest for the re-
discovery of Iran’s ancient past began through various publications on Iranian history. Without a doubt, 
the European discoveries of the 1700s and 1800s had a tremendous impact in shaping the pre-Islamic 
history of Iran. The site of Persepolis was instrumental in the gradual unfolding of the history of Ancient 
Persia and a medium through which the mythical fables of the Shahnameh were replaced by factual 
historical accounts. However, it was only in the subsequent period and with the rise of Reza Shah that this 
transitory period advanced further towards the realisation that to build a nation, archaeology needs to 
work intimately with history to promote nationalism.  
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The resistance to the expansionism of Western powers which was at the heart of Iranian nationalism had 
interesting implications for Persepolis. In 1914 a set of postage stamps were issued depicting these 
monuments (Fig. 5.4) (Sarkhosh-Curtis 2007:177). Considering the prevalent representation of the 
portrait of monarch or the symbol of lion and Sun, it is contended that the use of Persepolis on stamps had 
two indications. First, the Qajars had acknowledged Persepolis as an archeological site that could 
represent Persia, and second; the Qajars had comprehended and begun to appreciate the practice of 
adopting archaeological sites for political purposes. Both of these indications are driven from the theme of 
emancipation from imperialism that was advocated by the Iranian nationalists during this period. It is here 
argued that the depiction of Persepolis on stamps was less prominently for domestic consumptions and 
instead had international implications. These implications were concerned with presenting Iran as a 
‘civilised’ nation with a deep past. This perception rose from the widespread belief in the era of the 
French Revolution that only the most civilised states could claim nationhood (Diaz-Andreu 2007:67). In 
addition, the stamps aimed to validate the historical continuity of Persia at a time when its sovereignty 
was undermined by the political interference of Britain and Russia. It conveyed the message that Persia 
was an ancient civilisation and therefore entitled to retain political sovereignty. The same significance can 
be attributed to the first Persian “warship” which according to The Times correspondence in 1910 was 
named “Persepolis” (The Times 1910:9). 
This section has thus argued contrary to the conventional belief that nationalism began its interaction with 
archaeology during the Pahlavi period, that the onset of this alliance extends back to the Qajars. To 
illustrate this objective, Persepolis was selected as a case study to disclose the earliest example of the 
adoption of pre-Islamic monuments to achieve political aspirations. The incentive behind the political use 
of Persepolis was sought in the ethnic nature of Iranian nationalism that emerged during the 
Constitutional Revolution and aimed to propagate the message of Iranian political sovereignty in the 
global scale through verifying Iran as a ‘civilised’ nation. As the configuration of Iranian nationalism 
transformed during the Pahlavis, the manipulation of archaeological sites for political purposes took an 
abrupt turn. The following section is devoted to the study of the impact of the nationalist propagandas of 
the Pahlavi dynasty on the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis.  
 
5.4. Pahlavi Nationalism: The Case Study of Persepolis 
The elements of ethnic nationalism that gave rise to the Constitutional Revolution failed to fulfill its 
promises of unity and national sovereignty in the absence of an infrastructure of a modern nation-state 
(Abrahamian 2008:34). Further, the outbreak of World War I and the decline of Qajar authority enhanced 
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ethnic disintegration and the country’s fragmentation. In Chapter 2, it was argued that the task of 
establishing and unifying Iran as a modern nation fell to Reza Shah who in adherence with contemporary 
political trends favoured an ethnic-dynastic form of nationalism, albeit with more emphasis on ethnic 
elements. As proposed by Anthony Smith, the ethnic form of nationalism constitutes a nation that 
functions on pre-modern ethnic ties, memories, and heritage (see Chapter 3). These concepts rely on the 
demanding effort of ‘invention’ or ‘selection’ of traditions that aim to rediscover a ‘glorious’, ‘continues’, 
and ‘superior’ past. In addition, dynastic nationalism is a term penned by Ansari who argued for the 
increasing reliance of the Pahlavi on the institution of monarchy as the saviour of the Iranian nation (see 
Chapter 3). During the Pahlavi period of rule, a combination of ethnic-dynastic nationalism was applied 
to legitimise the State, albeit to varying degrees during different periods. In conformity with this form of 
nationalism, the Achaemenid and Sassanid periods were selected as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian history. 
This was due to the perceived success of these dynasties in establishing a unified power with hegemony 
over other ethnicities and neighbouring countries. The Achaemenid were particularly paramount in the 
narrative of the ethnic-dynastic nationalism of the Pahlavis considering their distinction as the first 
Persian dynasty and the heir to the Aryan race.  
This attention to the Achaemenid brought Persepolis to the forefront of the Pahlavis’ attention. Apart 
from earlier acquaintances with the monument and its debut as a potential political instrument, Persepolis 
was also esteemed for its archaeological merit, given that in comparison with Susa, it had largely escaped 
the antiquarian activities of the French and thus could yield to new discoveries. Such dispositions granted 
Persepolis a distinguished position within the Pahlavi Administration. It is here argued that while the 
Qajars had recognised the political indications of Persepolis as the symbol of Persia, the Pahlavis founded 
a modern nation-state around its ruins. In this section, it is contended that given the nature of Pahlavis’ 
nationalist rhetoric, the political exploitation of Persepolis reached its climax during this period. For the 
purpose of clarity, the adoption of Persepolis as a political instrument will be analysed under the 
Governments of Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah, separately.  
 
5.4.1. Reza Shah’s Government & Ethnic Nationalism: Pre-Islamic Archaeology      
During the 1990s archaeologists began to argue for the unavoidable relationship between archaeology, 
nationalism, and the rise of modern nation-states (Trigger 1984; Kohl & Fawcett 1995b; Diaz-Andreu & 
Champion 1996; Meskell 1998). In particular, Trigger (1984:358) argued for the nationalistic orientation 
of most archaeological traditions. Similarly, the development of archaeology as a scientific enterprise in 
Iran emerged simultaneously with the appearance of nationalism and the establishment of a modern 
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nation-state by Reza Shah’s Government. The brand of nationalism adopted in this period leaned towards 
ethnic elements and particularly the shared heritage of Iranians as Aryans. This inclination was targeted 
towards consolidating the multi-ethnic Iranian nation and to inject a sense of common racial, historic, and 
cultural past. These themes were endorsed to confirm the ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of the Iranian 
identity and to bolster the international position of Iran as a modern nation-state. In this section, it is 
argued that the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis served to support the narrative of ethnic nationalism adopted 
by the Government given its recognition as the first capital of the first Iranian (Aryan) dynasty. 
 For the optimist nationalists of this period, Iran had just rid itself from the French Monopoly, which was 
viewed as one of the symbols of Western expansionism in Iran, and begun to establish itself as an 
independent and ‘civilised’ nation. To verify the claims adopted about the ‘golden age’ of Persian 
Empire, Reza Shah’s Administration sought confirmation in the ruins of Persepolis. According to various 
accounts, given the colonial approach of the French towards Iranian archaeology, Reza Shah’s 
Administration was reluctant to offer the excavation at Persepolis to foreign delegations (Mousavi 
2002:224). Reza Shah himself had articulated that he did not want what happened to Susa repeated with 
Persepolis (ibid.:230). Even subsequent to granting Americans the permission to work at Persepolis, 
Iranian officials refused to give them credit for their discoveries and instead focused on presenting a 
narrative of the grandiose of the site itself. This is illustrated in complaints made by Breasted, Director of 
the Oriental Institute at Chicago, that while the site had become a ‘national shrine’ for the Iranians, they 
refused to credit the Institute for the discoveries made (Goode 2007:159). Wulsin of the University 
Museum of Pennsylvania further criticised the display of Persepolis Golden Foundation Tablets at the 
Leningrad exhibition (1935) as the achievement of the Iranian Archaeological Service (ibid.:172). The 
articulated approach taken by the Iranian Government displays the merit ascribed to Persepolis as a 
national symbol, the study of which was granted to a foreign expedition given the dearth of qualified 
Iranian experts to take over this national project. The restriction of finance provided an additional 
justification for permitting foreign institutes to study what was perceived to be the most important 
archaeological site in Iran. Through these efforts the Iranian officials were determine to pursue the 
application of ethnic nationalism in the absence of other domestic resources to do so.  
According to Trigger, the discipline of archaeology plays a vital role in the construction of nations, given 
that it can “prove” the continual existence of the nation and re-iterate its glorious past (Trigger 1984:358). 
The political elites of the Pahlavi Administration had recognised this potential and sought to implement 
their brand of nationalism through the manipulation of archaeological sites. As Smith (1999:9-10) argued, 
the process of re-discovery and re-interpretation of the past was carried by the modern nationalist 
intelligentsia. Iran was no exception to this general trend. As discussed in Chapter 4, the most 
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instrumental organisation during this period was the SNH, whose approach of ‘inventing’ traditions 
through the selection and promotion of national symbols and mythology, tailored the history of Iran in 
accordance to the ‘golden ages’ of Ancient Persia. These elites propagated ethnic and dynastic 
nationalism, albeit with more inclinations towards ethnic elements, by seeking refuge in the concepts of 
“Aryanism” and the adoption of “myth of saviour” to legitimise Reza Shah’s dynasty (Ansari 2005:323). 
While “Aryanism” was paramount to this nationalist rhetoric, the adoption of “myth of saviour” was a 
political tactic to promote national unity and emancipation from Western influences. By assuming the role 
of “saviour”, Reza Shah was made an instrument to reach the above targets. As shall be argued, 
Persepolis was selected given its competence to confirm the adopted form of political rhetoric and 
nationalism during this period. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Achaemenid kings were culturally identified as the heirs to the Aryan race. 
Therefore, the cultivation of the myth of Aryans was manifested in the promotion of the Achaemenid 
dynasty. The emphasis on the concept of ‘Aryanism’ rested on the two pillars of “superiority” and 
“continuity” (Heyd 1950:164). In harmony with this national Primordialist approach, Persepolis was at 
the pinnacle of Iranian ‘golden age’ and the expression of Iranian ‘superiority’ and cultural ‘continuity’. It 
provided Iranians with a common historical and cultural past, in addition to confirming the perceived 
view of Iran as a sovereign, ancient Empire. The symbolic merit of Persepolis as the first capital of this 
empire made it prone to intense manipulations by the members of SNH. These men of power determined 
the fate of the site through various means. They were directly involved in the annulment of the French 
Monopoly (1927), the approval of American archaeological concessions (1930s), and the division of finds 
and ‘donation’ of artefacts to Americans. They further fostered the promotion of Persepolis through 
publications and the incorporation of its history within the education system. The cultivation of public 
interest in Persepolis persisted with the manipulation of communal spaces, and the implantation of 
rhetorical symbols and metaphors in architectural projects that echoed the glorification of Persepolitan 
style. In addition, it was through these influential elites in the SNH that the Americans were able to 
advance their archaeological interest in Iran. Therefore, it is argued that the SNH, as a political body ran 
by the intelligentsia, performed as a medium to re-construct the ‘golden age’ of Iranian history through 
the adoption of Persepolis as a symbol to promote ethnic-dynastic nationalism.  
Having illustrated the symbolic value of Persepolis as a propaganda apparatus during this period, it will 
now be argued that the work permit granted to American Delegations and the subsequent decision for the 
division of finds at the site was initially driven by motives to support the Government’s narrative of 
ethnic nationalism. To demonstrate the first argument, the foreign experts who were involved in the 
Antiquity Law in 1930 and further encouraged the excavations at Persepolis are subjected to evaluations. 
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The most notable foreign experts were Ernst Herzfeld (1880-1948 AD) who in addition to his 
involvement in drafting the Antiquity Law, had excavated at the site of Persepolis for four years; and 
Arthur Upham Pope (1881-1969 AD), the Curator of the Mohammadan Art at the Art Institute of 
Chicago, who was instrumental in the abolishment of the French Monopoly, the ratification of Antiquity 
Law, obtaining the Persepolis concession for American institutes, and promoting Iranian cultural heritage. 
Herzfeld was a German scholar and familiar with the Primordail form of nationalism that emphasised the 
‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of a nation-state. As was discussed in Chapter 3, this was the type of 
nationalism that Reza Shah’s Government emulated from the model of Turkish nationalism, which itself 
was inspired by the German model (Heyd 1950:164). Mousavi (2002:223) argued that Herzfeld acquired 
his privileged status in Iran by emphasising the importance of preserving national monuments and 
publicising the role they played in shaping the identity of a nation. In other words, Herzfeld may be 
recognised as the man who familiarised the Pahlavi court with the political potentials of monuments. As 
Ettinghausen argued, Herzfeld firmly believed in “the use of archaeological material for reconstruction of 
history” (Ettinghausen 1951:265). This position had an overarching influence on all aspects of his 
activities, and when in 1925 he was asked to design the logo for the SNH, he proposed a sketch that 
included the façades of Persepolis (left), Taq-e Kasra at Ctesiphon (right) and Gunbad-e Qabus (centre) 
(Fig. 5.5).  
While lobbying for the Persepolis concession, Herzfeld condemned the infertile effort of the French in 
recovering what he perceived as the glories of Ancient Persia and further complained about the so-called 
scientists who removed pieces of sculpture “with their profane hands, to enshrine them in the museums of 
Europe” (Goode 2007:143). This attitude was in conformity with the new ethnic nationalism endorsed by 
the political elites. Herzfeld presented himself as an expert who displayed concern over decaying Iranian 
grandiose and wished to uncover and maintain it. In a lecture given by him on 13 August 1925 to the 
members of SNH, Herzfeld declared: 
“Since the Aryan tribes, or more precisely because of them, this country is called 
‘Iranshahr’, that is about nine centuries before Christ, and the true ancient heritage 
of Iran dates from this period…The nation has reached the zenith of its culture at least 
on four occasions; first the Achaemenian period when Iran was the centre of the known 
world and lived in security for two hundred and fifty years, ….” 
 (Herzfeld cited in Grigor 2004:27) 
Herzfeld went on to identify the Sassanid, Seljuk, and Safavid periods as the other pillars of ‘cultural 
thrive’ in the Iranian civilisation and affirmed the ‘superiority’ of Iranians in comparison with young 
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European civilisations (ibid.). The highlighting of the Aryan tribe and their racial continuation into 
Achaemenid and subsequent Iranian dynasties, as well as the ‘superiorit’y of Iranians in comparison with 
other civilisations, is well illustrated in Herzfeld’s initial efforts to gain a favourable attitude from Iranian 
officials, in particular the members of SNH. His success in attaining this trust granted him the position of 
Directing the Persepolis restorations. Iranian support for Herzfeld soon deteriorated as they felt betrayed 
following the dispute over division of finds at Persepolis.  
Arthur Pope was another expert who gained Iranians’ respect through emphasising the concepts of 
‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ with various speeches that glorified the Iranian civilisation. His most 
influential speech was made on 22 April 1925 in the presence of members of Iranian Parliament, some of 
whom were affiliated with SNH, and Reza Shah, about “The Art of Iran in the Past and the Future” (Pope 
cited in Gluck & Silver 1938:93-110). Wilber (1975:98) argued that this speech made a deep and lasting 
impact on Reza Shah who envisaged the claims of Pope in perfect harmony with his revitalised image of 
Iran. Pope continued to advocate the revival of ancient glories and the restoration of Iran’s ancient 
civilisations by appealing to Iranian authorities and insisting on State support for undertaking the essential 
task of a new renaissance in Iran (Grigor 2004:32). His emphasis on the glories of ancient Iran gained him 
Iranian confidence and enabled him to prepare the ground for granting the Persepolis concession to 
Americans. In 1935 Pope was rewarded with a special decoration for this “cultural service to Persia” 
following the publication of Survey of Persian Art (Gholi Majd 2003:14). The above argument illustrates 
that the mediators between the Pahlavi Court and the American archaeological institutes had 
comprehended the ethnic-dynastic model of Iranian nationalism and through its adoption acquired the 
permission to excavate at Persepolis in 1930. In other words, it may be argued that the entrusting of 
Persepolis to an American institute stemmed directly from the elevated status that Herzfeld and Pope 
enjoyed within the SNH.  
For Americans, the Persepolis excavations would constitute an opportunity to expand their activities in 
the Middle East and earn credibility for their academic institutions. Despite initial rivalry between 
American institutes, in 1931 Herzfeld was able to obtain a permit and secure financial supports from Ada 
Small Moore, a wealthy benefactress, under the auspice of the Oriental Institute of Chicago to launch 
work at Persepolis (Mousavi 2002:224). However, there were many disputes over the substance of the 
permit granted to the Institute. Recent research has demonstrated that the permission granted to the 
Americans was restricted to “restoration” and “preservation” of the monuments (ibid.; Gholi Majd 
2003:19). This claim is verified in an official letter from Teymourtash, the Court Minister, to the Iranian 
Embassy in Paris, that “no excavation permit was given to foreign institutes” and the Oriental Institute 
was merely responsible for the “preservation of historic monuments at Persepolis” (Mousavi 2002:225). 
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In 1925, Herzfeld himself had acknowledged through a correspondence with Jayne, Director of 
University Museum of Pennsylvania, that “Persepolis is and always will be outside any possible law of 
antiquity” and therefore that there was no prospect for the division of finds (Goode 2007:157; Gholi Majd 
2003:19-20). In another correspondence between Herzfeld and Teymourtach, the latter articulates that he 
would prefer for all Iranian antiquities to remain unexcavated than to see them taken away by foreigners 
(Mousavi 2005:461). Further details are available through the analysis of the collection of correspondence 
between Vezarat-e Ma’aref (Ministry of Education) and the Oriental Institute of Chicago. According to 
these documents, the American activities at Persepolis were restricted to “clearing the surface of 
Persepolis from debris and waste; provision of substance for the protection of monuments and the 
restoration of dispersed pieces; repair and restoration of Darius Palace; and the refurbishment of the 
irrigation canals” (Yazdani 2001:217-25). Subsequent to the intensification of dispute between the Iranian 
Government and the Oriental Institute, the challenge over the division of finds turned into a political 
conflict between Iran and the United States as the American Foreign Ministry became involved. Finally 
under pressure from the American Foreign Ministry, Breasted, Herzfeld, and Godard, the Iranian 
Government agreed to “donate” certain discovered items from Persepolis to the Institute as an act of 
gratitude (ibid.). These items were “donated” with the permission of the Shah himself, granted that their 
equivalent was offered to Iran and the items given to Americans were not of unique value (ibid.).  
Considering the lack of bureaucratic verification for the division of finds at Persepolis in the official 
document, an obvious debate escalates over the Iranian consent in agreeing with the requests of the 
Oriental Institute as opposed to terminating the excavations. Gholi Majd (2003:20) argued that the Iranian 
response was induced by their fear of adverse publicity for Iran by Americans if they refuse to “donate” 
some of the finds to the sponsoring institutes. In this thesis, it is additionally argued that considering the 
economic constraints and the lack of Iranian expertise in uncovering the ‘glories of Ancient Persia’, the 
division of finds was justified as an reimbursement for the service that the Americans provided in the 
revival of Iranian past. Therefore, it is argued that the incentive for the “donations” made to Americans, 
was driven by nationalist convictions. Such approaches demonstrate the nature of Iranian nationalism as a 
double-edge blade that exchanged a portion of its past for the recovery of a reservoir of historical 
accounts to build a nation. As will be illustrated in the remaining of this section, following the reluctant 
division of finds, the Iranians directed their attention to constructive propagandas that portrayed the 
discoveries at Persepolis as a manifestation of Iran as a great civilisation.  
Having argued that the motives behind permitting excavations at Persepolis during the first Pahlavi period 
were driven by nationalistic ideals, the manipulation of the discoveries at Persepolis for the purpose of 
implementing ethnic-dynastic nationalism is evaluated. In his analysis, Smith (1999:176) illustrated the 
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role of archaeology in the formation of nations by arguing for the cultural platform that archaeology 
facilitates in promoting dignity and authority as well as bolstering self-esteem. In the case of Iran, this 
dignity and authority was driven from the discoveries at Persepolis. In the following, attention is drawn to 
three discoveries, two of which prompted state visits by Reza Shah himself to the site.  
In 1933 while clearing the courtyard between the Hall of One Hundred Columns and Apadana, Herzfeld 
discovered an archive of 30000 inscribed sealed clay tablets that documented the nature of life and 
economy in the Empire (Mousavi 2002:228). Later that year, Krefter, the engineer and architect of the 
expedition, uncovered the Apadana Foundation Tablets (ibid.:230). The last major discovery was made in 
March 1936 with Schmidt’s recovery of the Treasury of Persepolis and the Darius Audience Relief 
(ibid.:232). The latter two events were followed by official publicities and State visits. With respect to the 
Apadana Foundation Tablets, it is argued that the four inscribed silver and gold tablets were highlighted 
to articulate the grandeur and territorial extent of the Persian Empire. These tablets became the symbol of 
the ‘golden age’ when Iran enjoyed a great cultural and military supremacy over its neighbours. On their 
discovery, Reza Shah expressed his satisfaction through a personal letter (Goode 2007:152). Later in 
October 1933, Reza Shah visited Persepolis where he expressed his gratitude to Herzfeld for “doing a 
work of civilisation” (Mousavi 2002:231). During the inauguration of Tehran University and in emulation 
of the Achaemenid costumes at Persepolis, Reza Shah placed a Golden Foundation Plate in a marble box 
and set in the cornerstone of the University (see Chapter 2). The fervor of archaeological discoveries at 
Persepolis continued with the excavations of Schmidt who replaced Herzfeld in 1935. His discoveries of 
the Treasury of Persepolis and the Darius Audience Relief were followed by a second symbolic visit from 
Reza Shah and Mohammad Reza Shah, shortly after the Iranian New Year. Schmidt, who had long waited 
for a permit to fly over Iran to collect aerial photographs, staged a parallelism between the depiction of 
Darius and his son Xerxes on the Darius Audience Relief and Reza Shah and his Crown Prince (Fig. 5.6) 
(Gursan-Salzman 2007:78). This flattery impressed the Shah and persuaded him to grant Schmidt the 
permission to launch his aerial survey of archaeological monuments using his plane The Friend of Iran, 
despite security cautions from the Ministry of War (ibid.).  
In addition to the manipulation of the structural façade of Persepolis as an instrument for the 
implementation of ethnic-dynastic nationalism, the customs and beliefs of the kings of Persepolis were 
employed in producing the official’s narrative of ‘iranianness’. These were particularly concerned with 
Zoroastrian customs and the promotion of ancient festivals (Vaziri 1993:197). The use of the title 
Shahanshah (King of Kings) to relate to the Achaemenid kings of Persepolis also gained prominence 
during this period (Ansari 2003:61). The traces of Persepolis motifs can also be seen on stamps, 
banknotes and the architectural style of official buildings (Sarkhosh-Curtis 2005:256). In fact, the 
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majority of principal public buildings constructed during this period, such as the Edarey-e Police (Police 
Headquarters), Vezarat-e Omor Kharejeh (Foreign Ministry), and Bank-e Melli (National Bank) were 
inspired by Achaemenid motifs (Fig. 5.7) (Ehlers & Floor 1993:258). The employment of neo-Classical 
Achaemenid elements of design were so extensive that Vartan Avanessian who himself had taken part in 
the construction of some of these building protested against the use of “lions and cows” that have turn 
Tehran into a Zoo (Marefat 1988:135). Even the Ferdowsi mausoleum, constructed in 1934 was heavily 
adorned with borrowed motifs from Persepolis (Grigor 2004:37). 
A review of the archaeological activities at Persepolis is a manifestation of the potentials of this site to 
satisfy the pre-occupation of Reza Shah’s Government with enhancing national unity and international 
prestige. By the end of 1930s the co-operations between the Iranian Government and American institutes 
at Persepolis came to a halt. Various arguments have been proposed for the termination of these 
collaborations. Goode (2004:171-2) focused on the death of Breasted and the withdrawal of the 
Rockefeller Foundations which left the expedition without secured financial support to maintain work. 
Schmidt partially succeeded in resolving this crisis through merging the University Museum of 
Pennsylvania, the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, and the Thompson Foundation, in creating the Joint 
Expedition to Persia (Blacer 1991:155). Apart from financial difficulties, tension had grown following 
Schmidt’s effort to direct expeditions in Rey and Luristan, alongside his work at Persepolis. The 
significance of Persepolis as a national symbol was so excessive that the authorities demanded Schmidt’s 
undivided attention at the site. Therefore, as Mousavi (2002:234) argued, Schmidt’s tendencies to 
concentrate on scientific aspects of the excavation as opposed to the nationalistic significance of the site, 
led to further dissatisfaction of the Government. Indeed the main purpose of Schmidt’s excavations at 
Persepolis focused on developing a ceramic and cultural sequence (Blacer 1991:147). Thus it can be 
concluded that while the Americans were increasingly leaning towards scientific approaches to study 
Iranian archaeology, the Iranian authorities had seldom comprehended the scientific value of the 
discipline and insisted on employing its manipulative features for political purposes. By the end of 1930s, 
the American positions about the archaeological value of Persepolis changed and eventually the site lost 
its appeal. Correspondence from Horace Jayne, Director of the University Museum of Pennsylvania in 
1936, unfolds the American pessimism for the discovery of anything of “real scientific value” at 
Persepolis (ibid.:155). The mounting challenges of conducting excavations with the outbreak of World 
War II further added to the Americans’ dilemma to continue their expeditions in Iran. It is therefore 
argued, that an amalgam of these complications combined with the institutionalisation of Iranian 
archaeology through the establishment of the Department of Archaeology in 1937 terminated American 
excavations at Persepolis in 1939.  
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This section has argued that in a period replete with tension, Persepolis became the medium to foster the 
ethnic-dynastic nationalism that Reza Shah’s Government adopted in order to confirm the cultural 
‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of Iranians. In other words, Persepolis provided Iranians with a common 
historical and cultural past, and facilitated not only the unification of the multi-ethnic Iranian society, but 
the confirmation of the political supremacy of the Persian Empire. With the outbreak of World War II the 
validity of this embraced ‘supremacy’ was once again challenged as the Allies occupied Iran and 
threatened its sovereignty. In the following section the treatment of Persepolis under Mohammad Reza 
Shah is the subject of investigation. 
 
5.4.2. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government & Dynastic Nationalism: Pre-Islamic Archaeology    
The fostering of ethnic-dynastic nationalism continued to be the dominant Pahlavi ideology as 
Mohammad Reza Shah ascended to power in 1941. Accordingly, the themes of Iranian cultural 
‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ that had laid the foundation for the Pahlavi dynasty continued to prevail. 
Crucial to this period, and as the result of socio-economical improvements that accompanied the 
nationalisation of oil and the reforms of the ‘White Revolution’, was the Government’s intensified 
propagation of dynastic aspects of nationalism through the adoption of a cult that increasingly centred on 
the significance of monarchy and the persona of the Shah. As Ansari (2003:126) argued, this cult of 
personality grew from the stigma of illegitimacy that threatened the Shah’s Government considering his 
initial installation by the Allies and given that his reforms failed to crystallise a constructive relationship 
with the society. To surmount these obstacles, the Shah aspired to build a bridge between himself and the 
great kings of the past (Hoveyda 1980:87). Therefore, he presented himself as an heir to Cyrus, 
resurrected to save and lead the nation towards a “Great Civilisation”. The cult of Cyrus entailed 
additional manipulation on Persepolis as the first Capital of the Persian Empire. It was in compliance with 
these themes that in 1971 Persepolis became the platform for celebrating the Anniversary of 2500 years of 
Persian Monarchy and through it emerged as the epitome of archaeological manipulation in Iranian 
history. 
While the motifs of Persepolis remained pre-eminent within the Pahlavi propaganda, the extensive 
exploitation of the monument was pending on two imperative issues; the ailing Iranian economy and the 
absence of Iranian expertise to manage archaeological projects. The active utilisation of Persepolis for 
political purposes was synonymous with the economic upsurge that followed the rise of oil revenue in the 
1960s and the emergence of archaeology as a scientific discipline. In other words, the manipulation of 
Persepolis began once funding became more accessible and Iran was able to entrust work to Iranian 
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experts. Drawing on the contributions of economic surplus to this improvement, it can be argued that in 
confirmation with Gellner’s (2008: xxxix) notion of nationalism, the tenets of nationalism during the 
second Pahlavi period increasingly relied on modernity and industrialisation, which were manifested in 
the Shah’s slogan of the march “towards the Great Civilisation” (Pahlavi & Pahlavi 1994). As the 
progress made by institutionalisation became apparent and economic surplus began to grow, the 
Government began to validate the Shah’s claims to authenticity and thus the preliminary stages for the 
adoption of archaeological sites as political instruments were implemented. 
The dearth of Iranian expertise to excavate and manage major archaeological sites was an additional 
restriction that prevented the extensive use of Persepolis for political purposes. This trend was altered 
with the outbreak of World War II. The War had unprecedented repercussions for Iranian archaeology as 
foreign archaeological expeditions terminated their activities and left. Persepolis, too, was affected as the 
Americans left and the GOA took over the excavations with a limited budget that Godard secured from an 
Iranian living in France (Mousavi 2002:235). During the initial phases of Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, 
while the Government was struggling for political stability, various Iranian archaeologists who were 
previously overshadowed by foreign excavators emerged to contribute to the study and preservation of 
Persepolis (see 5.2). Nevertheless, considering the symbolic merits of Persepolis for the Iranian 
Government, all available resources, including young amateur archaeologists, were harnessed to preserve 
and study the site. With training opportunities at Persepolis, some of these individuals became successful 
archaeologists.  
Despite interest in Persepolis, funding remained scarce. Apart from minor donations, a correspondence 
between the Ministry of Culture and Finance indicates that exceptions were made for Isa Behnam, the 
Director at Persepolis in 1940, to receive 50 Rials a day towards his living expenses, when the standard 
wage was set at 3 Rials (Yazdani 2001:215). In spite of insufficient funding, archaeological activities 
continued until 1960s when a lift in Iranian economy permitted improved funding opportunities. Prior to 
the economic surge, although the effort of major figures such as Ali Sami contributed to the 
understanding of Persepolis, the majority of protective measures that were assumed, including the 
application of protective wax and setting up huge metallic roofs, were outdated and later corrected by the 
Italian team who started conservation at Persepolis in 1964 (Tilia 1978:68; Mousavi 2002:238). Sami’s 
acquired authority following years of experience at Persepolis made him a suitable candidate for the 
Directorship of the Bongah-e Elmi-e Takht-e Jamshid (Scientific Bureau at Persepolis), which was 
established towards the end of the 1950s (Mousavi 2002:236). Prior to the foundation of this Bureau, the 
allocation of an institute for the study of a single archaeological site was unprecedented in Iran. 
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By the end of 1960s Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government had addressed the economic problems and 
employed Iranian archaeologists to manage what was perceived as the most paramount national 
archaeological site, Persepolis. Given this premise, the Shah then confronted his Government’s lack of 
legitimacy by embarking on a project to improve the frail national sovereignty of Iran. Considering the 
symbolic connotations of Persepolis with concepts of ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’, the site once again 
became an emblem of pride, this time for the political quests of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government. 
 
5.4.2.1. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Concerns over Legitimacy 
As discussed previously, similar to Reza Shah, the struggle for legitimising the Government continued 
with Mohammad Reza Shah as he strove to gain authority after the Allies occupation of Iran and the 
abduction and exile of his father. This crisis was approached through the Government’s adoption of a 
narrative that supported the “myth of saviour” and cultivation of “dynastic nationalism” (Ansari 
2005:326). In the following, each of these approaches and their influence on the treatment of the pre-
Islamic site of Persepolis is discussed in detail. 
The Allies forced the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941 and installed his Crown Prince, Mohammad Reza 
Shah but many then perceived the Pahlavis as an instrument of Western imperialism. The Government’s 
legitimacy was further undermined with the rise of “secular nationalism” under the political mandates of 
Mohammad Mosaddeq (ibid.:325). The nationalisation of oil by Mosaddeq identified the latter as the new 
‘saviour’ of the people, a role previously reserved for the Shah. As Ansari argued, it was only after the 
fall of Mosaddeq in 1953 that the Shah gradually consolidated his rule and implemented his version of 
nationalism (ibid.:326) through instigating new traditions. Mohammad Reza Shah’s “myth of saviour” 
was in stark contrast with that of Reza Shah. Considering Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented tradition” 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger:2012), the “myth of saviour” invented by Reza Shah’s Government was assumed 
to promote national unity and emancipation from Western influences, while Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
Government adopted a version that centred on the promotion of the institution of monarchy as the only 
legitimate form of government. This inclination intensified following the growth of political awareness in 
the mid 1900s and the possibility of alternative modes of government. Therefore, the ‘invented traditions’ 
that accommodated Mohammad Reza Shah’s “myth of saviour” centred on the adoption of the institution 
of monarchy as the only legitimate government that could lead the nation towards prosperity (Ansari 
2005:326). In doing so, he claimed direct lineage with the founders of the Ancient Persian Empire. To 
accommodate these policies the Government made numerous references to Persepolis to articulate the 
pre-existing traditions and symbols of ancient monarchies. Some of these references included the 
144 
 
incorporation of motifs from Persepolis on the banknote issued in 1958 to inaugurate the opening of 
Mehrabad International Airport (Fig. 5.8), and the motif of lotus flower from Persepolis displayed on 
stamps published in 1969 to commemorate the sixth anniversary of the White Revolution (Fig. 5.9). Both 
of these examples demonstrate the efforts of the Government to cultivate an image of a charitable king 
who was determined to save his country through providing public services and national reforms. Apart 
from the distinct associations with the notion of “myth of saviour”, an additional issue that dissociated the 
two Pahlavi periods centred on the different emphasis on ethnic-dynastic nationalism. Although the 
principle mandates of the Pahlavi Administration in general focused on the sponsorship of both brands of 
nationalism, a distinctive feature of the second Pahlavi era was a pronounced lenience towards dynastic 
elements of nationalism and the institution of monarchy in particular. 
In Chapter 4, it was discussed that despite the adoption of dynastic nationalism, Mohammad Reza Shah’s 
Government continued the discourse of advocating ethnic elements of Iranian nationalism through the 
adoption of the title “Aryamehr” in 1965. Further, the very effort to identify Mohammad Reza Shah as a 
direct heir of Cyrus was indicative of the dissemination of ideologies, ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’, 
which rested on ethnic nationalism. A prudent investigation, however, testifies that while reliance on 
ethnic nationalism continued in racial terms, there was a growing reliance on the dynastic elements of 
nationalism as an apparatus to institutionalise the monarchy during the second Pahlavi period. As Ansari 
(2005:326) contended, this shift in substance was justified by illustrating the absolute dependency of Iran, 
as a nation, on the continuation of the institution of monarchy. The advocacy of dynastic nationalism 
required the instigation of the dynastic past, which was promoted through various celebrations. These 
celebrations included the Shah’s Coronation in 1967, the Anniversary of 2500 years of Persian Monarchy 
in 1971, and the 50
th
 Anniversary of the Foundation of the Pahlavi Dynasty in 1976. Considering the 
focus of this chapter on Persepolis, this section will analyse the role of the Persepolis celebrations of 1971 
in fostering the brand of nationalism adopted by Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government. Additional 
references are made to the adoption of the Cyrus Cylinder as a symbolic artefact that further harboured 
the Government’s rhetoric of dynastic nationalism.   
 
It is important to state that the Government’s inclination towards dynastic nationalism in this period had a 
distinct implication for the treatment of Persepolis. While during the first Pahlavi period Persepolis was 
struggling to reclaim its place in history and used as an apparatus to recuperate Iran’s sovereignty, during 
the second Pahlavi period, the monument was presented as the symbol of Iranian monarchy and military 
power. The climactic event that showcased the centrality of Persepolis as an instrument of the 
Government’s dynastic nationalism was the celebration of the Anniversary of 2500 years of Persian 
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Monarchy. As Hoveyda (1989:87) argued, the Persepolis celebrations were aimed at exhibiting the 
‘continuity’ of Iranian history and the uninterrupted line of Iranian monarchy on the global stage. He 
further suggested that the celebration signified the “re-awakening of national pride and Iran’s rich 
heritage”, while highlighting the confidence of “achievements” in the 1970s (Hoveyda 2003:26). Ansari 
further maintained that the Persepolis celebration was based on the two premises of “centrality of 
monarchy” and “military might” that persisted in Iran since the birth of the Persian Empire and continued 
with the reign of the Pahlavis (Ansari 2003:171). Having had illustrated the centrality of monarchy and its 
influence on transforming Persepolis to a platform for the Government’s dynastic nationalism, the next 
section will address Iran’s concerns over its lack of military power. 
 
5.4.2.2. National Sovereignty & Military Might 
It has thus been argued that Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government adopted dynastic nationalism to 
instigate a “myth of saviour” that legitimised the institution of monarchy and thus consolidated the Shah’s 
role as a monarch. In addition to overcoming the issue of the Shah’s illegitimacy, the Government had to 
address the serious threats to Iran’s national sovereignty following the country’s invasion by the Allies 
(Shakibi 2007:88). During this period, Iran’s homogeneity was further undermined with the separatist 
movements of the Soviet Kurdistan and Azerbaijan in 1945 (Chehabi 1990:10). The Government 
addressed these problems by investing in a myth that advocated the military might of the Ancient Persian 
Empire and by further engineering the illusion of Iran’s march towards a “Great Civilisation”. As shall be 
illustrated, the military parade exhibited in the Persepolis celebrations was a direct reference to the 
Government’s projection of the power of the Persian Empire. In addition, as Milani (2008:26) has 
asserted, the growing oil income allowed the Shah to pursue his dream of becoming a dominant military 
power in the region. Drawing on pre-existing traditions and heritage of Iranian dynasties and their 
military might, Persepolis was selected as a prominent platform for broadcasting this grand design to the 
world.  
The vision of Mohammad Reza Shah’s dynastic nationalism was fostered by a group of nationalists who 
sought refuge in re-evoking the glories of Ancient Persia to surpass the frailty of Iran’s sovereignty after 
its occupation by the Allies. Among them was Shojaeddin Shafa (1971:18) who in 1958 proposed the idea 
of holding a ceremony at Persepolis to highlight Iran’s imperial past (see Simpson 2013:75-76). The 
project was welcomed by the Shah since he had been entertaining the idea of re-introducing a new 
modern Iran, with an authentic heritage, to the world for a long time. Announcements were made that the 
celebration would be held in 1962 to coincide chronologically with the anniversary of the foundation of 
146 
 
Persian Empire by Cyrus (ibid.). The ceremony was further postponed to 1971 “due to more pressing 
matters” (ibid.).  
 
5.4.2.3. Persepolis Celebrations 
In the previous section it was argued that although the proposal to hold a ceremony at Persepolis was 
submitted in 1962, the event was postponed to 1971. This delay maybe attributed to the inadequacy of 
financial resources to execute a large scale celebration. The dearth of sufficient funding was overcome 
towards the end of 1960s and early 1970s as the reforms of the White Revolution and the increasing oil 
revenues lifted the Iranian economy (Milani 2008:25). In addition, as Ansari (2003:172) argued, this 
intermediate period was effectively used by various committees to introduce and familiarise the general 
public with Cyrus and Achaemenid history. Indeed the Pahlavi propaganda machine worked overtime to 
present the Shah’s narrative of monarchy through the arrangement of cultural, social, educational and 
economic activities. The names of Cyrus and Darius were adopted to all aspects of socio-political life, for 
example, Darius the Great Dam constructed in 1965; the Farm Corporation of Darius the Great 
established as a part of land reforms in early 1970s; Shahbazi’s publication Cyrus the Great selected as 
the book of the year in 1970. Further, the Organisation of Attracting Tourism was established in 1963 to 
initiate campaigns that introduced Iranian historic sites to a worldwide audience. Persepolis was one of 
the major historic sites advertised by this campaign. Additional efforts to promote Iran’s competence as a 
tourist destination include the 1969 issue of Vogue Magazine when Henry Clarke went to Iran to 
photograph European models posing in mosques and palaces, showcasing various tourist destinations in 
Iran (http://shahrefarang.com/en/vogue-iran). This edition was accompanied with pictures from Persepolis 
(Fig. 5.10), an article about the Iranian Empress Farah Diba, and the convenience of flying to Iran by the 
newly established airline company of Iran Air. It may be argued that the establishment of the Iranian 
tourism infrastructure, an airline company, and the Persepolis celebrations, were part of a unified effort to 
cultivate an image that presented Iran as a modern country, with an emerging economy for investment 
opportunities, while offering a taste of a rich ancient heritage. This rhetoric was best summarised in the 
October issue of National Geographic Magazine where modern Iranian elements were combined with a 
relief from Persepolis to advertise flights to Iran by Iran Air (Fig. 5.11). In fact the logo of Iran Air was 
the figure of the head of the mythical griffin from Persepolis (Kermani 2013). 
The appropriation of Persepolis as a symbol of Iranian civilisation and elegance through international 
propagandas, transformed the site into a popular tourist destination for travellers and politicians alike. In 
1961, the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh were driven from Shiraz to Persepolis accompanied by the 
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Shah himself (The Time 1961:9). In 1963, President De Gaule arrived at Tehran for a meeting and 
subsequently paid a visit to Persepolis (The Times 1963:10). In 1964 King Baudouin and Queen Fabiola 
of Belgium toured the site (The Times 1964:10). In addition, starting in 1964 the International Shiraz Art 
Festival was held annually in the city with various performances at Persepolis. The celebrations were 
funded by the Pahlavi Foundation, a patronage organisation established by the court in 1958 (see Chapter 
2), and showcased an array of national and international cultural activities in art, music, and theatre, that 
complemented the Government’s adopted narratives of the traditional Persian culture (Fig. 5.12) (Gluck 
2007:21). Among the more notable performances at Persepolis were the orchestral concert of Olivier 
Messiaen in 1969 (Hardly 1969:8), the French O.R.T.F Choir concert, Ravi Shankar’s performance of Vis 
and Ramin in 1970, Iannis Xenakis play of Polytope de Persepolis at the Darius Palace in 1971, and the 
electronic music events by Stockhausen, John Cage, David Tudor and Gordon Mumma who along with 
Merce Cunningham Dance Company transformed Persepolis to a platform for avant-garde forms of 
expressions in 1972 (Fig. 5.13) (Gluck 2007:23). Through these cultural efforts the Pahlavi 
Administration aimed to assign a significant role to the city of Shiraz with its pre-Islamic symbols at 
Persepolis. In other words, the overarching tenor of these festivals was the cultivation and promotion of 
an Iranian identity that was intrinsically ancient and modern.  
To prepare the site of Persepolis for these celebrations further restorations were required. In 1961 a 
restoration team from the Italian Institute of the Middle and Far East (IsMEO) was sent to Iran to repair 
various historic buildings (Fig. 5.14). In his book, Mission for My Country, Mohammad Reza Shah 
explained that the advance in Iranian-Italian cultural relations were the result of his visit to Italy in 1958 
(Pahlavi 1961:113). These relations were maintained and reciprocated in forms of cultural missions, 
lectures, and publications until the Revolution. As a part of these collaborations, in 1973, Empress Farah 
Diba provided patronage for the restoration of a monument in Venice while inaugurating the exhibition of 
“The Republic of Venice and Persia” in the same year (East & West 1973:426). Additionally, in 1974 a 
set of stamps were issued in support of the Save Venice Campaign (Fig. 5.15).  
With respect to Persepolis in 1964, IsMEO was granted the task of restoring and reconstructing the 
monuments in collaboration with NOCHMI and the Iranian Archaeology Department. The restoration 
began under the Direction of Cesare Carbone in 1964 and was entrusted to Guiseppe Tilia in 1965 only to 
be terminated with the Revolution (Tucci 1972: XII). The core of restoration activities were concerned 
with clearing the site from debris and reassemble blocks and fragments that were either scattered around 
the site, assembled in the wrong order by previous teams, or had been stored in the storehouse of the 
Museum (East & West 1968:446; 1970:511). In some cases, such as the northern doorway of the Palace 
of Darius, fragments were brought from Qasr Abu Nasr and the valley north of the Terrace to reassemble 
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architectural elements (East & West 1972:395). In cases where fragments could not be recovered, 
restorations continued by employing carved pieces from the same quarries near Persepolis that were used 
during the Achaemenids (Tucci 1978: XI). It is here argued that considering the central role of Persepolis 
as a symbol that represented an authentic but modern monarchy, IsMEO’s efforts in restoring palace 
complexes were vital in providing a physical platform to showcase the new image of Iran and the military 
power of the Persian Empire during the Persepolis celebrations.  
It would be misleading to constrict the activities of IsMEO to the recreation of parts of Persepolis. In the 
process of these projects, which were in accordance with standards established in Athens and Venice 
(ibid.), the team gained valuable knowledge of Achaemenid building techniques and architecture (Tilia 
1972:42-3). Other investigations addressed the issues of chronology; the raised platform on which the 
complex was constructed; the walls around the site; the secondary entrance on the southern terrace; as 
well as the original colours and designs that adorned various sections of the complex (Tilia 1978). In 
addition to the above, IsMEO removed the protective wax that the Iranian Archaeological Service had 
applied on the surface of the complex, following the departure of the Americans. They argued this 
substance was harmful to the stones, and in addition to giving the rock material a dull, brownish-black 
effect, it prevented spectators from seeing the original colours (ibid.:68). The involvement of IsMEO had 
unprecedented outcomes in training Iranian archaeologists and conservators who collaborated with the 
NOCHMI (see Chapters 2 & 6). The results of IsMEO’s activities were published in three volumes (Tilia 
1969; 1972; 1978).  
 The restoration and study of Persepolis under the auspice of Italian Directors was in close collaboration 
with the excavation undertaken by Akbar Tajvidi. In 1969 the GOA approved Tajvidi’s research project 
granted that it did not pose any obstacles for the preparation of the Persepolis celebrations (Mousavi 
2002:240). As Mousavi (1992:204; 2002:243) contended, the overarching significance of Tajvidi’s 
project was the study of the original purpose of the Persepolis complex, which he argued to be a military 
fortress transformed into a ceremonial city, and the articulation of the nature of urbanism at the site. In 
doing so, Tajvidi (1973; Mousavi 1992) directed the core of his research towards the study of 
fortifications on Kuh-e Rahmat (Rahmat Mountain) and the defensive system of Persepolis. The focus on 
military power of the Achaemenid and their defensive system is noteworthy considering the 
Government’s rhetoric and its stress on the military power of Iran-ancient and modern. Considering the 
significance of Persepolis for the Government, Tajvidi’s project benefited from the generous funds 
available for the preparation of Persepolis celebrations (Mousavi 2002:240). In an interview, Abdolreza 
Ansari estimated the entire budget for the celebrations around 22 million U.S. Dollars (Kadivar 
2002:145) whilst others estimated the cost to be between 100 to 200 million U.S. Dollars (Diamond 
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2005:223; Nafisi 1993:22). The budget allocated to the Persepolis project is not clear, however, it was due 
to initiatives taken during this period that the outdated Scientific Bureau of Persepolis established by 
Sami in the 1950s was revitalised and began its function under the Direction of Alireza Shahpour 
Shahbazi as Bonyad-e Hakhamaneshi Takht-e Jamshid (Institute of Achaemenid Studies) in 1974 
(Mousavi 2012:212).  
Apart from restoration and excavations, Persepolis had to be prepared for the celebrations. Therefore, in 
1960-1970 additional excavations were carried by the Italian team to accompany the installation of flood-
lights and acoustics at Persepolis (Tilia 1972:64). The instillations were exchanged in 1971 by the French 
company of Philips (ibid.). Perhaps this was a prelude to the French speech made on behalf of Darius 
during the Son et lumière at the night of the celebration.  
On the eve of 14
 
October 1971, royalty and representatives of 64 nations arrived at a banquet set in a 
tented city prepared in 160 acres on the footsteps of Persepolis. Mohammad Reza Shah had insisted that 
his 600 foreign guests camp outside Persepolis as ancient Assyrians, Lydians, Armenians, Arabs, and 
Babylonians had done during the Achaemenid period (Grigor 2005:25). The celebration had three focal 
locations in Pasargadae, Persepolis, and Tehran, with the mutual purpose of re-introducing Iran as a 
modern monarchy with high ambitions and strong roots in the ancient past. In doing so the Shah 
presented himself as the heir and follower of Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire (Hoveyda 
2003:39). The three day celebrations began with the Shah paying tribute to Cyrus at his tomb at 
Pasargadae. In the evening the guests were received at a grand banquet in Persepolis. The celebrations 
commenced with a brief speech from the Shah, welcoming the presence of many Heads of States in the 
“land of Cyrus, Darius and Xerxes”. The reference to ancient kings continued as the first day of festivities 
concluded with the son et lumière that narrated the story of Persepolis among its ruins. Ansari as one of 
the collaborators of the celebrations recalled:  
“From the tomb in the mountainside overlooking the ruined palaces where he ruled 500 
years before Christ, the voice of Darius the Great spoke in the dark, but in French. Andre 
Castelot, France's eminent historian, recounted the glories of Xerxes and the last days of 
the Persian empire. The columns of Persepolis were bathed in white light then gradually 
they turned red and the sound of fire mixed with the drunken orgy of Greek soldiers. It 
was the sacking of Persepolis by Alexander all over again. The guests were thrilled and 
applauded.” (Ansari cited in Kadivar 2002) 
The celebrations continued on the second day as the core of the festivities remained in Persepolis. The 
morning tour at Persepolis by Heads of States accompanied by the Iranian Royal Family was followed by 
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a parade that held the site as its background (ibid.). The grand attempt in showcasing two and a half 
millennia of conquest, military power, and imperial glory of Iran, began with yet another instigation of 
tradition that made a reference to the ancient kings (Fig. 5.16). Prior to making his third speech at the 
festivities, the Shah received a box from two officers dressed in Achaemenid uniforms travelling from 
Tehran on a horseback to deliver a message to the Shah. The box contained a manuscript prepared 
according to ancient traditions, sent from the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies who congratulated the 
Shah on his achievements (ibid.). Before the parade, the Shah made his third speech:  
“2500 years ago, one of the sons of this nation, Cyrus the Achaemenian, who 
incidentally belongs not only to our own heritage but also to that of the world 
and humanity, brought about a fundamental change… He institutionalised new 
ways in governing based on respect for the rights and beliefs of individuals… 
Many after him, followed his footsteps, which has in essence resulted in an 
evolutionary process for humanity to get ever closer to the utopia of a perfect 
society ... In the course of 2500 years, every inch of this soil, had been coloured 
with the blood of her gallant sons and daughters so Iran may live proudly 
forever. This land of ours has suffered from quite a few incursion, many came 
to pillage and bring this nation to its knees, yet, they have all vanquished and 
Iran remains intact.” (Ansari cited in Kadivar 2002). 
Following the speech hundreds of drums accompanied 6000 soldiers into a colourful parade that 
represented all the Iranian dynasties and their imperial warriors in an evolutionary manner. The soldiers 
dressed in authentic uniforms were accompanied by horses, camels and three enormous warships while 
re-enacting various epochs of Iranian history, including the Arab invasion of the seventh-century (ibid.).  
The military might of the Persian dynasties and their unbroken continuity was the pinnacle of the parade. 
Hoveyda (2003:85) maintained that through this event, Persepolis had once again turned into the “centre 
of the universe”, an “international capital”, where Heads of State and Governments met to settle global 
issues. The event was televised to “tens of millions around the world” and continued with another set of 
celebrations in Tehran (ibid.). The narrative of drawing lineage between Cyrus and Mohammad Reza 
Shah continued by negotiating the loan of Cyrus Cylinder (Appendix II, Doc 1) from the British Museum 
and exhibiting it at the iconic Shahyad Monument (the Royal Memorial) (later Azadi), which was built in 
1971 as a part of preparations of the Persepolis ceremonies. The housing of the Cyrus Cylinder, the 
adopted symbol of Iranian ancient heritage by the Government, at the Shahyad Monument, which was a 
symbol of Iran’s modern identity, was a significant part of the Shah’s social engineering towards a “Great 
Civilisation”. It is important to note that although the Cylinder was discovered in Babylon during 
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excavations in 1879 by Hormuzd Rassam on behalf of the British Museum (Walker 1972:158; Taylor 
2013; Curtis 2013:31-36), by 1950 it had already acquired an Iranian identity when, Abul Kalam Azad, 
the Indian Minister of Culture, contended that the Zolgharnein mentioned in the Holy Quran was in fact 
Cyrus the Great. Azad’s work was immediately translated by Bastani Parizi and his effort to incorporate 
Cyrus in the Quran was welcomed by many including Said Nafisi, who in 1951 wrote, “it is a great 
honour to know that Quran was a promoter of the great Iranian king … and we owe this to Abdul Kalam 
Azad” (Nafisi cited in Bastani Parizi 2001:148). Azad’s arguments fostered the incorporation of Cyrus 
into a more holistic view of Iranian identity, respected by secularists, monarchists, and Islamists.  
The Government’s preparations for the Persepolis celebrations was accompanied by the adoption of the 
Cyrus Cylinder as an instrument to further present its narrative of dynastic nationalism. Although the 
political utilisation of the Cylinder had already began in the 1960s, the artefact was now being adopted in 
the context of the celebrations, not only to promote the institute of monarchy as the sole contender and 
most appropriate form of government for Iran, but also to foster the projected image of Iran as a model for 
the Third World economic development (Burke 1968) and authority in human rights (Bailey 2004). In 
both these cases, references were made to Cyrus, as the founder of the Persian Empire, who laid the 
ground for an ‘enlightened’ and ‘liberal’ system of monarchy revived by Mohammad Reza Shah. The 
manifestation of this rhetoric was best visible in the Shah’s opening remarks at the 1968 Tehran 
International Conference on Human Rights, when he credited Cyrus as the founding father of human 
rights which has found fulfillment in the Pahlavi dynasty (http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/fatchr/fatchr.html). As 
Burke (1968:287) argued, this conference was to promote the modernisation programmes laid by the 
White Revolution, as a model for all Third World countries. In a way, Iran proclaimed itself as the 
champion of a distinctive Third World human rights ideology and an exemplar for other developing 
countries where human rights were equated with economic developments imposed by the traditionalist 
regimes (ibid.:285). These policies were further affirmed by the Shah’s twin sister, Princess Ashraf 
Pahlavi, who was active in the UN as a Commissioner and an advocate of women’s right (ibid.:296). On 
14 October 1971, just days before the celebrations that commemorated the Anniversary of 2500 years of 
Persian Monarchy, Princess Ashraf offered a replica of the Cyrus Cylinder to the United Nation Secretary 
General U-Thant as a “historic gift” (UN Press release 1971). She presented Cyrus’s heritage as “the 
heritage of human understanding, tolerance, courage, compassion and, above all, human liberty” (ibid.). 
The link made between past and present was aimed at generating the view that Iran with its historical 
appreciation of human freedom is a forerunner in the promotion of human rights. This was an acute 
attempt not only to present the Pahlavi Government as a model for all developing countries, but also to 
refute the accusations directed to Iran for its lack of human right policies. This is considering that the 
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discontent with the White Revolution had led to the onset of protest movements against the reforms by 
1963 (Ansari 2000:35). To restore authority, the Government was confined to retaliate through the 
management of the country with an “iron fist” (Ansari 2003:137) and a dramatic expansion of the army, 
the creation of a state security service known as the SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyyat-e Keshvar), 
and the violation of human rights by the Iranian Administration, drew international attention to Iran 
(ibid.) In this context, the Cyrus Cylinder was adopted during the Persepolis celebrations to re-emphasise 
the centrality of monarchy within the Iranian political system and the identification of the Shah with 
Cyrus (ibid:171). In preparation for the festivities, the year 1971 was recognised as the year of Cyrus the 
Great and various programmes were scheduled to pay homage to the founder of the Empire (Shafa 
1971:25). The Cyrus Cylinder was adopted as the symbol of the Persepolis celebrations and endorsed as 
the icon of Iran’s cultural identity (Fig. 5.17). This yield to the unprecedented manipulation of this 
archaeological artefact on postage stamps and banknotes as the symbol of Iranian national identity (Fig 
5.18). Apart from appearing on Iranian stamps, the Cylinder was showcased as part of the promotion of 
Persepolis celebrations on stamps issued in Ethiopia, Romania, Ajman and Oman (Curtis 2013:90). From 
October 7 to 19 of 1971 the Cylinder was taken to Iran by R.D. Barnett, the Keeper of the Department of 
Western Asiatic Antiquities, as part of the festivities.  
 By the end of these celebrations, the Shah’s Government had been able to achieve two outcomes, first, 
Persepolis was represented as the manifestation of dynastic nationalism and the institution of monarchy as 
the only legitimate form of government in Iran and second, through making references to Persepolis and 
the Ancient Persian kings, the Government had demonstrated to the world, Iran’s inherent competence, 
economically and militarily, to march towards a utopian “Great Civilisation”. The Cyrus Cylinder further 
provided the officials with the means to address the Shah’s lack of legitimacy in the domestic and 
international fronts through claiming lineage with Cyrus and his humanitarian morals. The national 
revivalism and the power display of the Shah’s Government at Persepolis did not cultivate the intended 
results. The celebrations were mocked by a number of Western journals and the Iranians were appalled by 
the Hollywood-style production of the past that failed to include them (Harmon 2005:32). The 
repercussions of these failures contributed to the social rage that fed the Islamic Revolution.  
 
5.5. Post- Revolution & Nationalism: The Case Study of Persepolis 
In the previous section, it was argued that during the Pahlavi period, pre-Islamic archaeological sites were 
utilised to implement the ethnic-dynastic nationalism of the Regime. In doing so, emphasis was laid on 
the instrumental use of Persepolis by Reza Shah’s Government to articulate the ethnic ‘superiority’ of 
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Iranians and that of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government to present the institution of monarchy as the 
only appropriate form of government for Iran. By the end of 1970s, the cultural policies of the Pahlavis 
which rested on modernisation, progress, and romanticism about pre-Islamic Iran, became increasingly 
incompatible with the wider section of the Iranian society (Farsoun & Mashayekhi 1992:8). The 
alienation of the Iranian society eventually led to the Islamic Revolution in 1979 which was founded on 
the pillars of return to native roots, opposition to foreign imperialism, and sympathy for the oppressed 
(Abrahamian 1993:38). According to this rhetoric, the native roots and the authentic cultural identity of 
Iranians was to be sought in the Islamic past and anything that was not Islamic was not considered a part 
of the Iranian identity (Holliday 2007:87). It was argued that the nationalism promoted by the Pahlavis 
and the illusions of the glories of Persian Empire were abstract and did not resonate with Iranian people 
who associated themselves with the more recent Islamic culture (Amuzegar 1991:142). Further, the 
institute of monarchy was denounced as an “agent” of Western imperialism and incompatible to rule the 
country. The rejection of monarchy was also justified by referring to its elitist and oppressive nature that 
opposed Islamic values. The hereditary succession of the monarchy was notably underscored as invalid 
and unjust (Algar 1981:31). In confirmation with Trigger’s (1984:356) contention on the intrinsic 
relationship between society and archaeology, with redefining the narrative of social context in the 
Iranian society, the general outlook towards the purpose of archaeology was revised. Therefore, pre-
Islamic archaeological sites, and in particular, Persepolis which was the expression of the Pahlavis’ 
ethnic-dynastic nationalism and the embodiment of their elitist, oppressive dominance, became 
exceedingly unpopular following the Islamic Revolution. Nevertheless, as is argued in this thesis, given 
the fluid social construction of Iran and the change in patterns of Iranian identity, pre-Islamic sites were 
gradually annexed through this period and regained their political significance.  
In this section, it is argued that the celebrations at Persepolis which affiliated the site with the institution 
of monarchy contributed to misunderstanding the value of the discipline of archaeology, degrading it to a 
pseudoscience in service of glorifying the kings. Although this trend eventually changed, the impact of 
initial hostilities towards pre-Islamic archaeology had unprecedented outcomes for the development of the 
discipline. To articulate these issues, this section will begin by focusing on the populist discourse of 
Khomeini’s Government and the antagonism to the pre-Islamic past. This will be followed by evaluating 
the impact of the War and the subsequent reconstruction phase that required a compromise with the pre-
Islamic past and the recognition of its significance as an integral part of Iranian identity. This is continued 
with the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ presented by Khatami’s Administration that 
provided a pretext for the reconciliation of pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian identities and the re-birth of 
Iranian archaeology. The section will conclude with demonstrating the impact of the return to ‘populism’ 
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and ‘principalism’ on the treatment of pre-Islamic sites, and in particular Persepolis, through analysing 
the adopted narrative of Ahmadinejad’s Administration. Further references are made to the Cyrus 
Cylinder in this context to demonstrate the adoption of pre-Islamic history for political purposes across 
different political periods.  
 
5.5.1. Populism & Return to Native Roots: Pre-Islamic Archaeology 
Following the Revolution, the criteria for the definition of nation-state, nationalism, and national identity 
changed and became Islamised. The adoption of ‘true Islamic values’ was achieved through two 
incentives; the condemnation of the institute of monarchy and its oppressive authority, and the promotion 
of “Shi’a nationalism” (Ansari 2003:222). Considering the focus of this chapter on Persepolis, this section 
will put more emphasis on the impact of the former on the treatment of pre-Islamic sites, while the latter 
will be discussed in more detail in the following Chapter where Islamic sites are the subject of 
examination.  
As discussed previously, one of the defining features of the populist rhetoric of Khomeini’s Government 
was the condemnation of the Pahlavis as the agent of Western imperialism. Through rejecting the 
Pahlavis’ oppressive role, Khomeini aligned his Government with the oppressed masses (Halliday 
1986:102). His criticisms were not confined to the Pahlavis, but further targeted the hereditary institution 
of monarchy that had been an integral component of Iranian identity. He denounced the pre-Islamic 
Iranian past as an age of absolute autocracy and ignorance. He argued: 
“God only knows what disasters the Iranian monarchy has given rise [to] since 
its beginning and what crimes it has committed. The crimes of [the] kings of Iran 
have blackened the pages of history. It is the kings of Iran that have constantly 
ordered massacres of their own people and had pyramids built with their skulls… 
Tradition relates that the Prophet (upon whom be peace) said that the title of 
King of Kings, which is born by the monarchs of Iran, is the most hated of all 
titles in the sight of God. Islam is fundamentally opposed to the whole notion 
of monarchy. Anyone who studies the manner in which the Prophet established 
the government of Islam will realize that Islam came in order to destroy these 
palaces of tyranny. Monarchy is one of the most shameful and disgraceful 
reactionary manifestations.” (Khomeini cited in Algar 1981:202) 
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To further validate his arguments, Khomeini made frequent references to the Shah’s Persepolis 
celebrations. As early as 1971, Khomeini had condemned this “shameful festival” by calling it a waste of 
the country’s wealth. Khomeini stated: 
“using the Muslim’s money, the tyrannical regime proposes to celebrate 
a festival and light up our cities for the sake of kings who in every age 
crushed the people beneath the boots of their soldiers, who always 
opposed true religion, who were the bitter enemies of Islam, and who 
                    tore up the blessed letter of the Prophet.” (Khomeini cited in  
Algar 1981:198) 
This extract demonstrates the Government’s lucid representation of Persepolis as the symbol of moral 
decadence that defined the Pahlavis and the institute of monarchy. Such associations made all pre-Islamic 
archaeological sites, especially Persepolis, vulnerable to the zeal of the Revolutionaries who were 
determined to demolish all cultural banners and symbolic remains affiliated with the institute of 
monarchy. These threats were most pronounced in the first year of the Revolution given the absence of 
legislative institutes, such as Cultural Heritage Organisation, to monitor the welfare of cultural remains. 
During this period the Provisional Government, granted the task of managing Iran’s cultural heritage to 
the Cultural Ministry. The first Head of this Ministry was Parviz Varjavand (1934-2007 AD), an 
archaeologist with political affiliations to Iran’s National Front Organization (NFO), a secular nationalist 
group association with Mossadegh. His background in archaeology made him a suitable candidate during 
this turbulent stage of political and social disorder. His most important contribution was the registration 
of three archaeological sites of Chogha Zanbil (Elamite), Persepolis (pre-Islamic) and Naghsh-e Jahan 
Complex (Islamic), as UNESCO world heritage sites in 1979 (Fig. 5.19).  
The choice of Persepolis is especially noteworthy considering the resentment towards pre-Islamic Iranian 
past during this period. However, it is here argued that the socio-political dynamics of this period is 
represented by two contrasting ideological discourse, one expressed by the hard-liner Islamists who 
advocated the elimination of all residues of the institute of monarchy, the other, a faction of nationalist 
technocrats who occupied administrative position within Bazargan’s Cabinet. Therefore, although the 
Government’s rhetoric on the triumph of the oppressed over oppressors instigated various acts of 
vandalism against pre-Islamic cultural remains, the efforts of certain officials restricted the spread of such 
hostilities on Iranian cultural heritage. Despite this arrangement, the deliberate destruction of many sites 
that were intimately associated with the institute of monarchy continued. The lack of concrete 
documented evidence in many cases creates almost insurmountable hurdles when trying to compile list of 
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acts of vandalism, however, there are a number of explicit examples and interview accounts that reflect 
the cultural extremism which followed the Revolution. Some of these cases are illustrated in the following 
section. 
In the process of re-defining itself, Iranian society destroyed a number of Pahlavi monuments such as the 
tomb of Reza Shah in Shah Abdol Azim near Rey and Pahlavi statues. Other symbols of monarchy, such 
as the crown-shaped Park in the valley of Taj (Crown) Village, near Rustamabad District in Northern Iran 
was destroyed by burning out and cutting down trees of a vast forest (today the trees are shaped to 
represent the Allah symbol of the Islamic Republic). Apart from symbols of the Pahlavi monarchs, the 
antagonising of pre-Islamic Iranian identity led to the destruction of tombs and raids of museums and 
private collections. There are accounts which record acts of vandalism at the tomb of Shah Ismail Safavi, 
the tomb of Nader Shah in Mashhad, and the tomb of Naser al-Din Shah in Shah Abdol Azim (Ansari 
2003:223). In addition, Abdi (2001:70) asserted that the Golestan Palace was broken into and few items, 
including the sword of Nader Shah, were taken. Varjavand further reported the removal of three to four 
items of sizeable value from Persepolis (http://www.chn.ir/news/?section=2&id=31388). The alienation of 
pre-Islamic identity continued with the local authorities’ ban on the use of pre-Islamic names such as 
Cyrus and Darius for new-born children (Molavi 2005:14).  
The most serious threat to pre-Islamic Iranian identity was voiced by Ayatollah Khalkhali, a hard-liner 
clergy, who published a book in which Cyrus was dismissed as a tyrant, a liar, and a Jew (Sadeghi Givi 
2001). He further called for the destruction of the Tomb of Cyrus and Persepolis, which to many 
Revolutionaries, encapsulated the despotism of Persian monarchs. His order to bulldoze Persepolis was 
aborted following the concerted reaction by a number of clergy and concerned officials in the Provisional 
Government. It is said that on hearing of Khalkhali’s intentions, the Governor of Fars, Nosratollah Amini, 
who was also affiliated with the NFO, went on the radio and criticised such acts of vandalism and 
proclaimed that any who wished to afflict harm on Persepolis should do so over his dead body (Amini 
2009). While Amini deployed guards to secure Shiraz from Khalkhali’s mob, Varjavand received a decree 
from the city’s Ayatollah Mahallati which condemned any damage or destruction to Persepolis.  
It is important to note that the confiscation and destruction of symbols of monarchy were justified by the 
Islamic Revolution as the uprising of the oppressed. These acts of vandalism were a reflection of society’s 
attempt to redistribute wealth and eliminate symbols of “unwarranted privileges” (Ansari 2003:216). 
Therefore, vengeful acts of vandalism continued despite the condemnation of the deliberate destruction of 
sites and confiscation of cultural remains by Ayatollah Taleghani and Imam Khomeini (ibid.:223; 
Abrahamian 2008:179). In addition, the prime intention during this period was the new regime’s attempt 
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to accommodate the process of re-defining the cultural identity of Iran by eliminating all that was pre-
Islamic and replacing it by Islamic values. This process was fully underway by 1980 as the Provisional 
Government resigned and the Cultural Revolution was launched to ‘purify’ institutes of all non-Islamic 
conformities. In this process all the residues of the institution of monarchy in form of iconic symbols or 
conventional instruments that helped to accommodate the cultural engineering of the Pahlavis were 
eradicated from statues, stamps, and banknotes. In the process, the discipline of Archaeology was 
degraded as a pseudoscience that nourished the dissemination of the Pahlavi doctrine and its department 
at Tehran University was shut down. Persepolis which had become the reflection of Pahlavis’ despotism 
and a pillar of imperialism, survived further vengeful threats, but largely, it was neglected until its 
recovery during later periods. 
 
5.5.2. War Years & the Reconstruction Period: Pre-Islamic Archaeology 
The aim of this section is to explore how the Iran-Iraq War and the ‘reconstruction phase’ altered the 
conduct of the new Regime in perceiving the Iranian identity and in the process becoming more tolerant 
towards disciplines such as archaeology. In doing so, emphasis is laid on the War as an incentive for the 
re-incorporation of pre-Islamic Iranian identity given the Government had to appeal not only to Islamic 
ideals, but also to Iranian nationalism to defend its national integrity (Hunter 1992:93; Chubin & Tripp 
1991:9; Holliday 2011:72). The death of Imam Khomeini, the charismatic leader of the Revolution, also 
played into redefining the ideals of the Revolution. In addition, the launch of the ‘reconstruction phase’ in 
1992 is considered as a remedy to facilitate the recovery of the Iranian economy and provide funding for 
scientific endeavours, such as that in the discipline of archaeology, that were considered unnecessary and 
wasteful given the financial restrictions and human cost during the War. It is argued that as the State 
revised its discourse of nationalism and the economy improved, the significance of pre-Islamic 
monuments such as Persepolis, were re-interpreted as an integral part of Iranian identity. 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, during the 1980s Iranian archaeologists had to fight battles on multiple fronts 
for the survival of their discipline. From 1980 to 1992 the CRC was responsible for setting Islamic 
guidelines for cultural, educational, and research activities. In the process, the discipline of archaeology 
was recognised as ‘fake knowledge’ and its department at Tehran University was closed until 1982. In 
addition, many ‘unfit’ instructors who had received their higher degrees from Western institutes, such as 
Dr. Shahbazi, were discharged or forced into retirement. The War inflicted damage to archaeological 
sites, was an additional concern of the archaeologists. In terms of pre-Islamic archaeological sites, the 
Sassanid sites of Qasr-e Shirin and Ivan Karkhe; and the Achaemenid sites of Hegmataneh and Susa, 
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were in the hinterland of the War and were subject to considerable damage. The Susa Museum which was 
constructed in 1966 and contained recovered artefacts from Elamite and Achaemenid periods was among 
the sites destroyed. However, it is reported that the officials transported a large portion of this collection 
to Tehran prior to its destruction by the Iraqi rockets (Rouhani 2010). The concerns for the fate of pre-
Islamic cultural heritage were extended to museums and private collections. As the process of 
antagonising pre-Islamic Iranian identity continued, numerous artefacts were destroyed or misplaced. The 
most notable case was the disappearance of the Golden Foundation Tablet recovered from Persepolis by 
the Americans. In 1999 while the National Museum was being re-organised, this loss was recognised and 
the previous Director of the Museum, Nosrat Allah Mo’tamedi was investigated. Although the identity of 
the person responsible was not officially released, it is believed that he was tried and charged for the 
destruction of the Tablet (Ommat Ali 2007).  
The position of archaeology as a discipline and the antagonisation of pre-Islamic Iranian identity were 
eventually re-evaluated as the Government became more tolerant towards Iranian nationalism during the 
War. In 1988 with Rafsanjani as President, a period of reconstruction began to facilitate the recovery of 
Iran’s devastated economy (Abrahamian 2008:181). An important development was the ratification of 
ICHO constitution in 1988 and the resumption of activities at the Institute of Archaeology at Tehran 
University in 1990 (Abdi 2001:70-1). In Chapter 2 it was noted that the appearance of the more liberal 
Organisation of CPIR in 1992 was one of the more pragmatic changes as this organisation aimed to 
relegate socio-cultural issues to experts rather than the clergy (Moslem 2002:167-8). This allowed for the 
return of archaeologists in executive positions and in the same year, Rafsanjani took a private tour of the 
National Museum and reopened its doors to the public (Sciolino 1992). The Government officially 
approved the acceptance of Iranian pre-Islamic identity when the President visited Persepolis in April 
1992. The impact of this public visit was profound, considering it was the first time since the Revolution, 
that any high officials from the new Islamic Regime had paid a visit to this site. Rather than condemning 
the site in the tradition of the post-Revolutionary rhetoric, Rafsanjani stated: 
“standing in the middle of these centuries-old ruins, I felt the nation’s 
dignity was all-important and must be strengthened. Our people must 
know that they are not without a history.” (Sciolino 1992) 
Following the Islamic State’s declaration of reconciliation with the pre-Islamic past, the first Congress of 
Iranian Archaeology after the Revolution was held in 1994 in Susa. The site of Susa Citadel was 
nominated by Ayatollah Zadeh Shirazi, an architect and conservator, to host this Congress. On the 
decision, Mehdi Rahbar was sent to the site to repair the War damage and prepare the site for the 
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Congress. The selection of Susa, an Elamite and Achaemenid site, to host the first congress of 
archaeology held after the Revolution is noteworthy. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the passage to 
the restoration of archaeology as a discipline was pursued through Prehistoric archaeology, which was 
considered as both scientific and apolitical. The revival of pre-Islamic archeology had to remain 
constrained until Khatami’s Administration presented the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ 
which adopted a holistic Islamic-Iranian doctrine of national identity.  
 
5.5.3. Khatami’s Administration & Reconciliations with the Past: Pre-Islamic Archaeology 
In the previous chapters, it was argued that the doctorine of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ adopted by 
Khatami’s Administration provided for the improvement in foreign policies by narrowing the cultural and 
political gaps between Iran and the West, and domestically by facilitating the reconciliation of pre-Islamic 
Iranian and Islamic identities. It was maintained that in respond to this political rhetoric Iranian 
archaeology once again emerged as a politicised discipline, albeit with emphasis on Prehistoric period. In 
this section, the implications of these developments on the treatment of pre-Islamic sites, and specifically 
Persepolis are discussed. In doing so, it is argued that although the pre-Islamic nationalist rhetoric of 
President Khatami’s Administration may have stressed the Sassanid period, as Holliday (2011:46-50) 
contended, the Achaemenid period received comparable considerations. This point is illustrated through 
emphasis laid on the emergence of institutes and the inauguration of museums that facilitated the 
promotion of the dual Iranian identity both domestically and internationally, with certain attention to the 
Achaemenid period.  
In Chapter 2, it was discussed that in 1997 the ICHO made fundamental changes to its infrastructure to 
become more efficient. The return of foreign experts, the establishment of conservation labs, the opening 
of museums to public, and the establishment of research institutes for archaeological sites, were among 
the endeavors of ICHO. In addition, in 2002 the Cultural Institute of Iranian ICOMOS was inaugurated. 
In terms of pre-Islamic sites, the new overture of cultural heritage instigated collaboration between 
Iranian archaeological teams and international institutes in a rescue project at the site of Tang-e Bolaghi, 
with archaeological remains mostly associated with the Achaemenid period. The 129 archaeological sites 
in this location were excavated by international teams from Italy, Poland, Japan, France, Germany, and 
Australia in a salvage project that was funded by the Ministry of Energy 
(http://www.payvand.com/news/05/jan/1014.html). The construction of the Sivand Dam conjured up a serious 
debate between nationalists, archaeologists, and Government officials over possible threats to the pre-
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Islamic site of Pasargadae, and even Persepolis (Abdi 2005). The Sivand Dam was inaugurated by 
President Ahmadinejad in 2007 following these debates. 
The implications of the Government’s reforms in foreign relations and domestic affairs were extended to 
advancing the activities of museums. In 1997 some of the Imperial Palaces were transformed to museums 
and opened to the public for the first time. As a part of this project the Golestan Palace, Sahebgharaniye 
and Niavaran Palace, including the Jahan Nama Museum, were opened to public. In addition, the Palatial 
Complex of Sa’d Abad and Niavaran, corresponding with the Qajar and Pahlavi periods, were registered 
as numbers 1957 and 2025 on the Inventory of Iranian National Heritage. Apart from expanding the 
museums within Iran, a number of international exhibitions were held or initiated. The exhibition of 
“Seven Thousand Years of Iranian Art” and the “Glory of Ancient Persia: Mining and Decoration in 
Ancient Persia” were showcased in a number of European countries between 2000 and 2005. In addition, 
negotiations were undertaken with the British Museum to prepare an exhibition under the title of The 
Forgotten Empire:The World of Ancient Persia. The exhibition at the British Museum aimed to offer a 
scarce opportunity to introduce Ancient Persians history and to readdress the negative Eurocentric views 
towards the ancient Persians (Curtis & Tallis 2005:9). This was the fruit of efforts by John Curtis, the 
Keeper of the Middle East Collection at the British Museum, and his negotiations with the Iranian 
authorities. Additional arrangements were made with the Louvre and the British Museum for the 
exchange of Achaemenid collections, including the Cyrus Cylinder. As a condition for the transfer of the 
Cyrus Cylinder to Iran, preparations were made by updating the National Museum, where pre-Islamic 
remains from Achaemenid and Sassanid periods predominated. One of the main undertakings of this 
project, which was conducted in collaboration with Italian architects, was to make the building resistant to 
earthquakes.  
The expansion of collaborations with foreign institutes and museums included a resumption of 
relationships between ICHO and the Oriental Institute of Chicago where the Persepolis Fortification 
Tablets had been on loan for studies since 1936 (Stein 2007:3). Some of these tablets had been returned to 
Iran following their decipherment in 1948 and 1951, but the return of 300 tablets in 2004 marked the first 
of such occasions following the Islamic Revolution. The event included high officials from Iran- S.M. 
Beheshti, the Director of ICHO, and Gil. J Stein from the Oriental Institute, and received extensive 
international coverage (Fig. 5.20). Following this collaboration, a legal suit was issued where the 
surviving victims and families of those Americans who died in Jerusalem in a bombing by Hamas in 
1997, claimed 400 million U.S. Dollar compensation from Iran, and attempted to satisfy this claim by 
selling the Persepolis Tablets that were on loan in the United States (ibid.:5). The Oriental Institute 
contested these claims on the ground that the tablets were not commercial assets and that law should 
161 
 
prevent the seizure of cultural heritage for such compensations (ibid.). In 2006, President Khatami visited 
the Oriental Institute and with regard to the Persepolis Tablets stated “the heritage of mankind is not 
tradable and replaceable” (http://www.payvand.com/news/06/sep/1055.html). He further argued “the artefacts 
do not belong to the governments. They belong to the whole Iranian nation and the entire world. We must 
stand up to the ongoing propaganda and safeguard the historical assets of Iran which are held in trust in 
this university and museum” (ibid.).  
Similar to President Rafsanjani, Khatami had already voiced his fascination with Persepolis when he 
visited the site in January 2001. This official visit was followed by the inauguration of Bonyad-e 
Pajoheshi-e Pars-e Pasargad (Pars-e Pasargad Research Institute) in 2002. The Institute became the 
leading designated body in Iran for conducting Achaemenid research and the management and protection 
of archaeological sites from this period, including Persepolis 
(http://persepolis.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=29&Itemid=64). The conduct of this 
Institute included the planning and aerial photography of the complex, geophysics and the establishment 
of an archive (ibid.). In addition, the collaborations between ICHO and IsMEO were resumed to continue 
the restoration and preservation of Persepolis. In 2004, the site of Pasargadae was added to the list of 
UNESCO world heritage. Further, in 2005, to celebrate the World Expo 2005 exhibition in Aichi, Japan, 
the Cyrus Cylinder together with a view of Persepolis appeared for the first time after the Revolution on a 
set of stamps (Curtis 2013:38). 
The above analysis demonstrates official attempts to politicise the of pre-Islamic Iranian heritage 
following the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ adopted by the Government . In doing so, 
emphasis was laid on the unprecedented attention to the Achaemenid period in comparison with previous 
post-Revolutionary Administrations. In 2004, Parliament implemented new legislation which agreed to 
merge the ICHO with the Organisation of National and International Tourism. The placement of this new 
organisation under the direct authority of the President demonstrates the extent of politicisation of 
Archaeology which persisted into the following Administrations. As is argued in the following sections, 
these same themes continued to play into Ahmadinejad’s Government and its populist rhetoric.  
 
5.5.4. Ahmadinejad’s Administration & Populism: Pre-Islamic Archaeology 
The reformist policies of Khatami’s Administration were opposed by Ahmadinejad, a ‘principalist’, who 
won the election in 2005. Ahmadinejad’s electoral campaign centred on the themes of rejecting the 
reformists who had deviated from the legacy of Imam Khomeini and returning to the true principles of the 
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Revolution (Kamrava 2011:167). Therefore, the political narrative of achieving national independence, 
serving the oppressed and exporting the Revolution were revived and advocated. Despite the commitment 
to the principles of the Revolution, Ahmadinejad’s Administration itself deviated from Khomeini’s 
discourse with populist rhetoric that conveyed an amalgam of ethnic-dynastic-Shi’a nationalism, 
depending on the occasion. These were articulated by the Government’s attempt to cultivate a ‘myth of 
saviour’ through adopting pre-Islamic as well as Islamic discourses. In terms of pre-Islamic rhetoric, in 
the Presidential Campaign, Ahmadinejad was presented as the son of a blacksmith, a connotation that 
evoked the mythical stories of Shahnameh about Kaveh the Blacksmith who was a pre-Islamic national 
hero (Abrahamian 2009:194). The most significant point of departure that distinguished the populist 
approach of Ahmadinejad’s Administration from its predecessors was the adoption of ethnic-dynastic 
nationalism. These included the President’s statements on the special connection between Iran and 
Germany, with racial rhetoric that hinted on the myths of Aryanism (Ansari 2012:265); and the proposal 
to celebrate Norouz at Persepolis in a style that resembled Mohammad Reza Shah’s 1971 festivities. 
These themes prevailed with the construction of a mock-up of Persepolis to provide a back-drop for the 
State visit of President Putin of Russia in 2007 and the enthusiastic welcome of the Cyrus Cylinder to the 
National Museum in 2011 (ibid.:260). 
 In this section, it is argued that despite the pursuit of Ahmadinejad’s Administration to adopt ethnic-
dynastic nationalism and utilise pre-Islamic archaeological sites such as Persepolis, this period was 
defined by lack of archaeological progress and deterioration of archaeology as a scientific discipline. The 
main incentive for this decline was the diminishing economic situation and aversive foreign policies that 
isolated Iran from the international community (Ehteshami 2007:76). Therefore, Iranian archaeology 
lapsed into another schism of financial deprivation and scholarly isolation. These were accompanied by 
the appointment of unqualified key figures to manage various dimensions of Iranian cultural heritage. As 
argued here, the greater part of constructive archaeological activities and exhibitions that provided 
Ahmadinejad’s Government with an opportunity to advocate Iranian nationalism was a residue of cultural 
policies of Khatami’s Administration that disseminated into the later period. 
As discussed above, the improved foreign relations during the period of ‘dialogue’ led to the prevalence 
of an open-door policy in Iranian archaeology and the revival of collaborations with international 
institutes. One of these institutes was IsMEO, that became IsIAO in 1995, an organisation that had worked 
on the preservation and restoration of Persepolis during the Pahlavi period. Following the establishment 
of the Pars-e Pasargad Institute and the realisation of its research oriented intentions, IsIAO was once 
again invited to resume its activities at Persepolis. These collaborations, which also involved University 
of Bologna, led to the proposal of a five year project with the title Az Kakh Ta Shahr (From Palace to 
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Town) that aimed to excavate the nearby town of Parsa, to uncover the historic development of 
settlements in the Persepolis area 
(http://persepolis.ir/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=78:archeology-
group&catid=15:reports&Itemid=63). The shift in research interest from palatial complexes to the residential 
area of the “commoners” is noteworthy given the Government’s rhetoric of serving the underclass of 
society. Apart from excavation, this mission aimed to launch a conservation project on the terrace of 
Persepolis (ibid.). In particular, the decay of monumental stones and the flooding of the terrace in rainy 
seasons caused by the blocked water channels were subject to investigation. While new techniques of 
stone conservations have been tried on Persepolis terrace since 2010, the project of locating and clearing 
the water channels and creating artificial slopes to drain water from the surface of the terrace was 
launched in 2012 (ibid.). It is important to note that despite delays in the projects and the prevalence of 
financial difficulties, the maintenance of positive foreign relations with Italy was paramount in the 
continuation of archaeological collaborations at Persepolis. 
Apart from archaeological excavations, a prominent number of international exhibitions with an 
overarching aim to highlight the pre-Islamic period, where held during this period. These include the 
exhibition of the “Forgotten Persian Empire” held at the British Museum and the Louvre in 2005; the 
“Glory of Persia” held in Japan in 2007; “The Sassanid Persians: Splendors of a Forgotten Empire” held 
in France in 2007, and the showcasing of the Cyrus Cylinder at the National Museum in Tehran in 2010.  
It must be argued that despite the archaeological activities at Persepolis and the unprecedented launch of 
international exhibitions concerned with pre-Islamic Iranian heritage, the foundation of organisations and 
the arrangements made during the Khatami period were the underlying momentum to advance these 
projects. Nevertheless, as an essential component of its populist approach, Ahmadinejad’s Administration 
maintained selected number of collaborations with various organisations to execute the projects foreseen 
by the previous Government. Such arrangements fell under the overarching political discourse of 
Ahmadinejad’s Administration, which rallied on making instrumental use of pre-Islamic or Islamic 
monuments to advocate the Government’s narrative of ethnic-dynastic-Shi’a nationalism. During his visit 
to Persepolis in April 2007, Ahmadinejad stood in front of the Gate of All Nations (Fig. 5.21) and stated 
“Islam pirouz ast” (Victory is with Islam).  
In 2010, one year after Norouz was registered on the UNESCO List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Humanity, a thesis was put forth by Ahmadinejad’s Administration to celebrate the Norouz festival at 
Persepolis. In a proposal that echoed the Persepolis festivals held by the Shah’s Government at 
Persepolis, 20 Prime Ministers were invited to take part in the festivities (Azar 2011). The project caused 
164 
 
frictions between Ahmadinejad’s Administration and the principalists who argued that the President was 
manipulating archaeological monuments to implement an “Iranian discourse” and in doing so diverting 
the Iranian society from Islam and the “Islamic discourse” (ibid.). Attention to pre-Islamic archaeology, 
and in particular the Achaemenid period, was further demonstrated in the collaboration of the Iranian 
officials with the British Museum which resulted in The Forgotten Empire:The World of Ancient Persia 
exhibition in london. The exhibition was launched in the British Museum on 9 September 2005 and 
continued until 8
 
January 2006, despite last minute concerns about the exhibition following the Iranian 
election and the victory of Ahmadinejad’s Cabinet with its unsympathetic views towards the West. The 
exhibition showcased Achaemenid artefacts from collections around the world, including the National 
Museum of Tehran, as well as the unique set of plaster casts made by Weld-Blundell on his expedition to 
Persepolis in 1892 and was followed by the publication of a volume with the same title (Curtis & Tallis 
2005) and a conference that embraced the various aspects of the Achaemenid civilisation. From the 
outset, the showcasing of the exhibition was entangled in political debates given the rhetoric of 
Ahmadinejad’s Administration and the adoption of a populist discourse about Iran’s right as a ‘strong 
Islamic nation’ to have access to nuclear energy programme. A combination of policies to elevate Iran’s 
status internationally and comments about the factuality of Holocaust (Adib-Moghadam 2007:136-37) 
brought Iran into collision with the political and cultural policies of the West. This triggered a round of 
demonisation of Iran as a nation. The fragile circumstances were deteriorated in view of President Bush’s 
assortment of Iran as one of the “Axis of Evil” in 2002 (Pollack 2004:352) and in 2007 George Melloan 
claimed in Wall Street Journal that Amadinejad “has cast himself as Adolf Hitler reincarnation” (Adib-
Moghadam 2007:135). This setting lead to the further demonisation of Iran and Iranian identity through 
its depiction as the epitome of historical maliciousness with movies such as “300” and articles such as 
“The Evil Empire” (see Chapter 7). Despite the overtaking of the exhibition by contemporary political 
affairs, the collaboration of the Iranian officials to represent a segment of the Iranian history that was 
largely overlooked following the Islamic Revolution is noteworthy.  
Ahmadinejad’s Administration employed the same rhetoric when the Cyrus Cylinder was welcomed in 
Tehran. On 12 September 2010, the Cyrus Cylinder was unveiled in Iran for the second time since its 
discovery in 1879. The relic was lent to Iran by the British Museum to display at Iran’s National Museum 
for the period of three months, later extended to seven months, in response to Iran’s cooperation in 
lending artefacts to the British Museum for the exhibitions of the “Forgotten Empire” and “Shah Abbas” 
in 2005 and 2009 (http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/search_the_collection_database).  
It is here argued that the selection of Cyrus as a symbol of a ‘just ruler’ had great appeals to the 
orchestrated vision of Ahmadinejad’s Administration. First the notion of a powerful king that expanded 
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the borders of Ancient Persia and became the ruler of the Persian Empire paralleled the Government’s 
agenda for the export of Shi’a messianism, glorifying the reappearance of the 13th Shi’a Imam, Imam 
Zaman, and Iran’s rise as a global power (Fig. 5.22). A palpable scheme to this approach was Iran’s desire 
to extend its nuclear programme in order to become a regional power. Secondly, Ahmadinejad’s 
Administration strove to gain legitimacy following the disputed elections of 2009 and the subsequent 
suppression of opposition. This was particularly needed after Amnesty International and other human 
right organisations documented human rights violations in relations to the post-election discontents 
(http://www.amnesty.org). Given the pretext, the arrival of the Cyrus Cylinder as the first charter of human 
rights would support the government in producing the legitimacy that the new Administration lacked. 
These two notions will be discussed further in the following paragraphs.  
Since the Islamic Revolution, the authorities had sought to “export” their ideals beyond Iranian 
peripheries. They argued that the Revolution was not only for Shi’a Muslims but for all Muslims (Ansari 
2003:229). The principalist make up of Ahmadinejad’s Government, endorsed the following of this 
mandate. One month prior to his historic trip to Lebanon in October 2010, in a Television interview 
following the arrival of the Cyrus Cylinder to Iran, Ahmadinejad had declared that Iran aimed to liberate 
and “manage” the world. He argued to draw “historical parallels” between Cyrus’s bloodless conquest of 
“Iraq” and the replacement of their “dictatorship” with a “just regime”; with the bloody 2001 War waged 
by the United States and Britain on Iraq and Afghanistan (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/142906.html). He 
concluded thus, that there were two ways to manage the world, the American way which was violent, or 
and the Iranian way which was founded on the legacy of Cyrus the Great (ibid.).  
The Cyrus Cylinder was also adopted as an instrument to support the Government’s legitimacy 
domestically and internationally (Fig. 5.23). Considering that Ahmadinejad had emerged as media-
oriented and often received extensive media attention, the Cylinder associated with the first charter of 
human rights provided the opportunity to relieve his Cabinet from criticisms regarding the violation of 
human rights. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran has criticised the UN by raising the objection that the 
laws are laid by the most powerful international rulers and are biased against countries with different 
cultural standards (Hunter 1990:169). Iran has further accused the “West” of misusing human right issues 
for reaching critical political agendas (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/231364.html). Therefore, the reception of 
a “national icon” that is considered as the first charter of human rights was a testament to the long 
tradition of an Iranian brand of human rights values. In an interview with Iranian Press six days after the 
arrival of the Cyrus Cylinder to Tehran, Ahmadinejad offered a connection between the Cylinder and 
human right issues. Following his praise for the “just king” he argued that Cyrus’s legacy is the “symbol 
of our thought”. He further maintained that this pre-Islamic legacy had been furnished with Islam to 
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supply a “better understanding of justice” (http://www.presstv.ir/detail/142906.html).  Referring to the Cyrus 
Cylinder of human rights, Ahmadinejad declared “This is what we started with. Look how amazing it is” 
(ibid.). This rhetoric was echoed by members of Ahmadinejad’s Cabinet, such as Esfandiyar Rahim 
Mashai, Advisor to President, Hamid Baghai, the Vice President of Iran and Head of ICHHTO, and 
Azadeh Ardakani the Director of the National Museum (for a summary of their speeches see Curtis 
2013:98-99, 102).  
It may be concluded that the position of Ahmadinejad’s Administration towards cultural heritage, whether 
pre-Islamic or Islamic, was a fusion of populist approach that seldom convey a consistent policy. 
However, the general disregard towards cultural heritage and the destruction of many archaeological sites 
during this period indicated an interest in the instrumental use of archaeological monuments rather than 
concern about their cultural value. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that nationalism was a key instrument in the birth and advance 
of pre-Islamic Iranian archaeology with the site of Persepolis as a case study. This contention was 
fulfilled by investigating the adoption of Persepolis as the symbol of Iranian identity, during different 
historical periods and under different Administrations. In doing so, this chapter argued that the potential 
benefits of using Persepolis as a political instrument was already recognised by the Qajars and a variation 
of ethnic nationalism was implemented through references to the site to support Iran’s right to 
independence. During the Pahlavis, Persepolis was an instrument to advocate the ethnic nationalism 
adopted by Reza Shah’s Government, while later during the Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign it emerged as 
a symbol of dynastic nationalism. Following the Islamic Revolution and the reconstruction of Iranian 
identity towards an authentic Islamic past, Iranian nationalism was replaced with Shi’a nationalism. With 
the emergence of this new form of nationalism, Persepolis was condemned as the symbol of imperial 
decadence and subjected to various threats. Eventually, pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian identities were 
reconciled and Iranian nationalism advanced towards a populist form where Persepolis was once again 
incorporated within the political schemes of nationalism.  
Through this analysis it may be concluded that despite the process of deconstruction and reconstruction of 
Iranian identity during different political periods, the position of Persepolis as the epitome of national 
pride, varied in intensity but seldom disappeared. This argument can be supported even in the transitional 
period after the Revolution when officials prevented the destruction of the monument by zealous 
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Revolutionaries, and further consolidated its protection by registering it as a UNESCO World Heritage 
Site. The rhetoric of national pride in Persepolis was even evident in the statements of the Supreme 
Leader, Ali Khamenei, who makes references to the site annually given its popularity as a tourist 
destination during the Norouz holiday season (http://www.mashreghnews.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=6297). 
While Khamaenei has repeatedly denounced the monument as the residue of imperial decadence in the 
tradition of the Revolutionary rhetoric, he has also admired the “architectural value” and the inherent 
“Iranian talent” that produced these monuments for the “tyrannical monarchs” (ibid.). A similar 
conclusion may be drawn from the reference made to the Cyrus Cylinder in this Chapter, which further 
complemented the hypothesis for the attention to pre-Islamic archaeology and its adoption across 
different political governments. The review of attempts by Ahmadinejad’s Administration to use the 
Cyrus Cylinder to gain political support corresponds with the adoption of the same artefact during the 
Pahlavi period.  
From the special attention given to Persepolis across different political periods, it can be concluded that 
similar to Prehistoric archaeology, pre-Islamic archaeology was of Trigger’s Nationalistic variety. It was 
contended that the interpretation of Persepolis as a pre-Islamic monument, assisted the historic 
construction of Iran as a nation and the formation of Iranian national identity. In fact, the involvement of 
the first Iranian archaeologists and the formation of the first archaeological institute at Persepolis, 
confirms the contention, that archaeology is institutionalised when it becomes politically useful (Diaz-
Andreu & Champion 1996:12). 
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Figure 5.3: Fath-ali Shah’s rock relief in Tang-e Allahu Akbar-Shiraz. 
(After Lerner 1991:fig.2.) 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Persepolis: Gate of all Nations by Luigi Pesce 1858 
(After Metropolitan Museum of Art) 
 
 Figure 5.2: Farhad Mirza’s inscription in the Palace 
of Darius (After Sarkhosh-Curtis 2005: fig.74.) 
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Figure 5.6: Reza Shah and Crown Prince’s visit to Persepolis in 1935. 
A commemoration to Reza Shah’s 100
th
 birthday- stamp issued 1978 
(After Stamp Directory 2007:245) 
 
Figure 5.4: Stamp issued in 1914 depicting 
the relics of Persepolis  
(After Stamp Directory 2007:85) 
 
Figure 5.5: Design of Vignetta for National Heritage Society (1903) 
(After Ernst Herzfeld papers Freer Gallery of Art and ArthurM. 
Sackler Gallery Archives, Smithsonian Institution) 
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Figure 5.8: Banknote issued in 1958 to inaugurate the 
opening of the International Mehrabad Airport 
depicting Persepolitan motifs. (After 
http://www.banknotes.com/ir.htm  
Accessed 02/09/11) 
 
Figure 5.7: The Foreign Ministry (Left) and the National Bank of Iran (Right) inspired by Persepolitan Motifs 
(Photo by Author 2009) 
 
Figure 5.9: Stamp issued in 1969 to commemorate the 
6
th
 Anniversary of the White Revolution and the 
Achaemenid 12 petalled symbol. (After Stamp 
Directory 2007:178) 
 
171 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Iran Air advertisement & the emphasis on 2500 years of history. 
(After National Geographic Archives 1975) 
 
 
Figure 5.10: 1969 Issue of Vogue Magazine. Advertisement for Iran Air (Left) and fashion shot at 
Persepolis (Right) (http://shahrefarang.com/en/vogue-iran/ Accessed 03/23/13) 
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5.12: The Theatre of the 3rd World, theme of Festival of Art held at Shiraz in 1973 
with the opening ceremony at Persepolis. (After Ryan 1973) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Karlheinz Stockhausen performing at Shiraz Art Festival in 1972- 
Persepolis. (After Stockhausen Foundation for Music) 
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Figure 5.16: March of the Achaemenid Royal Guards at Persepolis Celebration 
(After Center of Documents for the Islamic Revolution) 
 
Figure 5.14: Gate of Xerexes-Persepolis. IsMEO 
replacing the architrave (After G.Tilia IsMEO 
Activities 1970:9) 
                        
 
 Figure 5.15: Stamp issued in 1974- Save 
Venice Campaign (After Stamp Directory 
2007:218) 
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Figure 5.19: Persepolis certified as a World 
Heritage Site in 1979 
(After Pars-e Pasargad Research Institute) 
 
Figure 5.18: The Cyrus Cylinder depicted on postage stamps 
issue on October 12 1971. 2500
th
 Anniversary of Persian 
Empire (8
th
 issue). (After Stamp Directory 2007:195) 
Figure 5.17: The Cylinder of Cyrus adopted 
as the emblem for the commemoration of 
2500
th
 Anniversary of Iranian Monarchy. 
(http://www.angelfire.com/empire/imperia
liran/persepolis1.html Accessed 19/04/11) 
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5.20: Gil.J. Stein & Mohammad Beheshti. Iran receiving the               
Persepolis Tablets from Oriental Institute of Chicago in 2004. 
(After Persepolis Fortification Tablets Archives) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.21:  Ahmadinejad at the Gate of All 
Nations-Persepolis. 
(http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007
- 04/20/content_855319.htm Accessed 
03/12/12) 
 
Figure 5.22: Iran sponsored the construction of a replica of Al-Aqsa 
Mosque in Jerusalem in the Southern Lebanese village of Maroun-al-
Ras in honor of Ahmadinejad’s visit to the region in 2010. (After 
Nagar Levit 2010) 
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Figure 5.23: President Ahmadinejad inaugurating the Cyrus Cylinder exhibition at the 
National Museum of Iran with Hamid Baqai the Head of CHHTO by his side  
                                           (http://edition.presstv.ir/detail.fa/142251.html Accessed 18/10/12) 
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Chapter 6 
Nationalism & the Treatment of Islamic Archaeological Sites: The Friday Mosque 
of Isfahan 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that similar to Prehistoric and pre-Islamic archaeology, Islamic 
archaeology in Iran was born and dominated by a Nationalistic tradition in archaeology. This argument is 
supported by demonstrating that although during the Pahlavi period Islamic archaeology was 
‘Persianised’ and during the post-Revolutionary period it became ‘Islamised’, the common denominator 
remained the adoption of a particular interpretation of the past to facilitate the nationalistic rhetoric of 
various administrations. It is argued, given that the post-Revolutionary Administration authenticated its 
legitimacy through ‘populism’, as an integral part of Shi’a nationalism, rather than in history, there was a 
general tendency to disregard archaeology, including Islamic archaeology. Nevertheless, Islamic 
archaeology has been implemented as a political discourse to export the Iranian brand of Islam, and 
therefore, remains Nationalistic. To address these issues, the case study of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan 
has been selected and will be analysed in detail. 
As Hillenbrand argued, the story of art  and architecture was in the past, and still is to some extent, 
dominated by European traditions at the expense of omitting the “non-Western” and “Islamic” artistic 
traditions (Hillenbrand 2003:2). The Islamic monuments in Iran had fallen into further obscurity owing to 
their inaccessibility to non-Muslim (infidel) visitors, while knowledge of Islamic art and architecture 
grew in the rest of the Muslim world in the nineteenth century. It was only in the early 1930s and in 
response to the secular rhetoric of Reza Shah’s Government that Iranian mosques were for the first time 
exposed to foreign scholars to unveil these newly discovered form of Islamic art and architecture. The 
Islamic monuments in Isfahan, in particular, suffered further negligence, as most scholarly attention was 
swayed by the colour and grandiosity of the Safavid architecture remains from the seventeenth century, 
while overlooking the older monuments. A glance at the Islamic monuments of Isfahan, however, brings 
to light one of the most important contributions to Islamic architecture in Iran, and perhaps the Islamic 
world, extending back to the tenth century and the early days of Islam in Iran. This monument, famously 
known as the Friday Mosque of Isfahan, is also identified as the Jame’ (congregation) Mosque of Isfahan, 
the Jom’e (Friday) Mosque of Isfahan and the Atiq (old) Mosque of Isfahan.  
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As one of the first mosques constructed by the Abbasids in the city of Isfahan, the significance of the 
complex lies in its appeal as an assembly place for people. The dynamic function of the Friday Mosque as 
a place of congregation and a centre for education, along with its strategic location at the centre of the city 
has granted the monument with contributions from various sovereigns who sought to implement their 
authority. The politically strategic location of Isfahan and its abundant supply of water for agriculture 
further prepared the city to become an influential metropolis, the domination of which was vital to 
different ruling dynasties. They each introduced a particular form of art, the expression of which has been 
manifested at the Friday Mosque. This accumulation of art and architectural styles induced Pope in the 
1930s to identify the Mosque as one of the most important structures in Iran and a manual for the post-
Islamic art and architecture of the country (Pope 1976:52). The 20 distinctive structures of the Mosque 
that vary in date from the eleventh to eighteenth centuries have repeatedly been subjected to war, damage, 
destruction, and reconstruction (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Mosque remains as a testimony to the art and 
architecture of the past empires.. 
As one of the most significant and extensively studied Islamic monuments in Iran, the Friday Mosque of 
Isfahan was selected as a case study for an Islamic site to evaluate the impact of diverse ideological 
concepts on its treatment during various historical periods. This chapter will begin with locating the 
Friday Mosque in the heart of historic Isfahan and providing a context for the significance of the 
monument. As it was undertaken for the two previous case studies, the methodological approach is 
concerned with the three historical periods that begin with the Qajars, continue with the Pahlavis and end 
with the post-Revolutionary Administration. This chapter contends to argue that during the Qajar period, 
the Friday Mosque retained its functional purposes as one of Isfahan’s many mosques. During the first 
Pahlavi period the imposition of secular ideologies and the selection of pre-Islamic period as the ‘golden 
age’ of Iranian identity did not lead to neglecting Islamic sites but rather generated a renaissance in the 
study of Islamic art and archaeology with special emphasis on the Friday Mosque. While the pre-Islamic 
identity of Iran continued to be stressed during the second Pahlavi period, extensive renovations and 
excavations were undertaken within the Mosque. Finally, following the Revolution the Mosque was 
returned to the community and thus began a new adventure in its history. The central challenge of this 
chapter is to exhibit the motives behind the unprecedented escalation of Islamic archaeology during the 
Pahlavi Administration, the core of which rested on ethnic-dynastic nationalism; and the negligence of 
Islamic monuments during the post-Revolutionary period when Shi’a nationalism became the central 
emphasis of the State.  
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6.2. Historical Background 
The recorded accounts of Isfahan and its monuments come from various sources during different 
historical periods. These sources vary in nature depending on which episode of Isfahan’s history they 
intend to encapsulate. In general, Isfahan twice served as the political and cultural centre of Iran; first 
during the Seljuk (r. 1037-1194 AD) and Safavid rule (r. 1502-1736 AD) (Meri & Bacharach 2006:399). 
Prior to the Safavid era, the monuments of Isfahan were often cited in the chronicles of Islamic 
geographers and travellers such as Abu No’aym, Al Mafarrukhi, Al Moqaddasi, Naser Khusrow, Yaqut 
and Ibn Battuta (Graber 1990:10; Babaie & Haug 2007). The chief focus of these accounts rested on the 
Meidan-e Kohneh (Old Square) and it’s Friday Mosque, which composed the core of the pre-Abbasid 
city. This trend was significantly altered when in 1598 Shah Abbas decided to promote Isfahan as the 
metropolis of his Empire. The flourishing trade and the high religious tolerance associated with this 
period attracted many European travellers (Canby 2009:24). The towering construction of buildings and 
the re-focusing of the urban core of town to Naqsh-e Jahan (Ornament of the World) during post-Safavid 
Isfahan, however, produced a different account of building and monuments given by Europeans, often at 
the expense of the old centre of town. It is worth mentioning that this attraction towards the colourful 
Safavid structures did not lead to a total disregard of the Friday Mosque. In fact, as it will be illustrated, 
some of the first analytical descriptions of the Mosque were offered by Europeans such as Chardin and 
Coste during the seventeenth century.  
The history of the Friday Mosque extends back to the eighth and ninth centuries when the city came under 
the Abassid Caliphs (Meri & Bacharach 2006:399). The Arab settlement in and around Isfahan in the 
early Islamic times had an influence on the architectural structures of Isfahan. During this early period, 
the Abbasids initiated the construction of congregational mosques in cities to commemorate the 
establishment of Islamic communities. According to the historian Abu Nu’aim al Isfahani, as early as 773 
a new Friday Mosque, the third in the region of Isfahan, was built in the district of Yahudiyya (the Jewish 
city) on the location of the present Friday Mosque (Gaube 2008:164). Abu Nu’aim further stated that it 
was constructed on the site of a Church built in the Sassanid period (Golombek 1974:21-22). Prior to 
extensive studies that took place at the Mosque in 1970s, Golombek (1974) argued that this account 
suggested the existence of a Sassanid fortification under the Mosque with a Christian Church near the 
structure (ibid.). Other literary sources about this pre-Seljuk Mosque come from Al Muqaddasi, Al 
Mafarrukhi, and Naser Khosrow. Al Muqaddasi (985) provided one of the first accounts when he 
described the detail of the roof supported by round columns, and the minaret on the qibla side, entirely 
covered in plaster (Schroeder 1939:957). A more telling description of the Mosque came from Al 
Mafarrukhi, a historian from a respected Isfahani family, who wrote his Kitab Mahasin Isfahan between 
180 
 
1072 and 1092 (Mafrrukhi 2006). Mafarrukhi stated that the old and massive Friday Mosque was 
originally built by Tamimi Arabs from the Village of Tiran, and enlarged by Khasib-ibn Muslim 
(Mafrrukhi 2006:89; Schroeder 1939:957). He further described a basin for ablutions in the court and 
Sheykhs instructing on the foot of the existing piers. In Mafarrukhi’s time, caravanserais and eating 
houses were added to the Mosque, and a library was established (Mafrrukhi 2006:89-90; Mafrrukhi cited 
in Paul 2000:130). The Abbasid revolt of 747 was followed by a period of control over the city by the 
Daylamite between 912-13 and then the Samanid between 916-17 (Bosworth 1996:171). This troubled 
period of Isfahan’s history continued from 927 with disputes between Buyid and Ghaznavid (r. 977- 1086 
AD). Despite political turmoil, Isfahan under the Buyid flourished and the Friday Mosque in Yahudiyya 
was said to be bigger than that of Hamadan (ibid.:172-72).  
This pre-Seljuk period of Isfahan’s history has been introduced by some as the impetus for the formation 
of Shi’a identity in Iran (Marcinkowski 2010:69) and the spark for the architectural renaissance of Persian 
art during the Seljuks (Ayatollahi 2003:213-14). Indeed, the Samanid, who despite their Islamic 
conversion claimed descendant from a noble Sassanid family; and Buyid, an Iranian Shi’a dynasty, 
emerged in the tenth century as national awareness began to appear against the subjugating Arabs who 
ruled Iran (Frye 1975:136). The greatest manifestation of this revival of Iranian identity is displayed by 
Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh. In comparison with the Samanid who ruled from Greater Khurasan, the Buyid 
had a more immediate impact on the Friday Mosque considering one of the major seats of their 
Government was in Shiraz, close to Isfahan. In 1037-8 Ala al-Dowleh built a wall around the urban centre 
that had grown around the mosque and the market place (Le Strange 1930:204; Bosworth 1996:171; Meri 
& Bacharach 2006:399). The oldest city plan of Isfahan, reveals that the Friday Mosque and the Old 
Meidan (the large square southeast of the Mosque), were directly in the centre of the city (Gaube 2008: 
165). The contributions of the Buyid to the Friday Mosque were uncovered in the 1970s as the vestiges of 
an earlier Mosque beneath the current one emerged (Hutt 1978:253; Galdieri 1984:18). Therefore the 
subsequent Seljuk Mosque, which forms the nucleus of the Mosque as it stands today, was built on the 
plan of the original rectangular Buyid Mosque with colonnades on four sides (Hutt 1978:253).  
In the mid-tenth century, after two attacks on Isfahan, the city fell to Tughril Beg the Seljuk. The 
thirteenth-century historian, Yaqut, writing nearly two centuries after the event, recorded that when 
Tughril entered the city after his successful siege in June 1051, the inhabitants had been obliged, by lack 
of wood, to demolish the Friday Mosque (Blunt & Swan 1966:23, 30). Yet, in 1052, Naser Khosrow in 
his Safar-Nameh (Book of Travel), described the Mosque as a “great and magnificent” building that stood 
in the centre of town (ibid.). Schroeder argued that since a “superb mosque” is hardly built in a year, this 
account forces us to conclude that the Isfahanis in tearing away the wood from the Mosque had not 
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substantially damaged it (Schroeder 1939:956). They may have demolished the roofs or doors, or such 
annexes as library, a treasury, or a bath associated with the Mosque, but the report was hardly credible in 
its literal sense (ibid.). Blunt and Sawn (1966:30) further contended that the report of the great Mosque 
observed by Naser Khosrow was either due to the fact that only minor buildings were destroyed, or that 
the destruction occurred after Naser Khosrow’s visit. 
In 1063 Isfahan became the capital of the Seljuk Empire under Alp Arsalan (Petersen 1996:255). Under 
Saljuk patronage, the fundamentals of Iranian mosque architecture was laid as an archetype that continued 
to influence monuments within Islamic Iran for centuries to come. The Friday Mosque in Isfahan, 
although not the first example, nonetheless provides a permanent model of Seljuk structural compositions 
(ibid.). The Seljuk planned their centre near the existing Friday Mosque and given that the Mosque and its 
square became the focal point of the city, the area is often considered as the core of “pre-Safavid” Isfahan 
and the epitome of Seljuk architecture (ibid.). The Seljuk played a significant role in forming the principle 
structure of the Mosque as it stands today. The reign of Malik Shah (r.1072-1092 AD) and his Persian 
Vizier Hasan Tusi Nizam al-Mulk (r.1018-1092 AD) is often considered as the ‘golden age’ of the Seljuk 
period. The most notable additions to the Mosque during this period were the two domes in the north-east 
(Fig. 6.1) and south-west (Fig. 6.2) axis of the courtyard. In 1087 Nizam al-Mulk constructed the 
principle dome chamber (Fig. 6.3 area 3) of the Mosque on the south-east flank and before the mihrab 
(Brend 1991:74). In 1088-89, Nizam al-Mulk’s rival and successor, Taj al-Mulk, built a smaller more 
refined dome chamber (Fig. 6.3 area 8) on the north-east corner called Taj al-Mulk Dome or Gunbad’I 
Khaki (Earth dome). This dome is considered the supreme masterpiece of Saljuk architecture with its 
framing arches and brick inscriptions that circle the inside of the base of the dome (ibid.:75). Schroeder 
called this dome an “ideal dome” and considered the Persian dome builders of the Seljuk period the 
greatest masters of this architectural form in the world (Schroeder 1939:1008). 
These two Seljuk domes also signified the first political dissent over Shi’a-Sunni dispute in medieval 
Persia. The Friday Mosque was considered the centre of Sunnism and therefore a subject of dispute in 
sectarian refutes. Lambton (1984:59) argued that Nizam al-Mulk’s intolerance towards Shi’ism was 
justified as they represented the Buyid dynasty, whom the Seljuk had succeeded; however, the real threat 
to the State came from the Ismai’lis (Batinis). Alp-Arsalan was recorded to have said “Shi’ism is bad but 
Batinism is worse” (ibid.). The Isma’ilis, who also belonged to a branch of Shi’a sect, finally displayed 
their dissent by burning the main body of the Sunni Friday Mosque in 1129-21 (Brend 1991:75). 
Mafarrukhi stated that after the fire, there remained the two domes of Nizam al-Mulk and Taj al-Mulk 
(Honarfar 1965:80). Schroeder (1939:956), however, argued that the dispute was between the Shafi’ite 
and Hanifite sects (both Sunni), and after the destruction of the Mosque by the Shafi’ite, Nizam al-Mulk 
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replaced the old dome with the new one which bears his inscriptions. Therefore, he detected that the 
Nizam al-Mulk Dome was constructed after the sectarian feud that lead to the fire.  
The rebuilding of the Mosque after the fire had a substantial impact on the structural format of the 
building by transforming it from a hypostyle to a four-ivan Mosque, which became the characteristic of 
Iranian architecture for centuries to come (Graber 1968:631). The new structure had lofty brick piers 
supporting the vaults and the domes, and an ivan was placed at the centre of each courtyard façade (Brend 
1991:75-6). The balance of the court was overshadowed by the wider ivan on the qibla side, which was 
followed by a dome rising above the rest of the structure, in this case the Nizam al-Mulk Dome (Graber 
1968:629). The origins of the four-ivan plan is a matter of debate, but possibly traceable to palace 
architecture of pre-Islamic periods in Iran (Brend 1991:76). The Friday Mosque may not be the first four-
ivan mosque, but it certainly provides a classic example for this form of architecture (ibid.). To restore the 
orthodoxy of Sunnism and counteract Shi’ism, Nizam al-Mulk added a madrasa to the plan of the 
Mosque in the late eleventh century (ibid.). Graber (1968:633) argued that the appearance of the four-ivan 
model during this period may have roots in the need to accommodate the construction of a madrasa in the 
Mosque. In 1092 Nizam al-Mulk was assassinated, bringing the ‘golden age’ of the Seljuk architecture to 
an end in Isfahan (Morgan 1988:32). Through the composition of his book of guidance, Siyasat Nameh 
(The Book of Government), Nizam al-Mulk is recognised in Iranian history as the Persian Vizier of a 
Sunni Seljuk ruler who demonstrated the coexistence and compatibility of pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian 
values (Yavari 2012:238).  
Many more elements were added over the centuries to the Seljuk structure of the Mosque. However, 
Graber (1990:57) argued that any subsequent alterations to the Mosque were simply to accommodate the 
functional needs and specific events rather than an ambition royal project. The next significant chapter in 
the history of the Mosque unfolded with the Mongols and the imprints of their stamp on the Mosque. Iran 
was brought under the Mongol sphere of influence in the early thirteenth century. Following the Mongol 
invasion, when Ibn Battuta visited Isfahan in the early fourteenth century, he was struck by the state of 
decay that had befallen the city (Dunn 1986:95). The initial destruction of Iran by the Mongols later 
developed into what has been considered a benign and culturally flourishing period in Persian art and 
architecture (Lane 2012:243). Prominent among the influential Mongol rulers, who called themselves 
Ilkhans, was Mohammad Uljaytu Khodabandeh (r.1282-1316 AD). Uljaytu was a proponent of 
theological debate and in 1310 under the influence of Shi’a scholars such as Taj al-Din Avaji and Jamal 
al-Din Mutahhir, he converted to Shi’ism (Bausani 1968:543). Thereafter, Uljaytu became a strong 
promoter of Shi’a ideology and engaged in the extensive patronage of Shi’a institutes. It was during this 
period that the principle canons of Shi’a doctrine were established under scholars such as Naser al-Din 
183 
 
Tusi (1274) and Allama Hilli (1326) (ibid.:544). The conversion of Uljaytu to Shi’ism and his promotion 
of this branch of Islam is treated as a significant phase of Iranian history in this thesis given its 
contribution to the maturation of a sect which subsequently developed into an essential component of 
Iranian identity. The contributions of Uljaytu are particularly important to the structure of the Friday 
Mosque as they represent the introduction of Shi’a expressions into a Sunni bastion (Brend1991:126). His 
addition was manifested in the construction of a prayer room with a superb stucco mihrab (Fig .6.3 area 
14) which is dated to 1310 and is a commemorative gift to acknowledge the conversion of the Ilkhan ruler 
to Shi’ism (Fig. 6.4) (Renard 1998:45). The mihrab constitutes numerous professions of Shi’a faith 
through the Kufi inscriptions of hadith (text ascribed to Prophet Muhammad). The closing words of the 
inscription “Ali wali Allah” (Ali is the Friend of God), is a manifestation of the injection of the new Shi’a 
tradition into the Friday Mosque (Schimmel 1974:105). 
One of the struggling successors of Ilkhanid who gained prominence in 1353 were the Muzaffarids, a 
dynasty of Arab origins whose power lasted until 1393 (Brend 1991:124). Although much of their rule 
was associated with family strife, they were patrons of art and theology (Bosworth 1996:265). The 
Muzaffarid added a madrasa (Madrese-ye Omar) (Fig 6.3 area 17) and a Shabestan to the south-eastern 
side of the Friday Mosque as a testimony to the artistic quality of craftsman in this period (Fig. 6.5) (Hutt 
1978:253). The name of the madrasa (Omar) and the inscription of the names Abubakr, Omar, and 
Othman (the Caliphs of the Sunni tradition), display the Sunni inclinations of this complex (Honarfar 
1965:139).  
Tamerlane captured Isfahan in 1386, massacring its inhabitants but sparing its buildings (Blunt 1974:47). 
Blunt argued that under the Timurid many craftsmen, particularly tile-makers, left Isfahan to work for 
Tamerlane in Western towns and Samarqand (ibid.). The only surviving evidence of Timurid building at 
the Mosque is the Beit al-Sheta (winter hall) (Fig 6.3 area 15) and a portal on the north-western side 
incorporated into the Mosque at the order of Sultan Muhammad, the Governor of Isfahan (1446-1451 
AD) (Honarfar 1965:72). The most significant contribution of the Timurid was the use of faience tile 
which later inspired the colourful Safavid architecture (Babaie & Haug 2007). It was during this period 
that the courtyard façade of the Mosque, which was mainly plain-brick in the Seljuk period, was sheathed 
by colourful mosaic-tiles (ibid.).  
The main rival to the Timurid rule in Isfahan were the Aq Quyunlus’ (the White Sheep) of Turkman 
origin. The imprint of Aq Quyunlus’ Sultan Uzun Hasan emerged at the Friday Mosque in the form of an 
inscription dated to 1475-79 that mentions the deteriorating conditions of the Mosque and the restoration 
of the ceiling of an ivan (Graber 1990:30). It is argued that the tile-work of the sanctuary ivan in the 
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south-west (Fig 6.3 area 4) may be ascribed to a part of Uzun Hasan’s restorations (Wilson 1986:758). 
Godard (1936:248) argued that in addition to the vault on the south-west ivan, the minarets could also be 
attributed to restorations done during this period. 
In the fifteenth century with the ascendance of the Safavid dynasty to power, Isfahan once again became a 
city of royal patronage for architecture since the Seljuk period. The principle information about the 
Mosque during this period is retrieved from two sources; the inscriptions that decorated the walls and 
gates of the Mosque subsequent to any form of alteration to the structure, and the foreign travelogues. It 
was also during the Safavid period (r.1449-1736 AD) and during the reign of Shab Abbas I (r.1587-1629 
AD) that the Friday Mosque of Isfahan began to deteriorate.   
 From the inscriptions at the Friday Mosque it can be conceived that the Safavid Shahs continued to treat 
the Mosque as a political centre with the inscription of various farmans (decrees), as well as attempts to 
ta’mir (restore) and taz’in (beautify) various components of the Mosque (Honarfar 1965:87-88). The 
majority of Safavid kings, including Shah Ismail I (r.1502-1524 AD), Shah Tahmasp I (r.1524-1576 AD), 
Shah Abbas I (r.1587-1529 AD) and Shah Abbas II (r.1642-1666 AD), Shah Sulaiman (r.1666-1694 AD) 
and Shah Sultan Hossein (r.1694-1722 AD) contributed to the restoration of the Mosque. In addition, 
Shah Ismail and Shah Tahmasp both made decrees reducing the taxes of the people of Isfahan (ibid.). In 
1531-2, Shah Ismail placed an inscription in the Mosque that describes the Shah as “the leader of the 
army of the Mahdi, the Lord of the Age” (Newman 2009:32). This was a significant attempt as it elevated 
the status of the Shah to that of the hidden Imam (Mahdi), a tradition that more or less persisted to the 
reign of the Qajar kings who portrayed themselves as the “shadow of god”. The tradition of placing 
inscriptions in the Friday Mosque continued with Shah Tahmasp who ordered the inscription of his 
triumph over the Uzbeks as well as details about his repairs (Honarfar 1965:150; Blake 1999:16).  
The above attention to the Friday Mosque of Isfahan demonstrates that the Mosque continued to serve as 
the congregational space and a centre of religion and social life in Isfahan until the time of Shah Abbas. In 
1590 Shah Abbas transferred his capital from Qazvin to Isfahan and in doing so began to embellish the 
city with architecture that transformed Isfahan to a metropolitan city (Blake 1999:104). Shah Abbas 
began his project with repairs and renovations around the Old Meidan (called Harun-e Vilayat). He even 
engaged in adding a Chehel Sotun (40 columns) (Fig 6.3 area 7) to the south-east of the Mosque 
(Honarfar 1965:71). As Blunt (1974:60) argued, Shah Abbas was initially content with enlarging the Old 
Meidan and retaining it as the centre of the city, but when a truculent landowner refused to sale his 
property for the intended developments, Shah Abbas moved the centre of the city’s life elsewhere (ibid.). 
In 1611 as the New Meidan and the Masjid-e Shah (Shah Mosque) were constructed under the patronage 
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of Shah Abbas, the Friday Mosque slowly lost its preeminent position. Descriptions of Shah Mosque 
demonstrate that Shah Abbas meant the new mosque to replace the role of the old one, even taking the 
name Masjid-e Jami’ Jadid Abbasi (The New Masjid Jame’ of Abbasi) (Blake 1999:150). In his attempt 
to complete the Mosque quickly, Shah Abbas even tried to remove Yazd marbles from the Friday 
Mosque, an attempt that was prevented by the clergy (Blunt 1974:77-8) 
The foreign explorers who navigated through Isfahan in the sixteenth and seventeenth century were 
overwhelmed by the attractiveness and predominance of the Safavid art and architecture. The construction 
of a rival congregational mosque, Shah Mosque (later Royal Mosque), that marked the beginning of the 
Shi’a domain of Islam, marginalised the older Mosque (Babaie & Haug 2007). The promotion of the Shah 
Mosque by the Safavids’ and the plain features of the Friday Mosque, which lacked the colour and 
vibrancy of Safavid architecture, led to the extensive omission or trivial treatment of the latter Mosque in 
the writings of foreign travellers. While European trade was encouraged, various merchants, missionaries, 
adventurers and ambassadors, including the English organ maker, Thomas Dallam, the Huguenot jeweler 
Jean Chardin, the German physician Engelbert Kaempfer, and Capuchin father Raphael du Mans travelled 
to Persia (Blair & Bloom 2004:194). Some of these travellers have faintly described the state of the 
Friday Mosque during this period. 
The seventeenth-century French traveller, Chardin argued that the centrality of the Friday Mosque and its 
Old Maidan was challenged by Shah Abbas I and his New Meidan complex which became the symbolic 
focal point of the Safavid Persia (Ferrier 1996:50). The crafts and trades were located around the old 
Mosque but the businesses had begun to deteriorate (Newman 2009:96). Although by the late 1660s the 
old Friday Mosque no longer functioned as the central congregational mosque, there are confirmations 
that it continued to maintain a degree of significance. First it should be noted that a great passage was 
constructed to link the Old Meidan and its Friday Mosque to the New Meidan (Fig. 6.6). This attempt 
illustrates that the Old Meidan and its Mosque were considered as a significant part of civil life in Isfahan 
subsequent to the Safavid attempt to relocate the centre of town to the New Meidan (Zandieh 2004:98). 
Graber (1990:60) argued that despite the relocation of the socio-political life of the city to the New 
Meidan, it was the old Mosque of the city, not that of the king, that retained the rules by which life carried 
on. Shirazi (1974:589) further maintained that the Old Meidan never lost its importance, but the nature of 
its activities changed as shops and markets replaced the former centre of politics. More recent studies 
about the urbanisation process of Isfahan indicated that the Old Meidan, the Friday Mosque, and the 
access to bazaar represented the traditional urban landscape of the Safavid period (Zandieh 2004:103). 
Considering the function of the mosque as a public space that served both religious and social activities of 
the neighbourhood, the clustering of Isfahani population around the Friday Mosque may indicate that 
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despite the increasing number of mosques in Isfahan, the Friday Mosque continued to occupy a 
significant role in the life of the residents. Graber (1990:60) argued that although the inscription of 
farmans indicate that the Friday Mosque occupied a significant place in the Safavid society, eventually 
the new Mosque became reserved for important functions. The occasions of coronation and religious 
festivals were repositioned to the new Mosque and the principle religious scholars of the day taught in the 
Shah Mosque during the seventeenth century (Blake 1999:151). However, the placement of an inscription 
during the reign of Shah Suleiman Safavi regarding the renovations that took place on the northern axis 
reveals that the Mosque continued to be significant and in operation (Honarfar 1965:124). Nevertheless, 
in 1704 and ten years after the reign of Shah Suleiman, the Dutch painter de Bruyn describes the Old 
Meidan as an stable, with only poorer guilds still carrying businesses in that area (Newman 2009:96).  
Despite the above remark when Ashraf Afghan captured Isfahan in 1722, he reserved the Omar madrasa, 
which as described above was a Sunni addition to the Mosque during the Muzaffarid period, as the 
praying district for the Sunni Afghan soldiers and his own companions (Honarfar 1965:142). Further, in 
an attempt to avoid sectarian conflicts with the Shi’a, the corridor that joined the madrasa to the Mosque 
was closed with a wall and a new entrance from the bazaar was provided for the madrasa (ibid.). These 
historic episodes demonstrate that not only the Friday Mosque was fully functional as late as the mid 
eighteenth century, but it continued to be considered as a significant social bastion where the conquerors 
could advocate their authority to the citizens of Isfahan. It also displays that the multi-factional façade of 
the Mosque with its incorporation of Shi’a and Sunni wings allowed Muslims from different sects to 
respect this Mosque as the congregational Mosque of Isfahan. In the late 1730s when Nader Shah 
established the Afsharid dynasty (r.1736-1796 AD) he moved his capital from Isfahan to Mashhad and 
although the old capital remained under his patronage, his affiliation with the Sunni sect distanced him 
from the centre of Shi’a Islam in Isfahan (Curzon 1986:128). The following Zand (r.1750-1794 AD) and 
Qajar dynasties moved their capitals to Shiraz and Tehran respectively. Only Fath-ali Shah and Naser al-
Din Shah felt content with Isfahan. It was during the reign of Fath-ali Shah that the gate of the Friday 
Mosque was repaired and Naser al-Din Shah made minor alterations to other mosques in Isfahan.  
Travelogues from the Qajar period provide only brief descriptions of the Friday Mosque given it 
remained closed to non-Muslims. Nonetheless, some of the first depictions of the Friday Mosque were 
from this period by Pascal Coste (Fig. 6.7) and Madame Dieulafoy. It can be deduced that due to its 
functional purpose, the Friday Mosque was repaired by various donors who made it their duty as noble 
Muslims to safeguard the Mosque from falling into despair.  
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The first scientific study of the Friday Mosque was initiated during the reign of Reza Shah. Although the 
secular nature of the Pahlavi Administration made this period an unlikely moment in the history of Iran to 
ponder on the Islamic past of the country, the efforts of foreign scholars in the introduction of Iranian 
Islamic art and archaeology through various congresses, exhibitions, and publications permitted the 
development of this discipline. The initial studies of the Mosque during the reign of Reza Shah provided 
primary information about the historical chronology of the structure. Interest in the Mosque was 
maintained during the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah when as part of a larger project to restore various 
Islamic structures in Isfahan it became subjected to various repairs and excavations by IsMEO. After the 
Islamic Revolution and during the subsequent War with Iraq, Isfahan was hit by rockets in 1985 but the 
damaged southern flank was immediately restored.  
As is evident in this historical context, it is clear that the Friday Mosque of Isfahan served continuously as 
one of the chief centres of life and ideology in Isfahan. The narrative of the Mosque is intertwined with 
the history of the development of Isfahan as one of the major cities in Iran. It is in this context that the rest 
of this chapter will attempt to detect the influence of various nationalistic ideologies on the treatment of 
the Mosque during the Qajar, Pahlavi, and the post-Revolutionary periods.  
 
6.3. Qajar Nationalism: Case Study of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan 
As illustrated in the previous chapters, the politicisation of Iranian archaeology that emerged during the 
Pahlavi period had deep roots in the cultural and intellectuals changes that dominated the course of events 
in the late nineteenth century. In effect, it is argued that the Qajar period served as a mediator between the 
traditional imperial form of governance, which sought legitimation in the institutes of monarchy and 
Shari’a, and the later concept of a political nation-state that gained its legitimacy from a set of pre-
existing ethnic components to define the State. In this context it has been argued that while in the 
traditional Qajar paradigm of kingship legitimacy was granted to the person of the king as the ‘centre of 
divine glory’, the Qajar kings had begun to appreciate the potential of historic and pre-Islamic symbols as 
a political tool to modify domestic and international affairs. In addition, the Iranian intellectual movement 
towards the European-designed concept of a nation was discussed in respect to their agenda in 
authenticating Iranian civilisation by casting pre-Islamic history as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian history, 
while holding Islam responsible for the decadence that epitomised the Qajar period. While in the previous 
chapter the emphasis of Qajar on the institute of monarchy as one of the dual authorities of their 
legitimacy, monarchy and Shari’a, was examined (see Section 5.3.), this section will illustrate the Qajars’ 
reliance on the institution of Shari’a. It is demonstrated that, despite the inclination of the Qajar dynasty 
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to support the religious aspects of Iranian society, their refuge in a traditional framework of mind 
prevented the appreciation of Islamic monuments as cultural heritage. Therefore monuments such as the 
Friday Mosque witnessed a period of neglect during this period. 
As argued in previous chapters, while the Qajars’ lack of motivation to utilise the past in authenticating 
their rule, restricted the pronounced manipulation of archaeological monuments, they had comprehended 
the political potentials of such applications. In order to understand the dynamics of this association with 
Islamic monuments, it is necessary to demonstrate incidents that articulate the Qajars’ patronage of 
Shari’a as a source of legitimacy. Marashi (2008:19) argued that following Naser al-Din Shah’s European 
tour, he began to foster a new style of governance which increasingly relied on what he termed “royalist 
Shi’sim”. This new mandate was manifested in official celebrations, ceremonies, and commemorations, to 
break down the barriers separating the monarch from the masses (ibid.). The tenor of these events was 
inherently Islamic in nature. The most prominent illustration of this attempt was exhibited in the 
construction of a form of public theater called Taky-e Dowlat in Tehran in order to perform the state-
sponsored event of Ta’ziyeh, the passion play performed annually during the month of Moharram to 
commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hossein, the third Shi’a Imam (ibid.:39). From such activities it 
can be deduced that the Qajars had already initiated the application of a specific narrative of Islam in 
order to appeal to a pious Shi’a society. The influence of such legacies permeated to the refurbishment of 
Islamic monuments, especially those immediately associated with the Safavid, the pioneers of Shi’a 
Islam. Walcher (2001:117) argued that the most active constructive phase in Isfahan took place during the 
reigns of Fath-ali Shah and Naser al-Din Shah. The construction activities during Fath-ali Shah’s reign 
were mostly concerned with the restoration of Isfahan’s former magnificence and thus focused on Safavid 
remains (ibid.). Similarly as Mostowfi (1995:5-9) argued, the refurbishments that followed Naser al-Din 
Shah’s visit to Isfahan in 1850 were directed towards monuments from the Safavid era. This stress on the 
Safavid monuments demonstrates the Qajars’ inclination towards associating the Safavid period and its 
edifices as the ‘golden age’. However, would these illustrations confirm that the Qajar had comprehended 
the value of Islamic monuments, such as mosques, as manipulative instruments to authenticate their 
legitimacy? To further articulate this issue, the implications of a mosque as a functional space and the role 
of vaqf (endowment) in Islamic Shari’a will be discussed.  
The Islamic mosque was developed as a communal space where people came to congregate. It was not 
only a religious centre, but a political institute for religion, law, and government, where royal decrees, 
notices of tax, and tax exemptions were set up by the monarch to proclaim his authority (Pope 
1939b:907). The functional and spiritual values associated with the mosque present it with occasions of 
renovation sponsored by wealthy donors. These donations are often in the form of what is termed as vaqf. 
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According to Islamic laws, there exists a custom of vaqf, which reserves dedication of income for pious 
purposes (Mcchesney 1991:6). In doing so the wealthy residences of a town offer vaqf to support and 
maintain mosques, madrasas, and Imamzadahs, in order to secure their welfare on the Day of Judgment 
(Blake 1999:144). Therefore, religious spaces such as mosques were constantly subjected to repair and 
good care. Honarfar (1965:121,103) has provided two inscriptions, which illustrate such donations were 
made for the maintenance of the Friday Mosque, the inscription of Farkh al-Din Shushtari and Aqa 
Sultan. However, in consideration of vaqf as a means to refurbish Islamic buildings, the economic decline 
and the centrality of Shi’sim has to be taken into account. The deprived financial state that distinguished 
much of Qajar period only allowed for the refurbishment of Islamic monuments immediately associated 
with the Shi’a aspects of Iranian identity, Safavid period. The two most prestigious mosques in Isfahan 
were considered to be the Masjid-e Shah and Masjid-e Sheykh Lutfullah, managed by Hujjat al-Islam 
Sheykh Muhammad Baqir and his sons (Walcher 2001:135). This was a powerful family of religious 
authority which through the control of large vaqf properties and livestock had emerged as the second 
landowners of Isfahan, after Zillul Sultan (ibid.). Their control and residence in Masjid-e Shah further 
elevated the prestige of the Mosque. Therefore, the Friday Mosque, which had remained the 
congregational mosque of the city since the Abbasid period, was driven out of favour and the available 
vaqf funds were directed towards the more Shi’a evocative monuments built by the Safavid and managed 
by the most powerful religious family in Isfahan. The significance of the mosque as a functional space in 
the pious Qajar society and the religious system of vaqf to elevate the donor’s public status illustrated that 
the refurbishment of Islamic monuments had a social foundation in the Qajar society and restorations 
were carried out without a conscious awareness of the artistic and archaeological merit of the structures.  
Additional contributing factors to the pattern of renovations in Isfahan were twofold: the favouritism 
towards specific monuments by the dominating rulers of the city; and the drastic decline of Isfahan’s 
population following the invasion of the Afghans (Walcher 2000:336). With respect to the influential 
nobility, the case of Sheykh Muhammad Baqir’s patronage of the Safavid mosques to re-assert his 
religious authority has already been discussed above. In addition, it was during the political life of Hajji 
Muhammad Hossein Khan (1795-1823 AD), that the revitalisation of Isfahan to its former state began 
under his patronage (Walcher 2001:117). While the cultural status of Isfahan was frequently associated 
with the Safavid monuments and their refurbishments, it was during this period that the Friday Mosque 
witnessed an isolated episode of renovation (ibid.:119). In contrast, the period of Zillul Sultan Mas’ud 
Mirza’s governance in Isfahan (r.1874-1906 AD) is generally credited with the deliberate destruction of 
many Safavid complexes in the later years of his rule. Ansari (1943:54-56) argued that this intended 
negligence and demolition of Isfahan’s monuments was aimed at diminishing the prestige of the city and 
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therefore reducing the political power of Zillul Sultan. These contradictory patterns of renovations 
distinguished by irregular periods of decline and growth demonstrate that not only the older Seljuk 
monuments such as the Friday Mosque were not associated with the centre of power and went through a 
period of neglect, but even the Safavid structures that were considered as the embodiment of the prestige 
and supremacy of Shi’a authority were periodically demolished and neglected under Qajar rule.  
An additional factor that contributed to the neglect of the Friday Mosque was the city’s extensive 
population decline during the Qajar period. An amalgam of war, political instability, disease, and hunger 
that followed the fall of Isfahan from its political importance meant an inherent decline of the city’s 
population. As Isfahan’s significance faded away and its population declined, the large mosques of the 
city became impractical. Therefore, Masjid-e Shah with its central location became the place of 
congregation, and in addition, various small mosques were constructed to fulfill the requirement of 
various neighbourhoods. In fact, as Walcher (2001:130) argued, the construction of smaller mosques 
became a common practice for the private sponsors and prominent Ulama to convey their political 
authority and social prestige in Isfahan. Thus, the Friday Mosque of Isfahan which is identified as one of 
the largest mosques in Iran remained mostly underused during this period.  
The above demonstrates that while the social implications of Islamic monuments as instruments of 
authentication was comprehended by the Qajars, there were extensive irregularities in their political 
manipulations, depending on the economic circumstances, and the constructive mood of the nobility in 
Isfahan. However, because the Safavid complexes were merited as the symbols of the ‘golden age’ of 
Shi’a Persia, and fed into the Shari’a institute on which the Qajar monarchy was founded, the majority of 
Islamic structures from other periods fell into decay. Therefore, with the exception of minor renovations 
at the Friday Mosque discussed above, this Islamic site seldom received extensive attention during this 
period.  
In addition to the Qajars’ conduct towards Islamic monuments, the consideration of the secular elites and 
their discernible ideological shift towards blaming Islam for Iran’s backwardness should be discussed. 
The intelligentsia rose against the backdrop of religious milieu that dominated the Qajar society and 
conceived to disaffect the society from its religious inclinations and direct it towards modernization 
(Nashat 1982:137). Aside from denunciating Islam, they sought to make progress in the society through 
the endorsement of ethnic nationalism based on the notion of Aryanism and pre-Islamic history (see 
Chapters 4 & 5). In comparison with the rest of the Iranian society, these elites were more concerned with 
endorsing the cultural values of historical past and the significance of art and archaeology given their 
exposures to Western ideologies. In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the investment of these elites in 
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the pre-Islamic past had a relative impact on the Qajar monarchs and their comprehension of historic 
resources as political tools to authenticate their rule domestically and internationally. However, in the 
context of Islamic monuments, the elites’ condemnation of Islam for Iran’s backwardness and the 
association of Ulama with radical movements that opposed the secular constitution, further relegated 
Islam and its monuments to a minor position. Therefore, while this group of elite considered pre-Islamic 
monuments as cultural heritage and worthy of protection, they displayed little sympathy for the cultural 
merits of Islamic monuments such as the Friday Mosque.  
It is therefore held that irregular Qajars’ renovations of the Safavid monuments and the negligence of 
Islam by secular elites, garnered little support for the conservation of the Friday Mosque. This general 
disregard was noted by European travellers who visited Isfahan during this period. In fact, with the 
exception of Pascal Coste (Flandin & Coste 1900), European visitors to Isfahan during this period seldom 
mention the Friday Mosque. A few remarks are necessary to clarify the European lack of interest in the 
Friday Mosque. First, the equivocal geographical position of the Friday Mosque as an intricate part of the 
old centre of Isfahan had a bearing on attracting foreign travellers to this site. In contrast to the position of 
the Shah Mosque which was visible from afar and adorned with colourful motifs and attractive gardens 
from the Safavid period, the Friday Mosque was engrossed into the heart of the old town and as Graber 
(1990:15) argued, lacked a visible exterior edge. Indeed, the architectural prominence of the structure was 
only detectable from its own court-yard, a location closed to non-Muslims. Second, the European 
travellers who visited Isfahan were often inspired by the travelogues of previous visitors who wrote 
predominantly about the Safavid structures. Third, European travellers who visited Isfahan during the 
Qajar period had no personal or cultural ties with the monuments they explored, unlike Persepolis. The 
essential nature of their curiosity was one surpassed by the notion of the Orient with its unfamiliar 
buildings and peculiar costumes. Their curiosities were often unleashed by older travelogues describing 
Isfahan as a divine city under the Safavids and the acquisition of information about the religious 
minorities who lived there. Therefore, the Friday Mosque had a minor significance to the curiosities of 
foreign travellers.  
This is, however, not to contest the foreigner’s interest in Islamic archaeology. From the mid-1800s, 
foreigners had been collecting Islamic artefacts and engaging in commercial excavations in Iran. It is 
reported that Jean-Baptiste Nicolas and Jules Richard, the Frenchmen who resided in Iran, sold many tiles 
from buildings in Natanz, Varamin, Kashan, Damghan, and Qum, to Robert Murdoch Smith, who was 
collecting Persian artwork for the South Kensington Museum, later renamed the Victoria and Albert 
Museum (see Masuya 2000). Vernoit (1997:5) argued that from 1910 to 1914 commercial diggers such as 
Emile Vignier, the brother of the Parisian dealer Charles, were engaged in clandestine digging for Islamic 
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artefacts in towns like Rey, Sirjan and Sava. Further, the efforts of antiquarians such as Dikran Garabed 
Kelkian were imperative for the promotion of Islamic art. In fact, it was due to Kelkian’s bias in the 
‘supremacy’ of Islamic art from Persia that during the Pahlavi period Arab, Persian and Turkish art were 
clustered together and presented as “Persian Art” (see Jenkins-Madina 2000). As early as 1899, Kelkian 
had opened a gallery called Le Musee de Bosphore (Fig. 6.8), in New York to showcase his collection 
entitled The Art of Persia and the Levant (ibid.:73). The interest in Islamic art intensified in 1910 
following the Exhibition of Masterpieces of Muhammeden Art, held in Munich (see Sarre et.al 1912).  
The interest of foreigners in Islamic art and archaeology was often met through the collection of antiquity 
and fascination with the colourful Safavid monuments. Tiles were of particular interest, given they could 
be easily removed and transported. Although, there were restrictions for non-Muslims to enter religious 
complexes, there are accounts that testify to their accessibility to antiquity dealers. Some of these dealers, 
such as Jules Richard, also known as Reza Khan, were Muslims and hence able to enter religious places. 
Others, such as Jean-Baptiste Nicolas, were a part of diplomatic missions in Iran and therefore had 
influence within the Qajar court. Masuya (2000:50) argued that both these men, who contributed to the 
enrichment of Islamic collections abroad, had a strong relationship with Naser al-Din Shah. Musaya 
further contended that Naser al-Din Shah had no objections to the removal of artefacts from Islamic 
monuments, and in fact, these missions were authorised by the Shah (ibid.). Given the pious Iranian 
society and the influence of Ulama, however, the Qajar court was forced to issue an edict to ensure that 
religious buildings were not disturbed (ibid.). This is also evident in the second decree in the agreement of 
French Archaeological Concession in Iran (1895), whereby the French were band from entering and 
conducting research in religious places (Yazdani 2001:151-3). 
It has been the intention of this section to argue that given the Qajar’s failure to incorporate the Friday 
Mosque of Isfahan into a particular arrangement for the purpose of political and nationalistic 
manipulation, the site was largely overlooked during this period. In doing so, it was discussed that the 
irregular restoration projects of the Qajar authority invested in Safavid edifices as the ‘golden age’ of 
Shi’a patronage to satisfy their Shari’a source of legitimacy. The disregard for the Friday Mosque 
continued as the secular elite gave their support to ethnic nationalism that endorsed the protection of pre-
Islamic monuments with no sympathy for Islamic remains which they associated with Iran’s decline. 
Finally, the European search for an ‘Oriental’ city embodied in the monuments of the Safavid periods 
further propelled the Friday Mosque into the periphery. While the Islamic inclination of the Qajar period 
failed to recognise the artistic and archaeological merits of Iran’s Islamic heritage, the secular and to 
some extent anti-Islamic reign of Reza Shah with its ethnic nationalism is distinguished with the birth of 
Islamic archaeology. It is here argued, that the developments during the Pahlavi period could not have 
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endured if the Qajar period had not provided the prelude. The popularity of Islamic art and archaeology, 
and the available collections in the European and American Museums were an impetus for the birth of 
Islamic archaeology during Reza Shah’s reign (Fig. 6.9). The rhetoric of Major R. M. Smith, who was a 
collector of Persian Islamic art, foreshadowed the course of developments that emerged during the 
Pahlavi period. In his book on Persian Art, he wrote:  
“Unlike the Arabs, the Persians have always been, and still are, artistic … the Turkish element in the 
population, although politically and religiously amalgamated with the Persian, has, however, never 
imbibed the artistic idiosyncrasies of the latter. Works of art are almost exclusively confined to the parts of 
the country inhabited by the old Aryan stock.” (Smith 1876:3) 
 
As will be demonstrated, the emphasis on the Aryan ethnicity of Persian Islamic art provided for its 
incorporation within the interpretation of Iranian identity and ethnic nationalism adopted by Reza Shah’s 
Government.    
 
6.4. Pahlavi Nationalism: Case Study of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan 
In Chapter 5, it was argued that the identification of pre-Islamic archaeology as the epitome of Iran’s 
‘golden age’ became an ideal source for the instigation of Iranian identity and the propagation of the 
ethnic-dynastic nationalism that the Pahlavi Administration utilised for its nation building project. 
However, as argued throughout this research, the adoption of this identity was the outcome of a mutual 
effort between the Iranian Administration and the foreign academics who performed a vital role in the 
affairs of creating and orchestrating the discipline of Iranian archaeology during the Pahlavi period. 
Therefore, the focus of this section is to highlight some of the issues that guided the direction of Islamic 
archaeology and the treatment of Islamic monuments such as the Friday Mosque. It is further argued that 
while the ethnic-dynastic nationalism of the Pahlavi Administration may have preferred to relegate 
Islamic archaeology to the periphery, the educational background of the primary characters who had a 
particular influence on the course of Iranian archaeology, prevented the official propagated disregard for 
Islamic monuments.  
 
6.4.1. Reza Shah’s Government & Ethnic Nationalism: Islamic Archaeology 
The ethnic-dynastic nationalism that was adopted by Reza Shah’s Government to build a nation rested on 
the concepts of “invention” or “selection” of traditions that aimed to rediscover and promote Iran’s 
194 
 
ancient past. The ‘golden age’ selected by the Government constituted the pre-Islamic Achaemenid and 
Sassanid periods due to their cultural and political achievements that befitted the official’s model of a 
strong nation-state. Consequently, while the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis was adopted as the instrument 
behind the promotion of ethnic nationalism, Islamic sites were overlooked as functional spaces with 
limited significance worthy of systematic studies. However, it is the intention of this section to 
demonstrate that although Islamic monuments, such as the Friday Mosque, failed to feature in the 
nationalist quests of Reza Shah’s Government to build a nation, they were not subject to animosity and 
ignorance, primarily due to the interest of foreign scholars in their significance. With the efforts of these 
scholars, similar to pre-Islamic sites, the significance of Islamic sites was discussed in the context of 
‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’, and therefore, incorporated into the ethnic nationalism of the State.  
Before proceeding, two vital concepts have to be discussed. First, it has to be noted that the tenor of 
Islamic archaeology during this period was exceedingly anti-Arab with little recognition of their 
contributions to Islamic monuments. Rizvi argued that with respect to Iranian Islamic art and 
archaeology, the “Iranian” or “Aryan” rather than “Islamic” markers were often utilised to differentiate 
Iran and its ‘unique culture’, from the neighbouring Arab-speaking nations in the Middle East (Rizvi 
2007:50). In fact, Pope (1939a:910-911) in his Survey of Persian Art argued, in a similar tone that the 
Arab culture was in comparison with that of Iran, primitive, and brought no impulse into Iranian 
architecture. Second, the emergence of Islamic art and archaeology as an independent field of inquiry in 
the nineteenth century triggered art historical debates about the origins of European architecture (Grigor 
2007:570). For example, one of the more influential scholars of this period, Josef Strzygowski, identified 
certain crucial periods for the provision of archetypes that evolved into Christian art. He argued that the 
Sassanid, Islamic and especially Seljuk art were in debt to Hellenistic art and it was through their 
development that Christian art and hence European art was born (Strzgowski 1911:150). As illustrated in 
this section, these two factors had a bearing on the direction of development of Islamic art and 
archaeology in Iran. In doing so, foreign scholars appropriated this new discipline during Reza Shah’s 
rule, not only with emphasis on its ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’, but also through its assertion as an 
integral part of Iranian heritage. This was further enforced by an enhanced interest with Seljuk 
architecture as an impetus in the evolution of Christian art. This encouraged foreign scholars working in 
Iran to engage in the study of Seljuk monuments, such as the Friday Mosque, which provides a clear 
example of Seljuk architecture.  
 
From the above, it is argued that the development of the main strands of Islamic archaeology in Iran 
occurred simultaneously with the introduction of pre-Islamic archaeology, albeit lagging behind other 
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Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa. The principle reason for this delay rooted in the 
late introduction of archaeology as an independent discipline and its relatively recent institutionalisation 
in Iran. Nevertheless, it was during this period that along with the interest in Iranian Islamic artefacts that 
had long found their way into national and private collections abroad, emphasis was put on the scientific 
study of Islamic monuments. One of the very first monuments studied during this period was the Friday 
Mosque of Isfahan. 
The three main individuals associated with the development of Iranian archaeology during Reza Shah’s 
reign were Ernst Herzfeld, Arthur Urpham Pope, and André Godard, all of whom were familiar with 
Islamic art and architecture. In Chapter 5, it was argued that the comprehension and manipulation of 
ethnic-dynastic model of Iranian nationalism won Herzfeld and Pope the roles of mediators between the 
Pahlavi Administration and the American institutes in the course of obtaining the permission to excavate 
at Persepolis in the 1930s. This chapter focuses on the role performed by these same individuals, more or 
less, in developing Islamic archaeology in a political context that favoured pre-Islamic archaeological 
sites to support its brand of nationalism. As discussed above, the contributing factor in their success and 
that which procured the consent of Reza Shah’s Administration, was the ‘Persianisation’ of Islamic 
archaeology and the application of the same approach they had utilised to denote the durable significance 
of the pre-Islamic history of Iran. In particular, their emphasis on the concepts of ‘continuity’ and 
‘superiority’ that transcended the intrusion of foreigners and revived Iran as a unique nation is 
noteworthy.  
In Section 5.4, Ernst Herzfeld’s contributions to the politicisation of Persepolis were discussed in detail. 
However, it is noted that prior to his archaeological engagements in Iran, Herzfeld was involved in the 
study of Islamic monuments in Iraq and Syria and therefore was knowledgeable in Islamic archaeology 
(Hillenbrand 2005:414). Herzfeld revealed his fondness for Islamic archaeology in a lecture in front of the 
members of the SNH on 13
 
August 1925, as he identified the Achaemenid, Sassanid, Seljuk, and Safavid 
periods as the pillars of Iranian civilisations (Herzfeld in Grigor 2004:27). The significance of the Islamic 
period, in addition to the pre-Islamic period, as the ‘golden ages’ of Iranian civilisation was further 
affirmed by Herzfeld in his design of the vignette he prepared for the SNH (Fig. 5.5) (also discussed in 
Chapter 5), encompassing the three facades of the Achaemenid Palace at Persepolis, the Sassanid arch of 
Taq-e Kasra at Ctesiphon, and the Ziyarid monument of Gunbad-e Qabus in the Gorgan region. While 
Achaemenid Palace and Taq-e Kasra accommodated the ethnic-dynastic model of Iranian nationalism 
and expansionism, the selection of the tower of Qunbad-e Qabus was a testament to the merit that 
Herzfeld allocated to significance of Islamic archaeology. During this period particularly, Seljuk 
monuments were perceived as significant, considering they were regarded as an epoch during which 
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Islamic art and architecture reached its maturity in Iran and spread into the neighbouring regions (Korn 
2010). In order to identify a Turkish dynastic period as one of the “golden ages” of Iranian history, a 
narrative was adopted to place emphasis on the Persian character of Seljuk monuments and their technical 
origin in the pre-Islamic Sassanid period (Korn 2010; Schroeder 1939:1043-45; Godard 1936:56). One of 
the greatest manifestations of this ‘golden age’ was the Friday Mosque of Isfahan with its four-ivans and 
perfect domes. Its Seljuk structure was attributed to Nizam al-Mulk, the Persian Vizier of the Seljuk king, 
and therefore, an Iranian identity was assigned to the monuments. In 1923, Herzfeld travelled through 
Iran and took black and white photos of mostly the exterior of few Islamic monuments, including the 
Friday Mosque. 
Worthy of comment here is Herzfeld’s failure to contribute extensively to the development of Islamic 
studies in Iran considering his engagement with explorations at Persepolis. At a time when Iranian 
political culture was dominated by notions of ethnic nationalism, the presence of Herzfeld as a leading 
scholar to take over the task of studying and promoting the pre-Islamic site of Persepolis was more 
essential than any other site. Hillenbrand (2005:414, 419) argued that despite Herzfeld’s scholarly 
capacity for extending the knowledge of Islamic art he had acquired in Iraq and Syria, he failed to 
contribute to the development of these studies in Iran. Instead, considering the favourable political 
attitude towards pre-Islamic monuments and Herzfeld’s own interest in Hellenism, his research in Iran 
was fully engaged in the study of Persepolis (ibid.). With Herzfeld addressing the nationalistic policies of 
Reza Shah’s Government through his discoveries at Persepolis, other foreign scholars such as Pope were 
allowed more flexibility to explore the arena of Islamic art and archaeology. 
The rhetoric of emphasis on the ‘continuity’ and ‘superiority’ of Iranian culture in both pre-Islamic and 
Islamic period was also employed by Pope. As an advisory Curator of Mohammadan Art at the Art 
Institute of Chicago (1919), Pope fundamentally influenced the introduction and promotion of Persian art 
and its underpinning Islamic architecture and archaeology. The impact of Pope’s 1925 speech entitled The 
Art of Iran in the Past and Future, in front of Iranian officials and Reza Shah was discussed in the context 
of its impact on Persepolis. In this section, it is argued that Pope’s speech, not only stimulated a revival of 
ancient Iranian history, but triggered awareness towards Islamic history of Iran as well. Consistent with 
his scheme of appealing to the Pahlavi authorities, Pope presented Iran as an authentic nation with an 
instrumental role in the development of art and architecture of the world (Pope cited in Yazdani: 245-46). 
He deemed Iran as a gateway that provided a bridge between the East and the West, and the pinnacle for 
this cultural exchange he considered to be after the advance of Islam in Iran (Pope 1938b:93-97). It was 
this “Persian spirit” that manifested itself in the art and architecture of the Asia Minor as the Persian 
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artists travelled to the region, spreading their “unique” art into the land of Semitic Arabs and the 
“barbaric” Turks (ibid.). He further stated: 
“… hardly any of the art that are now called Turkish but what were in considerable measure 
of Persian origin. And in many ways Persian art reached the shores of Europe, there to teach 
new methods and new arts, to lend elegance, grace and decorative charm to those 
already established.” (ibid.) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, as Reza Shah’s Government was more inclined towards the ethnic elements of 
nationalism and the Aryan origin of Iranians as a stepping stone to unite the nation and build a nation-
state, the racial and anti-Semitic rhetoric articulated by Pope in his discourse, greatly appealed to Iranian 
officials. Therefore, although the Seljuk were not an ‘authentic’ Iranian dynasty and the Islamic period 
was not instrumental in building a secular nation-state, Pope’s emphasis on the “Persian spirit” with its 
‘superiority’, ‘continuity’, and over-arching influence on the art and architecture of the world, sealed the 
importance of this period and allowed for the study of the Friday Mosque. Following his speech, Reza 
Shah ordered the immediate replacement and duplication of tiles missing from the dome of Sheykh 
Lutfullah Mosque in Isfahan (Grigor 2004:32). He further contributed 500 Pounds towards Pope’s Survey 
of Persian Art, which had a section attributed to the Friday Mosque (Goode 2007:170). The study of 
Islamic archaeology in Iran substantially advanced following the first pictures taken of Islamic sites. This 
was provided by the Government’s intention to restrain the institute of Shi’a Islam as a part of the policy 
to secularise Iran and a simultaneous interest in the artistic and cultural value of Islamic monuments 
inspired by scholars such as Pope. Therefore, an additional outcome of Pope’s speech was Reza Shah’s 
order to lift the ban for non-Muslims to visit Islamic monuments. Further, Pope was provided with an 
expert photographer to capture the very first colour photographs of the most sacred Shi’a shrines (Gholi 
Majd 2003:31, 36). This was a significant advance for the American institutes, since similar to the case of 
Persepolis, they had once again monopolised a field hitherto unexplored by any other experts of Islamic 
monuments in Iran. In addition, it was through these efforts that mosques were transformed from 
performing as religious functional spaces to their recognition as ‘cultural heritage’.  
Pope went on to become one of the most enthusiastic promoters of Iran as the “source of artistic creativity 
in the Muslim world” (Rizvi 2007:48), which not only enhanced the value of Islamic monuments and 
established a bastion for the scholarly study of Islamic art and archaeology, but fed the growing demands 
of the private art collectors and antique dealerships. Gholi Majd (2003:8) argued that Pope himself, in 
collaboration with a dealer named Rabeno, was involved in illegal export of Islamic artefacts from Iran to 
museums abroad. It is argued that the mihrab on display in the Metropolitan Museum was acquired by 
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Pope during this period (Fig. 6.10) (ibid.). Vernoit (1997:5) further indicated that even Iranian officials 
such as General Zahedi became involved in clandestine digging and in this case the recovery of pottery, 
metalwork, and glass from a site in Gurgan in 1926.   
Pope’s efforts to promote Persian art resulted in a series of exhibitions and congresses organised under his 
direction in Philadelphia (1926), London (1930-31), Leningrad (1935), New York, Boston, Washington 
and Chicago (1949). A review of articles in The Times newspaper, illustrates the interest and enthusiasm 
that encircled these events outside Iran (The Times:1930a & 1930b; 1931; 1933; 1935a & 1935b). One of 
the more significant events for the purpose of this section was the Second International Congress on 
Persian Art that occurred simultaneously with the 1931 International Exhibition of Persian Art in New 
York and later in London. A great number of papers presented in this Congress concerned themselves 
with the influence of Persian art in China, Scandinavia, and European Architecture (Rizvi 2007:53). The 
participation of Josef Strzygowski was particularly notable, considering his support for the racial theory 
that the roots of ‘Aryan art’ lay in the traditions of Near East and particularly Iran (ibid.). It has to be 
noted that both Herzfeld and Pope were influenced by the racial theories espoused by Strzygoswki’s idea 
of Iranian/Aryan cultural superiority (ibid.). In correspondence with this paradigm, the Islamic art and 
archaeology in these exhibitions were framed in the racial rhetoric of “Aryan” and “Iranian” while the 
term “Islam” was strongly marginalised (ibid.:50). Additionally, a correspondence by Ali Asqar Hekmat, 
a former Minister of Education and Foreign Minister, demonstrate the inclination of Iranian officials to 
refer to Islamic artefacts as Sanaye’ (crafts) (Yazdani 2001:261) and avoiding Islamic markers. The 
launch of international exhibitions and the initial interests in the Islamic art and artefacts from Iran 
encouraged scholars to present a comprehensive understanding of the subject. In Brigg’s view, to 
understand Persian art properly, “one must know something of Persian architecture and particularly of the 
ritual requirements and historical development of the mosque” (Briggs et al. 1931:3). Therefore, Persian 
mosques played an important role in the promotion of Persian art. Particularly, considering the 
presentation of the Friday Mosque as a blue-print in the Islamic architecture of Iran, the Mosque was 
brought forth to be subjected to in-depth studied.  
Pope (1938a:5) was the first scholar to emphasise the importance of the Friday Mosque and to present its 
‘perfect dome’ as the epitome of Iranian architecture. He argued that the impressive technical evolution of 
the Mosque that extending over a period of 900 years provided a manual to post-Islamic art and 
architecture in Iran (Pope 1938a:5). Early in the spring of 1931, at the Exhibition of Persian Art in the  
Royal Academy in London, Pope met Eric Schroeder and persuaded him to go to Iran with him to “make 
the plan of the most important building in the East, the Jami Mosque at Isfahan” (Welch 1969-70:14). 
Schroader who had previously made plans of monuments in the Arabian Desert accepted the offer and 
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spent four month in Isfahan to complete the project (ibid.). His plan of the Mosque was published in the 
Architectural Survey by the American Institute of Persian Art and Archaeology in 1931 and remained in 
use as a reference to future scholars (Fig. 6.11) (Schroeder 1939:949). Pope himself began photographing 
the Mosque in 1929 and continued to work on the site for ten seasons on behalf of the American Institute 
of Iranian Art and Archaeology (ibid.). Some of the results of this research were published in the Survey 
of Persian Art. The most significant contribution of these photographs, which were presented in the 1933 
exhibition at the Royal Institute of British Architecture (The Times 1933), was the stimulation of the 
ongoing debates on the origins of European art and architecture. A correspondence between Arthur Pope 
(1933) and Martin Briggs (1933) in The Burlington Magazine, demonstrates the disputes around Pope’s 
proposition of the origin of Gothic architecture in Persian art in reference to the photo exhibition that 
included the Friday Mosque and a number of other Islamic monuments in Iran. Further work on the 
Mosque was undertaken in 1934 by Albert Gabriel (1935) who published the result of his one week 
preliminary studies at the site in the 1935 issue of Ars Islamica. In addition, between 1935 and 1937, 
M.B. Smith a research fellow from the American Council of Learned Societies offered a comprehensive 
photogrammetric survey and relief drawings of the Friday Mosque (Galdieri 1984:26). A detailed analysis 
of the preliminary studies during this period reveal the initial interest of foreign scholars with establishing 
a chronology for the evolution of the Mosque’s architecture, based on the styles each structure 
maintained, and the assertion of similarities between Iranian and European architectural elements in 
search of their origin.  
Another instrumental character in the appropriation of Islamic archaeology during the Pahlavi period was 
André Godard, the Head of the Archaeological Service of Iran created in 1928. Similar to Herzfeld and 
Pope, Godard had a background in Islamic art and architecture through his studies in Samara (1910) and 
Egypt (1912) (Gran-Aymerich & Marefat 2001). Unlike Herzfeld and Pope who had a nationalistic 
rhetoric attached to their work, Godard presented himself as an archaeologist with “no interest in 
romanticising archaeology” (Godard 1936:7). He initiated the documentation of both pre-Islamic and 
Islamic monuments by adding them to the Inventory of National Monuments (Godard & Smith 1937:13). 
These documents contributed to the knowledge of the site through the provision of historical background, 
architectural plan, and photographic archives (Smith & Godard 1935:153). In this process, the more 
significant sites were identified and those in immediate risk of destruction restored to prevent further 
decay (Vernoit 1997:7). In his Athar-e Iran, Godard (1936:213-275) committed to the study of ancient 
mosques in Iran and in particular contributed a substantial section to the Friday Mosque. Similar to 
previous scholars, Godard focused on dating the various structures of the building and in doing so 
providing a history for the development of Islamic architecture in Iran. In addition, Godard marked the 
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transitory periods in which the Mosque had changed in style and in size (ibid.:208). Perhaps his most 
distinguished proposition in the structural formation of Iranian mosque was the theory of “Kiosk 
Mosque” and the assumption that due to their resemblance to Sassanid fire temples, the origin of the 
structure of sanctuary in the mosque may lie in pre-Islamic architectural traditions (ibid.:207, 226). The 
offered presumptions regarding the pre-Islamic origin of Islamic monuments, such as the Friday Mosque, 
provided foreign scholars with an opportunity to engage in the study of Islamic monuments that were 
adopted to the Iranian cultural tradition and therefore posed no threat to the brand of nationalism 
advocated by the Government. In addition to the study of the Mosque, Godard engaged in the repair and 
restoration of the decaying components of the Mosque. This project was carried out between 1936 and 
1939 with the consolidation of the pillars on the western flank of the Mosque and the collapsing minaret 
(Galdieri 1984:30-34). However, Galdieri has noted that no official reports were provided by Godard 
regarding these restorations (ibid.:30-31). With the onset of World War II and following the departure of 
foreign archaeologists from Iran, activities at the Mosque were terminated. Apart from minor repair works 
by Godard in 1949 on the eastern ivan (ibid.:30-40) no critical studies were carried out. It was in the 
1960s and during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah that interest was further enhanced in Islamic art and 
archaeology as the Government began investing in the tourist industry.  
Before analysing the fate of the Friday Mosque during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, it is essential 
to note that although as discussed in Chapter 2 Reza Shah’s official policy imposed the development of a 
secular discourse, and his reforms targeted the marginalisation of the clergy who were blamed for the 
backwardness of the Iranian society (Menashri 1992:99), he displayed no contempt for the study and 
preservation of Islamic monuments. Despite the Government’s acknowledgement of the cultural 
significance of Islamic monuments alongside pre-Islamic monuments, the merit of Islamic sites were 
undermined when caught in the political quarrels between the Pahlavi regime and the Ulama.This case 
was best illustrated in Reza Shah’s use of heavy artillery to quell the rebellion at the Gohar-Shad Mosque 
in 1935 and in the process destroying parts of the historic complex (Rajaee 2007:59). 
 
6.4.2. Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government & Dynastic Nationalism: Islamic Archaeology 
In the previous section it was argued that the secular approach of Reza Shah’s Government had set to 
assault the clerical establishment. This is while Mohammad Reza Shah took a decisively different 
approach to religion. Having survived a number of life threatening incidents, the Shah was convinced that 
he was in touch with the divine (Rahnema 2011:121). His conviction was particularly dominated by 
empathies towards Shi’a mythology and claims of encountering the Holy figures (ibid.:116-18). 
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Mohammad Reza Shah’s relatively favourable attitude towards Islam did not translate into extensive 
deviations from the ethnic-dynastic nationalism promoted by Reza Shah’s Government, but it had 
valuable implications for the treatment of Islamic monuments, which continued to be presented as an 
integral part of the ‘superior’ Iranian identity. Nevertheless, this period witnessed a change in approach 
towards Islamic art and archaeology. During Reza Shah’s rule, the mainstream objective was the 
introduction of Iranian Islamic art and its equation in footing with that of Europe and the rest of Islamic 
world, mainly to feed the antiquity market and museums. During the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah, 
however, the preservation and restoration of sites became more prominent. With respect to the Friday 
Mosque, it was during this period that extensive restorations were implemented. In addition, the mode of 
research approach shifted from an artistic-architectural orientation in methodology to archaeological 
studies.   
A series of developments, particularly in the 1960s, contributed to illuminating the significance of Islamic 
monuments and the necessity of their preservation. First of all, as foreign scholars persisted on their 
interest in Islamic monuments and as a new generation of Iranian archaeologists began to modify the 
terrain of cultural institutes, an intensified awareness about the preservation and appreciation of cultural 
heritage prevailed. The second discernible shift in the treatment of cultural heritage was a direct outcome 
of the launch of tourism as an expansive industry in 1963 and the establishment of institutions, such as the 
NOCHMI in 1965. These new developments were assisted by the personal interest of Farah Pahlavi in 
Iranian art and architecture, as well as the rise in oil revenue and the relative availability of financial 
support for the preservation and restoration of archaeological sites.  
This favourable setting supplied the Islamic monuments of Isfahan with an opportunity to have their 
former appearance revitalised. According to Hojjat (1995:257), in 1963 Isfahan hosted a symposium with 
the collaboration of the SNH, in which the most important Islamic monuments of the city were identified 
and evaluated for preservation. The involvement of SNH is noteworthy considering, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, it had a significant role in building a nation by adopting an Iranian identity that according to 
the Pahlavis’ official paradigm predominantly relied on the pre-Islamic past. The co-ordination of SNH is 
a testament to the change in the outlook towards Iranian identity and national monuments, to include both 
pre-Islamic and Islamic aspects. The outcome of this symposium was the first ever Decree for the 
Technical Preservation of Cultural Heritage in Iran (ibid.). It is important to note that this decree was 
released almost thirty years after the First International Congress of Architects and Technicians of 
Historic Monuments in Athens, but as Hojjat argued, conformed to the codes of the Venice Charter 
offered during the Second Congress a few month later in 1964 (ibid.; 
http://www.international.icomos.org/venicecharter2004/index.html). This affinity, Hojjat argued, was due to 
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close collaborations between the Iranian authorities and UNESCO (ibid.:257). According to the articles of 
this decree which was published by the SNH in 1963, the Friday Mosque was amongst the more important 
monuments of the city in need of preservation (ibid.:413-23). The Mosque continued to appeal to scholars 
throughout the 1960s and Galdieri (1990:76) reported that in a 1966 tour of the Mosque accompanied by 
Giuseppe Tucci, he had mentioned the possibility of future collaborations between Italians and Iranians to 
fully study the site. Further, in 1967-68 Siroux carried a general survey of the Mosque on behalf of 
UNESCO (Galdieri 1984:87).  
It is argued that although the source of this interest stemmed from foreign scholars and their appreciation 
of the historic merit of the Friday Mosque, the Iranian authorities, albeit influenced by foreign interest, 
initiated minor operations towards the restoration of the Mosque. Galdieri (1972:10) reported that in 1966 
the local Archaeology Department replaced five flattened vaults on the western Shabestan of the Mosque. 
Further, there was an indication in the first Decree for Technical Preservation of Cultural Heritage that 
reported the replacement of the pavement at the Friday Mosque by the SNH with the financial assistant of 
the public (Hojjat 1995:417). In addition, it was during this period that Lutfullah Honarfar (1965) took on 
the task of recording all visible inscriptions and documenting them in a substantial volume entitled The 
Treasures of Historical Relics in Isfahan, before they became illegible due to further decay. Despite 
arranging projects to restore the Mosque, it has to be noted that similar to the Qajars, the Pahlavis were 
overwhelmed by the supremacy of the Safavid monuments. Therefore, the dominating trend in assigning 
more artistic value to this period persisted in the 1960s. However, unlike the Qajars who invested in the 
Safavid monuments for their merit as the vanguard of Shi’a patronage, the attention of Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s Government was drawn to the relics of this period predominantly due to their appeal to foreign 
tourists and thus their consideration as a potential source of income. Consequently, in 1964 when the 
interest of Iranian authorities in the preservation of Isfahan’s Islamic monuments brought an Italian team 
to take on the project of the conservation and restoration of the city’s Islamic monuments, the natural 
inclination was towards the prime aim of restoring the Safavid pavilions (Callieri 2006:8, 18). This 
project developed by IsMEO in collaborations with the NOCHMI, and won the first Aga Khan Award for 
Architecture in 1980 (Gnoli 1980:197). According to Galdieri (1972:76) the collaborations between Iran 
and Italy continued into the 1970s when he was asked to prepare a campaign for the investigation of the 
Friday Mosque. He argued that the IsMEO projects at the Friday Mosque was especially noteworthy 
given the application of a multidisciplinary approach and the employment of various specialists including 
archaeologists, historians, and architects working on the site simultaneously (ibid.: XII). Indeed, this 
period marks a critical stage in the history of the Mosque’s investigation as previous hypotheses 
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predominantly founded on the artistic and historical traditions of the Mosque were analysed through 
archaeological excavations.  
Before discussing the archaeological investigations which began in 1972, it is necessary to examine the 
conservation work Euginio Galdieri undertook from 1970 until 1978 when work was suspended due to 
political instability. The aim of the mission was mainly concerned with the identification and stabilisation 
of structural elements in danger of destruction as well as validation of the major chronological hypotheses 
proposed by previous scholars (Galdieri 1984:13). Graber (1990:23) argued that Galdieri’s initial 
perception of the Mosque and his decisions on where to excavate or investigate were based on Godard’s 
reconstructions, themselves affected by his theoretical assumptions on the evolutionary course in the 
formation of Iranian mosque. Galdieri (1984:80) reported that some of his time was spend on correcting 
the inaccurate and sometimes destructive repairs that had been completed during the restoration work in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s under the direction of Godard. Although the flawed restorations and the 
lack of proper attention to the original forms during this period could testify to Godard’s general 
insensitivities towards Iranian cultural heritage, it has to be noted that such concepts very rarely prevalent 
in the 1930s (the Venice Charter and its resolutions on restorations was written in 1964). In addition, the 
scarcity of funds available to undertake such project contributed to the hasty and unprofessional 
interventions that solely aimed to prevent the buildings from destruction.  
In the IsMEO project, as Galdieri (1990:76) argued, the task of technical restoration was simultaneously 
in progress in conjunction with research (Fig. 6.12). In 1972 an Italian Archaeological Mission was 
invited to conduct a series of research on the Mosque. This team was directed by Professor Umberto 
Scerrato from the Istituto Universitario Orientale in Naples (Galdieri 1984:416, 387). Unlike Persepolis 
where the Italian team engaged solely in the restoration of the site and the archaeological excavations was 
allocated to Iranians, in case of the Friday Mosque the task of restoration and archaeological research 
were granted to Italians and in conformity with the general trend of their project, the two projects 
progressed on parallel lines. Although the chief aim of the archaeological mission was to identify the 
Sassanid structure and the Arab hypostyle mosque that lay beneath the Friday Mosque, it was in this 
process that the loose foundation of the Mosque were discovered and restorations assumed (ibid.:89). 
From the excavations in the Nizam al-Mulk pavilion the remains of a Sassanid column decorated in 
stucco were uncovered confirming the hypothesis that the Mosque was constructed on a pre-Islamic 
building (Genito 2012:343). It is noteworthy that the newly discovered Sassanid decorative stuccos 
fragments were transferred to the Iran-e Bastan Museum (Galdieri 1972:7) as a manifestation of the 
‘continuity’ of Iranian art and architecture. Excavations were also carried in the northern area leading to 
the discovery of further structures from the Sassanid period the ancient town of Yavan and Seljuq pottery, 
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as well as a hypostyle mosque (ibid.). These investigations made a major contribution to the historical 
reconstruction of the different building phases of the Mosque and its locality (ibid.). 
IsMEO’s conservation and archaeological investigations were published in three volumes of Restorations 
(1972; 1973; 1984). Collectively, they present one of the few cases of the scientific studies of a mosque in 
Iran. It should be noted that despite the Pahlavis inclination towards the elimination of Islamic traditions, 
Iranian society remained largely traditional. Therefore, although the restoration and the conservation of an 
Islamic site, such as a mosque, may have appealed to the general public, they may have been less 
supportive of excavating underneath a sacred Islamic site. Indeed, it was only as late as the 1930s that 
Reza Shah had lifted the ban for non-Muslims to visit Islamic monuments. This may have contributed to 
the termination of restorations for a year in 1976 to allocate all available funding toward a rapid 
archaeological excavation. Galdieri argued that this was done in order to accelerate research in areas 
particularly visited by large numbers of worshipers (ibid.:77). Therefore, in the span of 40 years, the 
Friday Mosque was transformed from a site that prohibited the entrance of foreigners to an excavation site 
where foreign archaeologists excavated beneath the Mosque. The above transformations may have 
assisted the modification of the concept of a mosque as a place of worship to a historic monument worthy 
of preservation. As will be argued, these concepts underwent another wave of modifications following the 
Islamic Revolution.  
The activities of IsMEO in Isfahan had great ramifications for the process of development in conservation 
and restoration of monuments in Iran. Of particular significance was the training of Iranian technicians in 
NOCHMI (Gnoli 1980:197). Indeed, NOCHMI and its technicians continued to render valuable services 
to the conservation of historical monuments in Iran (Hojjat 1995:198) and, as will be discussed, 
contributed to the restoration of the Mosque following its partial destruction during the War.  
The perceived assumption within this thesis was that the study of Islamic monuments during the Pahlavi 
period would have been deliberately excluded from concepts of national heritage due to their association 
with the Islamic elements of Iranian identity. However, it has been the intention of this section to argue 
that despite Pahlavi emphasis on the pre-Islamic aspects of Iranian national identity, Islamic archaeology 
was born and the conservation of its monuments progressed during this period, within an appropriation of 
Islamic art as ‘Persian art’. The Friday Mosque provides an excellent case study that demonstrates the 
foreign interest in Islamic art and architecture during the reign of Reza Shah, and the wave of interest in 
preservation and restoration of Islamic monuments during Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule. During both 
periods, the involvement of foreign scholars in the affairs of Iranian Islamic archaeology was undeniable. 
However, while the austere approach of Reza Shah’s Government to Islamic traditions restricted the 
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appreciation of the cultural merits of Islamic monuments to exhibitions and congresses beyond the 
frontiers of Iran, the somewhat more tolerant approach of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government towards 
these same concepts allowed for their appreciation and conservation in Iran itself. An additional factor to 
be considered with regard to Islamic monuments during the second Pahlavi period was the establishment 
of Iran’s tourist industry and the investments in attracting foreigners to visits the historical monuments in 
Iran. Although the origin of the proposal for establishing this industry was born out of preparations for 
celebrating the Anniversary of 2500 years of Persian Monarchy and thus initially concerned with pre-
Islamic icons, the value of Islamic monuments was recognised for their appeal to foreign tourists. The 
collaboration of the British Museum and the National Museum of Iran to exhibit “The Art of Islam” at the 
Hayward Gallery in 1976 (Kargar 2005:8) may be recognised as an effort to introduce and publicise 
Iranian Islamic art abroad to improve tourism. Therefore, it may be argued that while during the reign of 
Reza Shah Islamic art and archaeology was introduced to Europe and North American through 
exhibitions and congresses, during the time of Mohammad Reza Shah these monuments were exploited in 
situ through tourism. The commercialisation of Islamic monuments went as far as advertisements on the 
GQ and Vogue magazines in 1969 (Fig. 6.13). This was particularly pertinent to the analysis of Islamic 
monuments during this period due to its demonstration of the Pahlavis’ exploitive approach towards 
cultural heritage. It demonstrates that just as they politicised the pre-Islamic monuments to legitimise 
their monarchy and provide support for an ethnic-dynastic form of nationalism, they commercialised 
Islamic monuments for economic advantage. It has to be noted, that similar to Reza Shahs Government, 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government resorted to antagonising Islamic sites when caught in political 
affairs. In this regard, the demolition of the historic centre and the bazaars around the Imam Reza Shrine 
are noteworthy. Although this project was presented as part of an attempt to beautify Mashed, 
Abrahamian argued, it was assumed to eradicate the “out-dated” and “fanatical” bazaaris given their anti-
Shah rhetoric and socio-political influence within Iranian society (Abrahamian 2008:151).  
 
6.5. Post-Revolution & Nationalism: The Case Study of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan 
In Chapter 5, it was demonstrated that the Pahlavis utilised pre-Islamic sites such as Persepolis as an 
instrument to support an ethnic-dynastic form of nationalism. This defining feature of Pahlavi 
legitimisation altered after the Revolution and leaned towards the adoption of an Islamic past that was 
suggested to be the ‘true’ and ‘authentic’ Iranian national identity. In previous chapters it was 
demonstrated that this national identity increasingly relied on the discourse of Shi’a nationalism to 
combat monarchy and imperialism. Considering the Pahlavis’ adoption of pre-Islamic Iran to legitimise 
their regime, it would be anticipated that in conformity with the revival of Islamic period as the ‘golden 
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age’ of Iranian history, and with the employment of Shi’a nationalism, the Islamic monument would have 
been utilised as an instrumental device to legitimise the new Islamic State. The intention of this section is 
to demonstrate that the nature of legitimisation in post-Revolutionary Iran relied on a set of concepts that 
marginalised the discipline of archaeology as a Western pseudoscience for the glorification of the 
monarchy. Therefore, although Islamic past was identified as the authentic identity of Iranians, there was 
seldom any reliance on Islamic monuments as archaeological sites in order to authenticate the 
government. This notion is especially accurate in the early years of the Revolution when legitimisation 
was drawn from ‘populism’, ‘traditionalism’ and ‘charismatic leadership’. It was only following the Iran-
Iraq War and the revived disputes over the identity of Iranians that Islamic sites such as Imam Reza 
Shrine in Mashhad, the most renowned Shi’a pilgrimage site, received attention and renovations were 
made to accommodate Shi’a pilgrims from neighbouring Muslim countries.  
Similar to the previous case studies presented, the practice of Islamic archaeology and its impact on the 
Friday Mosque of Isfahan in the post-Revolutionary phase is divided into four periods. The period 
immediately following the Revolution was a transitory phase where “populism” and return to “native 
roots” was promoted by the doctrine of Khomeini’s Government (Abrahamian 1993:38). The second 
period known as the War years and the subsequent reconstruction phase were integral for the resurrection 
of pre-Islamic Iranian identity as a principle component of the Iranian society. The third phase constituted 
the reconciliation period of Khatami, when Islamic and pre-Islamic Iranian national identities were 
equally appropriated to identify the Iranian nation (Holliday 2013:99). The fourth period was founded on 
the notions of ‘populism’ and ‘principalism’ endorsed by Ahmadinejad’s Administration. This structure 
provides the framework against which the case study of the Friday Mosque will be investigated.  
 
6.5.1. Populism & the Return to Native Roots: Islamic Archaeology 
In the previous chapter it was argued that while during the Pahlavi period, the officials held religious 
dogmatism of Islam responsible for deviating indigenous Iranian culture from its pre-Islamic roots, in the 
post-Revolutionary period, pre-Islamic Iranian identity was charged as a central component of the secular 
Pahlavi regime that tainted Iranian Islamic values by promoting Western ideals (Hunter 1992:11). The 
Revolution against the “tyranny” of the Pahlavi and Western incursions led to an anti-Western and pro-
Islamic reaction that relied on Shi’a nationalism at its core (Keddie 1986:161). Even though, Khomeini 
had discredited nationalism as a doctrine introduced by the imperialists and self serving rulers to create an 
artificial state that divided the Muslims (Algar 1981:302; Martin 2000:124), many scholars including 
Ansari argued that he simply replaced “dynastic nationalism” with “Shi’a nationalism” (Ansari 
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2003:222). It is contended that although Khomeini’s Government considered Shi’ism as an integral part 
of Iranian national identity; this new brand of nationalism was portrayed in an ambivalent manner by the 
officials (ibid.). The merit of Shi’ism as a part of Iranian identity is evident in Varjavand’s decision to 
include the Naqsh-e Jahan Complex as one of the three sites registered on the UNESCO World Heritage 
List in 1979 (Also see Chapter 2 & 5). The selection of Naqsh-e Jahan, which symbolised the Shi’a 
composition of Iranian identity rather than the Friday Mosque as an emblem of the most eminent 
architectural blue-print of the Iranian mosque, demonstrated the inclinations towards employing Shi’a 
nationalism in preserving archaeological sites during the transitory period of Revolution. Despite these 
efforts the Government’s main principle of rejecting the institute of monarchy as an illegitimate form of 
government had an unprecedented impact on the outlook towards archaeology, which also influenced the 
treatment of Islamic monuments. This antagonistic approach was reflective of the eulogies made by the 
Pahlavis to pre-Islamic monuments and, therefore, the Islamic Government’s association of archaeology 
with the pillars of imperialism and monarchy (Abdi 2001:70). While in the previous chapter the impact of 
such rhetoric on pre-Islamic monuments was investigated in detail, it is the objective of this chapter to 
evaluate how this same outlook towards archaeology exposed Islamic monuments such as the Friday 
Mosque to a parallel detrimental treatment.  
As previously argued, the Islamic Revolution was pre-eminently founded on the principles of populism 
that promoted anti-imperialism and anti-monarchism by seeking refuge in Islamic theocracy. This return 
to Islamic authenticity, however, had no positive outcomes for Islamic archaeology as the source of 
legitimacy laid in the populism of Khomeini’s Government. While archaeology was dismissed 
considering that the ideological Shi’a nationalism of the Government seldom required the adoption of 
Islamic monuments to legitimise its doctrine, the anti-Western outlook of the zealous Revolutionaries 
further isolated Iranian academics. In addition to discrediting university intellectuals as agents of 
imperialism, the Cultural Revolution that aimed to re-evaluate and re-organise the education system, 
prohibited contact with foreign scholars (Algar 1981:295-98). Following the restrictions of foreign policy, 
archaeological projects were halted and with that the excavation and renovation of the Friday Mosque 
was terminated. Following IsMEO’s departure in 1979, the Head of the Institute repeatedly requested the 
resumption of cultural activities between Iran and Italy (Callieri 1999). However, as will be discussed 
these collaborations only resumed following the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ adopted by 
Khatami’s Administration in 1997.  
During this period, although archaeology was undermined as a Western science to adopt the policies of 
the Pahlavi monarchy, the lack of interest in the archaeological value of Islamic monuments did not result 
in their complete disregard. Rather, Islamic monuments such as mosques began to assume a new practical 
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role in the Iranian society. As Hojjat (1995:214) argued, mosques had become the focal point of political 
activities that preceded the Revolution and continued to retain this functional role following the 
Revolution and especially during the Iran-Iraq War. The daily operations in the mosque required the 
construction of temporary shade roofs and public facilities that were completed swiftly and on a restricted 
budget leading to disregard for the conservation standards (ibid.:219). Galdieri (1984:11) reported that 
following his visit to Iran after the Revolution he was pleased and at the same time troubled to see 
workers engaged in the maintenance, conservation, and the general embellishment of the Friday Mosque. 
He argued that although these activities were nominally under the direction of the local technical office of 
NOCHMI, which had survived and remained in operation following the dismantling of the Ministry of 
Culture and Art, the work was assumed in the absence of previous agreement for planned restoration and 
on its own initiative (ibid.). According to Galdieri, these restorations were in accordance to the methods 
laid down by IsMEO; nevertheless, he displayed concerns regarding his lack of authority to act against the 
ongoing restorations (ibid.). 
From above it may be concluded that while Islamic monuments lost their archaeological value in the post-
Revolutionary period, they attained a cultural value that had deteriorated during the Pahlavi period. As a 
consequence, mosques such as the Friday Mosque once again converted into places for congregation and 
were restored to pious Muslims who assumed the traditional rule of restoration and preservation of their 
communal space. In the following section it will be demonstrated how this transformation affected the 
treatment of Islamic monuments during the War.  
 
6.5.2. War Years & the Reconstruction Period: Islamic Archaeology 
The Iran-Iraq War became an incentive to reduce the ambiguities that were presented about nationalism 
as a result of the Revolution. Therefore, while prior to the War the tenor of nationalism was restricted to 
emphasising the Iranian nature of the Islamic Revolution and stressing the universalism of Islam (Ansari 
2003:223), following the War, these changed to appeal to Iranian nationalism. Milani (1988:206) argued 
that with the coming of Islamic Revolution, many of the Arab States of Persian Gulf felt vulnerable and 
worried that it would lead to the de-stabilisation of the region through its Shi’a communities. Indeed, as 
Ansari contended, the Iranian Islamic revolutionaries were eager to “export” their Revolutionary ideas 
(Ansari 2003:229). With the Iranian Government’s insistence on spreading the Revolution, regions of the 
Muslim world with sizeable Shi’a communities, such as Iraq, became increasingly sensitive to 
Khomeini’s narrative of populist Islam (ibid.:230). Finally in 1980 this rhetoric led to a War between Iran 
and Iraq that ended in 1988. In order to justify a war between two Islamic States, the Iranian Government 
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increasingly employed the narrative of the ‘oppressed’ fighting the ‘oppressors’. In addition, Iranian 
nationalism was slowly making its way to the political scene due to the necessity of obtaining popular 
support not only from those who sought salvation in Islam but also those who maintained an Iranian 
nationalistic rhetoric (Hunter 1992:93). Following the War both Iraniat and Islamiat continued to be a 
part of the Government discourse (Holliday 2011:72). While the pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian identities 
were reconciled, the impact of the War on Islamic monuments was noteworthy. 
As discussed above, during the War, mosques were transformed into centres to register and dispatch 
volunteer forces to the lines of battle, collect donations, and assemble military equipment (Hojjat 
1995:214). Daily operations in the mosque required the construction of public facilities that were 
completed quickly with disregard for conservation standards (ibid.:219). Despite various requests from 
IsMEO to resume activities at the Friday Mosque (Callieri 1999), the restorations continued in conformity 
with the slogan of “Nor East, Nor West, only the Islamic Republic of Iran”. Therefore, despite financial 
restrictions that dominated the years of Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian authorities remained invested in 
adopting policies that demonstrated their independence from foreign scholars. It should be noted that the 
training of Iranian technicians by IsMEO played an instrumental role in equipping Iranians with the 
necessary means to take over the restoration of Islamic monuments without the consultation of foreign 
institutes.  
The technical competence of the Iranian trained technicians was challenged on 12 March 1984 when after 
the bombardment of Isfahan, two Iraqi missiles destroyed two separate areas at the north and southern 
flank of the Friday Mosque (Nomination File 2012:87). One of the missiles destroyed twelve vaults and 
damaged another twelve, demolishing the area south-east of the Mosque which mostly belonged to the 
Seljuk period (ibid.). Further, shock waves damaged the inner structure of Taq-o Cheshmeh (Fig. 6.3 area 
5) and pieces of shrapnel damaged the domes and tile works of the court-yard (Fig. 6.14) (ibid.:183). 
According to Galdieri (1990:86) who investigated the site in 1986 in order to inspect the War damage, the 
reconstruction was executed with ‘great care’ and ‘high technical ability', despite financial restrictions 
and political pressure for rapid reconstruction. The Friday Mosque was the only war damaged monument 
that was reconstructed immediately following its destruction. This indicated its importance, not only as a 
place of congregation for prayer and a centre to recruit militias, but also as a symbol of the Iranian brand 
of Islam that was under attack by an ‘oppressor’. Although, the presence of trained technicians who had 
experienced working on the site had a tremendous impact on the immediate project of reconstruction, the 
above political overtone of this event was highly significant.  
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The Friday Mosque has also been depicted as a national monument on stamps in two instances. In 1980 
the Uljaytu mihrab, which marked the imprint of the restoration of the Mosque to the Shi’a sect was 
depicted on a stamp during the Anniversary of Higra (Prophet Mohammad’s journey from Mecca to 
Medina) (Fig. 6.15). In 1988 the south-west dome and the minarets of the Friday Mosque were depicted 
in a series of stamps to celebrate Iranian Mosques. These examples illustrate the significance of the 
Friday Mosque as a cultural component of Iranian ‘authentic’ Shi’a identity that was promoted during this 
period. 
The Friday Mosque provides an excellent example for the substitution of archaeology by sectors that were 
involved in restoration projects, such as NOCHMI, during the period immediately after the Revolution. 
Considering the antagonism towards the discipline of archaeology and its lack of competence to support 
Shi’a nationalism, it seldom assumed a central role during this period, however, the restoration of 
functional Islamic sites such as mosques were essential in order to consolidate the Shi’a unity against 
foreign invaders. Further, the preservation of mosques was associated with guarding the legacy of Islam 
which was highlighted as an integral component of Iranian identity. Considering the perceived role of 
archaeology as an instrument to legitimise ethnic-dynastic nationalism, this task was allocated to 
conservators following the Revolution but given the restriction of budget, these restorations were highly 
sporadic.  
In previous chapters the impact of the closure of academic institutions on Iranian archaeology was 
discussed in detail. It was further demonstrated that when universities were reopened in 1982 following 
the structural modifications made by the Committee of Cultural Revolution, archaeology had lost its 
position as an academic science. Ironically, although the return of archaeology as a discipline was 
indebted to references to Islamic ideologies that advocated the preservation of cultural heritage (see 
Appendix I, Doc 4), Islamic archaeology was marginalised and restricted to the study of Islamic art.  
 
6.5.3. Khatami’s Administration & Reconciliation with the Past: Islamic Archaeology 
Central to the Islamic Revolution was the populist movement that according to Akhavi (1986:212) 
represented a popular reconstruction of the state, as opposed to an elitist one. He argued that following the 
Iran-Iraq War and the reconstruction period, new elitist tendencies emerged that could no longer rely on 
populism for legitimacy (ibid.). Therefore, the practice of adopting Iran’s cultural past to support a 
particular political system resurfaced during this period. This revival fully matured during the Presidency 
of Khatami and with his discourse of Iraniat and Islamiat as integral components of Iranian identity 
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(Holliday 2013:104). The reconciliation between these two often conflicting national identities in Iran 
diminished the unfavourable attitudes towards particular ‘authentic’ Iranian identities and reinforced their 
scientific study. However, despite this new approach, Khatami’s Administration continued to emphasise 
the employment of these policies based on the “essence of Islam” (Brumberge 2001:233) and therefore 
the official nationalist discourse remained Shi’a nationalism.   
In addition to these domestic reconciliation, Khatami’s Administration proposed the notion of ‘Dialogue 
among Civilisations’ and improved Iran’s foreign relations. This positive outlook towards the West and 
its scientific achievements had an impact on the revival of Iranian archaeology and the return of Western 
scholars to resume their projects. It was only during this period that the cultural and academic relations 
between Iran and Italy were resumed and IsMEO now returned as IsIAO to Iran under the condition that it 
launched its first project in Isfahan (Callieri 1999:15). IsIAO was the only foreign institute which had 
managed to maintain a prolonged association with Iran following the Islamic Revolution. Although this 
relationship had remained largely nominal, a review of IsIAO’s attempts to return to Iran (ibid.:9-17) 
demonstrate the mutual interest to restore academic relations between the two countries. In 1999 IsIAO 
offered a proposal to the Iranian authorities that detailed the resumption of activities in Isfahan (ibid.:15).  
The first Italian mission to Iran following the Revolution was in 2000 and focused on the management of 
material discovered by IsMEO at the Friday Mosque prior to the Revolution (Callieri 2011, pers.comm.). 
The Director of the mission was Bruno Genito from the Universita degli Studi di Napoli, who with the 
exception of the year 2001 continued to carry annual work in Iran until 2010 (Gnoli 2011, pers.comm.). 
The project mainly involved the assortment and digital cataloging of the material stored in 5000 
containers. In addition, the proposal to assemble a Museum for the Mosque in the south-east area 
associated with the Muzaffarid period, which was proposed during the Pahlavi period, was once again 
submitted and considered by the Iranian authorities. The normalisation of these activities corresponded 
with the nomination of the Mosque on the Tentative List of UNESCO in 1997 (ICOMOS Evaluation 
2012:135) and the prospect of its further nomination as a World Heritage Site in the feature. 
The resumption of collaboration between Iranian and foreign scholars was modestly constructive for the 
state of Islamic archaeology but the majority of these co-operations were either rescue missions or 
focused on Prehistoric sites. However, these efforts along with the launch of an international exhibition 
entitled “7000 years of Iranian Art” which started in Vienna in 2000, had a positive impact on re-
introducing Islamic Iranian culture and art to the world. The emphasis of Khatami’s Administration on 
Islamic art and archaeology may also be seen as part of the effort to recast the image of Islam as a rich 
and peaceful civilisation. This policy was evident in Khatami’s 2002 visit to the Alhambra at Granada, 
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home to the last Muslim Kingdom in Spain, and using it as a platform to caution about a clash with the 
Islamic civilisation. He argued “whoever practices terrorism and killing in the name of Islam is only 
denying its spirituality” (http://middle-east-online.com/english/?id=3065). The initiations of Khatami’s 
Administration to promote ‘dialogue’ were further combined with reduced restrictions on visa 
applications to improve Iran’s tourist industry as interest towards both pre-Islamic and Islamic 
monuments in Iran revitalised. 
From the above analysis it may be argued that the adoption of archaeology as an instrument to legitimise 
the state was resumed with Khatami’s Administration and the policies of  ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’. 
This approach allowed for further archaeological collaboration that unfolded during the period of 
Ahmadinejad, but soon were terminated. In addition, the economic growth during Khatami’s Presidency 
supplied the larger scale construction projects which continued during Ahmadinejad’s period, albeit with 
little regard for their implication on archaeological sites.   
 
6.5.4. Ahmadinejad’s Administration & Populism: Islamic Archaeology 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Ahmadinejad’s Administration adopted policies that were based on a 
juxtaposition of ‘populism’ and ‘principalism’ that relied on Islam and its Revolutionary principles. 
Although throughout this period, the populist approach of Ahmadinejad’s Administration altered to 
appeal to pre-Islamic and Islamic Iranian identities, the tenor of such discourse was to employ Shi’a 
nationalism in Iran and abroad. In Chapter 5 the emphasis was on the adoption of populist policies by 
Ahmadinejad’s Administration to appeal to the growing social interest in the pre-Islamic history of Iran. 
In this section it is contended that a similar populist approach towards the Islamic Iranian identity had a 
modest impact on any improvements in the treatment of Islamic archaeological sites. It is argued that the 
controversial approach of the Government’s foreign policies and the emphasis on a nuclear Iran once 
again interrupted scientific relations with foreign institutes and their scholars. In addition, the populist 
nature of the Government’s approach towards archaeology transformed the discipline into an organisation 
with the main aim to promote tourism. These efforts were assumed while the influence of ICHHTO was 
reduced and modest professional consultancies were inquired for monitoring the construction projects. 
One of these projects was the modernisation of the Atiq Square, adjacent to the Friday Mosque. In 
addition, in conformity with the principalist rhetoric that advocated the exportation of Shi’a Islam, despite 
various incidents of dismissal of the cultural merit of Islamic monuments, patronage was provided for 
renovation of mosques beyond the borders of Iran. In this section, these issues will be investigated in 
detail. 
213 
 
The economic improvements that followed the normalisation of foreign relations during Khatami’s 
Presidency led to an explosion of constructive projects that continued to dominate Ahmadinejad’s period. 
In 2009 the authorities proposed a project through which the Atiq Square of Isfahan was to be 
reconstructed and a train route was to run under the historic square (http://www.iranicomos.org/?p=490). 
This was part of a modenisation project implemented by the authorities to improve living conditions and 
facilitate public transportations in Isfahan (Harrison 2007). In respect to the Atiq Square, ICHHTO argued 
that the planned modifications were necessary to accommodate tourism and the increasing population of 
Isfahan (http://www.iranicomos.org/?p=490). Countering this plan, the archaeologists argued that given the 
antiquity of the vicinity at the centre of old Isfahan, any development projects should be preceded with 
thorough archaeological investigations. In addition, they argued that the employment of heavy machinery 
and resulting vibrations could damage the Friday Mosque. Notwithstanding the complaints of the 
archaeological community, this project was pushed forward despite numerous concerns about its harmful 
impact on the site. The issue was raised again by ICOMOS after the Mosque was nominated as a World 
Heritage Site to UNESCO in January 2011 (ICOMOS Evaluation 2012:135). The main concern was the 
threats caused by the Atiq Square Project which was within the buffer zone of the Mosque and 
endangered the integrity and historic authenticity of the property by changing the flow of pedestrian 
movement and putting added pressure on the eastern section of the Mosque as well as causing visual 
disorder in the buffer zone (ibid.:139). In addition, it was argued that the two year limit to complete the 
project did not allow an opportunity for archaeological excavations ahead of implementing the project 
(ibid.). The case was revised several times before Iran was able to accommodate some of these concerns.  
The Atiq Square Project provides an example for ICHHTO’s lack of authoritative power to prevent the 
extensive projects that could harm various Islamic sites in Isfahan. The issue of constructing an 
underground metro has become a serious threat to the Islamic monuments in Isfahan that continues to this 
date. The lack of consultation with professional archaeologist and the de-centralisation of archaeological 
institutes were the hallmarks of Ahmadinejad’s Presidency. These issues were intensified in 2010 when 
the research institute of ICHHTO was transferred from Tehran to Fars and Isfahan Provinces. This further 
weakened ICHHTO and the private sector took over a number of projects formerly under the management 
of ICHHTO. Therefore cultural projects were conceded simply in respect to their profitable values while 
the merits of cultural heritage were overlooked. Despite these uncertainties, in the year 2012 the Friday 
Mosque of Isfahan was registered as a World Heritage Site. Seiyf Allah Aminian, the Deputy of Cultural 
Heritage and Tourism in Isfahan, reported that the legal process was delayed considering the fact that the 
Mosque was under the authority of several different organisations (Mohajer 2005). Reportedly the 
Mosque was under the patronage of ICHHTO, the Department of Vaqf (Endowments) and a Board of 
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Trustees of the Mosque (Heyat-e Umanay-e Masajed), and its confines were allocated to the municipality 
(ibid.). As a precursor to its enlistment on UNESCO, the final restorations at the Mosque were assumed 
two month prior to its registration by a team of one hundred conservators (Hamshahri 2012). It is 
interesting that the Mosque was registered by ICOMOS under Criterion (ii): exhibit an important 
interchange of human values, over a span of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments 
in architecture or technology, monumental art, town-planning or landscape, where as its nomination by 
the Iranian State was based on all five Criteria (ICOMOS Evaluation 2012:139). ICOMOS accepted the 
registration of the Mosque considering that it is the first Islamic building that adopted the four-ivan 
courtyard layout of Sassanid palaces to Islamic architecture that became the prototype for mosque design 
thereafter; as well as the consideration of Nizam al-Mulk Dome as the first doubled-shell ribbed dome 
structure in the Islamic Empire (ibid.:140). As such, the innovative aspects of the Mosque were 
considered by ICOMOS as a harmony between pre and post-Islamic architectural styles. Whilst the State 
party also acknowledged the influence of Achaemenid and Sassanid architectural style on the Mosque, 
their main objective was to exhibit the overarching influence of the innovative style of the Mosque as a 
prototype for Mosques in the Islamic world (Nomination File 2012:112-174). 
Having presented the modernising experience of Isfahan in the recent years, it may be concluded that the 
weakening of ICHHTO and restricting its function to promote tourism had a damaging impact on Islamic 
archaeology during the Presidency of Ahmadinejad. His Administration’s populist discourse of Shi’a 
nationalism had little impact on the treatment of Islamic sites and rather than consolidating their scientific 
study led to the demise of their cultural value through the employment of irrational projects to appeal to 
the underdeveloped tourist industry in Iran. This rhetoric resembled the approach of Mohammad Reza 
Shah’s Government towards Islamic cultural heritage as a source of income through the expansion of the 
tourist industry. During Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, however, this approach was amalgamated by rhetoric 
of populism and the advocacy of “serving the nation”.  
On the international level, too, Islamic archaeology was adopted as an instrument for political purposes as 
the Iranian Government continued its patronage of Islamic monuments in other Islamic countries. In 
2007, Iranian miniaturist, Mahmoud Farshchian was commissioned to build the new Zarih (outer 
sarcophagus enclosure) for the Shrine of Imam Hossein (third Shi’a Imam) in Karbala, Iraq 
(http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2012/11/27/274846). The Zarih was made of 119 Kilograms of Gold and 
completed in 2011 (ibid.). Following two days of showcasing it at the Mausoleum of Imam Khomeini, the 
Zarih was transferred to Karbala for instillation (ibid.). This symbolic act confirmed the commitment of 
Ahmadinejad’s Administration to the ‘principalist’ rhetoric of Imam Khomeini and the fulfillment of his 
declaration of exporting the ‘Iranian brand’ of Islam. The construction of the replica of Jerusalem’s Al-
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Aqsa Mosque to commemorate Ahmadinejad’s visit to south of Lebanon in 2010 is yet another 
manifestation of this rhetoric, given that this border town overlooks Israel (see Fig. 5.22). 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
It has been the aim of this chapter to argue that Islamic archaeology in Iran was born and has been 
dominated by nationalistic rhetoric and political dynamics. This was demonstrated during Reza Shah’s 
reign when Islamic archaeology was developed through its appropriation as an integral part of Iranian 
identity and its ‘Persianisation’. During Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule policies were focused to capitalise 
on the merit of these historic monuments to feed the newly established tourism industry. The Islamisation 
of Iranian politics following the Islamic Revolution and its influence on the Iranian Islamic monument is 
particularly noteworthy. It has been argued that the adoption of Shi’a nationalism during the post-
Revolutionary period had little impact on the development of Islamic archaeology. Through a historical 
contextualisation of this discourse it was demonstrated that the populist nature of Iranian nationalism 
detached itself from historical legitimacies and relied on the popular demand of the society instead. 
Although this populist approach was subsequently modified during Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s 
Presidency, the general tenor of Iranian nationalism remained invested in a populist Shi’a nationalism. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the mode of treatment of Islamic archaeology after the Revolution 
reflected those of the Qajar period, with irregularities in interest and spasms in restorations. These 
restorations were mostly concerned with the promotion of Shi’a nationalism.  
The above historical contextualisation has demonstrated several factors crucial to the understanding of 
Islamic archaeology during the post-Revolutionary period. First, the general disregard for Iranian 
archaeology and its lack of participation in constructing the Islamic State transformed the discipline into a 
pseudoscience that never fully recovered after the Revolution. There were isolated instances where 
Islamic archaeology appeared to have been favoured over other archaeological periods. The allocation of 
Islamic artefacts to a more modern building adjacent to the old Iran-e Bastan Museum in 1996 and the 
neglect towards the latter is a good example of this favouritism. Nevertheless, the general tenor of this 
period was one of negligence towards both pre-Islamic and Islamic archaeological sites. Although modest 
attention was paid to Islamic monuments such as mosques and Shrines, many of the important 
archaeological sites that belonged to the Islamic period, such as Siraf, were not only overlooked, but were 
subject to destruction due to development 
(http://www.chn.ir/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=101240&Serv=0&SGr=0). The second phase of the Siraf Project 
only began in 2007 with the collaboration of the British Museum 
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(http://www.britishmuseum.org/research/projects/british_museum_siraf_project.aspx) within the geo-political 
narrative of Iran reaffirming its historic sovereignty across the Persian Gulf. Second, mostly Islamic sites 
that were incorporated within the rhetoric of Shi’a nationalism received attention, both within Iran and 
abroad. The case of the Friday Mosque provides an excellent example of the treatment of historic 
mosques during this period. While its function was modified following the Islamic Revolution, its lack of 
competence to reinforce a Shi’a identity led to its exclusion from becoming a national symbol. Therefore, 
while the Shah Mosque (renamed Imam Mosque) in Isfahan became the symbol of Shi’a nationalism and 
displayed on 20.000 Rial banknotes, the Friday Mosque was only represented on stamps in two occasions 
(discussed previously). A further comparison between the Naqsh-e Jahan Square, which was enlisted as a 
World Heritage Site in 1979, and the Friday Mosque testifies to the authorities’ investment in the rhetoric 
of Shi’a nationalism. Therefore, while the registration of the Naqsh-e Jahan complex prevented 
substantial damage to its enclosing mosques, the old structures within the vicinity of the Friday Mosque 
were not protected with the same vigor following the construction explosion of the 1990s and many were 
demolished. The example of the developmental activities at the Atiq Square supports this argument. 
Similarly, considering the popularity of Naqsh-e Jahan and its mosques with tourists, they not only 
received more appropriate maintenance treatment, but were also less frequently disturbed by daily 
ceremonies. In comparison, the Friday Mosque appealed to fewer tourists and therefore remained a major 
ceremonial centre in the heart of Isfahan. Considering its modest appeal to tourists and its functional rule 
as the largest mosque in the city, the Friday Mosque has gone through modifications to accommodate 
everyday requirements. Therefore, just as Graber (1990:41) proposed that the chronological modifications 
that were made to the Mosque through the past 800 years were to accommodate the requirements of the 
people, it may be argued that today the Mosque continues to be modified for similar reasons.  
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Figure 6.1: The view of the north dome chamber prior to 
restorations.Taken by Robert Byron 1933-34. 
(http://archnet.org/library/images/thumbnails.jsp?location_id=3696 
Accessed 10/11/11) 
 
Figure 6.2: The view of the south dome chamber prior to restoration. 
Taken by Robert Byron 1933-34. 
(http://archnet.org/library/images/thumbnails.jsp?location_id=3696 
Accessed 10/11/11) 
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Figure 6.4: Interior view of the sanctuary of 
Uljaytu displaying the stucco mihrab. 
(Photo by Author 2009) 
 
Figure 6.3: Introduction plan to the Friday Mosque. (After Nomination File 2012:11.) 
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Figure 6.5: View of the mihrab of the 
Madrasa Muzaffari on the southeastern 
side of the Friday Mosque. (Photo by 
Author 2009) 
Figure 6.6: Isfahan city core during the Seljuk (1) 
and Safavid (2) periods and the passage that 
connected the two. (After Assari et al. 
2012:1975) 
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Figure 6.7: The pictorial depiction of the Friday Mosque of Isfahan by Pascal Coste. 
(After Coste 1867: Plate V.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Le Musee de Bosphore, New York 1899 (After Jenkin-Madina 
2000:74) 
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Figure 6.9: The view of the Islamic Gallery at the Metropolitan Museum of Art 1918 
(After Jenkins-Medina 2000:fig. 10.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: The mihrab was originally set in the 
qibla wall of Madrasa Imami in Isfahan, ow on 
display in Metropolitan Museum. (After The 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, Islamic Collection) 
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Figure 6.11: The ground plan of Masjid-Jami’ of Isfahan as depicted by Eric Schroeder from American Institute of 
Art and Archaeology 1931 (left) in comparison with Pascal Coste’s depiction of the Mosque in 1867 (right). (After 
Ernest Herzfeld papers. Free Gallery of Art and Arthur M. Sackler Gallery Archives, Smithsonian Institute & Coste 
1867 Plate: IV.) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Court Façade, towards south, during the restorations of IsMEO. 
(After Graber 1990:fig. 5.) 
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Figure 6.13: From the collection of Vogue Magazine 1969 (left) and Jame’ Mosque and male 
model depicted in GQ Magazine in 1969 (right) (http://shahrefarang.com/en/vogue-iran/ Accessed 03/26/13) 
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Figure 6.14: Sections of the Mosque destroyed during the 
War. (After ICOMOS Evaluation 2011:Photo 4.4.) 
Figure 6.15: The Oljaytu Mihrab depicted on a stamp in 1980 to 
commemorate the anniversary of Higra (Stamp Directory 
2007:263) 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
7.1. Introduction   
The aim of this research was to evaluate the extent to which the tradition of Iranian archaeology is 
Nationalistic as the discipline was born and continues to sustain its inclination as an instrument to supply 
support for policies of various Governments, their brand of nationalism and prevalent ideologies. This 
aim was explored considering the prevalence of “regional traditions” (Trigger 1984:355) in archaeology 
and the necessity of investigating the impact of socio-political tendencies that led to the emergence of 
such traditions in Iranian archaeology. In this regard, the thesis employed an interdisciplinary analysis of 
various Externalist and Internalist dimensions to provide a platform for an interpretive study of Iranian 
archaeology. Following the presentation of socio-political dynamics that fostered the emergence of 
different forms of nationalism and national identities during various political periods, their influence on 
the three components of Iranian archaeology, Prehistoric, pre-Islamic, and Islamic were analysed. It was 
suggested that the structure of Iranian nationalism, irrespective of its form, corresponded with Anthony 
Smith’s Ethno-Symbolic approach as it relied on “ethnic ties” and cultural sentiments rather than the 
elements proposed by modernist theories (Smith 2009:27). It was this emphasis on ethnic nationalism 
defined by ‘common origin of birth’ and ‘native culture’ that manifested itself in the intellectual trends 
dominated by concepts of Aryanism and Shi’ism, albeit with varying degrees of prominence during 
different political periods. I have argued that the dependency of Iranian archaeology on ethnic nationalism 
has been instrumental in fostering the emergence of the Nationalist tradition of Iranian archaeology. My 
aim was not limited to the identification of this tradition, but to determining the definitive factors that 
contributed to its formation. Therefore, although this thesis has primarily focus on the influence of 
nationalism on archaeology, other factors such as intellectual trends, financial resources, tourism and 
foreign relations have been taken into account. 
In order to structure the general aim of this thesis, a series of objectives were proposed. First, the extent to 
which the development of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran was shaped by its suitability to support political 
agendas, different brands of nationalism, and instigation of national identity, was investigated through 
exploring the treatment of Sialk as a case study. Second, the birth and development of pre-Islamic 
archaeology in relation to affirming the above trends was investigated by evaluating the treatment of 
Persepolis. Third, the impact of the same factors was explored in relations to the birth and development of 
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Islamic archaeology by analysing the Friday Mosque of Isfahan. This arrangement has allowed for 
drawing parallels between different political periods and the depiction of influence of their adopted 
brands of nationalism on the development and treatment of each archaeological period. In this chapter, the 
conclusions that emerged from the above objectives are discussed in detail.  
The relationship between nationalism and Prehistoric archaeology was explored in Chapter 3 with Sialk 
as a case study. This analysis has demonstrated that despite the sporadic instances in adopting the 
Prehistoric period for nationalistic purposes, nationalism, irrespective of its form, has been a driving force 
in the birth and development of Prehistoric archaeology and thus it may be concluded that the discipline 
adheres to a Nationalistic tradition. The potential of Prehistory to be adopted as a political tool was not 
realised during the Qajar period, as their source of legitimacy was sought in the institute of “monarchy” 
and “Shari’a” (Amanat 1997:7-9). It was during the reign of Reza Shah that Prehistory was first utilised 
as an instrument to satisfy the Government’s political agenda by providing support for the projected 
image of Iran as the homeland of Aryans and supplying the ethnic nationalism of the State. The 
significance of Sialk in affirming such rhetoric was emphasised by Ghirshman’s (1938:101-3; 1977) 
studies that aimed to discover the trace of Indo-Iranians and their migration patterns within the Iranian 
Plateau. While Prehistoric archaeology was introduced and the Department of Archaeology was 
established at Tehran University during this period, a shift in the brand of nationalism adopted by 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government directed attention away from Prehistoric studies. The 
Government’s emphasis on dynastic nationalism and the historical periods facilitated the apolitical 
development of Prehistory. The State’s lack of interest to sponsor Prehistoric studies provided for the 
domination of theoretical debates by foreign archaeologists. Therefore, theories associated with ‘New 
Archaeology’, as a new approach for the scientific study of Prehistory was introduced and research 
questions became concerned with locating the origins of food production and urbanism in south-west Iran 
(Braidwood et al. 1961:2008). While the orientation of such theoretical debates directed attention away 
from Sialk, the scientific framework of these projects offered support for disentangling Prehistoric studies 
from nationalistic rhetoric. The interest of Iranian archaeologists in science, further contributed to the 
institutionalisation of the discipline and a rise in the number of Iranian Prehistorians. However, despite 
the introduction of these new paradigms, the approaches of these scientific traditions never fully 
disseminated into the infrastructure of Prehistoric archaeology in Iran. 
The consideration of Prehistoric studies as an apolitical ‘science’ provided for the revival of this division 
of archaeological studies following the Islamic Revolution when archaeology was condemned for its 
contributions to legitimising the rule of the Pahlavis. With the Presidency of Khatami and the adoption of 
the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ by the Administration to affirm Iran’s “independence” 
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and “dignity” (Pollack 2004:310), the Iranian Government once again began the utilisation of 
archaeological sites, in particular Prehistoric sites, for political purposes. This was considering the lack of 
an immediate connection between Prehistoric period and the Pahlavi monarchy, as well as the 
Government’s intentionto portray Iran as an ancient nation that has made contributions to human 
civilisation and thus is worthy of national independence and international political recognition. The 
competition for identifying Iran’s earliest contributions to humanity was best demonstrated in the ICHO’s 
attempts to promote a number of Prehistoric sites as the heirs to oldest civilisations in the world. 
Excavations at Sialk (Malek Shahmirzadi 2002:15) and other Prehistoric sites such as Jiroft (Majidzadeh 
2007; 2010) were further publicised to affirm these policies. Following Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, 
attention diverted towards the doctrine of Iranian and Shi’a nationalism, devising another spasm in the 
development of Prehistoric archaeology as excavations at Sialk came to an end in 2009. 
The above analysis demonstrates that the two most formative phases in the study of Prehistoric 
archaeology occurred during political periods that Prehistory was seen as an aiding instrument to assist 
the State’s nationalist rhetoric and preferred national identity, during the reign of Reza Shah and 
Khatami’s Presidency. This is considering that although the introduction of approaches associated with 
‘New Archaeology’ during a period where less emphasis was laid on Prehistoric periods as a defining 
component of Iranian nationalism led to the introduction of a scientific tradition to Iranian Prehistoric 
archaeology, such trends were never fully adopted into the infrastructure of the discipline. The disruptions 
that occurred in the study of Iranian archaeology following the Revolution further contributed to 
hindering the progress of Prehistoric studies towards formulating a scientific tradition as outdated 
approach remained to dominate the discipline.  
The relationship between nationalism and pre-Islamic archaeology was investigated in Chapter 4 with 
Persepolis as a case study. Given that as a general trend Nationalist archaeology tends to emphasis the 
more recent past and the achievement of ancient civilisations (Trigger 1984:360), the influence of 
nationalism on the birth and development of pre-Islamic archaeology in Iran has been more pronounced. 
This tendency was manifested in casting this period as the ‘golden age’ of Iranian history and the major 
contributor to the implementation of Iranian nationalism and the construction of national identity. The 
manipulation of pre-Islamic archaeology began during the Qajar period with emphasis on Persepolis and 
the reproduction of its motifs in architectural buildings and iconic symbols. While the structure of the 
Qajar court did not require the appropriation of historical past to legitimise its rule, the interest in 
Persepolis and pre-Islamic history was apparent in the Bazgasht movement and the anti-Arab nationalistic 
rhetoric of intellectual elite. The active manipulation of Persepolis began with the establishment of Iran as 
a modern nation-state during the reign of Reza Shah and the necessity to prove the continual existence of 
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Iran as a nation with a ‘glorious past’ through archaeological discoveries. This was achieved by 
cultivating the myth of Aryans that manifested in the ethnic nationalism of Reza Shah’s Government. 
Considering the identification of Achaemenid as the heir to the Aryan race, their capital at Persepolis was 
selected as an expression of Iranian ‘superiority’ and cultural ‘continuity’. The motifs of Persepolis came 
to dominate symbolic icons on stamps and banknotes, while principle public buildings were constructed 
to inspire Achaemenid motifs. The discoveries made by the Americans during their excavations at 
Persepolis further supported the adopted nationalist rhetoric of Reza Shah’s Government. The ratification 
of the Antiquity Law in 1930, the re-organisation of the GOA in 1936, the foundation of the National 
Museum in 1936 and the Department of Archaeology in 1937, were not only integral to 
institutionalisation of Iranian archaeology, but were closely associated with the management of 
discoveries at Persepolis. The domination of the Department of Archaeology by nationalist with 
educational backgrounds in Ancient Iranian Cultures and Languages (Abdi 2001:62) further demonstrated 
the influence of nationalism on the birth and development of pre-Islamic archaeology during this period. 
These trends intensified during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah as his Government sought to 
legitimise the institute of monarchy through the promotion of dynastic nationalism. Persepolis became the 
emblem of this political rhetoric by providing a platform for the Government to build a bridge between 
the Shah and the ancient kings through various celebrations, the most significant of which was the 
celebration in 1971 for the Anniversary of 2500 years of Persian Monarchy. It was during this intense 
manipulative phase that pre-Islamic archaeology was further institutionalised. The first Iranian 
archaeologists began their careers by excavating and restoring Persepolis following the departure of 
American teams after the outbreak of World War II. Persepolis became the first archaeological site with 
its own scientific bureau in the 1950s (Mousavi 2002:236). The preparation of Persepolis celebrations in 
1971 were preceded by further restorations and excavations undertaken by IsMEO that began work in 
1964 (Tucci 1972: XII). In October 1971, royalty and representatives from various nations arrived at a 
banquet set in Persepolis as the site became the focal point of the Government’s dynastic nationalism.  
Following the Islamic Revolution, Persepolis was condemned due to its identification as an instrument to 
legitimise the institute of monarchy and the Pahlavis’ ethnic-dynastic nationalism. During this period 
archaeology, and particularly pre-Islamic archaeology, failed to be incorporated as an instrument of 
legitimation, given that the Revolution gained its legitimacy from ‘charismatic leadership’ and 
‘populism’. The Iranian national identity was re-constructed with the Islamic period as its ‘golden age’ 
and Shi’a nationalism was promoted. Archaeology was de-institutionalised as the Department at Tehran 
University was closed in 1980 and only began restricted research following its re-launch in 1982 (Abdi 
2001:70). Following the Iran-Iraq War and with the death of the Revolution’s ‘charismatic leader’, the 
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source of the Government’s legitimacy was undermined. In the search to revitalise this legitimacy, 
successive governments sought to appeal to all Iranians, including those who adhered to Iranian 
nationalism. Therefore, pre-Islamic identity was once again incorporated as a legitimate component of 
Iranian national identity with official visits to Persepolis by President Rafsanjani (1992), Khatami (2001) 
and Ahmadinejad (2007). As Persepolis re-emerged as a source of national pride in this new socio-
political context, pre-Islamic archaeology consolidated its institutional infrastructure with the 
inauguration of Pars-e Pasargad Research Institute in 2002, while the construction of the Sivand Dam 
brought an international team to Tang-e Bolaghi in 2005 to save pre-Islamic archaeological remains 
(http://www.payvand.com/news/05/jan/1014.html ). The partial return of the Persepolis Fortification Tablets 
by the Oriental Institute of Chicago in 2004 (Stein 2007:3) marked another occasion of the Government’s 
investment in pre-Islamic archaeology to support the discourse of ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’. The 
manipulation of pre-Islamic archaeology, and the site of Persepolis in particular, intensified during the 
Presidency of Ahmadinejad with a proposal to celebrate Norouz at Persepolis in a style that resembled 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s 1971 festivities. Nevertheless, the Government’s populist rhetoric in support of 
pre-Islamic achievements of Iran were often accompanied by lack of support for research and a general 
disregard for the welfare of archaeological monuments.  
This analysis supports the concept that pre-Islamic archaeology was born and institutionalised in respond 
to nationalistic rhetoric and the orientation of its development or demise reflects the image that each 
political entity aimed to promote. The site of Persepolis has been instrumental in appropriating Iranian 
nationalism across different political periods and therefore has been adopted more intensely for political 
purposes. The casting of pre-Islamic Iranian history as the ‘golden age’ has encouraged an archaeological 
tradition that is deeply rooted in history. As further illustrated in Section 7.2, a heavy emphasis on 
historical periods make archaeology particularly susceptible to political manipulations and reinforces the 
Nationalistic tradition. 
The relationship between nationalism and Islamic archaeology was explored in Chapter 6 with the Friday 
Mosque of Isfahan as a case study. The analysis demonstrated similar patterns in the treatment of Islamic 
monuments during the Qajar and post-Revolutionary periods, when the Islamic (Shi’a) past was casted as 
the ‘golden age’ of Iran and Shari’a was an essential component of administrational infrastructure. It was 
demonstrated that while the Qajar had comprehended the potentials of Islamic monuments as an 
instrument of legitimisation, there were extensive irregularities in their exploitation of these monuments, 
depending on the economic circumstances and the constructive mood of the nobilities. The general 
financial deficit during this period directed the available funds towards restoring Safavid monuments, 
while Islamic buildings from other periods, such as the Friday Mosque, were neglected. The birth and 
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development of Islamic archaeology was simultaneous with the promotion of secular ideologies and the 
selection of pre-Islamic period as Iran’s ‘golden age’ during the reign of Reza Shah. It was argued that 
although Islamic archaeology was not initially incorporated into the ethnic nationalism of Reza Shah’s 
Government to support the project of ‘building’ a nation,  its significance was eventually acknowledged 
as foreign scholars appropriated this period by ‘Persianising’ it to fit the official’s rhetoric of Iranian 
racial ‘superiority’ and cultural ‘continuity’. The significance of the Friday Mosque was realised during 
this period and attempts were made to study its artistic technical evolution as the blue-print for the 
architectural development of Iranian mosques (Pope 1938a:5). The Friday Mosque was studied in the 
context of its over-arching influence on the art and architecture of the world (Pope 1938b:93-97; Rizvi 
2007:53) and was promoted through various international exhibitions and congresses (The Times:1930a & 
1930b; 1931; 1933; 1935a & 1935b). Such appropriations provided for the birth and advance of Islamic 
archaeology and the recognition of Islamic monuments as ‘cultural heritage’. As the emphasis on pre-
Islamic Iranian identity continued during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, Islamic sites underwent 
extensive renovations to accommodate the newly established tourist industry in 1963. The Friday Mosque 
became one of the few structures that was restored despite its dissociation with the often preferred Safavid 
monuments. The study of Islamic archaeology was further advanced as research approach shifted from an 
artistic-architectural orientation to archaeological studies. This allowed for the excavation of the Friday 
Mosque which became one of the few functioning mosques in Iran and the Middle East that was 
scientifically studied by archaeologists. Conservation work at the Mosque began by IsMEO in 1970 and 
continued to 1978, while in 1972 excavations began under the direction of Umberto Scerrato (Galdieri 
1984:13). The excavations were concerned with validating the presence of a Sassanid structure and later 
Arab hypostyle mosque beneath the Mosque (ibid.:89). The discovered Sassanid stuccos were transferred 
to the Iran-e Bastan Museum (Galdieri 1972:7) as the manifestation of ‘superiority’ of Iranian art and its 
contributions to Islamic culture, as well as its ‘continuity’ over time. This review demonstrated that the 
Pahlavis’ exploitation of cultural heritage was not restricted to the pre-Islamic period and Islamic 
monuments were appropriated for their cultural and commercial value.  
The renaissance in the study of Islamic art and archaeology during the Pahlavis is balanced against the 
negligence towards Islamic monuments after the Islamic Revolution when Shi’a nationalism was central 
to legitimising the State. It was argued that despite the identification of Islamic identity as the ‘authentic’ 
identity of Iranians, Islamic monuments were seldom adopted for the purpose of state building, given that 
the post-Revolutionary Administration authenticated its legitimacy through ‘populism’ and ‘charismatic 
leadership’, rather than in history. The identification of archaeology as a Western pseudoscience for the 
glorification of the Pahlavi monarchy further marginalised archaeology as a discipline (Abdi 2001:70). 
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Islamic monuments were no longer considered as museum spaces that showcased Iranian art and 
architecture, but as functional places where the community gathered to facilitate the promotion of Islamic 
identity and the ideals of the Revolution. During the War, mosques transformed into centres to register 
and dispatch volunteer forces to the lines of battle, collect donations, and assemble military equipment 
(Hojjat 1995:214). Therefore, although the State preferred symbolising Islamic monuments that were 
intimately association with Shi’a identity, such as Naqshe-e Jahan Complex and Imam Reza Shrine, when 
in 1985 Iraqi missiles destroyed the southern flank of the Friday Mosque (Galdieri 1990:77), immediate 
restoration were assumed given the attack was perceived as an offence against the ideals of the 
Revolution. The completion of the task by an all Iranian team reiterated the Government’s policy to 
portray Iran’s independence from foreigners. As archaeological activities were resumed during Khatami’s 
Presidency, Islamic archaeology was also revived and IsIAO returned to follow up on studies of the 
Friday Mosque in 2000. During Ahmadinejad’s Presidency, the general disregard for archaeology, 
including Islamic archaeology, was apparent in the transformation of archaeological institute into 
organisations that promoted tourism. This was achieved by reducing the influence of ICHHTO and 
promoting construction projects to beautify cities, a policy that corresponded with the Government’s 
populist rhetoric. During this period, despite the registration of the Friday Mosque on the UNESCO 
World Heritage list, construction projects threatened the cultural value of the Mosque. 
The analysis of the employment of Islamic monuments and their role in the construction of the Islamic 
State has been difficult given the irregularities that manifested in the construction of numerous new 
mosques, the utilisation of Islamic symbols on bank notes and stamps, and the provision of patronage for 
renovation of mosques outside Iran, while simultaneously overlooking the development of Islamic 
archaeology. Nevertheless, Islamic monuments were utilised in their traditional capacity to bring the 
community together and provide a platform to consolidate Shi’a nationalism and propagate the policies of 
the new State. In addition, in conformity with Iran’s ambition to be perceived as the guardian to the 
legacy of Islam and export its Revolution, numerous construction and restoration projecst were assumed 
in other Islamic countries (Fig. 7.1 & 5.22). These policies provide support for the conclusion that similar 
to other divisions of Iranian archaeology, Islamic archaeology was also employed for nationalistic 
purposes, albeit occasionally with an imperialist inclination. Such trends were observed during the 
Pahlavi period by ‘Persianisation’ of Islamic archaeology and during the post-Revolutionary period by its 
‘Islamisation’. 
 Through the articulation of above objectives, the internal and external dimensions that have shaped the 
formation of the Nationalist tradition in Iranian archaeology were verified. A major question revolves 
around the reason for the longevity of this Nationalist tradition, given the introduction of scientific 
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archaeology to Iran in the 1960s and its re-introduction during Khatami’s Presidency. This chapter will 
continue to investigate the reasons by articulating three points that have further aided the process of 
embedding nationalist traditions within Iranian archaeology. First, it is argued that as Trigger (1984:359) 
contended, in countries where the emphasis of archaeology is on historical periods, the past is vulnerable 
to maltreatment from political movements and state policies. As illustrated in this thesis, given Iran’s 
ancient past, there has been great emphasis on historic periods, particularly the Achaemenid, Sassanid, 
Seljuk, and Safavid, to serve the means of strengthening a certain political regime’s credibility as the 
rightful sovereign of the nation. Secondly, it is argued that although the ineffectiveness of Prehistoric 
archaeology in validating the dynastic nationalism of Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government contributed 
to the emergence of this discipline as the most scientific division within Iranian archaeology, similar to 
historic archaeology, Prehistoric archaeology failed to generate an indigenous scientific tradition. This 
failure is attributed to differences in the social context that dominated Iran in comparison with other 
countries where approaches associated with ‘New Archaeology’ was prominent, such as United States. 
Thirdly, it is argued that as Trigger (2009:261) contended, Nationalist archaeology is prevalent among 
people who feel threatened or deprived of their collective right by more powerful nations or in countries 
where appeals for national unity are made to counteract internal divisions. Throughout this research it has 
been argued that the core incentive for the initial rise and resurrection of various forms of Iranian 
nationalism was to counter Western political expansion and to establish Iran as a civilised and sovereign 
nation. This argument is further elaborated in this chapter by discussing the occasional display of an 
antagonistic rhetoric by the West against Iranian culture. It is argued that the prevalence of this discourse, 
which occasionally portrays itself in various manifestations of ‘Orientalism’, further contributed to 
sustaining a Nationalistic tradition in Iranian archaeology. In the following, each of these arguments will 
be discussed in more detail.  
 
7.2. Historical Archaeology: A Pervasive Source of Identity & Legitimacy         
In this section, a further platform of evidence for the Nationalistic tradition of Iranian archaeology is 
provided by arguing that given the emphasis of Iranian archaeology on historical periods, the past has 
become vulnerable to manipulation by political movements and state policies. The articulation of this 
point is provided by comparing the treatment of the same archaeological periods, pre-Islamic and Islamic, 
during two different political periods of Pahlavi and post-Revolution. It is demonstrated that despite the 
prevalence of conflicting brands of nationalism and ideology, these archaeological periods were utilised 
as instruments to influence the Iranian identity and to legitimise both Government’s by emphasising 
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different interpretations of the same archaeological period. In this thesis, this has been demonstrated in 
the representation of Persepolis as a source of ‘national identity’ and ‘pride’ for the Pahlavis and post-
Revolutionary Governments (Fig 7.2). This was exhibited in the adoption of Persepolis and the Cyrus 
Cylinder on a set of stamps (see Chapter 5) issued before and after the Revolution. Further, the Islamic 
Government’s decision to celebrate Norouz in the style that closely resembled the Persepolis celebrations 
during Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign, demonstrates that irrespective of the type of nationalism adopted 
by different Governments, the same pre-Islamic period was selected as an instrument to support different 
political rhetoric. With regards to the Cyrus Cylinder, the examination of the two periods led to the 
emergence of certain themes that echoed in both pre and post-Revolutionary Regimes. These were 
emphasis on a ‘just ruler’, promotion of historical continuity, as well as the stress on the narrative of Iran 
as an ancient power with prospects to regain its past glories and sovereignty over the region. In addition, 
both Governments utilised the values attached to the Cylinder as an instrument to offer an Iranian 
approach in managing the world. However, despite both Regimes’ promotion of the legacy of Cyrus as a 
flag-bearer of justice and a forerunner to human right policies, there was one sharp difference between the 
two Administrations; while Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government sought to gain legitimacy through 
emphasising Cyrus’s legacy of monarchy, the post-Revolutionary Government took refuge in Cyrus’s 
significance as a liberator. This latter claim served the adventurous nature of Iran’s Islamic regime to 
export its brand of Islam to other countries. Nevertheless, the featuring of the same pre-Islamic artefact in 
two regimes with competing brands of nationalisms demonstrates that a reliance on historic aspects of 
Iranian archaeology may have had an aversive impact on the discipline through its domination by 
nationalist rhetoric. 
The same emphasis on history can be detected with regards to the instrumentalisation of the Islamic 
archaeological period across different political governments. This is particularly prevalent in the 
“Persianisation” of Islamic archaeology during the reign of Reza Shah and its presentation as an extension 
of pre-Islamic Iranian art that expanded to other neighbouring nations and influenced their architectural 
developments. Similarly after the Islamic Revolution, the various Iranian Administrations adopted a 
policy to become the guardian of Islamic monuments in other Islamic nations as a part of the appeal to 
export the Iranian Revolution. The articulation of these examples further testify to Trigger’s (1984:198) 
proposed argument that in countries where emphasis is on historical periods, archaeology is considered as 
a state sponsored discipline that is utilised for political discourse.  
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7.3. ‘New Archaeology’ & the Opportunity to Break with Traditions    
In Chapter 4 it was argued that although Prehistoric archaeology was subjected to nationalistic rhetoric 
during Reza Shah’s reign and later during Khatami’s Presidency, in comparison with the historic past, the 
adoption of Prehistoric sites for political aims was less prevalent. It was particularly contended that the 
ineffectiveness of Prehistoric archaeology as an instrument to support the dynastic nationalism of 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s Government allowed for the apolitical development of this discipline during this 
period. The failure of Prehistoric archaeology to generate a scientific tradition in Iranian archaeology 
supplied the foundation for the second argument made in this chapter which is centered on differences in 
social context between Iran and other countries where new approaches associated with ‘New 
Archaeology’ were prevalent. In Chapter 4, it was argued that there were parallels between the socio-
economic climate that harboured the unfolding of New Archaeology as a new scientific approach in both 
United States and Iran. In this section, this theme is continued by articulating similarities and differences 
between the archaeological communities in these countries and how their work transformed Prehistory 
into an independent discipline in one country, while in the other Nationalistic traditions prevailed.                  
In the book Reconstructing Archaeology: Theory and Practice, Shanks and Tilley (1996) described the 
inferior status of Prehistoric archaeology in the United States prior to the advent of New Archaeology. 
They argued that New Archaeology was readily embraced by American Prehistorians due to its capability 
to adopt scientific approaches and therefore to accredit their field with more disciplinary power and 
prestige (ibid.:31). In the 1950s and 1960s, archaeology in Iran was facing similar crisis and Iranian 
archaeologists were struggling with issues that reflected those of their American colleagues. As noted by 
Negahban (2006:75), in the late 1950s academic archaeology was reduced to a discipline that fed the 
demands of uninterested students in seek of a Bachelor Degree to heighten their chance of employability 
at the job market. Therefore, there was a collective desire to disentangle archaeology from its struggling 
status and enhance its position by portraying it as a scientific enterprise. However, the scientific approach 
introduced by American archaeologists was commonly concerned with deductive theories about the 
Prehistoric period. Therefore, while the archaeology of the pre-Islamic period was inclined towards State 
sponsored propagandas and Islamic archaeology was regarded as art, the Prehistoric period was perceived 
by young Iranian archaeologists as a scientific enterprise. This resulted in a rise in the number of Iranian 
archaeologists who pursued the study of Prehistory in Iran and abroad. The association of Prehistoric 
archaeology with science is accounted for the bias that persist today in perceiving Prehistoric archaeology 
as ‘real archaeology’ while marginalising archaeology in other periods as history and art, in other words, 
unscientific disciplines.  
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The scientific approach introduced by foreign archaeological teams and in particular the Americans had 
an additional appeal to the emerging Iranian archaeological community by allowing them to dissociate 
their discipline from the nationalist mandates that had dominated the field for decades. In so far, the 
similarities between American and Iranian archaeological communities and their dominating socio-
political climate have been discussed to articulate the rational for the interest of Iranian archaeologists in 
familiarising themselves with theoretical frameworks that they associated with ‘New Archaeology’. 
However, despite these similarities, there were structural differences between these societies that set the 
experience of applying these new theories in Iran apart from other countries. In essence, there were 
significant differences in how nationalism was conceived in Iran and the United States. As Trigger 
(2009:409) argued, American nationalism was based on values that embraced present mindedness and 
shackling the burdens of the past, while Iranian nationalism was based on a constructed past that relied on 
the ‘superiority’ of Aryans and the ‘grandiose’ of an age of Empires. Therefore, there were significant 
differences between American archaeologists who practiced new approaches and their Iranian 
counterparts who were the by-product of an age of nationalism and often had difficulties in distinguishing 
science from national sentiments. This thesis has thus provided a supporting narrative for Niknami’s 
(2003:3) argument that despite its wide application, ‘New Archaeology’ failed to take root in Iranian 
archaeology as the dominant trends remained heavily restrained by ‘Culture-Historical approaches’.  
During Khatami’s Presidency, Iranian archaeologists invested in Prehistoric archaeology, given its lack of 
associations with political issues. Nevertheless, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the adoption of Prehistoric 
archaeology to aid the political rhetoric of Khatami’s Administration prevented the autonomous 
development of this discipline. Instead, Prehistoric archaeology became the new means to support the 
Government’s image of Iran as a country with an ancient heritage that has contributed to human 
civilisation. Therefore, it may be argued, that the politicisation of Prehistoric archaeology during this 
period, prevented the adoption of scientific approaches that were introduced by foreign archaeological 
institutes, and Iranian archaeology continued to retain its Nationalistic traditions.  
  
7.4. Persian Empire as the Axis of Evil 
In this section, a third argument that contributes to the sustenance of a Nationalistic tradition in Iranian 
archaeology is provided by articulating the influence of the ‘West’ and its occasional ‘Orientalist’ outlook 
towards Iran and Iranian archaeology. It is contended that as Trigger (2009:261) argued, Nationalist 
archaeology is prevalent among people who feel threatened or deprived of their collective right by more 
powerful nations. In the previous chapters, the rise of Iranian nationalism as a reaction to Western 
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political expansion has been illustrated. It is argued here, that to counter the threats to Iran’s political 
entity and cultural values, Iranian archaeology has often been utilised by Iranian politicians as an 
instrument to verify Iran’s place in history. In contrast, there is an strong Western tradition of presenting 
Iran as the symbol of history’s tyrannical ‘Orient’ which was defeated by the ‘democratic Athenians’ (the 
West) and this has influenced the perception of Iranian archaeology from the Qajar period to 
contemporary times. Such narratives are often apparent in history books and documentaries dealing with 
the Classical period and are amalgamated with contemporary political discourse. They often draw links 
between Greece, Europe and democracy/freedom, against Persia, Asia and despotism/slavery. In The 
Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter that Saved Greece and Western Civilisation, Barry Strauss 
(2005:13, 14) concluded that the Greek’s democratic nature enabled them to overcome the Persian 
advance. Richard further argued, “The Persian Wars decided the fate of Western civilisation. Had the 
Persians been able to incorporate the Greek polies into their vast empire, they might have crushed the 
spirit of Greeks. The achievements of classical Greece would not have survived to form the basis of 
Western culture” (Richard 2003:29). Although prevalent in Classical literature, in 1993 and with 
Huntington’s (1993) proposition that future global politics will be dominated by patterns of clashes 
between civilisations, the historic battles and traditional rivalries between ancient civilisations emerged as 
a new political discourse. With notions such as that the clash between Western civilisation (Europe & 
North America), and Islamic civilisation (Arab, Turkic & Malaya subdivisions) will create political 
conflict (ibid.:24), the theme of Orientalism was revitalised. These notions were further re-enforced by 
the political conflicts following the events of 9/11 and the application of Orientalist rhetoric became a 
prevalent political discourse. It is argued that this Orientalist outlook had an adverse impact on how Iran 
and its archaeology were perceived globally.  
In Section 7.2, it was contended that Iranian archaeology relied heavily on the historic period and that the 
‘golden age’ selected to promote nationalism often corresponds with the Achaemenid dynasty (Persian 
Empire) or Safavid dynasty (Shi’a Empire); both held in opposition with Western cultural values. The 
promotion of historic periods, particularly imperial archaeology, was pursuit by most young nation-states, 
especially in Greece, Italy and Egypt who possessed an imperial ancient past. There was, however, a 
difference in the international reception of imperial archaeology in Iran in comparison with the latter 
countries, given their association with the Classical world and their consideration as shared cultural 
heritage. Thus, while Mussolini engaged in the excavations of the Classical period in Italy to promote his 
Fascist ideology, there was a wide global support from archaeologists that enthusiastically followed the 
discoveries (Dyson 2006:181). Iran did not benefit from this global support, as instead any attempt by the 
Iranian Government to promote its past was associated with chauvinism and the advocacy of an eastern-
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despotic form of government. As discussed previously, this Eurocentric outlook was dominant during 
both the Pahlavi and post-Revolutionary periods. According to recent files release from the Public Record 
Office in the United Kingdom in 2001, the Queen was advised not to attend the “tasteless” Persepolis 
celebrations in 1971 as it was not appropriate for her to go to what promised to be “a bit of an omium 
gatherum affair” (Tweedie 2001). In retrospect, Tweedie drew attention to the celebrations as 
symbolising the “excess of the Pahlavy dynasty” (ibid.), echoing the ancient Greek’s perception of the 
Persian kings as the oriental despot, incapable of moderation. 
During the post-Revolutionary period, the manifestation of this Eurocentric outlook was best presented in 
the events around the exhibition of The Forgotten Empire:The World of Ancient Persia (see Chapter 5). 
The exhibition at the British Museum aimed to offer a scarce opportunity to introduce the history of 
Ancient Persians to a Western audience (Curtis & Tallis 2005:9). As discussed previously, the preparation 
of this exhibition was a continuation of policies on ‘Dialogue among Civilisations’ and these tendencies 
were demonstrated with references made to such ‘dialogues’ by Kargar (2005:8), the Director of National 
Museum of Iran at the time, while discussing the National Museum’s collaboration with British Museum 
to prepare for the exhibition. Despite endeavours to represent a segment of the Iranian identity that was 
overlooked after the Revolution, the global political stance immediately transformed the occasion into a 
contemporary political propaganda and the initial intention for ‘Dialogue among Civilisation’ was once 
again replaced by the paradigm of ‘clash of civilisations’. The existing ambiguities about the history of 
Persian Empire were further reinforced by the publication of an article in the Guardian. 
On 8
 
September 2005, one day before the opening of the exhibition, Jonathan Jones wrote a controversial 
article in the Guardian entitled The Evil Empire. The article revoked various political bearings that 
continue to surround the paradigm of ‘Orientalism’ and the polarisation of the world as “civilised” and 
“barbarians” (Said 2003). Arguably Jones portrayal of the “strange”, “flat”, and defective Persian art, 
compared to “Greek masterpieces” was an attempt to recast the image of a civilisation that was “evil” 
long before it transformed into its contemporary state. In the same manner the content of the article 
encourages the reader to get caught in the fifth-century B.C. Greek propaganda to portray the Persians as 
“Barbarians” and “history’s original villains” (see Jones 2005). Jones further drew historical parallels 
between the ancient world where the Greeks, which he portrayed as the Western liberators, triumphed 
over the “Oriental despots” in Persia; and the contemporary world, by reminding the readers that “Persia 
is now Iran”. While the casting of Iran as a ‘historical villain’ who threatened world security from the 
outset continued, Jones further elucidated that Ancient Persia’s notoriousness as a tolerating Empire was 
in fact a myth and all that “openness had an emptiness at its heart” (ibid.).  
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The article received severe criticism from the general public and a number of specialists who shared their 
disappointment in disseminating such obsolete notions about Iran and its ancient history through various 
correspondents. Daryaee (2005) criticised Jones for his retreat to the foundations of “Orientalism” and 
Alizadeh (2005) questioned Jones’ scholarly knowledge about Persian Art. Jones was further accused of 
retaining a biased political agenda to vilify an ancient nation by extending it to the current Regime in Iran 
(Alizadeh 2005). The exhibition, thus, triggered efforts to distort history in order to achieve particular 
political agendas in regards to contemporary Iran. Despite such rhetoric, it would be erroneous to 
underestimate the impact of the exhibition in dispersing knowledge about Ancient Persia. In addition, 
there were other art historians, such as Andrew Graham-Dixon (2005), who wrote an account of the 
exhibition, devoid of Eurocentric rhetoric. His article aimed to bridge the gaps between the East and West 
by highlighting the shared heritage and the links between cultural influences (ibid.).  
From the above arguments, it is contested that Iranian archaeology has also been politicised by Western 
powers, who drew parallels between contemporary Iranian politics and its ancient/Islamic legacies; as 
well as by Iranian politicians, who aimed to counter these accusations by taking refuge in the 
appropriation of the past to attain political legitimacy. These continuous debates over Iranian ‘civilisation’ 
to discredit or legitimise Iran’s sovereignty as a nation confirmed that Iranian archaeology is deeply 
entangled in a tradition of political rhetoric and nationalist discourse that threatened, and continues to 
threaten, the emergence of scientific traditions within the discipline. This trend has further reinforced a 
Nationalist tradition in Iranian archaeology which will remain dominant as long as Iranian ‘civilisation’, 
its past and contributions are challenged. 
 
7.5. Limitations of Research & Future Prospects  
This thesis has successfully contributed to knowledge by identifying and comparing the socio-political 
issues that have impacted on the development of Iranian archaeology within a comparative historical 
framework and by providing a fresh platform for the beginning of more open debates in future studies. 
Although an all inclusive analysis was provided in this research, given the dearth of Iranian 
archaeological studies that engage in such debates, the thesis was challenged to develop a strong body of 
literature on which to build its arguments. Therefore, this analysis required the author’s familiarity with 
every component, whether socio-political, ideological, economical and religious, to generate a 
comprehensive interpretation. In this regard, I cannot fail to recognise the limits of self-instruction as the 
simultaneous training in two or more academic fields, such as politics and history, along with archaeology 
has been difficult and occasionally led to leaving the subjects only half-explored. The unequal access to 
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documents has further limited this research as I was not able to consult available sources in Iran due to 
University travel restrictions. Although this research contended that the interpretive study of the history of 
Iranian archaeology is necessary, nevertheless, it is acknowledged that there are inherent problems with 
the application of this framework given its subjectivity. However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the 
employment of this approach does not confine this research to the embracement of relativism, but rather 
has encouraged the demonstration of the very many different concepts and ideologies that influenced 
Iranian archaeology. This is best represented in the consideration of the various types of nationalism at 
play in Iran during different political periods. Although Trigger (1984) broadened the debate on the 
politicisation of archaeology by discussing it in terms of Nationalist, Colonialist and Imperialist forms, 
the more recent concept that all archaeologies are Nationalist is more prevalent (Diaz-Andreu & 
Champion 1996:3). This study has, however, demonstrated that even within Nationalist archaeology, 
various types of nationalism are at play by highlighting the ethnic, dynastic and Islamic variations of 
Iranian nationalism and their influence on molding the orientation of Iranian archaeology. To account for 
the socio-political context embedded within the tradition of Iranian archaeology this research has 
remained loyal to the embracement of diversity by consulting primary sources on various subjects and in 
different languages to devise a comprehensive analysis, free of personal biases. In spite of this claim, it is 
acknowledged that as Murray (2012:144) argued, any academic work is inherently influenced by the 
contemporary ideals and prevalent traditions. Nevertheless, it is suggested that given the lack of a 
coherent analysis in the examination of key milestones in the history of Iranian archaeology, this thesis 
can contribute to knowledge by providing a preliminary foundation for future research. 
  
Despite these limitations and challenges, this thesis represents the first in-depth analysis to explore the 
ways in which Iranian archaeology has been influenced by political discourse, different brands of 
nationalism, various aspects of Iranian identity, and the prevalent ideological trends. Also this is the first 
study that details the analysis of the influence of an Islamic State and its prevalent ideologies on shaping 
archaeological traditions. It has been demonstrated that the lack of reliance on historical foundations to 
legitimise the State and emphasis on charismatic leadership and populism leads to diminishing the role of 
scientific archaeology in such conditions. Although other factors, such as economy, conflict, and global 
outlook towards Iranian archaeology have been discussed, given the lack of archaeological studies that 
engage in such debates, this area of research remains in need of further analysis. In particular, it is 
required that Iranian archaeological community regenerates itself and cultivates an environment receptive 
of reflective self-criticism and debate. To provide for this context, research in history of archaeology 
needs to be acknowledged as an emerging sub-field of the discipline. Further, it is imperative to move 
beyond the restrictions that prohibit or discourage the involvement of archaeologists with backgrounds in 
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other disciplines, as this may contribute to the analysis of Iranian archaeology from a multidisciplinary 
perspective and supply the progress of Iranian archaeology. This is given that according to Trigger “there 
is not one history of archaeology, but many depending in part on the differing assumptions that individual 
historians bring to their work” (Trigger 1994:121). Therefore, the contextualisation of debates varies 
depending on the social and ethnic background of the researcher. It also differs with accordance to their 
disciplinary background in history of art, architecture, history, philosophy, politics, ecology and 
intellectual trends such as Romanticism, Rationalism, Orientalism, Feminism and other approaches. It is 
only in consideration of the above, that Iranian archaeology can move beyond its current state and acquire 
a new self-awareness. This transformation is necessary as Iran remains as one of the few isolated cases 
where the history of its archaeology is under-studied. As noted in Chapter 3, this lack of concern is of 
twofold; the politicised nature of such research and the absence of interest in a self-critical interpretive 
approach. The two factors are inter-related as social constrains and career threatening repercussions 
associated with interpretive archaeology has prevented the cultivation of the tradition of debate which is 
imperative to this approach. Although this research has made attempts to reduce the gaps between 
different academic fields and to provide the first comprehensive interpretive study of the history of 
Iranian archaeology, future work will be able to expand this preliminary research by investigating the 
interactions between intellectual trends such as Feminism or the influence of political rhetoric such as 
Orientalism on shaping Iranian archaeology. In addition, considering that this research has not devoted an 
in-depth analysis to the influence of socio-political context on the foundation and promotion of 
archaeological museums, both indoor and outdoor, and their role in the construction of an Iranian State, 
future studies are required to address these omissions. In addition, this research has covered the impact of 
nationalism and politics on Iranian archaeology until the end of the Presidency of Ahmadinejad. The same 
approach can be applied to the analysis of the impact of alterations by the Government of President 
Rouhani (r.2014-present) on Iranian archaeology. It is only through such studies and with raising 
awareness about the subjective biases that threaten the discipline that the promotion of a more objective 
approach in Iranian archaeology is attainable. 
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Figure 7.1: Sayyida Khawla (daughter of Imam Hossein) Shrine in 
Ba’albak, Lebanon. The inscription on top of the entrance reads 
“the reconstruction of this shrine was made by Grand Ayatollah 
Imam Ali Khamenei and his Wakil (deputy) Imam Sheykh 
Muhammad Yazbek in the year 1995”. (Photo by Author 2010) 
 
Figure 7.2: The political manipulation of the same historic period (pre-Islamic, Achaemenid) is 
apparent in the pictures from two different political periods, Pahlavi (left) and post-Revolution (right). 
(After Vogue 1969:8-11 and National Geographic 2008:14-18) 
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Appendix I 
Official Documents 
 
 
 
This appendix provides additional background to support the analysis presented in the preceding chapters. 
Given that most of these documents are in Farsi language, for each of the items, a descriptive section is 
introduced to contextualise the subject analysed.  
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Document 1: The Terms of the Decree on the Foundation of Cultural Heritage Organisation in 1986 which clarified the activities 
of the institute that largely relied on research and the assignment of different aspects of the cultural heritage to different executive 
organisations. The decree was signed by Akbar. Hashemi Rafsanjani (After Samadi Rendi 1993:17-19). 
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Document 2: The decree issued by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education to begin a Doctoral Programme in State 
Universities- January 1995. While this decree was issued in 1995, its implementation was delayed until 1999-2000 (After 
http://www.irphe.ac.ir/ Accessed 09/09/12). 
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Document 3: The explanation provided by Tarbiat Modarres University for launching the Doctoral Programme in 1999-2000. It 
highlighted the central aim for the launch of this programme as a means to enable Iranians to take over archaeological activities 
in Iran and to prevent further damage to Iranian cultural heritage by export of antiquities or antiquarian activities (After 
http://www.modares.ac.ir/edu Accessed  04/09/12). 
. 
 
 
 
 
276 
 
 
 
Document 4: The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education, Committee of Programming in Archaeology, 1986. This document 
provided support for restoring archaeology as an institutionalised discipline following the Islamic Revolution by referencing the 
significance of the past in the Quran and Islamic ideology (After http://www.irphe.ac.ir/ Accessed 09/09/12).  
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Appendix II 
Translation of Text 
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Translation of the Text on the Cyrus Cylinder  
 
 
1. [When ... Mar]duk, king of the whole of heaven and earth, the ....... who, in his ..., lays waste his.......  
2. [........................................................................] broad? in intelligence, ...... who inspects (?) the wor]ld quarters 
(regions)  
3. [..............................................................…] his [first]born (=Belshazzar), a low person, was put in charge of his country,   
4. but [..................................................................................] he set [a (…) counter]feit over them .  
5. He ma[de] a counterfeit of Esagil, [and .....….......]... for Ur and the rest of the cult-cities.  
6. Rites inappropriate to them, [impure] fo[od-offerings ….......................................................] disrespectful […] were 
daily gabbled, and, as an insult,  
7. he brought the daily offerings to a halt; he inter[fered with the rites and] instituted […....] within the sanctuaries. In his 
mind, reverential fear of Marduk, king of the gods, came to an end.  
8. He did yet more evil to his city every day; … his [people ................…], he brought ruin on them all by a yoke without 
relief.  
9. Enlil-of-the-gods became extremely angry at their complaints, and […] their territory. The gods who lived within them 
left their shrines,  
10. angry that he had made (them) enter into Shuanna (Babylon). Ex[alted Marduk, Enlil-of-the-Go]ds, relented. He 
changed his mind about all the settlements whose sanctuaries were in ruins,  
11. and the population of the land of Sumer and Akkad who had become like corpses, and took pity on them. He inspected 
and checked all the countries,  
12. seeking for the upright king of his choice. He took the hand of Cyrus, king of the city of Anshan, and called him by his 
name, proclaiming him aloud for the kingship over all of everything.  
13. He made the land of Guti and all the Median troops prostrate themselves at his feet, while he shepherded in justice and 
righteousness the black-headed people  
14. whom he had put under his care. Marduk, the great lord, who nurtures his people, saw with pleasure his fine deeds and 
true heart,  
15. and ordered that he should go to Babylon. He had him take the road to Tintir (Babylon), and, like a friend and 
companion, he walked at his side.  
16. His vast troops whose number, like the water in a river, could not be counted, were marching fully-armed at his side.  
17. He had him enter without fighting or battle right into Shuanna; he saved his city Babylon from hardship. He handed 
over to him Nabonidus, the king who did not fear him.  
18. All the people of Tintir, of all Sumer and Akkad, nobles and governors, bowed down before him and kissed his feet, 
rejoicing over his kingship and their faces shone.  
19. The lord through whose help all were rescued from death and who saved them all from distress and hardship, they 
blessed him sweetly and praised his name. 
20. I am Cyrus, king of the universe, the great king, the powerful king, king of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of 
the four quarters of the world,  
21. son of Cambyses, the great king, king of the city of Anshan, grandson of Cyrus, the great king, ki[ng of the ci]ty of 
Anshan, descendant of Teispes, the great king, king of the city of Anshan,  
22. the perpetual seed of kingship, whose reign Bel (Marduk)and Nabu love, and with whose kingship, to their joy, they 
concern themselves. When I went as harbinger of peace i[nt]o Babylon  
23. I founded my sovereign residence within the palace amid celebration and rejoicing. Marduk, the great lord, bestowed 
on me as my destiny the great magnanimity of one who loves Babylon, and I every day sought him out in awe.  
24. My vast troops were marching peaceably in Babylon, and the whole of [Sumer] and Akkad had nothing to fear.  
25. I sought the safety of the city of Babylon and all its sanctuaries. As for the population of Babylon […, w]ho as if 
without div[ine intention] had endured a yoke not decreed for them,  
26. I soothed their weariness; I freed them from their bonds(?). Marduk, the great lord, rejoiced at [my good] deeds,  
27. and he pronounced a sweet blessing over me, Cyrus, the king who fears him, and over Cambyses, the son [my] issue, 
[and over] my all my troops,  
28. that we might live happily in his presence, in well-being. At his exalted command, all kings who sit on thrones,  
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29. from every quarter, from the Upper Sea to the Lower Sea, those who inhabit [remote distric]ts (and) the kings of the 
land of Amurru who live in tents, all of them,  
30. brought their weighty tribute into Shuanna, and kissed my feet. From [Shuanna] I sent back to their places to the city of 
Ashur and Susa,  
31. Akkad, the land of Eshnunna, the city of Zamban, the city of Meturnu, Der, as far as the border of the land of Guti - the 
sanctuaries across the river Tigris - whose shrines had earlier become dilapidated,  
32. the gods who lived therein, and made permanent sanctuaries for them. I collected together all of their people and 
returned them to their settlements,  
33. and the gods of the land of Sumer and Akkad which Nabonidus – to the fury of the lord of the gods – had brought into 
Shuanna, at the command of Marduk, the great lord,  
34. I returned them unharmed to their cells, in the sanctuaries that make them happy. May all the gods that I returned to 
their sanctuaries,  
35. every day before Bel and Nabu, ask for a long life for me, and mention my good deeds, and say to Marduk, my lord, 
this: “Cyrus, the king who fears you, and Cambyses his son,  
36. may they be the provisioners of our shrines until distant (?) days, and the population of Babylon call blessings on my 
kingship. I have enabled all the lands to live in peace.” 
37. Every day I increased by [… ge]ese, two ducks and ten pigeons the [former offerings] of geese, ducks and pigeons.  
38. I strove to strengthen the defences of the wall Imgur-Enlil, the great wall of Babylon,  
39. and [I completed] the quay of baked brick on the bank of the moat which an earlier king had bu[ilt but not com]pleted 
its work.  
40. [I …… which did not surround the city] outside, which no earlier king had built, his workforce, the levee [from his 
land, in/int]o Shuanna.  
41. [… ......................................................................with bitum]en and baked brick I buil t anew, and [completed] its [work].  
42. […...........................................................] great [doors of cedar wood] with bronze cladding,  
43. [and I installed] all their doors, threshold slabs and door fittings with copper parts. [….......................]. I saw within it 
an inscription of Ashurbanipal, a king who preceded me;  
44. […................................................] in its place. May Marduk, the great lord, present to me as a gift a long life and the 
fullness of age,  
45. [a secure throne and an enduring rei]gn, [and may I …... in] your heart forever. 
a. [Written and check]ed [from a…]; (this) tablet (is) of 
b. Qishti-Marduk, son of […]. 
 
Document 1: Translated by Irving Finkel. Assistant Keeper, Department of the Middle East (After 
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/articles/c/cyrus_cylinder_-_translation.aspx Accessed 01/11/13) 
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Table. 1. Rulers and Administrators of Iran 
  
Administrations 
 
Duration of Reign/ Presidency 
Achaemenid Dynasty 
 
 
Cyrus II, The Great r. 559-530 BC 
Cambyses II r. 530-522 BC 
Darius I, The Great r. 522-486 BC 
Xerxes I r. 486-465 BC 
Artaxerxes I r. 465-424 BC 
Xerxes II r. 424-423 BC 
Darius II r. 423-404 BC 
Artaxerxes II r. 404-359 BC 
Artaxerxes III r. 359-338 BC  
Arses r. 338-336 BC 
Darius III r. 336-330 BC 
Parthian Dynasty (early rulers not noted) 
 
 
Mithradates I  r. 171-138 BC 
Phraates II  r. 138-128 BC 
Artabanus II r. 128-123 BC 
Mithradates II r. 123- 87 BC 
Gotarzes I r. 91-80 BC 
Orodes r. 80-76 BC 
Sinatruces r. 76-70 BC 
Phraates III r. 70-57 BC 
Mithradates III r. 57-55 BC 
Orodes II r. 57-37 BC 
Phraates IV r. 37-32 BC 
Tiridates II r. 30-25 BC 
Phraataces r. 2 BC- 4 AD 
Orodes III r. 4-7 AD 
Vonones I r. 7- 12 AD 
Artabanus III r. 12-38 AD 
Tiridates III r. 36 AD 
Vardanes r. 39-47 AD 
Gotarzes II r. 38-51 AD 
Vonones II r. 51 AD 
Vologeses I r. 51-80 AD 
Pacorus r. 79-115 AD 
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Oroses r. 109-128 AD 
Artabanus IV r. 80-81 AD 
Vologeses II r. 105-147 AD 
Mithradates IV r. 128-147 AD 
Vologeses III r. 148-192 AD 
Vologeses IV r.191-207 AD 
Vologeses V r. 207-227 AD 
Artabanus V r. 213-224 AD 
Artavasdes r. 226-227 AD 
Sassanid Dynasty 
 
  
Ardeshir r. 224-240 AD 
Shapur I r. 240-272 AD 
Hormizd Ardashir r. 272-273 AD 
Bahram I r. 273-276 AD 
Bahram II r. 276-293 AD 
Bahram III r. 293 AD 
Nerseh r. 293-302 AD 
Hormizd II r. 302-309 AD 
Shapur II r. 309-379 AD 
Ardashir II r. 379-383 AD 
Shapur III r.383-388 AD 
Bahram IV r. 388-399 AD 
Yazdgird I r. 399-421 AD 
Bahram V r. 421-439 AD 
Yazdgird II r. 439-459 AD 
Hormizd III r. 457-459 AD 
Peroz r. 459-484 AD 
Valash r. 484-488 AD 
Kavad r. 488-531 AD 
Zamasp r. 496-498 AD 
Chosroes I r. 531-579 AD 
Hormizd IV r. 579-590 AD 
Chosroes II r. 591-628 AD 
Kavad II r. 628 AD 
Ardashir III r. 628-629 AD 
Boran r. 629-630 AD 
Hormizd V, Chosroes III r. 630-632 AD 
Yazdegird III r. 632-651 AD 
Seljuk Dynasty 
 
  
Togrul  r. 1029-1063 AD 
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Alp Arsalan r. 1063- 1072 AD 
Malik Shah I r. 1072- 1092 AD 
Mahmud I  r. 1092-1094 AD 
Barkiyaruq r. 1094-1105 AD  
Muhammad I r. 1105-1118 AD 
Mahmud II r. 1118-1131 AD 
Toghrul II r. 1132-1134 AD 
Ahmed Sanjar r. 1097-1157 AD 
Mas’ud r. 1134-1152 AD 
Marlik Shah II r. 1152- 1153 AD 
Muhammad II r. 1153- 1160 AD 
Suleiman Shah r. 1153-1155 AD 
Malik Shah II r. 1160 AD 
Suleiman Shah r. 1160-1161 AD 
Arsalan r. 1161-1176 AD 
Toghrul III r. 1176- 1194 AD 
Sanjar II r. 1189-1191 AD 
Safavid Dynasty 
 
 
Shah Ismail r. 1502-1524 AD 
Tahmasp I r. 1524-1576 AD 
Ismail II r. 1576-1577 AD 
Mohammad Khodabande r. 1578-1587 AD 
Shah Abbas I r. 1587-1629 AD 
Safi I r. 1629-1641 AD 
Abbas II r. 1642-1667 AD 
Sulaiman  r. 1667-1694 AD 
Hussein r. 1694-1722 AD 
Tahmasp II r. 1722-1732 AD 
Abbas III r. 1732-1736 AD 
Afsharid Dynasty 
 
 
Nadir Shah r. 1736-1747 AD 
Adil Shah  r. 1747-1748 AD 
Ebrahim Afshar r. 1748 AD 
Shahrukh r. 1748-1796 AD 
Zand Dynasty 
 
 
Karim Khan Zand r. 1750-1779 AD 
Mohammad Ali Khan r. 1779 AD 
Abol Fath Khan r. 1779 AD 
Zaki Khan r. 1779 AD 
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Sadiq Khan  r. 1779-1781 AD 
Ali Murad Khan r. 1781-1785 AD 
Jafar Khan r. 1785-1789 AD 
Sayed Murad Khan r. 1789 AD 
Lotf Ali Khan r. 1789-1794 AD 
Qajar Dynasty 
 
 
Aqa Mohammad Khan r. 1794-1797 AD 
Fath-ali Shah r. 1797-1835 AD 
Mohammad Shah r. 1835-1848 AD 
Naser al-Din Shah r. 1848-1896 AD 
Muzaffar al- Din Shah r. 1896-1906 AD 
Mohammad Ali Shah r. 1907-1909 AD 
Ahmad Shah r. 1909-1924 AD 
Pahlavi Dynasty 
 
 
Reza Shah r. 1925- 1941 AD 
Mohammad Reza Shah r. 1941- 1979 AD 
Islamic Republic   
 
Mehdi Bazargan  February 1979 AD-November 1979 AD 
Khomeini  1979-1989 AD 
Rafsanjani 1989- 1997 AD 
Khatami 1997-2005 AD 
Ahmadinejad 2005-2013 AD 
Rouhani 2014- Present 
Table after Frye 1968: 110-114 with added sections 
 
